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History of the Peloponnesian War

Ἱστορίαι

Thucydides

5th century BC

History · Biography

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Thucydides

Translated from the Greek by Ether Library

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Thucydides of Athens (c. 460–c. 400 BC)

Translated from the Greek by Ether Library

Written in Greek in the last decades of the fifth century BC and left unfinished, breaking off in the summer of 411 BC.

A Note on the Translation

This is a complete translation of Thucydides' history of the war between Athens and Sparta, made directly from the Greek. The source is the Oxford text of H. Stuart Jones, revised by J. E. Powell (1942), in the digital transcription of the Perseus Digital Library. Richard Crawley's public-domain translation of 1874 was consulted only where the Greek is in doubt, and none of its wording is kept.

The work is printed in its eight traditional books. Each of the 917 chapters into which later editors divided it appears here as one paragraph, opening with its chapter number, so that any passage can be found in a Greek text or another translation. Thucydides dates events by summers and winters, and closes each year with the same formula; the English keeps his system and his formula. The work breaks off in the middle of the twenty-first year of the war, and the translation ends where the Greek does.

Thucydides is compressed and severe. His narrative reports without comment, and his speeches argue in tight antitheses of word and deed, justice and advantage, fear and honor. The English aims at the same clarity and does not soften what he states flatly. Key terms are kept the same throughout: *archē* is "empire," *stasis* "civil strife," and the sentence of 1.23 is rendered "the truest cause." Peoples are named as he names them: Lacedaemonians, Hellenes, and the Medes for the Persians. In the Melian dialogue the speakers are named as in the Greek.

The 96 notes are the translator's. They give dates, identify people, places, and institutions, and mark damaged passages, and offer no commentary.

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Book 1

1 Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, and of how they fought each other. He began as soon as it broke out, expecting that it would be a great war and more worth recording than any before it. He judged so because both sides were at the height of their power when they entered it, with their preparation complete in every respect, and because he saw the rest of the Hellenic world taking one side or the other, some at once, others meaning to. This was in fact the greatest upheaval that had ever come upon the Hellenes and upon a part of the barbarians, and one might say upon most of mankind. As for the events before it, and those still older, it was impossible to discover them clearly because of the length of time; but from the evidence I find I can trust, when I look back as far as I can, I do not think they were great, either in their wars or in anything else.

2 It is evident that the country now called Hellas was not settled firmly in the past. There were migrations in early times, and each people readily abandoned its land whenever it was pressed by others, who were always more numerous. There was no trade, and they did not mix with one another without fear, either by land or by sea. Each people worked its own land only enough to live from it; they had no surplus of wealth and planted no orchards, since it was never certain when someone would come and take it all, especially as they had no walls; and as they thought they could get their daily bread anywhere, they moved away without much difficulty. For this reason they were strong neither in the size of

their cities nor in their other resources. The best land always saw the most frequent changes of inhabitants: what is now called Thessaly, and Boeotia, and most of the Peloponnese except Arcadia, and the richest parts of the rest. For the goodness of the soil made some men more powerful than others; this bred factions that ruined them, and at the same time they were more exposed to the designs of foreigners. Attica, at any rate, was free of faction from very early times because of the thinness of its soil, and the same people always lived in it. And here is no small proof of my argument that it was because of the migrations that the other regions did not grow in the same way. When men were driven out of the rest of Hellas by war or faction, the most powerful of them withdrew to the Athenians as to a safe place, and by becoming citizens they made the city, from very early times, still larger in population, so that later the Athenians even sent out colonies to Ionia, since Attica was not large enough.

3 The weakness of the ancients is shown to me no less clearly by this. Before the Trojan War, Hellas appears to have done nothing in common. Indeed, I think that as a whole it did not even have this name yet. Before Hellen son of Deucalion the name did not exist at all; the various peoples, the Pelasgian most widely, gave their own names to the regions they held. But when Hellen and his sons grew powerful in Phthiotis and were called in to other cities to help them, the peoples one by one, through this contact, came to be called Hellenes more and more; yet it was a long time before the name prevailed among them all. Homer is the best evidence. Though he lived long after even the Trojan War, he nowhere uses this name for them all, or for anyone except the men who came with Achilles from Phthiotis, who were in fact the first Hellenes; in his poems he calls them Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. Nor does he use the word barbarians, because, I think, the Hellenes had not yet been set apart under one name as its opposite. At any rate,

those who came to be called Hellenes, city by city, wherever they understood one another's speech, and later all of them together, did nothing in a body before the Trojan War, because of their weakness and their lack of contact with one another. And even this expedition they made together only when they had come to use the sea more.

4 Minos is the earliest man known to us by report to have acquired a navy. He controlled most of what is now the Hellenic sea, ruled the Cyclades, and was the first to colonize most of them, driving out the Carians and installing his own sons as governors. He also cleared piracy from the sea as far as he could, as was natural, so that more of his revenues would reach him.

5 For in early times the Hellenes, and those barbarians who lived on the coasts of the mainland or held islands, turned to piracy once they began to cross over to one another more by ship. They were led by men of no small power, who sought gain for themselves and a living for the weak. Falling on cities that were unwalled and made up of scattered villages, they plundered them and made most of their living from this, since the work as yet carried no disgrace but even brought some glory. This is shown by some of the mainland peoples even now, among whom it is an honor to do this well, and by the ancient poets, in whose poems people everywhere alike ask those who land from ships whether they are pirates, as though those who were asked would not be ashamed of the work, and those who wanted to know would not think it a reproach. They also plundered one another on land. And to this day much of Hellas lives in the old way, around the Ozolian Locrians, the Aetolians, the Acarnanians, and the mainland in those parts; and the habit of carrying arms has survived among these mainlanders from the old piracy.

6 For all Hellas used to carry arms, because its dwellings were unprotected and travel from one to another was unsafe, and like

the barbarians they lived their daily lives under arms. The parts of Hellas that still live this way are a sign of the customs that were once the same for all. The Athenians were among the first to lay aside their arms and to change to an easier and more luxurious way of life. It is not long since the older men of the wealthy class, in their delicate living, stopped wearing linen tunics and fastening their hair in a knot on the head with a brooch of golden cicadas; and from them, through kinship, this fashion long prevailed among the older Ionians as well. The Lacedaemonians, for their part, were the first to wear simple dress of the present kind, and in other ways as well those who owned more lived on terms as nearly equal as possible with the many. They were also the first to strip, undressing in public and rubbing themselves with oil for exercise. In early times, even at the Olympic games, the athletes competed with loincloths around their private parts, and it is not many years since the practice ended. Even now, among some of the barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes are offered for boxing and wrestling, and they compete in loincloths. One could show that the ancient Hellenic world lived like the barbarian world of today in many other ways too.

7 Of the cities, those that were founded most recently, when sailing had become easier, and that had more surplus wealth, were built with walls right on the shore and took over isthmuses, both for trade and for strength against their neighbors. But the old cities, because piracy persisted so long, were built mostly away from the sea, on the islands as well as on the mainland (for the pirates raided one another and all others who lived on the coast but were not seafarers), and to this day they remain inland.

8 The islanders, who were Carians and Phoenicians, were pirates no less, for these peoples settled most of the islands. Here is the evidence. When Delos was purified by the Athenians in this war[1] and all the graves of the dead on the island were taken up,

more than half proved to be Carian, recognized by the kind of arms buried with them and by the way they bury their dead even now. Once Minos had established his navy, sailing from one people to another became easier, for he removed the evildoers from the islands at the time when he was colonizing most of them; and the men who lived by the sea, now acquiring more property, lived more securely, and some even built walls around themselves, as they were growing richer than before. For in their desire for gain the weaker submitted to slavery under the stronger, while the more powerful, having surplus wealth, made the smaller cities their subjects. And it was later, when they had gone further in this direction, that they made the expedition against Troy.

9 Agamemnon, I think, was able to gather that expedition because he surpassed the men of his time in power, and not so much because he led the suitors of Helen bound by their oaths to Tyndareus. Those Peloponnesians who have received the clearest account from earlier generations also say that Pelops first won power through the great wealth he brought with him from Asia to a people without means, and so, though an immigrant, he gave his name to the land; and later his descendants came to still greater power. Eurystheus was killed in Attica by the Heraclids. Atreus was his mother's brother, and when Eurystheus set out on campaign he entrusted Mycenae and his rule to Atreus because of their kinship (Atreus happened to be in exile from his father over the death of Chrysippus). When Eurystheus did not come back, the Mycenaeans, out of fear of the Heraclids, wanted Atreus, who seemed powerful and had won over the people of Mycenae and of all whom Eurystheus ruled; so Atreus took over the kingship, and the descendants of Pelops became greater than those of Perseus. Agamemnon, I think, inherited all this, and since he was also stronger at sea than the others, he gathered the expedition less through goodwill than through fear. For he evidently came with

the most ships himself and supplied the Arcadians with ships besides, as Homer has shown, if his evidence is enough for anyone. And in the passage on the handing down of the scepter Homer says that Agamemnon "ruled over many islands and all Argos." Living on the mainland, he could not have ruled islands other than those nearby (and these would not be many) unless he also had a navy. From this expedition we must judge what the earlier ones were like.

10 That Mycenae was small, or that some town of that time does not seem important now, is not an exact sign, and one would be wrong to use it to doubt that the expedition was as great as the poets have said and as tradition holds. Suppose the city of the Lacedaemonians were deserted, and only its temples and the foundations of its buildings were left. After a long time, I think, later generations would strongly doubt that its power had matched its fame. (And yet the Lacedaemonians occupy two-fifths of the Peloponnese and lead the whole of it, as well as many allies outside it; still, since their city is not built together in one place and has no costly temples or buildings, but is settled in villages in the old Hellenic way, it would seem inferior.) Whereas if the Athenians suffered the same fate, their power would be guessed, from the plain sight of the city, to have been twice what it is. So it is not reasonable to be skeptical, or to look at the appearance of cities rather than their power. We should think that that expedition was the greatest of all before it but fell short of those of our day, if here too we must trust the poetry of Homer, which he is likely, being a poet, to have embellished to make it greater; and even so it appears inferior. He has given it twelve hundred ships, and he has the Boeotian ships carry a hundred and twenty men each and those of Philoctetes fifty, indicating, I think, the largest and the smallest; at any rate he did not mention the size of any others in the Catalogue of Ships. That the rowers were all fighting

men as well, he has shown in the ships of Philoctetes, for he has made all the oarsmen archers. And it is not likely that many passengers sailed with them besides the kings and those highest in authority, especially since they were to cross the open sea with the equipment of war, and in boats that had no decks either but were fitted out in the old way, more like pirate craft. So if one takes the mean between the largest and the smallest ships, not many men appear to have come, considering that they were sent from all Hellas in common.

11 The cause was not so much shortage of men as shortage of money. For lack of supplies they brought a smaller army, of the size they hoped could live off the country while it fought. When they arrived and won a battle (which is clear, for otherwise they could not have built the wall around their camp), even then they evidently did not use their whole force, but turned to farming the Chersonese and to plunder, for lack of supplies. This is the more reason why the Trojans held out by force for those ten years while the Hellenes were scattered, since the Trojans were a match for whatever part was left behind at any time. If the Hellenes had come with plenty of supplies, and had kept together and carried on the war continuously without plundering and farming, they would easily have won in battle and taken the city, since even when they were not together, but only with the part of them present at the time, they held their own; and if they had settled down to a siege they would have taken Troy in less time and with less trouble. But through lack of money the undertakings before this one were weak, and this one itself, the most famous of all before it, is shown by the facts to have been less than its fame and than the account of it that now prevails because of the poets.

12 For even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still on the move and being resettled, so that it had no rest in which to grow. The return of the Hellenes from Ilium, coming so late, brought about

many changes, and factions arose in the cities nearly everywhere; those driven out by them founded new cities. Sixty years after the capture of Ilium the present Boeotians were driven out of Arne by the Thessalians and settled the country now called Boeotia but formerly the Cadmeian land (part of their people had been in this land before, and from these came the Boeotians who joined the expedition to Ilium); and in the eightieth year the Dorians, with the Heraclids, took possession of the Peloponnese. With difficulty and after a long time Hellas came to a lasting rest, and no longer uprooted, it sent out colonies. The Athenians settled the Ionians and most of the islanders; the Peloponnesians settled most of Italy and Sicily and some places in the rest of Hellas. All these were founded after the Trojan War.

13 As Hellas grew more powerful and went on acquiring wealth still more than before, tyrannies were established in most of the cities, since revenues were growing (before this there had been hereditary kingships with fixed privileges); and Hellas began to fit out navies and to take more to the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the first to handle ships in a way close to the present one, and the first triremes in Hellas are said to have been built at Corinth. It appears too that Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships for the Samians; and it was about three hundred years before the end of this war that Ameinocles went to the Samians. The oldest sea battle we know of was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyreans, and this too was about two hundred and sixty years before the same date. For the Corinthians, whose city lay on the Isthmus, had always kept a market there, since in early times the Hellenes, both those inside the Peloponnese and those outside it, had dealings with one another more by land than by sea, passing through the Corinthians' territory; and they were rich, as the ancient poets have shown as well, for they called the place "wealthy." And when the Hellenes took

more to the sea, the Corinthians acquired ships and cleared away piracy, and by providing a market for traffic by both land and sea they made their city powerful through the income of money. Later the Ionians too had a large navy, in the time of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses; and when they made war on Cyrus they controlled the sea off their own coast for some time. Polycrates, who was tyrant of Samos in the time of Cambyses, was strong at sea and made several of the islands his subjects; he also took Rhenea and dedicated it to Delian Apollo. And the Phocaeans, when they were founding Massalia, defeated the Carthaginians in a sea battle.

14 These were the most powerful navies. Yet even these, it appears, though they came many generations after the Trojan War, used few triremes and were still fitted out with fifty-oared ships and long boats, as the navies of that time had been. It was only a little before the Persian Wars and the death of Darius, who was king of the Persians after Cambyses, that triremes came into use in numbers, among the tyrants of Sicily and among the Corcyreans. These were the last navies worth mention established in Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes. For the Aeginetans and the Athenians, and any others, had small fleets, and most of these were fifty-oared ships. It was late that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, when they were at war with the Aeginetans and the barbarian was also expected, to build the ships with which they fought at sea; and even these did not yet have decks running their whole length.

15 Such, then, were the navies of the Hellenes, both the old ones and those that came later. Still, those who applied themselves to them gained no small strength, both in income of money and in rule over others. For they sailed against the islands and subdued them, especially those whose own land was not enough for them. On land, no war arose from which any considerable power came.

All the wars that did take place were between each people and its own neighbors, and the Hellenes did not go out on expeditions far from home to subdue others. For the subject cities had not joined the greatest cities, nor did the cities themselves make common expeditions on equal terms; rather, neighbors fought one another separately. It was above all in the war fought long ago between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians that the rest of the Hellenic world too divided, to join in alliance with one side or the other.

16 Various peoples met, in various places, with obstacles to their growth. The Ionians, when their affairs had made great progress, were attacked by Cyrus and the Persian kingdom: having overthrown Croesus and everything between the river Halys and the sea, Cyrus made war on them and enslaved the cities on the mainland; and later Darius, strong with the Phoenician fleet, enslaved the islands as well.

17 As for the tyrants in the Hellenic cities, since they looked ahead only to their own interests, to their own persons and the growth of their own houses, they governed their cities with as much caution as they could, and nothing worth mention was done by them, except perhaps by each against his own neighbors; for the tyrants in Sicily advanced furthest in power. Thus Hellas was held back on every side for a long time, so that it achieved nothing conspicuous in common, and city by city it lacked daring.

18 But at last the tyrants of the Athenians, and those of the rest of Hellas, which had long been ruled by tyrants even before Athens, most of them and the last of them, except those in Sicily, were put down by the Lacedaemonians. (For though Lacedaemon, after its founding by the Dorians who now live there, suffered from faction for the longest time of any city we know of, it nevertheless gained good laws from very early times and was never ruled by tyrants. It is about four hundred years, or a little more, to the end of this war since the Lacedaemonians have had the same

constitution, and through this they became powerful and settled the affairs of other cities as well.) Not many years after the tyrants were put down in Hellas, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians. In the tenth year after it the barbarian came again with his great expedition against Hellas to enslave it. With a great danger hanging over them, the Lacedaemonians led the Hellenes who joined in the war, since they were the strongest; and the Athenians, as the Medes advanced, resolved to abandon their city, packed up their belongings, went on board their ships, and became a naval people. They drove the barbarian back together, but not long afterward the Hellenes who had revolted from the King and those who had fought in the war together divided, some with the Athenians and some with the Lacedaemonians; for these two had shown themselves the greatest in power, the one strong on land, the other at sea. For a short time the alliance in arms held; then the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians quarreled and made war on each other with their allies; and any other Hellenes who fell out anywhere now went over to one or the other. So from the Persian Wars down to this war, now making truces, now fighting either each other or their own allies in revolt, they prepared well for war and became more experienced, training in the midst of dangers.

19 The Lacedaemonians led their allies without making them pay tribute, but took care that they should be governed by oligarchies suited to the interest of the Lacedaemonians alone. The Athenians, in time, took over the ships of the allied cities, except those of Chios and Lesbos, and assessed all of them a sum of money to pay. And so their own resources for this war became greater than they had ever been at their peak, when the alliance was still intact.

20 Such, then, I have found ancient times to be, though it is hard to trust every piece of evidence one after another. For men

accept from one another reports of past events, even those of their own country, equally without testing them. The mass of the Athenians, at any rate, think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was killed by Harmodius and Aristogeiton,[2] and do not know that it was Hippias who ruled, as the eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers. On that day, at the very moment, Harmodius and Aristogeiton suspected that one of their accomplices had informed Hippias, so they kept away from him, thinking he had been warned. But wanting to do something and take the risk before they were arrested, they came upon Hipparchus near the place called the Leocorium, as he was marshaling the Panathenaic procession, and killed him. And there are many other things, still existing even now and not forgotten through lapse of time, about which the rest of the Hellenes too have wrong ideas: for example, that the kings of the Lacedaemonians each cast not one vote but two, and that the Lacedaemonians have a Pitanate company, which never existed at all. So little trouble do most men take in searching for the truth, and so readily do they turn to what lies at hand.

21 Still, from the evidence I have given, anyone who believes that things were very much as I have described them would not go wrong. He would not trust rather what the poets have sung about them, embellishing them to make them greater, or what the prose chroniclers have composed with an eye more to what will attract the audience than to the truth: things that cannot be checked and that, most of them, have lost all credit through time and passed into myth. He would instead consider that they have been discovered from the clearest signs, sufficiently for events so old. And this war, although men always judge the war they are fighting to be the greatest while they are in it, and once it is over admire the ancient ones more, will nevertheless show itself, to those who examine the facts themselves, to have been greater than those were.

22 As for what each side said in speeches, either when about to go to war or when already in it, it was hard to remember the exact words spoken, both for me with what I heard myself and for those who reported to me from elsewhere. I have written the speeches as I thought each speaker would have said what the situation at each moment most required, keeping as close as possible to the general sense of what was actually said. But as for the deeds done in the war, I did not think it right to write them down on the word of whoever happened to be at hand, nor as I thought they had happened, but I went into each one with all the accuracy I could, both those at which I was present myself and those I learned of from others. The facts were found out with great labor, because those present at each event did not give the same account of the same things, but spoke as each one's sympathy or memory served. For a listener, perhaps, the absence of myth from my work will make it less pleasing; but if those who wish to see clearly what happened, and what will one day happen again, in the same or a similar way, as human things go, judge it useful, that will be enough. It has been composed as a possession for all time, not as a prize piece to be heard for the moment.

23 Of earlier deeds, the greatest was the war against the Medes, and yet it was quickly decided in two sea battles and two land battles. But this war went on to a great length, and it brought upon Hellas such sufferings as no other brought in an equal time. Never were so many cities taken and left desolate, some by barbarians, some by the Hellenes themselves fighting one another (and some even changed their inhabitants when they were captured); never were there so many exiles, or so much killing, some in the war itself, some through civil strife. Things that before had been told by report but seldom confirmed in fact ceased to be incredible: earthquakes, which seized the largest part of the earth at once and with the greatest violence; eclipses of the sun, which happened

more often than is remembered from earlier times; great droughts in some places, and famines from them; and, not least in the harm it did and the part of the people it destroyed, the plague. All these fell upon them together with this war. The Athenians and the Peloponnesians began it by breaking the thirty years' treaty they had made after the capture of Euboea.[3] As for why they broke it, I have first set down the grievances and the disputes, so that no one may ever have to ask from what origin so great a war arose among the Hellenes. The truest cause, though the one least spoken of, I believe to have been this: the Athenians were growing great and causing fear in the Lacedaemonians, and so compelled them to go to war. But the grievances openly stated on each side, on account of which they broke the treaty and entered the war, were these.

24 Epidamnus is a city on the right as you sail into the Ionian Gulf.[4] Its neighbors are the Taulantians, barbarians of the Illyrian race. It was colonized by the Corcyreans, but its founder was Phalius son of Eratocleides, a Corinthian of the line of Heracles, who was summoned from the mother city according to the ancient custom; and some Corinthians and others of the Dorian race joined in the settlement. As time went on, the power of the Epidamnians became great and their population large. But after many years of civil strife among themselves, so it is said, they were ruined in a war with the neighboring barbarians and lost most of their power. Finally, shortly before this war, their people drove out the men of power, who went over to the barbarians and plundered those in the city by land and by sea. When the Epidamnians in the city were hard pressed, they sent envoys to Corcyra as their mother city, begging the Corcyreans not to stand by and watch them be destroyed, but to reconcile the exiles with them and put an end to the war with the barbarians. They made this plea seated as suppliants in the temple of Hera. But the Corcyreans did not accept their supplication and sent them away with nothing.

25 When the Epidamnians learned that there was no help for them from Corcyra, they were at a loss how to deal with their situation. They sent to Delphi and asked the god whether they should hand their city over to the Corinthians as its founders and try to get some help from them. The god answered that they should hand it over and make the Corinthians their leaders. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and, as the oracle directed, handed over the colony, pointing out that their founder was from Corinth and making the oracle known, and they begged the Corinthians not to stand by and watch them be destroyed, but to come to their defense. The Corinthians undertook to help them, both on grounds of justice, since they held that the colony was no less theirs than the Corcyreans', and also out of hatred for the Corcyreans, because although they were colonists of Corinth they neglected her. At the common festivals they did not give the Corinthians the customary privileges, nor did they begin the sacrifice with a Corinthian, as the other colonies did; instead they looked down on them. In wealth they were at that time equal to the richest of the Hellenes, and in preparation for war they were stronger; they sometimes boasted that they were far superior at sea, and claimed the fame of the Phaeacians, who had lived on Corcyra before them and were renowned for their ships. (This was all the more reason why they kept building up their navy, and they were not without power: they had a hundred and twenty triremes when the war began.)

26 Having all these grievances, then, the Corinthians gladly sent the help to Epidamnus. They invited anyone who wished to go there as a settler, and sent a garrison of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and their own men. These went by land to Apollonia, a colony of Corinth, for fear that the Corcyreans would stop them if they crossed by sea. When the Corcyreans learned that the settlers and the garrison had arrived at Epidamnus and that the colony had

been given to the Corinthians, they were furious. They sailed at once with twenty-five ships, and later with another fleet, and insultingly ordered the Epidamnians to take back the exiles (for the exiles of Epidamnus had come to Corcyra, pointing to the tombs of their ancestors and appealing to their kinship as grounds for asking to be restored) and to send away the garrison the Corinthians had sent and the settlers. The Epidamnians would not listen to any of it, and so the Corcyreans marched against them with forty ships, along with the exiles, intending to restore them, and taking the Illyrians with them as well. They sat down before the city and proclaimed that any Epidamnian who wished, and the foreigners, could leave unharmed; otherwise they would treat them as enemies. When this had no effect, the Corcyreans laid siege to the city, which stands on an isthmus.

27 When messengers came to the Corinthians from Epidamnus saying that they were being besieged, the Corinthians prepared an expedition, and at the same time proclaimed a colony to Epidamnus, on equal and like terms for anyone who wished to go; anyone who did not want to sail at once, but wished to have a share in the colony, could stay at home by depositing fifty Corinthian drachmas. Many sailed, and many paid down the money. They also asked the Megarians to escort them with ships, in case the Corcyreans tried to stop them from sailing. The Megarians made ready to sail with them with eight ships, and the Paleans of Cephallenia with four. They also asked the Epidaurians, who provided five; the Hermionians provided one, the Troezenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots eight. They asked the Thebans and the Phliasians for money, and the Eleans for unmanned ships and money. The Corinthians themselves made ready thirty ships and three thousand hoplites.

28 When the Corcyreans learned of these preparations, they went to Corinth with envoys from Lacedaemon and Sicyon, whom

they took with them, and demanded that the Corinthians withdraw the garrison and the settlers at Epidamnus, since they had no claim to Epidamnus. If the Corinthians did claim anything, the Corcyreans were willing to submit the dispute to arbitration in the Peloponnese, before cities on which both sides agreed, and whichever side the colony was judged to belong to should keep it. They were also willing to refer it to the oracle at Delphi. But they told the Corinthians not to make war; otherwise, they said, if the Corinthians used force, they too would be compelled to make friends they did not want, others than their present ones, for the sake of help. The Corinthians answered that if the Corcyreans withdrew their ships and the barbarians from Epidamnus, they would consider the matter; before that it was not right for the Epidamnians to be under siege while they themselves went to arbitration. The Corcyreans replied that they would do this if the Corinthians also withdrew their men from Epidamnus; they were ready too for both sides to stay where they were and make a truce until the case was decided.

29 The Corinthians would listen to none of this. When their ships were manned and their allies had arrived, they first sent ahead a herald to declare war on the Corcyreans, then put out with seventy-five ships and two thousand hoplites and sailed for Epidamnus to make war on the Corcyreans. The ships were commanded by Aristeus son of Pellichus, Callicrates son of Callias, and Timanor son of Timanthes; the infantry by Archetimus son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son of Isarchus. When they reached Actium in the territory of Anactorium, where the temple of Apollo stands at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, the Corcyreans sent a herald ahead to them in a small boat to forbid them to sail against Corcyra, and at the same time manned their ships, putting braces on the old ones to make them seaworthy and refitting the rest. When the herald brought back no peaceful answer from the

Corinthians and their ships were manned, eighty in number (for forty were besieging Epidamnus), they put out against the enemy, drew up their line, and fought at sea. The Corcyreans won by a wide margin and destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian ships. On the same day it also happened that the force besieging Epidamnus brought the city to terms: the foreigners were to be sold, and the Corinthians to be kept in chains until some other decision was made.

30 After the sea battle the Corcyreans set up a trophy on Leucimme, a headland of Corcyra, and put to death all the prisoners they had taken except the Corinthians, whom they kept in chains. Afterward, when the Corinthians and their allies had gone home defeated at sea, the Corcyreans were masters of the whole sea in those parts. They sailed to Leucas, the Corinthian colony, and ravaged its land, and burned Cyllene, the port of the Eleans, because the Eleans had provided ships and money to the Corinthians. For most of the time after the sea battle they controlled the sea and sailed about doing damage to the allies of the Corinthians, until, as the summer was coming round, the Corinthians sent ships and an army, since their allies were suffering, and encamped at Actium and around Cape Cheimerium in Thesprotis, to protect Leucas and the other cities friendly to them. The Corcyreans encamped opposite them on Leucimme with ships and infantry. Neither side sailed against the other; they faced each other through that summer, and when winter came both went home.

31 All through the year after the sea battle, and the year after that, the Corinthians, angry over the war with Corcyra, built ships and prepared a naval force as strong as they could, collecting rowers from the Peloponnese itself and from the rest of Hellas and winning them over with pay. When the Corcyreans learned of these preparations they were afraid; and since they were in treaty

with none of the Hellenes and had not enrolled themselves in either the Athenian or the Lacedaemonian treaty, they decided to go to the Athenians, become their allies, and try to get some help from them. When the Corinthians learned of this, they too came to Athens as envoys, so that the Athenian navy should not be added to the Corcyrean and prevent them from ending the war as they wished. An assembly was held, and the two sides argued against each other. The Corcyreans spoke as follows.

32 "Athenians, when men come to their neighbors to ask for help, as we do now, without any great service done or any alliance already in place to give them a claim, it is right that they should first show, above all, that what they ask is to the others' advantage, or failing that, at least that it will do them no harm; and then that their gratitude can be relied on. If they can establish none of this clearly, they should not be angry if they fail. The Corcyreans have sent us in the belief that, along with our request for alliance, we can give you sure grounds on these points as well. But it so happens that the same policy has proved both inconsistent with the request we now make of you and unprofitable for our own affairs at present. For in the past we never chose to be anyone's ally, and now we have come to ask others for exactly this; and because of it we stand alone in the present war with the Corinthians. What once seemed our prudence, not to share the dangers of an alliance with others at the discretion of a neighbor, has now turned out to be folly and weakness. In the sea battle that took place we beat back the Corinthians by ourselves. But now that they have set out against us with a larger force from the Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas, and we see that we cannot prevail with our own strength alone, and since the danger is great if we fall under their power, we are compelled to ask help from you and from anyone else. And we should be forgiven if we now dare to act against our former

policy of keeping clear of affairs, not out of any malice, but rather through an error of judgment.

33 "If you are persuaded, the chance that brings us to need you will prove fortunate for you in many ways. First, you will be helping men who are wronged and who do no harm to others. Second, by taking in men whose most vital interests are at stake, you will lay up a favor with a testimony that will be remembered forever. And we possess the largest navy except your own. Consider: what good fortune could be rarer, or more painful to your enemies, than this? A power whose addition you would have valued above much money and gratitude is here, offering itself unasked, without danger or expense, and bringing you besides a name for virtue with the many, gratitude from those you defend, and strength for yourselves. In all of history few have had all these at once, and few who ask for alliance come to those they call on bringing as much security and honor as they will receive. And if any of you thinks that the war in which we could be useful will not happen, he is mistaken in his judgment. He does not see that the Lacedaemonians are eager for war out of fear of you, and that the Corinthians, who have influence with them and are your enemies, are seizing us first as a step toward attacking you, so that we may not stand together against them in common hatred, and so that by moving first they may make sure of one of two things: either crippling us or securing themselves. It is our business, in turn, to get in first, we by offering the alliance and you by accepting it, and to plot against them first rather than counter their plots.

34 "If they say that it is not just for you to receive their colonists, let them learn that every colony honors its mother city when it is well treated, but becomes estranged when it is wronged. Colonists are not sent out to be the slaves of those left behind, but to be their equals. That the Corinthians were in the wrong is clear. When we invited them to arbitration over Epidamnus, they chose

to pursue their grievances by war rather than by fair means. And let their conduct toward us, their kinsmen, be a warning to you, so that you are not led astray by their deceit and do not give them help when they ask for it openly. For the man who has fewest regrets from doing favors for his enemies will go on in the greatest safety.

35 "Nor will you break the treaty with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, since we are allies of neither side. For it is stated in it that any Hellenic city that is no one's ally may join whichever side it pleases. And it would be monstrous if these men may man their ships from cities under the treaty, and from the rest of Hellas besides, and not least from your own subjects, while they bar us from the alliance open to us and from help from anywhere else, and then call it a wrong if you are persuaded to grant what we ask. We shall have far more cause to complain if we fail to persuade you. For you will be thrusting away us, who are in danger and are not your enemies, while you not only fail to stop these men, who are your enemies and are advancing, but allow them to draw strength from your own empire. That is not just. Rather, you should either stop them from hiring men from your empire, or send us too whatever help you are persuaded to send, and best of all receive us openly and help us. Many are the advantages we can point out, as we suggested at the start, and the greatest is that our enemies are the same, which is the surest pledge, and these enemies are not weak but able to harm those who leave them. And when the alliance offered is a naval one and not a land one, its loss is not the same. Your best course is, if you can, to let no one else possess ships; if not, to have the strongest naval power as your friend.

36 "And if anyone thinks that what we say is to your advantage but fears that by following it he will break the treaty, let him understand this. His fear, if it has strength behind it, will frighten

his opponents more, while his confidence, if he rejects us, will be weak and will frighten enemies who are strong all the less. Let him understand too that he is deliberating now not about Corcyra more than about Athens, and that he is not providing for her best when, with the war that is coming and all but here, he looks only at the moment and hesitates to gain a place whose friendship or enmity carries the greatest consequences. For Corcyra lies well on the coastal route to Italy and Sicily, so that it can stop a fleet from coming from there to join the Peloponnesians, and can escort a fleet from here to those parts; and in other ways too it is most useful. In the briefest summary, which covers both the whole and each part, you may learn from this why you should not abandon us. There are three navies worth mention among the Hellenes: yours, ours, and that of the Corinthians. If you allow two of these to combine, and the Corinthians seize us first, you will fight at sea against the Corcyreans and the Peloponnesians together; if you receive us, you will be able to fight against them with your ships increased by ours." So spoke the Corcyreans. After them the Corinthians spoke as follows.

37 "Since these Corcyreans have spoken not only about your receiving them but also to the effect that we are in the wrong and that they are being attacked unjustly, we must first deal with both these points ourselves before going on to the rest of our argument, so that you may know more surely beforehand the claim we make, and may have good reason to reject their need. They say that it was out of prudence that they have never accepted an alliance with anyone. But they adopted this policy for wickedness, not for virtue: they wanted no ally to witness their wrongdoing, and no need to feel shame at calling one in. Their city, too, lies in a position that is self-sufficient, and so makes them the judges of the injuries they do to anyone, rather than leaving it to agreements. For they sail out very little to their neighbors, but very

often receive others who are forced to put in at Corcyra. And this fine-sounding refusal of treaties they have held up as a screen, not to avoid sharing in the wrongs of others, but so that they may do wrong alone, so that where they are strong they may use force, where they go unnoticed they may take more than their share, and where they happen to gain something they may feel no shame. And yet if they were good men, as they claim, the less exposed they were to attack from their neighbors, the more clearly they could have shown their virtue by giving and accepting what is just.

38 "But they are not like this, either toward others or toward us. Though they are our colonists, they have always stood apart from us, and now they are at war with us, saying they were not sent out to be ill treated. We say that we did not found the colony to be insulted by them either, but to be their leaders and to receive due respect. At any rate our other colonies honor us, and no city is loved more by its colonists than we are. And clearly, if we please the majority, we could not rightly displease these men alone, nor would we make war on them in this unusual way unless we were wronged in some unusual way. Even if we were at fault, it would have been honorable for them to give way to our anger, and shameful for us to use force against their moderation. But in their insolence and the license of their wealth they have committed many offenses against us, and above all this: Epidamnus was ours, and they laid no claim to it while it was in distress, but when we came to its help they seized it by force and hold it.

39 "And now they say that before all this they were willing to have the matter decided by arbitration. But an offer of arbitration made by one who holds the advantage and makes it from a safe position should count for nothing; it counts only from one who puts his deeds on an equal footing with his words before entering the contest. These men offered this fine pretense of arbitration not before laying siege to the place, but only when they thought

we would not stand by and allow it. And they have come here, not content with their own offenses there, to ask you now not to be their allies but their partners in wrong, and to receive them when they are at odds with us. They should have come to you when they were safest, not now, when we have been wronged and they are in danger, and when you, who had no share in their power then, will now give them a share in your help, and who had no part in their offenses will bear an equal share of the blame from us. Those who are to share the consequences should have shared the power long ago.

40 "That we come with fitting grievances, and that these men are violent and grasping, has been shown. You must now learn why it would not be just for you to receive them. For if it is stated in the treaty that any of the cities not enrolled may join whichever side it wishes, the clause is not meant for those who join one side in order to harm the other. It is meant for a city that needs protection without robbing another of what is his, and that will not bring war instead of peace to those who receive it, if they are wise. That is what you would suffer now if you were not persuaded by us. For you would not only become their helpers but our enemies instead of our partners in the treaty; if you go with them, we must defend ourselves against them, and you with them. And yet it would be most just for you to stand aside from both of us, or else to go with us against them instead (for you are in treaty with the Corinthians, but with the Corcyreans you have never had even an armistice), and not to set up the rule that you receive those who revolt from others. We did not cast our vote against you when the Samians revolted, though the rest of the Peloponnesians were divided in their vote on whether to help them; we openly argued that each side should be left to punish its own allies. For if you receive and help those who do wrong, it will be seen that just as many of your

own allies will come over to us, and you will be setting up a rule more against yourselves than against us.

41 "These, then, are the claims of justice we have on you, sufficient under the laws of the Hellenes. But we also have an appeal to make and a claim on your gratitude, such that, since we are neither enemies who would harm you nor friends who would take advantage of you, we say it should be repaid to us now. Once, before the Persian Wars, when you were short of warships for your war with the Aeginetans, you received twenty ships from the Corinthians. That service, and the one in the matter of the Samians, when it was because of us that the Peloponnesians did not help them, enabled you to defeat the Aeginetans and to punish the Samians. And these were done at moments of the kind in which men, going against their own enemies, care for nothing in the world except victory. For they count as a friend whoever serves them, even if he was an enemy before, and as an enemy whoever opposes them, even if he happens to be a friend, since they handle even their own affairs worse for the sake of the struggle at hand.

42 "Think about these things, and let the younger men learn them from their elders, and resolve to repay us in kind. Let no one think that what we say is just, but that if he goes to war, his advantage lies elsewhere. For advantage follows most closely where a man does least wrong. And the coming war, with which the Corcyreans try to frighten you into wrongdoing, still lies in the dark. It is not worth being carried away by it into acquiring an enmity with the Corinthians that is already open and not in the future. It would be wiser to remove the suspicion that already exists because of the Megarians, for a final favor, if it comes at the right moment, can cancel a greater grievance, even if it is a smaller favor. Nor should you be drawn in because they offer a great naval alliance. For to do no wrong to one's equals is a surer strength

than to be carried away by what is plain for the moment and to gain an advantage through dangers.

43 "We ourselves have now met the case we stated at Lacedaemon, that each side should punish its own allies, and we ask to receive the same treatment from you, and that you, having been helped by our vote, should not harm us by yours. Pay us back equally, knowing that this is the very moment when the man who serves is most a friend, and the man who opposes most an enemy. Do not receive these Corcyreans as allies against our will, and do not help them in their wrongdoing. If you do this, you will be acting as you should, and planning what is best for yourselves."

44 Such was the speech of the Corinthians. The Athenians heard both sides, and held the assembly twice. At the first they inclined no less to the arguments of the Corinthians; but on the next day they changed their minds. They decided not to make an alliance with the Corcyreans that would bind them to have the same enemies and friends (for if the Corcyreans told them to sail with them against Corinth, their treaty with the Peloponnesians would be broken), but they made a defensive alliance to help each other if anyone attacked Corcyra, or Athens, or the allies of either. For they thought that the war with the Peloponnesians would come in any case, and they did not want to give up Corcyra, with so large a navy, to the Corinthians. They wanted rather to wear them down against each other as much as possible, so that, if it came to it, they would go to war with the Corinthians and the other naval powers when these were weaker. At the same time the island seemed to them well placed on the coastal route to Italy and Sicily.

45 With these considerations the Athenians received the Corcyreans, and not long after the Corinthians had left they sent ten ships to help them. Their generals were Lacedaemonius son of Cimon, Diotimus son of Strombichus, and Proteas son of Epicles.

They were instructed not to fight the Corinthians at sea unless the Corinthians sailed against Corcyra and were about to land there or on some place belonging to it; in that case they were to stop them as best they could. These instructions were given so as not to break the treaty.

46 The ships arrived at Corcyra. The Corinthians, when their preparations were complete, sailed against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. Ten of these were Elean, twelve Megarian, ten Leucadian, twenty-seven Ambraciot, one Anactorian, and ninety were the Corinthians' own. Each city had its own generals, and the Corinthians had Xenocleides son of Euthycles and four others. Sailing from Leucas, they reached the mainland opposite Corcyra and anchored at Cheimerium in Thesprotis. This is a harbor, and above it, some way from the sea, lies the city of Ephyra, in the Elaeatis district of Thesprotis. Near it the Acherusian lake empties into the sea; the river Acheron flows through Thesprotis into the lake, and gives it its name. The river Thyamis also flows there, forming the boundary between Thesprotis and Cestrine, and between these rivers rises the headland of Cheimerium. It was here on the mainland that the Corinthians anchored and made their camp.

47 When the Corcyreans learned that they were sailing toward them, they manned a hundred and ten ships, under the command of Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus, and encamped on one of the islands called Sybota; and the ten Athenian ships were with them. Their infantry was on the headland of Leucimme, together with a thousand hoplites from Zacynthus who had come to help them. The Corinthians too had many of the barbarians who had come to their support on the mainland, for the mainlanders in those parts have always been their friends.

48 When the Corinthians were ready, they took three days' provisions and put out by night from Cheimerium to give battle. At

dawn, as they sailed, they caught sight of the Corcyrean ships out at sea and sailing toward them. As soon as they saw each other, they drew up in line of battle. On the Corcyrean right wing were the Athenian ships, and the Corcyreans themselves held the rest of the line, having formed their ships into three divisions, each commanded by one of the three generals. So the Corcyreans were drawn up. On the Corinthian side the Megarian and Ambraciot ships held the right wing, and the other allies were in the center, each in its own group; the Corinthians themselves, with their fastest ships, held the left wing, opposite the Athenians and the Corcyrean right.

49 When the signals had been raised on each side, they closed and fought. Both sides had many hoplites on their decks, and many archers and javelin throwers, for they were still equipped in the old way, rather unskillfully. The battle was hard fought, not in skill but rather because it was more like a battle on land. For whenever they rammed one another, they could not easily get clear, because of the number and crowding of the ships, and they relied for victory more on the hoplites on the decks, who stood and fought while the ships lay still. There was no breaking of the line; they fought more with fury and strength than with skill. Everywhere there was great uproar, and the battle was confused. In it the Athenian ships came up to support the Corcyreans wherever they were pressed and caused fear in the enemy, but they did not begin fighting, since their generals were afraid of the Athenians' instructions. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most. For the Corcyreans with twenty ships routed them, chased them in disorder to the mainland, sailed right up to their camp, landed, burned the deserted tents, and plundered their property. Here, then, the Corinthians and their allies were defeated and the Corcyreans prevailed. But where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they were winning decisively, since the Corcyreans,

whose numbers were smaller to begin with, were short the twenty ships that had gone in pursuit. The Athenians, seeing the Corcyreans hard pressed, now began to help them more openly, at first holding back so as not to ram any ship themselves. But when the rout became plain and the Corinthians pressed hard, then every man set to work and no distinction was made any longer: things came to such a pass that the Corinthians and the Athenians were compelled to fight each other.

50 When the rout came, the Corinthians did not take in tow the hulls of the ships they had disabled, but turned to the men, rowing through the wreckage to kill rather than to take them alive; and not knowing that their own men on the right wing had been defeated, they killed their own friends without realizing it. For there were many ships on both sides, covering a wide stretch of sea, and once they were engaged it was not easy to tell who was winning and who was losing. In the number of ships, this was the greatest sea battle of Hellenes against Hellenes that had yet been fought. When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyreans to land, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead, and recovered most of them and brought them to Sybota, where the land army of the barbarians had come to support them. This Sybota is a deserted harbor in Thesprotis. After doing this they gathered again and sailed against the Corcyreans. The Corcyreans, with the ships that were still seaworthy and all that were left, together with the Athenian ships, sailed out against them in turn, afraid that they would try to land on their territory. It was already late, and the paean for the attack had been sung, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water. They had sighted twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which the Athenians had sent later to support the ten, afraid, as in fact happened, that the Corcyreans would be defeated and their own ten ships would be too few to defend them.

51 The Corinthians saw these ships first, and suspecting that they came from Athens and that there were more of them than they could see, they began to withdraw. The Corcyreans could not see the ships, which were sailing up from a direction hidden from them, and they wondered why the Corinthians were backing water, until some of them saw the ships and said, "There are ships sailing up." Then they too withdrew, for it was already getting dark, and the Corinthians had turned away and broken off. So the two sides parted, and the battle ended at nightfall. The Corcyreans were encamped at Leucimme when these twenty ships from Athens, commanded by Glaucon son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras,[5] made their way through the corpses and the wreckage and sailed into the camp not long after they were sighted. The Corcyreans (for it was night) were afraid they were enemy ships, but then recognized them, and the ships anchored.

52 The next day the thirty Athenian ships and as many of the Corcyrean ships as were seaworthy put out and sailed to the harbor at Sybota where the Corinthians lay at anchor, wanting to know whether they would fight. The Corinthians put out from the shore, drew up in line in open water, and waited there. They had no intention of starting a battle of their own accord, since they saw that fresh ships had arrived from Athens and that they themselves faced many difficulties: they had to guard the prisoners they had on their ships, and there was no way to repair their ships in a deserted place. They were thinking rather of how to make their way home, for they were afraid that the Athenians would consider the treaty broken, since they had come to blows, and would not let them sail away.

53 So they decided to put some men in a small boat, without a herald's staff, and send them to the Athenians to test them. They sent them and they said this: "You are doing wrong, men of Athens, in starting a war and breaking the treaty. We are punishing

our enemies, and you stand in our way with arms raised against us. If it is your intention to stop us from sailing against Corcyra, or anywhere else we wish, and so to break the treaty, take us first, who are here, and treat us as enemies." So they spoke. All of the Corcyrean camp that heard it at once shouted to seize them and kill them, but the Athenians answered as follows: "We are not starting a war, men of the Peloponnese, nor breaking the treaty. We have come to help these Corcyreans, who are our allies. If you wish to sail anywhere else, we do not stop you. But if you sail against Corcyra or any place of theirs, we shall not stand by and allow it, as far as it is in our power."

54 After the Athenians gave this answer, the Corinthians prepared for the voyage home and set up a trophy at the Sybota on the mainland. The Corcyreans took up the wrecks and the dead that had drifted toward them, carried by the current and by a wind that rose in the night and scattered them everywhere, and set up a rival trophy at the Sybota on the island, as victors. Each side claimed the victory on these grounds. The Corinthians set up a trophy because they had prevailed in the sea battle until nightfall, so that they had recovered most of the wrecks and the dead, and they held no fewer than a thousand prisoners and had sunk about seventy ships. The Corcyreans set up a trophy because they had destroyed about thirty ships, and after the Athenians came had recovered the wrecks and dead on their side; because the day before the Corinthians had backed water and retreated before them on seeing the Athenian ships; and because, when the Athenians came, the Corinthians did not sail out against them from Sybota.

55 So each side claimed the victory. On their voyage home the Corinthians took Anactorium, which is at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, by treachery (it was held in common by the Corcyreans and themselves), settled Corinthian colonists in it, and

went home. Of the Corcyrean prisoners, they sold the eight hundred who were slaves, and kept two hundred and fifty in chains, treating them with great consideration, so that when they went back they might win Corcyra over to the Corinthians; and in fact most of them were among the most powerful men in the city. In this way Corcyra survived the war with the Corinthians, and the Athenian ships left it. This was the first cause of the war that the Corinthians had against the Athenians: that the Athenians had fought at sea against them, with the Corcyreans, while under treaty.

56 Immediately after this, further disputes arose between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, leading them toward war. While the Corinthians were working out how to take revenge on the Athenians, the Athenians, suspecting their hostility, ordered the Potidaeans, who live on the isthmus of Pallene and are colonists of Corinth but allies of Athens paying tribute, to pull down their wall on the side facing Pallene and to give hostages, and also to send away the Corinthian magistrates and in future not to receive those whom the Corinthians sent out every year. They feared that the Potidaeans, persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians, would revolt, and would bring the other allies in Thrace to revolt with them.

57 The Athenians made these preparations against the Potidaeans immediately after the sea battle at Corcyra. For the Corinthians were now openly at odds with them, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, who had been their ally and friend before, had become their enemy. He had become their enemy because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were acting together against him. In his alarm he was sending to Lacedaemon to work for a war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, and he was trying to win over the Corinthians, with a view to the revolt of Potidaea.

He also made proposals to the Chalcidians in Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had these places, which bordered his own country, as allies, he could more easily carry on the war with their help. The Athenians learned of this and wanted to forestall the revolt of the cities. They happened to be sending thirty ships and a thousand hoplites against his country, under the command of Archestratus son of Lycomedes with ten others,[6] and they instructed the commanders of the ships to take hostages from the Potidaeans and pull down their wall, and to keep watch on the neighboring cities so that they would not revolt.

58 The Potidaeans sent envoys to the Athenians, to see whether they could persuade them to make no changes in their affairs; but they also went to Lacedaemon with the Corinthians, to get help ready if it should be needed. After long negotiations at Athens they gained nothing useful; the ships were sailing against Macedonia and against them alike; and the authorities at Lacedaemon promised them that if the Athenians moved against Potidaea they would invade Attica. Then, at this moment, they revolted, together with the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans, all bound by a common oath. Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull down their cities on the coast and move inland to Olynthus, and to make that one city strong; and to those who abandoned their cities he gave part of his own territory of Mygdonia, around Lake Bolbe, to live on while the war with the Athenians lasted. So they moved inland, pulling down their cities, and prepared for war.

59 The thirty Athenian ships arrived in the Thracian region and found Potidaea and the rest already in revolt. The generals, thinking it impossible with their present force to make war both on Perdiccas and on the places that had revolted with him, turned to Macedonia, against which they had been sent in the first place,

and settled down to make war there together with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded with an army from inland.

60 Meanwhile, now that Potidaea had revolted and the Athenian ships were off Macedonia, the Corinthians feared for the place and considered the danger their own. They sent volunteers of their own and others from the rest of the Peloponnese whom they won over with pay, sixteen hundred hoplites in all and four hundred light-armed troops. Their general was Aristeus son of Adeimantus, and it was not least out of friendship for him that most of the soldiers from Corinth went with him as volunteers, for he had always been on good terms with the Potidaeans. They arrived in Thrace forty days after Potidaea revolted.

61 The news that the cities had revolted also reached the Athenians at once. When they learned that Aristeus and his men were on their way as well, they sent two thousand of their own hoplites and forty ships against the places in revolt, with Callias son of Calliades and four others as generals. These arrived first in Macedonia and found the earlier thousand, who had just taken Therme and were besieging Pydna. They too sat down before Pydna and besieged it. But then they made an agreement and an alliance with Perdiccas, as they were forced to, since Potidaea pressed them and Aristeus had arrived, and they withdrew from Macedonia. They came to Beroea and from there to Strepsa, and after first making an attempt on the place and failing to take it, they marched by land toward Potidaea with three thousand of their own hoplites, many allies besides, and six hundred Macedonian cavalry, those with Philip and Pausanias; at the same time seventy ships sailed along the coast. Advancing by short stages, they reached Gigonus on the third day and encamped.

62 The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus, expecting the Athenians, were encamped on the Olynthus side of the isthmus and had set up a market outside the city. The allies

had chosen Aristeus as general of all the infantry and Perdiccas of the cavalry; for Perdiccas had at once broken with the Athenians again and was fighting on the side of the Potidaeans, leaving Iolaus in command in his place. Aristeus' plan was this: he would keep his own force on the isthmus and watch for the Athenians if they came on, while the Chalcidians, the allies from outside the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas stayed at Olynthus; and when the Athenians advanced against him, these would come up from behind and catch the enemy between them. Callias, the Athenian general, and his colleagues sent the Macedonian cavalry and a few of the allies toward Olynthus to prevent help from coming from there, and they themselves broke camp and marched on Potidaea. When they reached the isthmus and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they took up position opposite them, and not long after the two sides engaged. The wing of Aristeus himself, with the picked men of the Corinthians and others who were around him, routed the troops facing it and pursued them a long way. But the rest of the army, Potidaeans and Peloponnesians, was defeated by the Athenians and fled inside the wall.

63 As Aristeus came back from the pursuit and saw that the rest of the army had been defeated, he was at a loss which way to risk going, to Olynthus or to Potidaea. He decided to draw his men together into as small a space as possible and force his way into Potidaea at a run. He got through by way of the breakwater, through the sea, under fire and with difficulty, losing a few men but saving most. The troops at Olynthus who were to help the Potidaeans (it is about sixty stades away and in plain sight), when the battle began and the signals were raised, advanced a short way to give help, and the Macedonian cavalry drew up against them to stop them. But since the Athenians won quickly and the signals were taken down, they withdrew again inside the wall, and the

Macedonians went back to the Athenians; so neither side's cavalry took part. After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy and gave back the dead to the Potidaeans under truce. Of the Potidaeans and their allies a little fewer than three hundred died; of the Athenians themselves a hundred and fifty, and Callias their general.

64 The Athenians at once built a wall to cut off the city on the isthmus side and kept a garrison there; but the side toward Pallene was left unwalled. For they did not think they had enough men both to garrison the isthmus and to cross to Pallene and build a wall there, and they were afraid that if they divided their forces the Potidaeans and their allies would attack them. When the Athenians at home learned that Pallene was unwalled, some time later they sent sixteen hundred of their own hoplites, with Phormio son of Asopius as general. When he arrived at Pallene he made Aphytis his base and brought his army up to Potidaea, advancing by short stages and ravaging the land as he went; and since no one came out to fight, he built a wall to cut off the city on the Pallene side. So Potidaea was now closely besieged on both sides, and from the sea as well by ships blockading it.

65 Once the city was walled off, Aristeus had no hope of saving it unless something came from the Peloponnese or some other unexpected thing happened. He advised that all but five hundred should wait for a wind and sail out, so that the food would last longer, and he was willing to be one of those who stayed. When he could not persuade them, he wanted to arrange what came next and to put affairs outside the city on the best possible footing, so he sailed out, evading the Athenian blockade. Staying among the Chalcidians, he joined them in the war in various ways; in particular he laid an ambush near the city of Sermyle and killed many of its men; and he negotiated with the Peloponnese to see how some help might be had. After the walling of Potidaea, Phormio, with his

sixteen hundred men, ravaged Chalcidice and Bottice and took some towns.

66 These, then, were the grievances that had arisen between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. The Corinthians complained that the Athenians were besieging Potidaea, their colony, with Corinthian and Peloponnesian men inside it; the Athenians complained against the Peloponnesians that they had caused a city that was their ally and paid tribute to revolt, and had come and fought openly against them on the side of the Potidaeans. The war, however, had not yet broken out; there was still an armistice, for the Corinthians had done these things on their own account.

67 But with Potidaea under siege the Corinthians did not keep quiet, since they had men inside and also feared for the place. They at once summoned the allies to Lacedaemon and, once there, loudly denounced the Athenians for having broken the treaty and wronged the Peloponnese. The Aeginetans did not send envoys openly, for fear of the Athenians, but in secret they did as much as anyone to urge on the war, saying that they were not independent as the treaty provided. The Lacedaemonians summoned in addition any of the allies and anyone else who said he had been wronged by the Athenians, held their usual assembly, and told them to speak. Others came forward and stated their grievances, each in turn, and among them the Megarians, who set out a good many other disputes, but above all that they were excluded from the harbors in the Athenian empire and from the market of Attica, contrary to the treaty.[7] The Corinthians came forward last, having let the others first stir up the Lacedaemonians, and spoke as follows.

68 "Lacedaemonians, the trust you place in your own constitution and in your dealings with one another makes you slower to believe the rest of us when we tell you something. It gives you moderation, but it leaves you more ignorant in your handling of

affairs abroad. Time and again we warned you of the harm the Athenians were about to do us, and each time, instead of learning from what we told you, you suspected the speakers of talking out of their own private quarrels. And so it was not before we suffered, but now that we are in the thick of it, that you have called these allies together; and among them it is fitting that we should speak not least, since we have the greatest grievances: we are insulted by the Athenians and neglected by you. If they were wronging Hellas somewhere out of sight, you would need instruction, as men who did not know. But as it is, why make a long speech? You see that some of us have been enslaved already, and that they are plotting against others, not least against our allies, and that they have long been prepared, in case war should ever come. Otherwise they would not have taken Corcyra and held it in spite of us, or be besieging Potidaea. Potidaea is the most convenient place for operations in Thrace, and Corcyra would have given the Peloponnesians a very large navy.

69 "And you are to blame for this. First you allowed them to fortify their city after the Persian Wars, and later to build the Long Walls; and ever since, you have been depriving of freedom not only those they have enslaved but now your own allies as well. For it is not the man who enslaves but the man who could stop it and stands by who more truly does the deed, especially if he claims the honor of virtue as the liberator of Hellas. Even now we have barely managed to meet, and even now not on any clear basis. We ought no longer to be asking whether we are being wronged, but how we shall defend ourselves. For those who act have made their plans and move at once, without delay, against men who have not yet decided. And we know the path the Athenians take, and how they encroach on their neighbors little by little. As long as they think they are unobserved because of your dullness, they are less bold; but once they know that you see and let it pass, they will press on

hard. You alone of the Hellenes, Lacedaemonians, sit still, defending yourselves against an enemy not with your power but with your hesitation; you alone put down the growth of your enemies not when it is beginning but when it has doubled. And yet you were said to be safe; but your reputation, it seems, was greater than the fact. We ourselves know that the Mede came from the ends of the earth to the Peloponnese before your forces went out to meet him as they should; and now you overlook the Athenians, who are not far off, as he was, but near at hand. Instead of attacking them yourselves you prefer to defend yourselves when they attack, and to put yourselves at the mercy of chance by fighting men far more powerful than before. Yet you know that the barbarian failed mostly through his own mistakes, and that against these same Athenians we have often survived more through their errors than through any help from you; for hopes placed in you have before now ruined some who trusted them and made no preparations. And let none of you think that we speak out of hostility rather than complaint. Complaint is for friends who have made mistakes; accusation is for enemies who have done wrong.

70 "Besides, we believe that we, if anyone, have a right to find fault with our neighbors, especially when the interests at stake are so great. Of these, it seems to us, you are not aware. You have never considered what kind of men the Athenians are against whom you will have to fight, and how much, how utterly, they differ from you. They are innovators, quick to form plans and quick to carry out in deed whatever they decide. You are good at keeping what you have, at devising nothing new, and, when you act, at not achieving even what is necessary. Again, they are daring beyond their power, they take risks beyond their judgment, and in danger they are full of hope. Your way is to do less than your power allows, to distrust even what your judgment is sure of, and to think you will never be free of dangers. They are decisive while you hesi-

tate; they go abroad while you are the greatest stay-at-homes. For they think that by being away they may gain something, while you think that by going out you may harm even what you have. When they defeat their enemies they follow up as far as they can, and when they are beaten they fall back as little as possible. Further, they use their bodies for their city as if they were not their own, and their minds as most truly their own, to accomplish something for her. When they have formed a plan and fail to carry it out, they think they have been robbed of something that was theirs; when they go out and gain something, they think they have done little compared with what is to come. And if they fail in some attempt, they form new hopes instead and make up the loss. For they alone possess a thing and hope for it at the same moment once they have conceived it, because they set about whatever they decide so quickly. And all this they labor at, with toil and danger, all their lives, and enjoy least what they have, because they are always acquiring more. They think no holiday is anything but doing what has to be done, and they count untroubled quiet no less a misfortune than painful work. So if someone were to sum them up by saying that they were born neither to have rest themselves nor to let other men have it, he would be right.

71 "And yet, Lacedaemonians, with such a city ranged against you, you hold back. You think that peace lasts longest not for those who use their power justly but make it plain in their resolve that they will not put up with being wronged; instead you practice fairness on the principle of not hurting others and of not being harmed yourselves in defending yourselves. You could hardly achieve this even if you lived beside a city like your own. But as it is, as we have just shown, your ways are old-fashioned compared with theirs. And it is inevitable, as in any craft, that what is new always prevails. For a city at peace, established customs that are left undisturbed are best; but for those compelled to face many

challenges, much improvement is needed too. That is why the Athenian system, because of their wide experience, has been made new far more than yours. Here, then, let your slowness end. Now help the Potidaeans and the others, as you promised, by invading Attica quickly, so that you do not betray friends and kinsmen to their worst enemies, and do not drive the rest of us in despair to some other alliance. If we did so, we would be doing nothing wrong in the sight of the gods by whom we swore, or of men who understand. For it is not those who turn to others when deserted who break treaties, but those who do not help the men they swore to help. But if you are willing to be zealous, we shall stay; for we would be committing an impiety if we changed sides, and we would find no others more congenial to us. In view of this, take good counsel, and try to lead a Peloponnese no smaller than the one your fathers handed down to you."

72 So spoke the Corinthians. Now an Athenian embassy happened to be at Lacedaemon already on other business, and when its members heard of these speeches they decided that they must come before the Lacedaemonians. They did not mean to make any defense against the charges the cities were bringing, but to show on the question as a whole that the Lacedaemonians should not decide quickly but should consider it at greater length. At the same time they wanted to show how great their own city was in power, and to remind the older men of what they knew and to tell the younger of what they had not seen, thinking that their words would turn the Lacedaemonians toward peace rather than war. So they went to the Lacedaemonians and said that they too wished to address their assembly, if nothing prevented it. The Lacedaemonians invited them to come forward, and the Athenians came forward and spoke as follows.

73 "Our embassy did not come here to argue with your allies, but on the business for which our city sent us. But since we hear

that there is no small outcry against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the cities (for you are not judges before whom either we or they could plead), but so that you may not be easily persuaded by your allies to decide wrongly on matters of great importance. We wish at the same time to show, on the whole question that has been raised against us, that we hold what we possess not unreasonably, and that our city is worth taking into account. Why speak of very ancient matters, for which the evidence is hearsay rather than the eyes of those who will hear us? But the Persian Wars, and all that you know yourselves, we must speak of, even if you are weary of always hearing them brought up. For when we acted, we ran our risks for a benefit; you had your share of its substance, and we should not be robbed of all the credit, if the credit is of any use to us. What we say will be said not so much to beg off as to bear witness, and to make clear what kind of city you will have to contend with if you do not decide well. We say that at Marathon we alone stood in the front of the danger against the barbarian; and that when he came the second time, and we were not able to defend ourselves on land, we went on board our ships, the whole people, and fought with the others at Salamis. That kept him from sailing against the Peloponnese and destroying it city by city, since the cities could not have helped one another against a large fleet. He himself gave the greatest proof of it. When he was defeated at sea, he withdrew in haste with the greater part of his army, since his power was no longer a match for them.

74 "Such being the outcome, and it having been shown clearly that the fate of the Hellenes depended on their ships, we contributed the three things most useful to it: the largest number of ships, the shrewdest general, and the most unhesitating zeal. Of the four hundred ships we provided a little under two-thirds; we provided Themistocles as commander, who more than anyone

brought about the battle in the narrows, which most clearly saved the cause, and for this you yourselves honored him more than any foreigner who has ever come to you; and we showed zeal by far the most daring. When no one came to help us by land, and the rest up to our borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon our city and sacrifice our property, and even so not to desert the common cause of the remaining allies, or to scatter and become useless to them, but to go on board our ships and face the danger, and not to be angry that you had not come to our aid first. So we say that we did you no less a service than we received. You came to help from cities still inhabited, and to keep them inhabited in future, when you feared for yourselves rather than for us (at any rate, while we were still unharmed, you did not appear). We set out from a city that no longer existed and ran our risks for one that had only a slim hope of existing again, and so we helped to save you, in part, and ourselves. If we had gone over to the Mede at the start, fearing for our land, as others did, or if afterward we had not dared to take to our ships, as men already ruined, there would have been no point in your fighting at sea, since you did not have enough ships, and his affairs would have gone forward at leisure, as he wished.

75 "Do we not deserve, Lacedaemonians, for the zeal we showed then and for the intelligence of our judgment, not to be so excessively hated by the Hellenes for the empire we hold? We did not gain this empire by force. You were unwilling to stay on and finish the war against what was left of the barbarian, and the allies came to us and of their own accord asked us to be their leaders. It was the course of events itself that compelled us at first to advance our empire to its present point, chiefly out of fear, then for honor as well, and later for advantage too. And it no longer seemed safe, once we were hated by most of them, when some had already revolted and been subdued, and when you were no

longer friendly to us as before but suspicious and at odds with us, to let it go and run the risk; for those who revolted would have gone over to you. No one can be blamed for arranging his own interests well when the greatest dangers are at stake.

76 "You at any rate, Lacedaemonians, lead the cities in the Peloponnese after arranging their affairs to suit your interest. And if you had stayed on through the whole of that time and become hated in your leadership, as we have, we know well that you would have been no less oppressive to your allies, and would have been compelled either to rule with a strong hand or to run risks yourselves. So we too have done nothing remarkable, nothing contrary to human ways, if we accepted an empire that was offered to us and then did not give it up, mastered by the three strongest motives, honor, fear, and advantage. Nor were we the first to act this way: it has always been established that the weaker are kept down by the stronger. And we thought ourselves worthy of it, and so did you, until now, calculating your interest, you use the argument of justice. Yet no one, given the chance to gain something by strength, has ever preferred that argument and so held back from taking more. Those deserve praise who, following human nature in ruling others, prove more just than their power requires. At any rate we think that if others took our place they would show very clearly whether we are moderate; but in our case our very fairness has brought us, unreasonably, more ill repute than praise.

77 "For although we put ourselves at a disadvantage in lawsuits with our allies under our agreements, and have the cases tried at Athens under laws equal for both sides, we are thought to be fond of litigation. And none of them asks why others who have an empire elsewhere, and are less moderate toward their subjects than we are, are not reproached for this. It is because those who can use force have no need of lawsuits. But our allies, used to dealing with us on equal terms, if they are worsted in any way contrary

to what they think right, whether by a decision or by the power our empire gives us, are not grateful that they have not lost more; they resent what they lack more bitterly than if we had put the law aside from the start and openly taken more than our share. In that case not even they would have argued that the weaker ought not to give way to the stronger. Men, it seems, are angrier at being wronged than at being forced. The one seems like being cheated by an equal, the other like being compelled by a superior. At any rate they endured worse than this at the hands of the Mede, but our empire seems harsh to them; and naturally so, for the present is always heavy to subjects. You, certainly, if you overthrew us and ruled in our place, would soon lose the goodwill you have won through fear of us, if you were to show the same disposition now as you displayed during your brief leadership against the Mede. For you have customs of your own that do not mix with those of others, and besides, each one of you, when he goes abroad, follows neither these nor those that the rest of Hellas observes.

78 "Deliberate slowly, then, as on no small matter, and do not let the judgments and grievances of others persuade you to bring trouble on yourselves. Before you are in the war, consider how great a part the unforeseen plays in it. As it lengthens it usually comes down to chance, which both of us are equally far from controlling, and its outcome is a risk in the dark. When men go to war they turn first to action, which should come later, and only when they are suffering do they take up words. We have not yet made any such mistake ourselves, and we see that you have not. So we tell you, while good counsel is still a free choice for both of us, not to break the treaty or violate your oaths, but to settle our differences by arbitration according to the agreement. Otherwise, calling to witness the gods by whom we swore, we shall try to defend ourselves against you if you begin the war, in whatever way you lead."

79 So spoke the Athenians. When the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges of the allies against the Athenians and what the Athenians had said, they sent everyone out and deliberated among themselves about the situation. The opinions of the majority tended the same way: that the Athenians were already in the wrong and that they must go to war quickly. But Archidamus their king, a man thought to be both intelligent and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows.

80 "I myself have experience of many wars already, Lacedaemonians, and I see among you men of the same age, so that no one is likely to long for war out of inexperience, as most men would, or because he thinks it a good and safe thing. You would find that this war you are now deliberating about would be no small one, if you considered it soberly. Against the Peloponnesians and our neighbors our strength is of a like kind, and we can move quickly against each of them. But against men whose land is far away, who are besides the most experienced at sea, and who are excellently equipped in every other way, with private and public wealth, with ships and horses and arms, and with a population larger than any other single place in Hellas, and who also have many allies paying them tribute, how can we lightly take up a war against such men, and in what can we trust that we should rush into it unprepared? In our ships? But we are weaker there; and if we train and prepare to match them, it will take time. In our money? But there we fall short still further: we have none in a common treasury, and we do not readily pay contributions from our private means.

81 "Perhaps someone may take confidence in our superiority in arms and numbers, so that we can invade and ravage their land. But they have much other land under their rule, and they will bring in what they need by sea. If, again, we try to make their allies revolt, we shall have to support these too with ships, since most of

them are islanders. What kind of war, then, will ours be? Unless we either defeat them at sea or take away the revenues from which they maintain their navy, we shall take more harm than we inflict. And in that case it will no longer be honorable even to make peace, especially if we are thought to have begun the quarrel. Let us not be carried away by the hope that the war will soon be over if we ravage their land. I fear rather that we may leave it to our children as well, so unlikely is it that the Athenians, with their pride, will be slaves to their land, or be panic-stricken by war like men without experience.

82 "I do not say that we should be so insensible as to let them harm our allies, or fail to expose their plots. But we should not take up arms yet. We should send to them and make complaints, without either threatening war too openly or suggesting that we will give way; and meanwhile we should build up our own strength by winning allies, Hellenes and barbarians alike, wherever we can gain any addition in naval power or money (no one can blame those who, like us, are the targets of Athenian plots for saving themselves by taking on barbarians as well as Hellenes), and at the same time we should develop our own resources. If they listen to our envoys, so much the better. If not, after two or three years have passed we shall be better fortified and can go against them, if we so decide. And perhaps when they see our preparations, and our words keeping pace with them, they will be more inclined to give way, while their land is still unravaged and they are deliberating about goods they still possess and that are not yet destroyed. For you must think of their land as nothing but a hostage, and the better it is cultivated, the better the hostage. We should spare it as long as possible, and not drive them to desperation and so make them harder to handle. For if we are unprepared, and are hurried by the complaints of our allies into ravaging it, take care that we do not bring on the Peloponnese more disgrace and more diffi-

culty. Complaints, whether of cities or of individuals, can be settled; but a war taken up by all for the sake of private interests, when no one can know how it will go, is not easy to end with honor.

83 "And let no one think it cowardice that many of us do not quickly attack one city. They too have allies, no fewer than ours, who pay them money; and war is a matter not so much of arms as of money, which makes arms effective, especially when a land power fights a sea power. Let us first provide ourselves with money, then, and not be carried away beforehand by the speeches of our allies. Since it is we who will bear most of the blame for the outcome, whichever way it goes, let us also take time to look ahead a little.

84 "And do not be ashamed of the slowness and hesitation for which they blame us most. If you hurry, you will be longer in finishing, because you started unprepared; and besides, the city we inhabit has always been free and most highly regarded. This quality may well be, more than anything, a sensible moderation. Because of it we alone neither grow insolent in success nor give way to misfortune as much as others. When people urge us to dangers with praise, against our own judgment, we are not carried away by the pleasure of it; and if anyone tries to provoke us with accusations, we are no more persuaded for being vexed. We are good in war and good in counsel because of our discipline: good in war because shame is the chief part of self-control and courage the chief part of shame; good in counsel because we are brought up too unlearned to look down on the laws, and with too severe a discipline to disobey them. We are not so clever in useless things as to find fine words of blame for the enemy's preparations and then fail to match them in deed. We hold rather that the minds of our neighbors are much like our own, and that the chances that befall us cannot be determined by argument. We always prepare in

deed against our enemies on the assumption that their plans are good. We must place our hopes not on the chance that they will blunder, but on the soundness of our own foresight. And we should not think that one man differs much from another, but that the best is he who is trained in the hardest school of necessity.

85 "These are the practices that our fathers handed down to us and that we have always kept, to our benefit. Let us not give them up, or in a brief part of a single day, under pressure, decide about many lives, much wealth, many cities, and our good name. Let us decide at leisure. We can do this more than others, because of our strength. Send to the Athenians about Potidaea, and send about the wrongs the allies say they suffer, especially since the Athenians are ready to submit to arbitration; and against one who offers arbitration it is not lawful to proceed as against a wrongdoer before the case is heard. But prepare for war at the same time. This will be the best decision for yourselves and the most frightening to your enemies." So spoke Archidamus. Last of all Sthenelaidas, who was one of the ephors at the time, came forward and spoke as follows.

86 "The long speech of the Athenians I do not understand. They praised themselves at length, but nowhere denied that they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnese. And yet if they were good men then against the Medes but are bad men now toward us, they deserve double punishment, because they have turned bad from good. We are the same now as we were then, and if we are sensible we shall not stand by while our allies are wronged, nor delay to help them; for they are not delaying in their suffering. Others have much money, and ships, and horses; we have good allies, whom we must not betray to the Athenians. Nor must this be settled by lawsuits and words, since it is not in words that our allies are being harmed. We must help them quickly and with all our strength. And let no one tell us that we ought to deliberate

when we are being wronged; it is rather those who intend to do wrong who ought to deliberate long. Vote for war, then, Lacedaemonians, as befits Sparta. Do not let the Athenians grow greater, and let us not betray our allies, but with the help of the gods let us go against the wrongdoers."

87 When he had said this, he himself, as ephor, put the question to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. They decide by shouting, not by ballot, and he said he could not tell which shout was louder. Wanting them to show their opinion openly and so to be more eager for war, he said: "Those of you, Lacedaemonians, who think that the treaty has been broken and that the Athenians are in the wrong, stand up and go to that place," pointing to a place, "and those who do not think so, to the other side." They stood up and divided, and those who thought the treaty had been broken were far more numerous. They called in the allies and told them that in their own view the Athenians were in the wrong, but that they wanted to summon all the allies and put it to a vote, so that they might make war by a common decision, if it was so decided. Having accomplished this, the allies went home, and the Athenian envoys later did the same, after doing the business for which they had come. This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the thirty years' treaty that was concluded after the affair of Euboea.[8]

Notes

88 The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken and that they must go to war, not so much because they had been persuaded by the arguments of their allies as because they feared the Athenians and the further growth of their power, seeing that most of Hellas was already in their hands.

89 For it was in the following way that the Athenians came to the position in which they grew great. When the Medes withdrew from Europe, defeated by the Hellenes on sea and on land, and those of them who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, who had led the Hellenes at Mycale,[9] went home with the allies from the Peloponnese. But the Athenians, and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont who had by now revolted from the King, stayed on and laid siege to Sestos, which the Medes held. They spent the winter before it and took it after the barbarians abandoned it; and after that they sailed away from the Hellespont, each to his own city. As for the Athenian people, as soon as the barbarians had left their country they began to bring back their children, their wives, and what remained of their belongings from the places where they had put them for safety, and they prepared to rebuild the city and its walls. For only short stretches of the circuit wall were still standing, and most of the houses had fallen; a few survived, those in which the Persian grandees had themselves been quartered.

90 The Lacedaemonians saw what was coming and sent an embassy. In part they themselves would have preferred to see neither the Athenians nor anyone else with a wall; but they acted chiefly because their allies urged them on, alarmed at the size of the Athenian navy, which had not existed before, and at the daring the Athenians had shown in the Median war. They asked the Athenians not to build walls, and instead to join them in pulling down the circuit walls of all the cities outside the Peloponnese that still had them standing. They did not reveal to the Athenians what they really wanted or what they suspected; the reason they gave was that the barbarian, if he came again, would then have no strong place to start from, as he had lately started from Thebes. The Peloponnese, they said, was enough for everyone, both as a refuge and as a base. On the advice of Themistocles, the Athenians

answered that they would send envoys to Sparta about what the Lacedaemonians proposed, and dismissed them at once. Themistocles then told the Athenians to send him to Lacedaemon as quickly as possible; to choose other envoys to go with him, but not to send them off at once, and to hold them back until they had raised the wall to the minimum height from which it could be defended; and meanwhile to have everyone in the city, the whole population, men, women, and children, build the wall, sparing no building, private or public, that could be of any use to the work, but pulling everything down. Having given these instructions, and hinted that he would see to everything else at Sparta himself, he left. When he reached Lacedaemon he did not go to the authorities, but kept putting it off and making excuses. Whenever one of those in office asked him why he did not appear before the public authorities, he said he was waiting for his fellow envoys: some business had kept them behind, but he expected them to arrive soon and was surprised that they were not there yet.

91 Hearing this, they believed Themistocles, because of their friendship for him; but when others arrived and stated plainly that the wall was being built and was already rising, they did not see how they could disbelieve it. When he learned of this, he told them not to be misled by talk, but rather to send men of their own, men of good character, who would look and report faithfully. So they sent them; and Themistocles sent word about them secretly to the Athenians, telling them to detain these men as inconspicuously as possible and not to let them go until he and his colleagues were safely home. (For his fellow envoys, Abronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of Lysimachus, had by now joined him, with the news that the wall was high enough.) He feared that the Lacedaemonians, once they heard the plain truth, would not let them go. So the Athenians detained the envoys as instructed, and Themistocles went before the Lacedaemonians and there at last

spoke openly. Their city, he said, was now walled, strongly enough to protect its inhabitants; if the Lacedaemonians or their allies wished to send embassies to them, they should come in the future as to men capable of judging both their own interests and the common interest. When they had thought it better to abandon their city and take to the ships, they had made that daring decision, he said, without the Lacedaemonians; and in everything they had deliberated on together with them, they had shown themselves second to none in judgment. So now, too, it seemed better to them that their city should have a wall, and this would be of more use both to their own citizens in particular and to the allies as a whole. For it was impossible to have an equal or even a similar voice in common deliberations without a matching strength behind it. Either, then, he said, all the members of the alliance must be without walls, or they must accept that this, too, was right.

92 When the Lacedaemonians heard this, they showed no open anger at the Athenians, for they had sent their embassy not to stop them but, so they said, to offer advice for the common good; and besides, they were at that time on the friendliest terms with them, because of the zeal they had shown against the Mede. Still, they had failed to get what they wanted, and they were secretly aggrieved. The envoys of each side went home without formal complaint.

93 In this way the Athenians walled their city in a short time. The construction shows even now that it was done in haste. The foundations are laid with stones of every kind, in places not even shaped to fit but set just as each was brought up at the time, and many gravestones and stones already worked for other purposes were built into it. For the circuit of the city was carried out farther on every side, and so they hurried, sparing nothing. Themistocles also persuaded them to finish building Piraeus (a start had been

made on it earlier, during the year he held office as archon at Athens). He judged the site a fine one, with its three natural harbors, and thought that the Athenians, now that they had become a seafaring people, would gain a great advantage from it in acquiring power; for he was the first who dared to say that they must lay hold of the sea, and he at once began helping to lay the foundations of the empire. On his advice they built the wall to the thickness that can still be seen around Piraeus: it was wide enough for two wagons, going in opposite directions, to pass each other as they brought up the stones. Inside there was neither rubble nor clay, but large stones, cut square, fitted together and bound to one another on the outside with iron clamps and lead. The height was carried to only about half of what he intended. He wanted the size and thickness of the wall to keep off the designs of enemies, and he thought that a few men, and those the least fit for service, would be enough to guard it, while the rest manned the ships. For he gave his attention above all to the fleet, having seen, as it seems to me, that the King's army had an easier approach by sea than by land. He considered Piraeus more useful than the upper city, and he often advised the Athenians that if they were ever overpowered by land, they should go down to it and with their ships resist all comers. This, then, was how the Athenians were walled and made their other preparations immediately after the withdrawal of the Medes.

94 Pausanias son of Cleombrotus was sent out from Lacedaemon as general of the Hellenes, with twenty ships from the Peloponnese; the Athenians sailed with him with thirty ships, and a number of the other allies. They campaigned against Cyprus and subdued most of it, and afterward against Byzantium, which the Medes held, and took it by siege, still under Spartan leadership.

95 But he was already behaving with violence, and the other Hellenes resented it, not least the Ionians and all those who had recently been freed from the King. They kept coming to the Athenians and asking them to become their leaders, on the ground of kinship, and not to give way to Pausanias if he tried to use force anywhere. The Athenians accepted these proposals and turned their minds to the matter, resolved not to stand by and to settle everything else as seemed best to them. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias to question him about what they had been hearing; for the Hellenes who came to Sparta accused him of great injustice, and his conduct looked more like an imitation of tyranny than a generalship. It so happened that his recall came at the very time when the allies, out of hatred for him, went over to the Athenians, all except the soldiers from the Peloponnese. When he came to Lacedaemon he was found guilty of the wrongs he had done to particular individuals, but acquitted on the gravest charges. Not the least of the charges against him was Medism, collusion with the Mede, and it seemed the best founded of all. They did not send him out again as commander, but sent Dorcis and some others with him, with no large force. The allies would no longer grant them the leadership; and when they saw this they went home. After that the Lacedaemonians sent out no more commanders, for fear that those who went abroad would be corrupted, as they had seen happen with Pausanias. They also wanted to be rid of the Median war, and they thought the Athenians capable of leading it and, at that time, well disposed toward themselves.

96 In this way the Athenians took over the leadership, with the allies' consent, because of the hatred felt for Pausanias. They fixed which of the cities were to provide money for the war against the barbarian and which ships; the declared aim was to avenge what they had suffered by laying waste the King's territory. It was then

that the Athenians first set up the office of the Hellenotamiae, the "treasurers of Hellas," who received the tribute; for this was the name given to the contribution of money. The first tribute was assessed at 460 talents. Their treasury was at Delos, and the congresses were held in the temple there.

97 As leaders of allies who were at first autonomous and deliberated in common congresses, they carried out the following enterprises, in war and in the management of affairs, between the Median war and this one: against the barbarian, against their own allies when these rebelled, and against such Peloponnesians as came into conflict with them on each occasion. I have written of these things, and allowed myself this digression from my account, for this reason: this period had been left out by all my predecessors, who wrote either of the affairs of Hellas before the Median wars or of the Median wars themselves; and the one who did touch on these events, Hellanicus, in his *Attic History*,[10] mentioned them briefly and with inaccurate dates. The account also shows, at the same time, how the Athenian empire came to be established.

98 First, under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, they besieged and took Eion on the Strymon, which the Medes held, and enslaved its people. Next they enslaved the people of Scyros, the island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopians, and settled it themselves. They had a war with the Carystians, without the rest of Euboea, and in time the two sides came to terms. After this they made war on the Naxians, who had revolted, and reduced them by siege; and this was the first allied city to be enslaved contrary to the established terms. Afterward the same thing happened to the others, as each case arose.

99 There were various causes of the revolts, but the chief ones were arrears in tribute or ships and, in some cases, failure to serve. For the Athenians exacted everything strictly, and they made themselves offensive by applying compulsion to men who

were neither used to hardship nor willing to endure it. In other ways too the Athenians were no longer so popular as rulers; they did not share in campaigns on equal terms, and it was easy for them to bring back into line those who revolted. For this the allies had only themselves to blame. Because of their reluctance to go on campaign, most of them, to avoid being away from home, had themselves assessed to pay their share of the cost in money instead of ships. So the Athenian navy grew on the money they contributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, entered the war unprepared and without experience.

100 After this came the battle, on land and at sea, at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, between the Athenians and their allies and the Medes. The Athenians won both on the same day, under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, and took or destroyed Phoenician triremes to the number of two hundred in all. Some time later the Thasians revolted from them, after a quarrel over the trading posts on the facing coast of Thrace and the mine they worked. The Athenians sailed against Thasos with a fleet, won a battle at sea, and landed on the island. About the same time they sent ten thousand settlers, their own people and allies, to the Strymon, to colonize the place then called Nine Ways and now Amphipolis. They made themselves masters of Nine Ways, which the Edonians held; but when they advanced into the interior of Thrace they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the Thracians acting all together, who regarded the founding of a settlement at Nine Ways as an act of war.

101 The Thasians, defeated in battle and under siege, appealed to the Lacedaemonians and urged them to come to their aid by invading Attica. The Lacedaemonians promised to do so, without the knowledge of the Athenians, and intended to; but they were prevented by the earthquake that occurred, during which their Helots, and from among the Perioeci the Thuriates and the

Aethaeans, revolted from them and went to Ithome. Most of the Helots were descendants of the old Messenians who had been enslaved in former times; and so all of them were called Messenians. The Lacedaemonians, then, had a war on their hands against those in Ithome; and the Thasians, in the third year of the siege, came to terms with the Athenians. They pulled down their wall and handed over their ships; they agreed to pay at once whatever money was required and to pay tribute in the future; and they gave up their holdings on the mainland and the mine.

102 As the war against those in Ithome dragged on, the Lacedaemonians called in their allies, the Athenians among them; and the Athenians came, under the command of Cimon, in no small numbers. They had been called in chiefly because they were thought to be good at assaulting walls; but because the siege had dragged on so long, the Lacedaemonians themselves were evidently lacking in this skill, for otherwise they would have taken the place by storm. It was out of this campaign that the first open quarrel arose between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians. When the place could not be taken by storm, the Lacedaemonians, fearing the daring and the revolutionary spirit of the Athenians, and regarding them besides as men of another race, became afraid that if they stayed they might be persuaded by those in Ithome to make some revolutionary move. So they sent them away, alone of the allies, not revealing their suspicion, but saying that they had no further need of them. The Athenians recognized that they were not being sent away on the more respectable ground, but because some suspicion had arisen. They resented it, feeling that they had not deserved such treatment from the Lacedaemonians, and as soon as they had returned home they renounced the alliance they had made with them against the Mede and became allies of the Argives, the Lacedaemonians' enemies; and both alike entered into the same oaths and alliance with the Thessalians.

103 Those in Ithome, in the tenth year, when they could hold out no longer, came to terms with the Lacedaemonians: they were to leave the Peloponnese under a truce and never set foot in it again, and if any of them were caught there, he was to be the slave of whoever seized him. The Lacedaemonians had also received, some time before, an oracle from Delphi telling them to let the suppliant of Zeus of Ithome go free. So they came out, the men with their children and wives, and the Athenians, out of the hostility they now felt toward the Lacedaemonians, took them in and settled them at Naupactus, which they had recently captured from the Ozolian Locrians who held it. The Megarians, too, went over to the Athenians as allies, revolting from the Lacedaemonians, because the Corinthians were pressing them hard in a war over boundaries. So the Athenians held Megara and Pegae; they built the Megarians their long walls from the city to Nisaea and garrisoned them themselves. It was from this, above all, that the Corinthians' violent hatred of the Athenians first began.

104 Inaros son of Psammetichus, a Libyan, king of the Libyans who border on Egypt, setting out from Marea, the city above Pharos, brought most of Egypt to revolt from King Artaxerxes. Having made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians. They happened to be campaigning against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and their allies; they left Cyprus and came. They sailed up the Nile from the sea, and making themselves masters of the river and of two parts of Memphis, they made war on the third part, which is called the White Wall. Inside it were the Persians and Medes who had fled there, and those Egyptians who had not joined the revolt.

105 The Athenians made a landing from their ships at Halieis, and a battle took place there against the Corinthians and Epidaurians; the Corinthians won. Later the Athenians fought a sea battle off Cecryphaleia against a Peloponnesian fleet, and the

Athenians won. After this war broke out between the Athenians and the Aeginetans, and a great sea battle was fought off Aegina between the Athenians and the Aeginetans, with the allies of each side present. The Athenians won, took seventy of their ships, landed on the island, and laid siege to the city, under the command of Leocrates son of Stroebus. Then the Peloponnesians, wishing to help the Aeginetans, first sent over to Aegina three hundred hoplites, auxiliaries of the Corinthians and Epidaurians; then the Corinthians and their allies seized the heights of Geraneia and came down into the Megarid. They thought the Athenians would be unable to help the Megarians, with large forces away both in Aegina and in Egypt; or that if they did help, they would have to raise the siege of Aegina. But the Athenians did not move the army at Aegina; of those left in the city, the oldest and the youngest went to Megara under the command of Myronides. A battle was fought against the Corinthians that came out even, and the two sides separated, each thinking it had not had the worse of the action. The Athenians, who had in fact had rather the better of it, set up a trophy when the Corinthians withdrew. But the Corinthians, taunted by the older men in their city, made their preparations, and about twelve days later they came back and set up a trophy of their own, as though they too had won. The Athenians sallied out from Megara, killed the men who were setting up the trophy, engaged the rest, and defeated them.

106 The defeated army fell back, and a sizable part of it, hard pressed and having lost its way, blundered onto a private estate that happened to be enclosed by a great ditch, with no way out. When the Athenians saw this, they blocked them in from the front with their hoplites, posted their light-armed troops in a ring around them, and stoned to death every man who had gone in. This was a heavy blow to the Corinthians. The main body of their army returned home.

107 About this time the Athenians also began to build their long walls down to the sea, the one to Phalerum and the one to Piraeus. The Phocians campaigned against Doris, the mother country of the Lacedaemonians, with its towns of Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineum, and took one of these towns. The Lacedaemonians, led by Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus in place of King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, who was still a minor, came to the aid of the Dorians with 1,500 hoplites of their own and 10,000 of their allies, compelled the Phocians to give the town back on terms, and set out for home. If they wanted to cross by sea, through the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians were ready to sail around with a fleet and stop them; and the route over Geraneia did not look safe to them while the Athenians held Megara and Pegae. For Geraneia was hard to cross and was always guarded by the Athenians, and on this occasion they learned that the Athenians meant to stop them there too. So they decided to wait in Boeotia and consider how they might get through most safely. In part, too, certain Athenians were secretly inviting them in, hoping to put an end to the democracy and to the building of the long walls. The Athenians marched out against them in full force, with a thousand Argives and contingents from each of their other allies; altogether they numbered 14,000. They marched against them because they thought the enemy were at a loss how to get through, and partly also on suspicion of a plot to overthrow the democracy. Thessalian cavalry also came to the Athenians under the terms of the alliance, but in the course of the action they went over to the Lacedaemonians.

108 A battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies won; there was great slaughter on both sides. The Lacedaemonians went into the Megarid, cut down the trees, and returned home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. On the sixty-second day after the battle the Athenians marched against the Boeotians under the command of Myronides, defeated

them in a battle at Oenophyta, and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They pulled down the wall of Tanagra, took a hundred of the richest of the Opuntian Locrians as hostages, and completed their own long walls. After this the Aeginetans, too, came to terms with the Athenians: they pulled down their walls, handed over their ships, and agreed to pay tribute in the future. And the Athenians sailed around the Peloponnese under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus; they burned the dockyard of the Lacedaemonians, took Chalcis, a Corinthian town, and defeated the Sicyonians in battle after making a landing on their territory.

109 The Athenians and their allies in Egypt stayed on, and the war there took many forms. At first the Athenians were masters of Egypt, and the King sent a Persian named Megabazus to Lacedaemon with money, so that the Peloponnesians might be persuaded to invade Attica and so draw the Athenians away from Egypt. When this made no headway and the money was being spent to no purpose, Megabazus was brought back to Asia with what was left of it, and the King sent Megabyzus son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large army. He arrived by land, defeated the Egyptians and their allies in battle, drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and finally shut them up on the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year and six months. At last he drained the canal and turned the water off elsewhere, leaving their ships high and dry and making most of the island part of the mainland; then he crossed over and took the island on foot.

110 So the cause of the Hellenes was lost after six years of war. A few out of many made their way through Libya to Cyrene and were saved; most of them perished. Egypt came under the King again, except for Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes. Him they could not capture, because of the extent of the marsh; and besides, the marsh people are the best fighters among the Egyptians. Inaros, the king of the Libyans, who had been responsi-

ble for everything that was done in Egypt, was taken by treachery and impaled. Fifty triremes from Athens and the rest of the alliance, sailing to Egypt to relieve the others, put in at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile knowing nothing of what had happened. Infantry fell on them from the land and a Phoenician fleet from the sea, and destroyed most of the ships; the smaller part got away. Such was the end of the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt.

111 Orestes son of Echecratidas, the king of the Thessalians, had been exiled from Thessaly, and he persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking along the Boeotians and the Phocians, who were their allies, the Athenians marched against Pharsalus in Thessaly. They were masters of the countryside, so far as they could be without going far from their camp, for the Thessalian cavalry kept them in check; but they did not take the city, and nothing else for which they had come succeeded either. They went back again with Orestes, having achieved nothing. Not long after this a thousand Athenians went aboard the ships at Pegae (Pegae was in their hands), sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, landed, and defeated those of the Sicyonians who engaged them. At once they took the Achaeans on board, crossed the gulf, and marched against Oeniadae in Acarnania and besieged it. They did not take it, however, but went home.

112 Three years later a five years' truce was made between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. The Athenians held off from war in Hellas, and campaigned against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these ships sailed off to Egypt, at the request of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, and the rest besieged Citium. When Cimon died and food ran short, they withdrew from Citium, and sailing off Salamis in Cyprus they fought the Phoenicians,

Cyprians, and Cilicians at sea and on land at once. They won both battles and went home, and with them the ships that had come back from Egypt. After this the Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called Sacred War: they took control of the temple at Delphi and handed it over to the Delphians. Later, after they withdrew, the Athenians marched out in their turn, took control of it, and handed it over to the Phocians.

113 Some time after this, when Boeotian exiles held Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places in Boeotia, the Athenians marched against these places, which were hostile to them, with a thousand hoplites of their own and the contingents of each of their allies, under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus. They took Chaeronea, enslaved its people, left a garrison, and started back. On the march, at Coronea, they were attacked by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, together with Locrians, Euboean exiles, and all who were of the same mind. These defeated them in battle, killing some of the Athenians and taking others alive. The Athenians then evacuated the whole of Boeotia, making a treaty on condition that they should recover their men. The Boeotian exiles came home, and they and all the others became independent again.

114 Not long after this Euboea revolted from the Athenians. Pericles had already crossed over to it with an Athenian army when the news reached him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that the Athenian garrison had been destroyed by the Megarians, except for those who had escaped to Nisaea. The Megarians had called in the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians and then revolted. Pericles brought the army back from Euboea in haste. After this the Peloponnesians invaded Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria and laid the country waste, under the leadership of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians; then, without advancing

any farther, they went home. And the Athenians crossed over to Euboea again under Pericles and subdued the whole island. The rest of it they settled by agreement; but they drove out the Hestiaeans and took their land for themselves.

115 Not long after their return from Euboea they made a treaty for thirty years with the Lacedaemonians and their allies,[11] giving back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea; for these were the places in the Peloponnese that the Athenians held. In the sixth year a war broke out between the Samians and the Milesians over Priene, and the Milesians, getting the worse of the war, came to Athens and loudly denounced the Samians. They were supported by certain private men from Samos itself who wanted to overthrow the constitution. So the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy; they took from the Samians fifty boys and as many men as hostages, lodged them on Lemnos, left a garrison behind, and went home. But there were some Samians who had not stayed on the island but had fled to the mainland. They made an alliance with the most powerful men in the city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, who then held Sardis; they collected about seven hundred mercenaries, and crossed over to Samos by night. First they rose against the popular party and got most of its members into their hands; then they stole their own hostages away from Lemnos and revolted, handed over to Pissuthnes the Athenian garrison and the Athenian officials who were on the island, and at once prepared to march against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with them.

116 When the Athenians learned of this, they sailed against Samos with sixty ships. They did not use sixteen of them, for some had gone toward Caria to watch for the Phoenician fleet, and others to Chios and Lesbos to summon help; but with forty-four ships, under the command of Pericles and nine other generals, they fought a sea battle off the island of Tragia against seventy

Samian ships, twenty of them troop transports (the whole fleet happened to be sailing back from Miletus), and the Athenians won. Later they were reinforced by forty ships from Athens and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos. They landed, and since they were superior on land, they besieged the city with three walls, and from the sea at the same time. Pericles took sixty of the blockading ships and went off in haste toward Caunus and Caria, on a report that Phoenician ships were sailing against them; for Stesagoras and others had also left Samos with five ships to go against the Phoenicians.

117 Meanwhile the Samians made a sudden sortie, fell on the unfortified camp, destroyed the guard ships, and defeated in battle the ships that put out against them. For about fourteen days they were masters of the sea off their own coast, and brought in and carried out whatever they wished. But when Pericles returned, they were again shut in by the fleet. Later further reinforcements came from Athens: forty ships with Thucydides,[12] Hagnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians fought a brief battle at sea, but they were unable to hold out, and in the ninth month they were reduced by siege and surrendered on terms. They pulled down their wall, gave hostages, handed over their ships, and agreed to repay the cost of the war in installments. The Byzantines, too, agreed to be subjects as before.

118 It was after this, and not many years later, that the events already described took place: the affair of Corcyra, the affair of Potidaea, and everything that became a pretext for this war. All these actions of the Hellenes against one another and against the barbarian took place in a period of about fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war. In those years the Athenians made their empire more secure and themselves advanced to great power. The Lacedaemonians saw it, but did not

try to stop it, except for brief moments, and stayed quiet most of the time; they had always been slow to go to war unless they were forced to, and they were partly held back as well by wars at home; until at last the power of the Athenians was plainly rising and they had begun to lay hands on the Lacedaemonians' own alliance. Then the Lacedaemonians found it no longer tolerable; they decided that they must set to work with all their energy and destroy that strength, if they could, by undertaking this war. The Lacedaemonians themselves had already decided that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were in the wrong; but they sent to Delphi and asked the god whether it would be better for them to go to war. He answered them, so it is said, that if they made war with all their strength they would be victorious, and that he himself would help them, whether called upon or not.

119 They summoned their allies once more, intending to put to them the vote whether they should go to war. The envoys came from the alliance and a congress was held, and the others said what they wished, most of them accusing the Athenians and demanding that the war take place. The Corinthians had already gone to each of the cities separately and begged them to vote for the war, for they feared for Potidaea and that it would be lost before help came. They were present on this occasion too, and coming forward last, they spoke as follows.

120 "Allies, we can no longer find fault with the Lacedaemonians for not having voted for the war themselves, or for not having brought us together now for this purpose. For leaders, while they treat their own interests on an equal footing with the rest, must look ahead on behalf of the common interest, just as in other ways they are honored above all. Those of us who have already had dealings with the Athenians need no lesson in being on guard against them. But those who live farther inland and away from the routes of trade must understand that if they do not help

the people of the coast, they will find it harder to bring their seasonal produce down to the sea and to take in exchange what the sea gives to the land. They must not be poor judges of what is being said here, as though it did not concern them; they must expect that if they abandon the coast, the danger will one day reach them too, and that they are deliberating now about themselves no less than about us. That is why they should not hesitate to exchange peace for war. It is the part of prudent men to keep quiet if they are not wronged; but it is the part of brave men, when they are wronged, to go from peace to war, and when the chance offers, to come to terms again after war; to be neither elated by success in war, nor, from delight in the quiet of peace, to submit to wrong. For the man who hesitates for the sake of his pleasure would very soon, if he kept quiet, be stripped of the very comfort for whose sake he hesitates; and the man who presses too far on a success in war has not reflected that he is carried away by a confidence that cannot be trusted. Many plans badly made have succeeded because the enemy proved still more ill-advised; and even more that seemed well made have ended, on the contrary, in disgrace. For no one carries a plan out in action with the same confidence with which he conceives it: we form our opinions in safety, and in action we fall short through fear.

121 "We, for our part, are now raising this war because we have been wronged and have grievances enough; and once we have punished the Athenians, we shall put an end to it in good time. There are many reasons why we are likely to prevail. First, we are superior in numbers and in military experience; second, we all alike obey orders. As for a navy, in which they are strong, we shall equip one from the resources each of us already has and from the money at Delphi and Olympia. By taking a loan we can lure away their foreign seamen with higher pay; for the power of the Athenians is bought rather than their own. Ours would be less

exposed to this, since its strength lies in men rather than in money. With a single victory at sea they will in all likelihood be beaten; and if they hold out, we too shall have more time to train ourselves at sea, and once we have brought our skill up to the level of theirs, we shall surely be their superiors in courage. For the excellence we have by nature they could never acquire by instruction; and the advantage they have in skill we can wipe out by practice. As for the money needed for all this, we shall contribute it. It would be monstrous if their allies never refuse to pay for their own enslavement, while we will not spend money to take vengeance on our enemies and to save ourselves as well, and to keep that very money from being taken from us by them and used against us.

122 "We have other ways of making war too: we can bring about the revolt of their allies, which is the best way of cutting off the revenues on which their strength depends; we can establish a fortified post in their country; and there are other measures no one could foresee now. For war, least of all things, proceeds on fixed terms; it mostly devises its own means as occasions arise. The man who deals with it calmly stands more securely; the man who loses his temper over it comes to grief all the more. Let us consider this too: if each of us had a quarrel about boundaries with an opponent of equal strength, it could be borne; but as it is, the Athenians are a match for all of us together, and still more powerful than any one city; so that unless we resist them in a body, every nation and every city with one mind, they will find us divided and master us without effort. And defeat, terrible as it may be to hear, let everyone know, brings nothing else than outright slavery. It is shameful for the Peloponnese even to mention such a thing as a possibility, or that so many cities should suffer at the hands of one. If it came to that, it would seem either that we suffered justly or that we put up with it out of cowardice and proved worse men than our fathers, who freed Hellas; while we do not even secure this free-

dom for ourselves, but allow a city to be set up as a tyrant, though we think it right to put down sole rulers in single cities. We do not know how such conduct can be acquitted of the three greatest faults, stupidity, softness, or negligence. For you have certainly not escaped them by going over to that contempt for the enemy which has done harm to more men than anything else, and which, because it trips up so many, has had its name changed to its opposite, senselessness.

123 "But why should we find fault with the past at more length than serves the present? For the sake of the future, we must come to the aid of the present by toiling still harder, for it is your ancestral custom to win excellence through hardship. You must not change that custom, even if you are now a little ahead in wealth and resources, since it is not right that what was won in poverty should be lost in plenty. You must go to war with confidence, for many reasons: the god has given his oracle and promised to help you himself, and all the rest of Hellas will join you in the struggle, some from fear and some for their own advantage. Nor will you be the first to break the treaty: the god himself, in bidding you go to war, holds that it has been violated. Rather, you will be coming to the aid of a treaty that has been wronged; for it is not those who defend themselves who break a treaty, but those who attack first.

124 "So, since you have every good reason to go to war, and since we give this advice in common, if it is true that identity of interest is the surest bond, for cities as for individuals, do not delay to bring help to the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and are being besieged by Ionians, the reverse of what used to happen, and to recover the freedom of the rest. We can no longer wait, when some are already being harmed, and others, if it becomes known that we met but did not dare to defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same. Recognize, allies, that we have come to the point of necessity, and that this is at the same time the best advice; vote

for the war, not afraid of the immediate danger, but desiring the more lasting peace that will come from it. For peace is made more secure by war, but to refuse to go to war out of love of quiet is not equally free from danger. Consider that the city that has been set up as a tyrant in Hellas has been set up against all of us alike, ruling some already and intending to rule the rest. Let us go against it and bring it to submission, so that we ourselves may live in safety in the future and free the Hellenes who are now enslaved." Such was the speech of the Corinthians.

125 When the Lacedaemonians had heard the opinions of all, they put the vote to all the allies who were present, one after another, great city and small alike, and the majority voted for war. Though the decision had been made, it was impossible for them to set to work at once, since they were unprepared; but it was resolved that each should provide what was needed, and that there should be no delay. Even so, while they were making the necessary arrangements, a full year did not pass, but something less, before they invaded Attica and openly began the war.

126 During this time they sent embassies to the Athenians with complaints, so as to have the strongest possible pretext for going to war if the Athenians paid no attention. First the Lacedaemonians sent envoys and told the Athenians to drive out the curse of the goddess.[13] The curse was this. There was an Athenian named Cylon, a victor at Olympia, a man of old family and of great influence, who had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, who at that time was tyrant of Megara. When Cylon consulted the oracle at Delphi, the god answered that he should seize the Acropolis of Athens at the greatest festival of Zeus. He got troops from Theagenes, persuaded his friends to join him, and when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnese came round, he seized the Acropolis in order to make himself tyrant, thinking that this was the greatest festival of Zeus and that it had

some special bearing on himself as an Olympic victor. Whether the greatest festival meant was in Attica or somewhere else, he did not stop to consider, and the oracle did not make it plain. (For the Athenians too have a festival, the Diasia, which is called the greatest festival of Zeus Meilichius; it is held outside the city, and the whole people offer many sacrifices at it, not animal victims but bloodless offerings of the local kind.) Believing that he had understood correctly, he made the attempt. When the Athenians learned of it, they came in from the fields in full force against them, sat down before the Acropolis, and besieged it. As time went on, the Athenians grew weary of the blockade, and most of them went away, leaving the guard to the nine archons with full power to settle everything as they judged best; for in those days the nine archons conducted most of the business of the state. Cylon and those with him, under siege, were in a bad way for lack of food and water. Cylon and his brother escaped; but the rest, as they were hard pressed and some were even dying of hunger, sat down as suppliants at the altar on the Acropolis. Those of the Athenians who had been charged with the guard, seeing them dying in the sanctuary, raised them up, promising to do them no harm, led them away, and killed them. Some who had sat down at the altars of the Dread Goddesses as they passed were also put to death there. From this those men and their descendants were called accursed and offenders against the goddess. The Athenians drove out these accursed men, and later Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian also drove them out, with the help of an Athenian faction; they drove out the living, and dug up the bones of the dead and cast them out. They came back afterward, however, and their family is still in the city.

127 This, then, was the curse the Lacedaemonians told the Athenians to drive out, ostensibly to avenge the honor of the gods first of all. But they knew that Pericles son of Xanthippus was con-

nected with it through his mother, and they thought that if he were banished, things would go more easily for them with the Athenians. They did not so much expect that he would actually suffer this as that it would bring him into discredit with his city, as though the war would be partly due to the taint upon him. For he was the most powerful man of his time and the leader of the state, and he opposed the Lacedaemonians in everything; he would not let the Athenians give way, but kept urging them on to war.

128 The Athenians in return told the Lacedaemonians to drive out the curse of Taenarum. For the Lacedaemonians had once raised up some Helot suppliants from the temple of Poseidon at Taenarum, led them away, and killed them; and they themselves believe that this was the cause of the great earthquake at Sparta. The Athenians also told them to drive out the curse of the goddess of the Bronze House.[14] It came about as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled the first time by the Spartiates from his command in the Hellespont, and had been tried by them and acquitted of wrongdoing, he was not sent out again in any public capacity. But he took a trireme from Hermione on his own account, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians, and arrived at the Hellespont, in word to take part in the Hellenic war, but in fact to carry on his dealings with the King, as he had first attempted before, with the aim of ruling over Hellas. He had begun by doing the King a service, and so made a start on the whole enterprise, in this way. When he took Byzantium on his earlier visit, after the return from Cyprus (it was held by the Medes, and some relatives and kinsmen of the King had been captured there), he sent back to the King the prisoners he had taken, without the knowledge of the other allies, and gave out that they had escaped from him. He arranged this with Gongylus of Eretria, to whom he had entrusted Byzantium and the prisoners. He also sent Gongylus to carry a letter to the King, in which, as was later dis-

covered, the following was written: “Pausanias, the commander of Sparta, wishing to do you a favor, sends you back these men, whom he took with the spear. And I propose, if you agree, to marry your daughter and to bring Sparta and the rest of Hellas under your rule. I believe I am able to do this with you as my partner in counsel. If any of this pleases you, send a trustworthy man down to the sea, through whom we shall communicate from now on.”

129 That was all the letter disclosed. Xerxes was pleased with it, and he sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces down to the sea, ordering him to take over the satrapy of Dascylium, removing Megabates, who had governed it before. He gave him a letter in reply, to send across to Pausanias at Byzantium as quickly as possible, showing him the royal seal; and if Pausanias gave him any instructions about his own affairs, he was to carry them out as well and as faithfully as he could. Artabazus arrived, did everything else as he had been told, and sent the letter across. The reply read as follows: “Thus says King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom you saved for me from Byzantium across the sea, a benefaction is laid up for you in our house, recorded forever; and I am pleased with your words. Let neither night nor day hold you back from pressing on with anything you promise me; let neither the cost in gold and silver nor the number of troops, if they are needed anywhere, stand in your way. With Artabazus, a good man whom I have sent to you, act boldly in my affairs and in yours, so that they may turn out most honorably and best for us both.”

130 On receiving this letter, Pausanias, who had already been held in great esteem by the Hellenes because of his command at Plataea, grew far more elated than before and could no longer live in the established way. He would go out from Byzantium dressed in Median clothes; when he traveled through Thrace, Medes and Egyptians served as his bodyguard; he had a Persian table set for him; and he could not keep his purpose to himself, but showed by

small acts what he meant to do on a larger scale later on. He made himself hard to approach, and treated everyone alike with a temper so harsh that no one could come near him. This was not the least of the reasons why the alliance went over to the Athenians.

131 It was for these very reasons that the Lacedaemonians, when they learned of them, had recalled him the first time. And now he had sailed out a second time in the ship from Hermione without their orders and was evidently behaving in the same way; he had been forced out of Byzantium by the Athenians in a siege, and instead of returning to Sparta he had settled at Colonae in the Troad, and reports came to them that he was intriguing with the barbarians and that his stay there was for no good purpose. So at last they waited no longer. The ephors sent a herald with a scytale, the staff on which they wrote their dispatches, and told him to come back with the herald, or else the Spartiates declared war on him. Wishing to be as little suspected as possible, and confident that he could clear himself of the charge with money, he returned to Sparta a second time. At first he was thrown into prison by the ephors (the ephors have the power to do this to the king); afterward he arranged matters and got out, and offered to stand trial before anyone who wished to bring proof against him.

132 The Spartiates had no clear evidence, neither his enemies nor the city as a whole, on which they could rely with confidence in punishing a man of the royal house who held high honor at the time; for he was the cousin of Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was king and still a minor, and was acting as his regent. But by his disregard of the laws and his imitation of the barbarians he gave much cause for suspicion that he was not content to stay within the bounds of his present position. They went over the rest of his conduct, to see whether he had anywhere departed from the established customs, and they recalled that he had once taken it upon himself to have the following couplet inscribed in his own

name on the tripod at Delphi, which the Hellenes had dedicated as first fruits from the spoils of the Medes: "Leader of the Hellenes, when he destroyed the army of the Medes, / Pausanias set up this memorial to Phoebus." The Lacedaemonians had at once chiseled this couplet off the tripod and inscribed on it the names of all the cities that had joined in overthrowing the barbarian and had set up the offering. Still, even at the time this was thought to be a crime on Pausanias's part, and now that he had come under suspicion, it seemed all the more to be of a piece with his present designs. They learned, too, that he was intriguing with the Helots; and so he was. He promised them freedom and citizenship if they would rise with him and help him carry the whole plan through. But even so they would not trust certain Helots who informed against him, nor think fit to take any drastic step against him. In this they kept to their usual practice toward their own people: not to be hasty in deciding anything irreparable against a Spartiate without indisputable proof. At last, it is said, the man who was to carry to Artabazus the last letters for the King, a man of Argilus, who had once been Pausanias's lover and was most trusted by him, turned informer. He had grown afraid when it occurred to him that none of the messengers before him had ever come back. So he counterfeited the seal, so that if he proved mistaken in his suspicion, or if Pausanias asked for the letters back to change something, he would not discover it, and opened the letters. Suspecting that some instruction of this kind had been added, he found it written there that he himself was to be killed.

133 Then, when he showed them the letters, the ephors were more inclined to believe; but they wanted to hear something from Pausanias's own mouth as well. By arrangement, the man went to Taenarum as a suppliant and built a hut divided in two by a partition, in which he hid some of the ephors; and when Pausanias came to him and asked the reason for his supplication, they heard

everything clearly. The man reproached him with what had been written about himself and set out the rest point by point: he had never once put Pausanias at risk in his errands to the King, and yet he had been granted the same honor as the mass of servants, to be put to death. Pausanias admitted these very things and told him not to be angry about what had happened; he gave him a pledge of safety if he would leave the sanctuary, and asked him to set out as quickly as possible and not hinder what was being done.

134 Having heard it all exactly, the ephors went away for the time being; and now that they knew for certain, they prepared to arrest him in the city. It is said that when he was about to be arrested in the street, he saw the face of one of the ephors as he came up and knew why he was coming; and when another, out of goodwill, gave him a covert nod to warn him, he ran to the precinct of the goddess of the Bronze House and took refuge there ahead of them, for the sacred ground was close by. He went into a small building that belonged to the temple, so as not to suffer in the open air, and kept quiet there. For the moment his pursuers were too late; but afterward they took the roof off the building, and watching until he was inside, shut him in and walled up the doors. Then they sat down before it and starved him out. When he was about to die, there in the building, they saw it and carried him out of the temple while he was still breathing; and as soon as he was outside he died. They meant to throw him into the Caeadas, where they throw criminals, but then decided to bury him somewhere nearby. Later, however, the god at Delphi ordered the Lacedaemonians to move his tomb to the place where he died (he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, as inscribed stelae show), and, since what they had done was a curse upon them, to give back two bodies in place of one to the goddess of the Bronze House. So they had two bronze statues made and dedicated them, as though in place of Pausanias.

135 Since the god himself had judged it a curse, the Athenians told the Lacedaemonians in return to drive it out. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles of having shared in the Medism of Pausanias, as they found from the evidence brought against Pausanias, and they demanded that he be punished in the same way. The Athenians agreed (he happened to have been ostracized,[15] and was living at Argos and traveling about the rest of the Peloponnese as well), and they sent, together with the Lacedaemonians, who were ready to join in the pursuit, men with orders to bring him back wherever they found him.

136 But Themistocles learned of it in advance and fled from the Peloponnese to Corcyra, for he was a benefactor of the Corcyraeans. When the Corcyraeans said they were afraid to keep him, since it would make enemies of the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, they had him taken across to the mainland opposite. Pursued by the men assigned to the task, who kept learning which way he was going, he was forced, at a loss what to do, to stop at the house of Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was no friend of his. Admetus happened to be away from home; Themistocles became a suppliant of his wife, and she told him to take their child and sit down at the hearth. When Admetus came back not long after, Themistocles told him who he was, and asked him not to take vengeance on an exile, even if he himself had once opposed some request Admetus had made of the Athenians. For now, he said, he might suffer harm at Admetus's hands, being far the weaker, and it was noble to take vengeance only on equals and on equal terms. Besides, he had opposed Admetus over some matter of business, not of life and death; whereas Admetus, if he handed him over (and he told him by whom and for what reason he was being pursued), would deprive him of the means of saving his life.

137 When Admetus heard this, he raised Themistocles up, together with his own son, just as Themistocles had been sitting holding him; and this was the most solemn form of supplication. Not long after, when the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians came and said a great deal, he would not hand him over; and since Themistocles wished to go to the King, he sent him overland to the other sea, to Pydna, which belonged to Alexander. There he found a merchant ship putting out for Ionia and went aboard, and he was carried by a storm to the Athenian fleet that was besieging Naxos. He was afraid, and since he was unknown to those on board, he told the shipmaster who he was and why he was in flight; and he said that unless the shipmaster saved him, he would say that he had been bribed to carry him. Their safety, he said, lay in no one leaving the ship until they could sail on; and if the shipmaster did as he asked, he would repay the favor as it deserved. The shipmaster did so, and after riding at anchor for a day and a night off the fleet, he eventually reached Ephesus. Themistocles rewarded him with a gift of money (for funds reached him later from his friends at Athens and from Argos, where he had money deposited), and traveling inland with one of the Persians of the coast, he sent a letter to King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, who had recently come to the throne. The letter said: "I, Themistocles, have come to you. Of all the Hellenes I did your house the most harm, for as long as I was compelled to defend myself against your father's attack; but I did it still more good, when his retreat was under way, at a time when I was in safety and he was in danger. And a service is owed me" (here he wrote of the warning he had sent from Salamis about the retreat, and of how, thanks to him, the bridges had not been broken down, a claim that was false), "and now I am here, able to do you great service, pursued by the Hellenes because of my friendship for you. I wish to wait a year and then explain to you myself why I have come."

138 The King, it is said, admired his purpose and told him to do as he proposed. In the time he waited, he learned as much as he could of the Persian language and of the customs of the country. When he arrived after the year, he became a great man at the court, greater than any Hellene had ever been, because of his earlier reputation and the hope he held out to the King of enslaving the Hellenic world, but above all because he gave proof of his intelligence. For Themistocles was a man who showed beyond any doubt the strength of natural ability, and in this respect he deserved admiration in an exceptional degree, more than any other. By his own native intelligence, without studying anything to prepare for it beforehand or learning anything to supplement it afterward, he was the best judge of a present situation with the least deliberation, and the best at forecasting what was to come, furthest into the future. What he had in hand he was able to explain; what lay outside his experience he was still able to judge adequately; and he could foresee, better than anyone, the better or the worse course while it was still hidden. To sum it up: by the power of his nature and with very little study, this man was the very best at improvising what had to be done. He died of an illness; though some say that he took poison of his own accord, believing it impossible to accomplish what he had promised the King. There is a monument to him in the marketplace of Magnesia in Asia; for he governed that district, the King having given him Magnesia for his bread, which brought in fifty talents a year, Lampsacus for his wine (it was thought to be the richest wine country of the time), and Myus for the rest of his fare. His relatives say that his bones were brought home at his own request and buried in Attica without the knowledge of the Athenians; for it was not lawful to bury him there, as he had been exiled for treason. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and Themistocles the Athenian, the most brilliant of the Hellenes of their time.

139 Such were the demands the Lacedaemonians made at their first embassy, and such the counterdemands made of them, about driving out the accursed. Later they kept coming to the Athenians, telling them to raise the siege of Potidaea and to leave Aegina autonomous; and above all, and most plainly of all, they declared that there would be no war if the Athenians revoked the decree about the Megarians, which barred them from the harbors in the Athenian empire and from the market of Attica. The Athenians would neither listen to them on the other points nor revoke the decree, and they charged the Megarians with cultivating the sacred land and the unmarked borderland, and with taking in runaway slaves. At last the final envoys arrived from Lacedaemon, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and said nothing of what they had been in the habit of saying before, only this: "The Lacedaemonians want peace, and there will be peace if you leave the Hellenes autonomous." The Athenians held an assembly and put the question up for debate among themselves; and they resolved to deliberate on everything once and for all and then give their answer. Many others came forward and spoke, on both sides, some saying that they must go to war, others that the decree should not stand in the way of peace, but should be revoked. Then Pericles son of Xanthippus came forward, at that time the first man in Athens and the most able in speech and in action, and gave the following advice.

140 "Athenians, I hold always to the same judgment: that we must not give way to the Peloponnesians. I know that men are not persuaded to go to war in the same temper in which they carry it on in action, but that their judgments shift with what befalls them. Still, I see that I must now give the same advice as before, or nearly the same; and I ask those of you who are persuaded to stand by what we resolve in common, even if we should meet with some setback, or else, if we succeed, not to claim any credit for

wisdom. For the course of events can go as stupidly as the plans of men; which is why we are in the habit of blaming chance for whatever turns out contrary to our reckoning. The Lacedaemonians were plainly plotting against us before, and they are now more than ever. It was agreed that we should submit our differences to arbitration and accept its judgment, each side keeping what it has; yet they have never once asked for arbitration, nor do they accept it when we offer it. They want to settle their grievances by war rather than by words; and now they come no longer complaining, but already giving orders. They order us to raise the siege of Potidaea, to leave Aegina autonomous, and to revoke the Megarian decree; and these last envoys have come even proclaiming that we must leave the Hellenes autonomous. Let none of you think that we would be going to war over a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megarian decree, which they put forward above everything, saying that if it were revoked there would be no war; and leave yourselves no ground for the self-reproach that you went to war over a small matter. For this trifle holds the whole confirmation and testing of your resolve. If you give way to them, you will at once be ordered to do something greater, since you will have obeyed in this out of fear; but by a firm refusal you would make it clear to them that they had better deal with you as equals.

141 "Make up your minds, then, here and now, either to submit before you come to any harm, or, if we go to war, as I for one think best, to do so resolved not to give way on any pretext, great or small, and not to hold what we possess in fear. For the greatest claim and the least have the same meaning, slavery, when they are imposed as commands on neighbors by their equals, before any judgment at law. As for the war and the resources of each side, listen to the particulars, and you will see that ours will not be the weaker. The Peloponnesians work their own land; they have no money, either private or public; and they have no experience of

long wars or of wars overseas, because their poverty limits them to brief wars against one another. Men like these cannot often man fleets or send out armies by land, since they would have to be away from their own farms and to spend from their own means, and besides they are shut off from the sea. It is reserves of wealth, rather than forced contributions, that sustain wars. And men who work their own land are readier to make war with their bodies than with their money: their bodies, they are confident, may come through the dangers, but they have no assurance that their money will not run out first, especially if the war, as is likely, lasts longer than they expect. In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are able to stand against all the Hellenes together; but they are unable to carry on a war against a power equipped unlike themselves. They have no single council chamber, so they cannot carry anything through promptly and with vigor; they all have an equal vote and are not of the same race, so each presses his own interest; and in this way nothing is usually accomplished. Some want above all to take vengeance on an enemy, others to lose as little as possible of their own. They are slow to assemble, and when they do, they give a small part of the time to some matter of common concern and the greater part to their own affairs. Each supposes that his own neglect will do no harm, and that it is someone else's business to look ahead for him; so that by this same notion, held by each of them privately, the common cause is ruined all together without their noticing it.

142 "Most important of all, they will be hampered by lack of money, since they must provide it slowly and so will be delayed; and the opportunities of war do not wait. Nor are their fortified post or their navy worth fearing. As for the first, it is hard even in peacetime to build a city that could rival ours, still more in enemy country, and when we have fortified posts against them no less than they against us. If they build a mere fort, they might damage

part of our land by raids and by giving refuge to deserters; but this will not be enough to prevent us from sailing to their country and fortifying posts there, and from retaliating with our ships, in which our strength lies. For we have more experience of fighting on land from our naval operations than they have of naval matters from their fighting on land. And skill at sea will not easily become theirs. Not even you, who have practiced it ever since the Median wars, have yet brought it to perfection; how then could farmers, not seamen, achieve anything of note, men who will not even be allowed to practice, because we will always be blockading them with many ships? Against a few blockading ships they might take the risk, emboldening their ignorance by their numbers; but held in check by many, they will keep still, and for want of practice they will be less skillful, and so all the more timid. Seamanship is a matter of skill, like anything else; it cannot be practiced whenever the chance offers, as a sideline, but rather nothing else can be a sideline to it.

143 "And if they should lay hands on the money at Olympia or Delphi and try to lure away our foreign seamen with higher pay, that would be serious if we were not a match for them by going on board ourselves, with our resident aliens. But as it is, we are; and, what matters most, our helmsmen are citizens, and the rest of our crews are more numerous and better than in all the rest of Hellas. Nor, with the danger in view, would any of the foreigners choose to be exiled from his own country and to fight on their side, with less hope of winning as well, for the sake of a few days of high pay. That, or something close to it, is how the position of the Peloponnesians appears to me. Ours, I think, is free of the defects I have found in theirs, and has other great advantages besides, out of all proportion to theirs. If they march against our country by land, we shall sail against theirs; and it will no longer be the same thing for part of the Peloponnese to be laid waste as for the whole

of Attica. For they will have no other land to take in its place without fighting, while we have plenty of land both in the islands and on the mainland. The command of the sea is a great thing. Consider: if we were islanders, who would be harder to capture? As it is, we must think of ourselves as nearly as possible in that position: give up our land and our houses, and keep guard over the sea and the city. We must not, in our anger over these things, fight it out with the Peloponnesians, who are far more numerous (for if we win, we shall have to fight again against no fewer of them, and if we fail, we lose our allies as well, the source of our strength, since they will not keep quiet when we are no longer able to march against them); and we must lament the loss not of houses and land, but of lives. For it is not these things that win men, but men who win these things. And if I thought I could persuade you, I would tell you to go out and lay them waste yourselves, and show the Peloponnesians that you will not give in to them for the sake of these.

144 "I have many other reasons to hope that we shall prevail, if you are willing not to extend the empire while we are at war and not to take on dangers of your own choosing; for I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's designs. But that will be made clear in another speech, when the deeds themselves are at hand. For now, let us send these envoys back with this answer: as to the Megarians, that we will allow them to use our market and our harbors if the Lacedaemonians, too, stop their expulsions of foreigners, whether of us or of our allies (for the treaty forbids neither the one nor the other); as to the cities, that we will leave them autonomous if they were autonomous when we made the treaty, and when the Lacedaemonians, too, allow their own cities to be autonomous, not in the way that suits the Lacedaemonians, but as each of them wishes; and that we are willing to submit to arbitration according to the treaty, and will not begin a war, but

will defend ourselves against those who do. This answer is both just and befitting this city. But you must understand that the war is a necessity; that the more willingly we accept it, the less hard we shall find our enemies pressing upon us; and that it is from the greatest dangers that the greatest honors come, both to a city and to a man. Our fathers, at any rate, stood up to the Medes, though they started from no such resources as ours, and even abandoned what they had; and by judgment more than by fortune, and by daring more than by power, they drove back the barbarian and brought our affairs to where they are now. We must not fall short of them, but must defend ourselves against our enemies in every way, and try to hand on to those who come after us no less than we received."

145 Such was the speech of Pericles. The Athenians, believing that his advice was the best, voted as he urged, and answered the Lacedaemonians as he proposed, both on each point as he had stated it and on the whole: they would do nothing on command, but they were ready to settle the grievances by arbitration according to the treaty, on fair and equal terms. And the envoys went home and sent no further embassies.

146 These were the grievances and the differences between the two sides before the war, beginning immediately with the affairs at Epidamnus and Corcyra. Even so, they kept up their dealings with one another while these went on, and visited each other without heralds, though not without suspicion; for what was happening was a breaking of the treaty and a pretext for war.

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1. The purification of Delos took place in the winter of 426/5 BC; Thucydides describes it at 3.104.

2. Hipparchus was killed in 514 BC; Hippias was expelled in 510 BC. Thucydides returns to the story at length at 6.54–59.

3. The Thirty Years' Treaty between Athens and Sparta was made in 446/5 BC, after Pericles put down the revolt of Euboea (1.114–115).

4. Epidamnus, later Dyrrachium, is modern Durrës in Albania. The Ionian Gulf is the Adriatic; sailing north into it, the city lies on the right.

5. The manuscripts name Andocides as the second commander, but the editor marks the name as doubtful: an Athenian inscription recording payments for this expedition appears to name Glaucon together with Metagenes and Dracontides.

6. The number of Archestratus' colleagues is corrupt in the manuscripts; many editors read "four," giving the usual board of five.

7. The so-called Megarian decree, passed at Athens shortly before the war; its terms are given again at 1.139.

8. That is, in 432 BC.

9. Mycale, a promontory on the coast of Asia Minor opposite Samos, where the Hellenes destroyed the Persian fleet and army in 479 BC, the year of the battle of Plataea.

10. Hellanicus of Lesbos, a fifth-century BC writer of chronicles and local histories; his *Attic History* is lost.

11. The Thirty Years' Peace, 446/5 BC.

12. Not the historian; the identity of this Thucydides is uncertain.

13. The goddess is Athena, at whose altar on the Acropolis the suppliants sat. Cylon's attempt is usually dated to 632 BC. The family held accursed was the Alcmaeonidae, to which Pericles' mother belonged (1.127).

14. Athena Chalcioecus, "of the Bronze House," whose temple on the acropolis of Sparta was faced with bronze.

15. Ostracism: a vote by which the Athenians could send a citizen into exile for ten years without trial and without loss of property. Themistocles was ostracized about 471 BC.

Book 2

1 From this point begins the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and the allies of each side. In it they no longer had dealings with one another except through heralds, and once they had gone to war they fought without a break. It has been written down in order, as each thing happened, by summers and winters.

2 For fourteen years the Thirty Years' Peace, concluded after the capture of Euboea, held. In the fifteenth year, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood at Argos, Aenesias was ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus had two months left as archon at Athens,[1] in the sixth month after the battle at Potidaea, and just at the beginning of spring, at about the hour of first sleep, a force of Thebans a little over three hundred strong, led by the Boeotarchs Pythangelus son of Phyleides and Diemporus son of Onetorides, made an armed entry into Plataea, a town in Boeotia allied with Athens. They had been called in, and the gates opened to them, by men of Plataea, Naucleides and his party, who wanted, for the sake of their own power, to destroy those of the citizens who opposed them and to bring the city over to Thebes. They managed this through Eurymachus son of Leontiades, a man of the greatest influence at Thebes. For the Thebans foresaw that the war was coming, and they wanted to seize Plataea, which had always been at odds with them, in advance, while there was still peace and the war had not yet openly broken out. This was also why they got in so easily without being noticed: no guard had been posted. They grounded their arms in the marketplace, but they

would not do as the men who had called them in urged, and set to work at once and go to the houses of their enemies. Instead they resolved to issue conciliatory proclamations and to bring the city to an agreement and to friendship. (Their herald proclaimed that anyone who wished to be an ally according to the ancestral custom of all the Boeotians should come and ground his arms beside them.) They thought that in this way the city would easily come over to them.

3 When the Plataeans realized that the Thebans were inside and that their city had been taken by surprise, they were terrified, and thinking that far more had come in than had (for they could not see in the dark), they came to terms, accepted the proposals, and kept quiet, all the more because the Thebans were doing no violence to anyone. But while they were negotiating they somehow became aware that the Thebans were not many, and they thought that if they attacked they could easily overpower them; for the mass of the Plataeans did not want to break away from the Athenians. So they decided the attempt must be made. They gathered together by digging through the party walls between their houses, so as not to be seen going through the streets; they set wagons without their draft animals across the streets to serve as a barricade; and they prepared everything else as each thing seemed likely to be useful in the circumstances. When they were as ready as they could be, they waited for the last of the night, the very hour before dawn, and moved out of their houses against them, so that they would not be attacking men made bolder by daylight and meeting them on equal terms, but men made more fearful by the dark, who would be no match for the Plataeans' own knowledge of the town. They attacked at once and quickly came to close quarters.

4 When the Thebans saw that they had been deceived, they closed up among themselves and beat back the attacks wherever

they fell. Two or three times they repulsed them. Then the Plataeans charged with a great uproar, while the women and the slaves on the housetops screamed and yelled and pelted them with stones and tiles, and heavy rain had come on during the night as well; at that the Thebans panicked, turned, and fled through the city. Most of them had no knowledge of the ways out by which they might escape, in the dark and the mud (for this happened at the end of the month), while their pursuers knew well how to keep them from escaping, so that most of them were killed. One of the Plataeans shut the gate by which they had come in, the only one that was open, by driving the butt spike of a javelin into the bar in place of a pin, so that there was no way out even there. Chased through the city, some of them climbed the wall and threw themselves down outside, and most of these were killed; others got out by a deserted gate, unseen, after a woman gave them an ax and they cut through the bar, but not many, for they were soon discovered; and others were killed scattered here and there about the city. The largest part, and those who had kept most closely together, rushed into a large building that formed part of the wall, whose doors happened to be open, thinking that its doors were a gate of the city and that there was a passage straight through to the outside. When the Plataeans saw them trapped, they debated whether to burn them as they were by setting fire to the building, or to deal with them in some other way. In the end these men and all the other Thebans still alive and wandering about the city agreed to surrender themselves and their arms to the Plataeans, to be dealt with as they pleased. That was how matters had gone for those in Plataea.

5 The rest of the Thebans, who were to have arrived with their whole force while it was still night, in case things should not go well for those who had entered, were on their way when the news of what had happened reached them, and they hurried to help.

Plataea is seventy stades from Thebes, and the rain that had fallen in the night made them slower in coming, for the river Asopus had risen high and was not easy to cross. Marching in the rain and getting across the river with difficulty, they arrived too late: of the men, some had already been killed and the rest were being held alive. When the Thebans learned what had happened, they planned to strike at the Plataeans outside the city, for there were people in the fields and property too, as was natural when trouble had come unexpectedly in time of peace; they wanted any they captured to be held as hostages for the men inside, if any of them had in fact been taken alive. That was what they intended. But the Plataeans, while the Thebans were still deliberating, suspected something of the kind and, fearing for those outside, sent a herald to the Thebans. They said that the Thebans had committed an impious act in trying to seize their city while the treaty was in force, and they told them not to harm what was outside; if they did, the Plataeans said, they would kill the men they held alive, but if the Thebans withdrew from their territory, they would give the men back to them. That is the Theban account, and they say the Plataeans swore to it. The Plataeans do not agree that they promised to give back the men at once, but only after talks had first been held, if they could reach some agreement, and they deny that they swore an oath. At any rate the Thebans withdrew from the territory without doing any harm; and the Plataeans, as soon as they had hastily brought in what they had in the countryside, killed the men at once. Those taken were one hundred and eighty, and Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had made their arrangement, was one of them.

6 When they had done this, they sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead to the Thebans under a truce, and settled affairs in the city as seemed best to them in the circumstances. The news of what had happened at Plataea was brought to the

Athenians at once. They immediately arrested all the Boeotians who were in Attica and sent a herald to Plataea with orders to tell them to take no drastic step concerning the Theban men they held until the Athenians themselves had come to some decision about them; for they had not been told that the men were dead. The first messenger had left just as the Thebans were coming in, and the second just after they had been defeated and seized, and of what followed they knew nothing. So the Athenians sent their instructions in ignorance, and the herald arrived to find the men killed. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea, brought in grain, and left a garrison, and they took away the least useful of the people together with the women and children.

7 Now that the affair at Plataea had taken place and the treaty had been openly broken, the Athenians prepared for war, and so did the Lacedaemonians and their allies. Both sides intended to send embassies to the King and to the other barbarians elsewhere, wherever either hoped to get some help, and they were making alliances with the cities that lay outside their own sphere of power. The Lacedaemonians, in addition to the ships already on hand, ordered those in Italy and Sicily who had taken their side to build ships in proportion to the size of their cities, so that the total number would come to five hundred, and to get ready a fixed sum of money; in other respects they were to keep quiet and to receive Athenians only if they came in a single ship, until these preparations were complete. The Athenians reviewed their existing alliance and sent embassies above all to the places around the Peloponnese, Corcyra, Cephallenia, the Acarnanians, and Zacynthus, seeing that if these were securely friendly to them, they could wage war on the Peloponnese from all around it.

8 Neither side had small thoughts; both threw themselves into the war with all their strength, and not unnaturally. Everyone grips a thing more eagerly at the beginning, and at that time there was a

great number of young men in the Peloponnese and a great number in Athens who, for lack of experience, took up the war gladly. All the rest of Hellas was in suspense as its leading cities came into collision. Many prophecies were being recited, and oracle-mongers were chanting many of them, both among those about to go to war and in the other cities. Besides this, Delos had been shaken by an earthquake a little before, though it had never been shaken before in the memory of the Hellenes; it was said, and believed, to be a sign of what was to come. If anything else of the kind happened to occur, it was all sought out. The goodwill of mankind leaned far more toward the Lacedaemonians, especially since they had proclaimed that they were freeing Hellas. Every individual and every city was eager to join in helping them, in word and deed, as far as they could, and each man felt that the cause was held back wherever he himself could not be present. So angry were most people with the Athenians, some wanting to be released from their empire, others afraid of coming under it.

9 Such were the preparations and the spirit with which they set out, and these were the cities each side had as allies when they entered the war. The allies of the Lacedaemonians were these. All the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus except the Argives and the Achaeans (these were on friendly terms with both sides; of the Achaeans the Pellenians alone joined in the war at first, but later all of them did); and outside the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Boeotians, Locrians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of these, the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided ships; the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians provided cavalry; the other cities provided infantry. That was the alliance of the Lacedaemonians. The allies of the Athenians were the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, the Zacynthians, and other cities

that paid tribute among the following peoples: coastal Caria, the Dorians who border on the Carians, Ionia, the Hellespont, the places on the Thracian coast, the islands that lie east of a line between the Peloponnese and Crete, and all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans provided ships; the rest provided infantry and money. Such was the alliance of each side and its preparation for the war.

10 Immediately after the events at Plataea, the Lacedaemonians sent word around the Peloponnese and the allied states outside it, telling the cities to prepare an army and the supplies appropriate for an expedition abroad, since they were going to invade Attica. When each was ready, they assembled at the Isthmus at the appointed time, two-thirds of the forces of every city. When the whole army had been gathered, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, who was in command of this expedition, called together the generals of all the cities and the men of highest rank and greatest consequence, and addressed them as follows.

11 "Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many expeditions, both within the Peloponnese itself and outside it, and the older men among us are not without experience of war. Yet we have never before set out with a greater force than this. And now we are marching against a city of the greatest power, and we ourselves are marching in the greatest numbers and with our best men. It is right, then, that we should prove neither worse than our fathers nor beneath our own reputation. For all Hellas has been stirred by this enterprise and is watching it closely, and, out of hatred of the Athenians, wishes us well and hopes we will accomplish what we intend. So even if some think we are attacking in great numbers, and that it is quite certain the enemy will not come out to meet us in battle, we must not for that reason advance any less carefully prepared. The commander and the soldier of every city should always expect, as far as he himself is concerned, that

he will come into some danger. The course of war is uncertain, attacks are mostly made on the spur of the moment and in anger, and often a smaller force, because it was afraid, has defended itself better against a larger one that was caught unprepared through contempt. In enemy country one should always march with confidence in one's judgment but make one's preparations in fear; in this way men will have the most courage for attacking their enemies and the most safety against being attacked. And we are not marching against a city so powerless to defend itself, but against one superbly prepared in every respect. So we must fully expect them to come out and fight, if they have not already started out before we are even there, then at least when they see us in their land, ravaging it and destroying their property. For all men are seized by anger when they suffer some unaccustomed injury before their very eyes and at that very moment, and those who use reason least act most from passion. The Athenians are likely to do this more than others, since they think themselves fit to rule others and are used to invading and ravaging their neighbors' land rather than seeing their own ravaged. Remember, then, how great a city you are marching against, and how great a name you will win for your ancestors and for yourselves, for good or ill, from the outcome. Follow wherever you are led, putting good order and vigilance above everything, and taking up your orders promptly. For this is the finest thing and the safest: that a great number of men be seen to act under a single discipline."

12 Having said this much and dismissed the meeting, Archidamus first sent Melesippus son of Diacritus, a Spartiate, to Athens, in case the Athenians might be more ready to give way now that they saw the Peloponnesians already on the march. But they did not admit him to the city or to the assembly, for a motion of Pericles had carried earlier that they should receive no herald or embassy once the Lacedaemonians had taken the field. So they

sent him away without hearing him and ordered him to be outside their borders that same day; in future, if the Lacedaemonians wanted anything, they should go back to their own territory and then send envoys. They also sent escorts with Melesippus so that he should not talk with anyone. When he reached the border and was about to part from them, he said only this before he went on his way: "This day will be the beginning of great evils for the Hellenes." When he came back to the camp and Archidamus understood that the Athenians would not yet give way at all, he finally broke camp and advanced with his army into their land. The Boeotians provided their contingent and their cavalry to march with the Peloponnesians, and with the rest of their force they went to Plataea and ravaged its land.

13 While the Peloponnesians were still gathering at the Isthmus and were on their way, before they invaded Attica, Pericles son of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten generals of the Athenians, understood that the invasion was going to take place. Archidamus happened to be his guest-friend, and Pericles suspected that he might well pass over his estates and not ravage them, either because he himself wished to do Pericles a personal favor, or on the instructions of the Lacedaemonians, to bring suspicion on him, just as they had demanded the expulsion of the curse for his sake.[2] So he announced to the Athenians in the assembly that Archidamus was indeed his guest-friend, but that this friendship would not work to the city's harm; if the enemy did not ravage his lands and houses as they did those of others, he would give them up to be public property, so that no suspicion should fall on him on that account. He also advised them about the present situation as he had before: they should prepare for the war and bring in their property from the fields; they should not go out to battle, but come into the city and guard it; they should fit out the fleet, in which their strength lay; and they should keep a firm hand on the

allies. Their strength, he said, came from the money these allies paid in, and most victories in war were won by judgment and a surplus of money. He told them to take heart: on average six hundred talents of tribute came in to the city from the allies every year, not counting its other revenue, and there were still at that time six thousand talents of coined silver on the Acropolis. (The greatest amount there had ever been was ten thousand talents less three hundred, from which money had been spent on the Propylaea of the Acropolis, on the other buildings, and on Potidaea.) Besides this there was uncoined gold and silver in private and public offerings, all the sacred vessels used in the processions and the games, the spoils taken from the Medes, and anything else of that kind, worth no less than five hundred talents. He added the considerable sums in the other temples, which they could use, and if they were cut off from absolutely everything, even the gold plates that covered the goddess herself. He pointed out that the statue had forty talents' weight of refined gold on it, and that it was all removable. But if they used it for their survival, he said, they must put back no less afterward. So he encouraged them about money. As for hoplites, they had thirteen thousand, not counting the sixteen thousand in the garrisons and along the battlements. For that was the number that stood guard at first whenever the enemy invaded, drawn from the oldest and the youngest citizens and from those of the resident aliens who were hoplites. The Phaleric wall ran thirty-five stades to the circuit wall of the city, and the guarded part of the circuit itself was forty-three stades (part of it was left unguarded, the stretch between the long wall and the Phaleric); the Long Walls to Piraeus ran forty stades, of which the outer wall was manned; and the whole circuit of Piraeus together with Munychia was sixty stades, half of it under guard. He showed that they had twelve hundred cavalry including mounted archers, sixteen hundred archers, and three

hundred triremes fit for sea. These were the forces the Athenians had, in each category no fewer than these, when the Peloponnesian invasion was first about to take place and they were entering the war. Pericles also said other things, as he usually did, to show that they would prevail in the war.

14 The Athenians listened and were persuaded. They brought in from the countryside their children and wives and the rest of the household goods they used, even stripping the woodwork from the houses themselves; their sheep and draft animals they sent across to Euboea and the islands lying off the coast. The move was hard for them, because most of them had always been used to living in the country.

15 This had been true of the Athenians, more than of others, from very early times. Under Cecrops and the first kings down to Theseus, Attica had always been settled in separate towns, each with its own town hall and magistrates, and unless they were in some danger they did not come together to consult with the king, but each governed itself and made its own decisions. Some of them even made war at times, as the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did against Erechtheus. But when Theseus became king, a man who combined intelligence with power, he set the land in order in various ways, and in particular he abolished the council chambers and magistracies of the other towns and united them all into the present city, designating a single council chamber and town hall. Each continued to occupy his own land as before, but Theseus compelled them to have this one city, which, since all now belonged to it, became great and was handed down by Theseus to those who came after. From that time down to the present the Athenians have held a public festival in honor of the goddess, the Synoecia.[3] Before this, what is now the Acropolis was the city, together with the area below it, facing mostly south. Here is the evidence. The temples of the other gods as well are on the

Acropolis itself, and those outside it are situated mostly in this part of the city: the temple of Olympian Zeus, the Pythium, the temple of Earth, and that of Dionysus in the Marshes, in whose honor the older Dionysia are held in the month of Anthesterion, as the Ionians descended from the Athenians still celebrate them even now. Other ancient temples are also located here. And the spring that is now called the Nine Spouts, since the tyrants gave it that form, but was called Callirhoe in the old days when the springs were open, was used by the people of that time for the most important purposes, because it was near; even now, from that ancient custom, its water is used before weddings and for other sacred rites. And because of the ancient settlement there, the Acropolis is still called "the city" by the Athenians to this day.

16 So the Athenians had long lived in independent settlements throughout the country, and even after they were united, most of them, both in early times and later down to this war, from habit still lived with their households in the country, where they had been born and had their homes. So they did not find it easy to move with their whole households, especially since they had only recently restored their establishments after the Persian Wars. They were distressed and took it hard to leave their houses and the temples that had always been theirs, ancestral since their old form of government, and to change their way of life; each man was leaving nothing less than his own city.

17 When they reached the city, a few had houses or found refuge with friends or relatives, but most of them settled in the empty parts of the city and in all the temples and shrines of heroes, except the Acropolis, the Eleusinium, and any other place that could be securely locked. Even the so-called Pelargicum below the Acropolis, which was under a curse forbidding anyone to live there, and which the end of a Pythian oracle also forbade, saying, "Better the Pelargicum unused," was nevertheless occupied

under the pressure of immediate necessity. And it seems to me that the oracle came true in the opposite way from what they expected. The disasters did not befall the city because of the unlawful occupation; rather, the necessity of the occupation arose from the war, and the oracle, without naming the war, foreknew that the place would never be settled for any good. Many also set themselves up in the towers of the walls, and wherever each could; for the city did not have room for them all when they had come in. Later they divided up and occupied the space between the Long Walls and most of Piraeus. At the same time they took up the business of war, gathering allies and fitting out an expedition of a hundred ships against the Peloponnese. That was the stage of their preparations.

18 The army of the Peloponnesians, advancing, came first to Oenoe in Attica, where they intended to invade. Encamped there, they prepared to assault the wall with siege engines and by other means. For Oenoe, lying on the border of Attica and Boeotia, had been fortified, and the Athenians used it as a fort whenever war broke out. So they made ready their assaults and wasted time around it in other ways as well. Archidamus incurred no small blame for this. He was thought to have been soft in the gathering of the war, too, and well disposed to the Athenians, since he had not urged war wholeheartedly. Then, once the army was being assembled, the delay at the Isthmus and the slowness on the rest of the march had brought him into discredit, and most of all the halt at Oenoe. For the Athenians were bringing their property in during this time, and the Peloponnesians believed that if they had advanced quickly, they would have caught everything still outside, had it not been for his delay. Such was the anger the army felt toward Archidamus while it sat there. But he held back, it is said, because he expected the Athenians to give way somewhat while

their land was still untouched, and to shrink from seeing it laid waste.

19 When, however, they had assaulted Oenoe and tried every method without being able to take it, and the Athenians sent no herald, they finally set out from there, about the eightieth day after what had happened at Plataea, in midsummer, when the grain was ripe, and invaded Attica. Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, was in command. They encamped and ravaged first Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and routed some Athenian cavalry near the place called the Rheiti. Then they advanced through Cropia, keeping Mount Aegaleus on their right, until they reached Acharnae, the largest of the places in Attica called demes. They encamped there, made it their base, and stayed a long time ravaging.

20 It is said that Archidamus had the following purpose in staying at Acharnae in battle order and not coming down into the plain on that invasion. He hoped that the Athenians, who were in the prime of a large population of young men and prepared for war as never before, might come out against him and would not stand by and see their land laid waste. So when they did not come out to meet him at Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, he made a trial, encamped at Acharnae, to see if they would come out. The place seemed to him suitable for a camp, and he also thought that the Acharnians, who were a large part of the city (they furnished three thousand hoplites), would not stand by and see their property destroyed, but would rouse all the rest to battle as well. And if the Athenians did not come out against him on that invasion, he could then ravage the plain with less fear in future and advance up to the city itself. For the Acharnians, once deprived of their own property, would not be equally eager to run risks for the land of others, and there would be dissension in their counsels. Such was Archidamus' intention at Acharnae.

21 As long as the army was around Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, the Athenians still had some hope that it would not come any closer. They remembered that Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army as far as Eleusis and Thria, fourteen years before this war, and had then gone back without advancing farther[4] (which was in fact why he was banished from Sparta, since he was thought to have been bribed to withdraw). But when they saw the army at Acharnae, sixty stades from the city, they no longer found it bearable. Their land was being ravaged before their eyes, a thing the younger men had never seen, nor the older ones except in the Persian Wars, and naturally it seemed an outrage to them; everyone, and the young men above all, thought they should go out and not stand by and watch. They gathered in knots and argued fiercely, some demanding that they march out, some refusing to allow it. Oracle-mongers chanted oracles of every kind, and each man listened to them according to his own inclination. The Acharnians, who thought themselves no small part of the Athenians, pressed hardest for the sally, since it was their land that was being ravaged. The city was in every way inflamed. They were angry with Pericles, they remembered nothing of the advice he had given them before, and they abused him because, though he was their general, he would not lead them out; they held him responsible for everything they were suffering.

22 Pericles saw that they were angry at the moment and were not thinking at their best, and he was confident that he was right about not going out. So he did not call an assembly or any meeting of them, for fear that if they came together they would make some mistake out of anger rather than judgment. He kept the city guarded and as calm as he could. He did, however, keep sending out cavalry to stop raiding parties from the army from falling on the fields near the city and doing damage. There was a brief cav-

alry battle at Phrygia between one squadron of the Athenian cavalry, with the Thessalians, and the Boeotian cavalry. In it the Athenians and Thessalians held their own until hoplites came up to support the Boeotians; then they were routed, and a few of the Thessalians and Athenians were killed. They recovered their bodies, however, that same day without a truce, and the Peloponnesians set up a trophy the next day. This help from the Thessalians came to the Athenians under their old alliance; those who came to them were the Larisaeans, Pharsalians, Crannonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. Their leaders from Larisa were Polymedes and Aristonous, one from each faction, and from Pharsalus Meno; the others also had their own commanders, city by city.

23 When the Athenians did not come out to fight them, the Peloponnesians broke camp at Acharnae and ravaged some of the other demes between Mount Parnes and Mount Brilessus. While they were in the country, the Athenians sent off around the Peloponnese the hundred ships they had been preparing, with a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers on board, under the command of Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. They set sail with this force and went around the Peloponnese. The Peloponnesians stayed in Attica as long as their provisions lasted and then withdrew through Boeotia, not by the way they had come in. Passing Oropus, they ravaged the land called Graea, which the Oropians, subjects of the Athenians, cultivate. When they reached the Peloponnese, they disbanded, each to his own city.

24 After they had withdrawn, the Athenians set up guards on land and sea, as they meant to keep guard throughout the whole war. They also decided to set aside a thousand talents of the money on the Acropolis as a special reserve, and not to spend it, but to carry on the war with the rest. If anyone proposed or put to

the vote a motion to touch this money for any other purpose, except if the enemy should sail against the city with a fleet and they had to defend it, the penalty was to be death. Along with this money they set aside a hundred triremes each year, the best ones, with trierarchs for them, and none of these was to be used for any purpose except together with the money, for that same danger, if the need arose.

25 The Athenians in the hundred ships around the Peloponnese, together with the Corcyraeans, who had come to help with fifty ships, and some others of the allies in those parts, did damage at various places as they sailed around. They landed at Methone in Laconia and assaulted the wall, which was weak and had no men in it. But Brasidas son of Tellis, a Spartiate, happened to be in that district with a guard force, and when he learned of it, he went to the aid of those in the place with a hundred hoplites. He dashed through the Athenian army, which was scattered over the countryside and had its attention on the wall, burst into Methone, losing a few of his men in the dash, and saved the town. For this daring act he was the first in the war to be officially commended at Sparta. The Athenians set sail and went on along the coast. They put in at Pheia in Elis and ravaged the land for two days, and they defeated in battle three hundred picked men who came to the rescue from Hollow Elis and the Eleans of the surrounding district. A strong wind came down on them, and since they were being battered by the storm in a place without a harbor, most of them boarded the ships and sailed around the headland called Ichthys to the harbor at Pheia. Meanwhile the Messenians, and some others who could not get on board, went overland and took Pheia. Later the ships sailed around and picked them up, and they put to sea, abandoning Pheia, for the main army of the Eleans had now come up. The Athenians sailed on along the coast and ravaged other places.

26 About this same time the Athenians sent thirty ships around Locris, which were also to guard Euboea; Cleopompus son of Clinias was in command of them. He made landings and ravaged parts of the coast, took Thronium and received hostages from it, and at Alope defeated in battle the Locrians who came to its defense.

27 In this same summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina, men, children, and women, charging them with being not the least of the causes of the war. And it seemed safer to hold Aegina, which lies close to the Peloponnese, by sending settlers of their own. Not long afterward they sent the colonists there. The Lacedaemonians gave the exiled Aeginetans Thyrea to live in and its land to farm, both because of their quarrel with the Athenians and because the Aeginetans had been their benefactors at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea lies on the border between Argolis and Laconia and runs down to the sea. Some of them settled there; others were scattered through the rest of Hellas.

28 In the same summer, at the new moon (which seems to be the only time when this can happen), the sun was eclipsed after midday and became full again. It became crescent-shaped, and some stars appeared.[5]

29 In the same summer the Athenians made Nymphodorus son of Pytheas, a man from Abdera, their proxenus (a citizen who represents another city's interests in his own). He had great influence with Sitalces, who was married to his sister, and the Athenians had previously regarded him as an enemy. They now summoned him because they wanted Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, to become their ally. This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to establish the great kingdom of the Odrysians over the greater part of Thrace, for a large part of the Thracians is independent. This Teres has no connection with the Tereus who took Procne

daughter of Pandion from Athens as his wife, nor did they come from the same Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulia, in what is now called Phocis, a land then inhabited by Thracians, and it was in this land that the women did the deed concerning Itys. (Many of the poets, when they mention the nightingale, call the bird "the Daulian.") And it is likely that Pandion contracted his daughter's marriage at that short distance, for mutual help, rather than at a distance of many days' journey, to the Odrysians. Teres, who did not even have the same name, was the first king to rule the Odrysians in power. It was his son Sitalces whom the Athenians were making their ally, wanting him to help them subdue the places on the Thracian coast and Perdiccas. Nymphodorus came to Athens, concluded the alliance with Sitalces, and had Sitalces' son Sadocus made an Athenian citizen; and he undertook to end the war on the Thracian coast, for he would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a Thracian army of cavalry and peltasts. He also reconciled Perdiccas with the Athenians and persuaded them to give Therme back to him. Perdiccas at once joined the Athenians and Phormio in a campaign against the Chalcidians. In this way Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, became an ally of the Athenians, and so did Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians.

30 The Athenians in the hundred ships, still in the waters around the Peloponnese, took Sollium, a small town belonging to the Corinthians, and handed it over to the Palaereans, alone of the Acarnanians, to occupy the land and the town. They also took by storm Astacus, where Evarchus was tyrant, drove him out, and brought the place into their alliance. They sailed to the island of Cephallenia and won it over without a battle. Cephallenia lies opposite Acarnania and Leucas and consists of four cities: the Paleans, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronnaeans. Not long afterward the ships returned to Athens.

31 About the autumn of this summer the Athenians invaded the Megarid in full force, citizens and resident aliens, under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus. The Athenians in the hundred ships around the Peloponnese, who happened to be already at Aegina on their way home, learned that the men from the city were at Megara in full force, and they sailed to join them. This was the largest Athenian army ever assembled in one body, for the city was still at its height and had not yet been struck by the plague. The Athenians themselves numbered no fewer than ten thousand hoplites (not counting the three thousand at Potidaea), and no fewer than three thousand resident-alien hoplites joined in the invasion, besides a large crowd of light-armed troops. They ravaged most of the land and withdrew. Later in the war there were other invasions of the Megarid by the Athenians, every year, sometimes with cavalry, sometimes in full force, until Nisaea was taken by the Athenians.

32 At the end of this summer the Athenians also fortified Atalanta as a guard post, an island off the coast of Opuntian Locris that had been uninhabited before, to prevent pirates from sailing out of Opus and the rest of Locris and doing damage to Euboea. These were the events of this summer after the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Attica.

33 The following winter Evarchus the Acarnanian, wanting to return to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred hoplites and restore him; he also hired some mercenaries himself. The commanders of the force were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. They sailed and restored him. They wanted to win over some other places on the coast of Acarnania as well, and they tried, but when they could not, they sailed for home. Putting in on the way at Cephallenia, they made a landing in the territory of the Cranians. Deceived by them through some agree-

ment, they lost some of their men when the Cranians attacked them unexpectedly, and after putting out to sea with some difficulty they made their way home.

34 In the same winter the Athenians, following their ancestral custom, held at public expense the funeral of those who had been the first to die in this war. They do it in the following way. Three days before the funeral they lay out the bones of the dead in a tent they have put up, and each person brings whatever offerings he wishes to his own dead. When the procession takes place, wagons carry coffins of cypress wood, one for each tribe, and the bones of each man are in the coffin of his tribe. One empty bier, spread with coverings, is carried for the missing, those whose bodies could not be found for recovery. Anyone who wishes, citizen or foreigner, joins the procession, and the women who are related to the dead are present at the grave, wailing. They lay them in the public tomb, which is in the most beautiful suburb of the city. There they always bury those who have died in the wars, except those who fell at Marathon; judging their courage to have been surpassing, they made their tomb on the spot. When they have covered them with earth, a man chosen by the city, one who is regarded as not lacking in judgment and stands foremost in public esteem, delivers over them the praise that is fitting; after this they depart. That is how they bury them, and throughout the whole war, whenever the occasion arose, they followed this custom. Over these first dead, then, Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. When the moment came, he came forward from the tomb onto a high platform that had been built so that he could be heard by as much of the crowd as possible, and he spoke as follows.

35 "Most of those who have spoken here before me have praised the man who added this speech to the custom, saying that it is a fine thing for it to be delivered over those who are buried from the wars. To me it would have seemed enough that men who

proved brave in deed should also have their honors shown in deed, as you see them now in what the city has publicly prepared around this tomb, and that the courage of many should not be staked on one man, to be believed or not according to whether he speaks well or badly. For it is hard to speak in due measure on a subject where even the impression of truth is barely established. The listener who knows the facts and is well disposed will perhaps think that what is said falls short of what he wishes and knows, while the one who lacks that knowledge will think, out of envy, that some things are exaggerated, if he hears of anything beyond his own capacity. Praise spoken of others is bearable only so far as each listener thinks that he too could do something of what he hears; whatever goes beyond that rouses envy, and then disbelief. But since the men of old judged that this was a good practice, I too must follow the custom and try to meet, as far as I can, the wishes and expectations of each of you.

36 "I will begin first with our ancestors, for it is just, and fitting as well, that on such an occasion they should be given this honor of remembrance. The same people have always lived in this land, generation succeeding generation down to the present, and by their courage they handed it on to us free. They deserve praise, and our fathers still more. For in addition to what they inherited, they won, not without toil, all the empire we now hold, and left it to us who are alive today. Most of it we ourselves who are here now, those of us still in the settled years of life, have enlarged further, and we have made the city in every respect most self-sufficient for war and for peace. Of the deeds in war by which each of these possessions was gained, or of how we or our fathers eagerly beat back an enemy, barbarian or Hellene, who came against us, I will say nothing, since I do not wish to speak at length among people who know. But I will first show what way of life brought us to this, and with what form of government and from what habits of

character our greatness arose, and then I will go on to the praise of these men. For I think it would not be unfitting to speak of these things on the present occasion, and that it is to the advantage of this whole gathering, citizens and foreigners alike, to hear them.

37 "We have a form of government that does not imitate the laws of our neighbors. We are rather a model to some than imitators of others. In name it is called a democracy, because it is run with a view not to the few but to the many. Under the laws, all have an equal share in settling their private disputes; but as for public standing, each man is preferred for public office according to how he is esteemed in some field, not by his turn in rotation so much as by merit. Nor is a man kept back by obscurity of rank because of poverty, if he has it in him to do the city some good. We conduct our public life freely, and so too our everyday dealings with one another, free of suspicion: we are not angry with our neighbor if he does as he pleases, nor do we put on the sour looks that do no actual harm but are painful to see. Easy as we are with one another in private, in public affairs it is above all fear that keeps us from breaking the law. We obey whoever is in office at the time, and the laws, especially those laid down to help the wronged, and those that, though unwritten, bring acknowledged shame on those who break them.

38 "And we have provided for the mind the most numerous relaxations from toil. We hold games and sacrifices throughout the year, and we have handsome private establishments whose daily delight drives away gloom. Because of the greatness of our city, the goods of every land flow in to us, and it is our lot to enjoy the good things of other men as much as our own, as if they were no less our own produce.

39 "We differ from our enemies in our training for war as well. We open our city to all, and we never expel foreigners to keep

anyone from learning or seeing something, the sight of which, if it were not hidden, might benefit an enemy. For we trust less in preparations and deceptions than in our own spirit when it comes to action. In education, they pursue courage from early youth by painful discipline, while we live at our ease and yet go out no less ready to face dangers equal to theirs. Here is the evidence. The Lacedaemonians do not invade our land on their own, but with all their allies; while we, when we attack our neighbors' land by ourselves, generally defeat without difficulty, on foreign soil, men who are defending their own homes. No enemy has ever yet met our full strength, because we attend to our navy at the same time as we send our own citizens out by land on many missions. Wherever they engage some fraction of us, if they defeat a few of us they boast that they have routed us all, and if they are beaten they claim to have been defeated by our entire force. And if we choose to meet danger with an easy mind rather than with laborious training, and with a courage that comes less from law than from character, we gain this: we do not suffer in advance for hardships still to come, and when we meet them we prove no less daring than those who are always toiling. In this our city is worthy of admiration, and in other things as well.

40 "For we love beauty without extravagance, and we love wisdom without softness. We use wealth as an opportunity for action rather than as a subject for boasting, and among us it is no disgrace for a man to admit poverty; the greater disgrace is not to act to escape it. The same men attend to their households and to public affairs, and others, though occupied with their trades, have no inadequate knowledge of public affairs. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in these things not as one who minds his own affairs, but as useless. We ourselves either decide or at least think through public matters properly, believing not that words harm action, but rather that harm comes from not being

instructed by discussion before going into action as we must. For we have this too to a remarkable degree, that the same men both dare the most and reason out most fully what they undertake; with other men, ignorance brings boldness and reflection brings hesitation. Those would rightly be judged strongest in spirit who know most clearly what is terrible and what is pleasant, and are not turned aside from danger for all that. In matters of generosity, too, we are the opposite of most men, for we win our friends not by receiving favors but by conferring them. The one who confers a favor is the firmer friend, since he means to keep the gratitude owed him alive by continued goodwill toward the one he has given it to; the one who owes it in return is less warm, knowing that he will repay the kindness not as a favor but as a debt. And we alone help others without fear, not so much from a calculation of advantage as from confidence in our freedom.

41 "To sum up, I say that our city as a whole is the school of Hellas, and that each one of us, in my view, would show himself, as an individual, fit for the greatest variety of roles, and with the greatest grace and versatility. That this is not a boast of words made for the occasion, but the truth of the facts, is shown by the very power of the city, which we have won by these habits. Alone of the cities of our time, she proves greater than her reputation when put to the test. She alone gives no enemy who attacks her cause for indignation at the kind of men who defeat him, and no subject cause to complain that he is ruled by men unworthy of it. We have displayed our power with mighty proofs, and it is not without witnesses; we shall be admired by the men of today and by those who come after. We need no Homer to praise us, nor any poet whose verses will give pleasure for the moment while the truth will undo the impression of the facts. We have forced every sea and every land to open itself to our daring, and everywhere we have planted, together with our colonies, everlasting memorials of

harm done and good done. It was for such a city, then, that these men, nobly refusing to have her taken from them, fought and died, and it is fitting that every one of those left behind should be willing to labor for her.

42 "That is why I have spoken at length about the city, to teach you that the contest is not for equal stakes between us and those who have nothing of all this, and at the same time to make plain, with evidence, the praise of the men over whom I now speak. The greatest part of it has been spoken. For the qualities for which I have praised the city are the ornaments with which the courage of these men and men like them adorned her, and there are not many Hellenes whose fame would prove, as theirs does, equal to their deeds. It seems to me that the death these men have now met shows a man's worth, whether as its first revelation or as its final confirmation. Even for those who were worse in other respects, it is right to put first their bravery in war on behalf of their country; for they have wiped out evil with good, and have done more good in public than harm in private. None of these men grew soft because he valued the further enjoyment of wealth more, and none, in the hope that belongs to poverty, that he might yet escape it and become rich, put off the danger. They desired vengeance on their enemies more than these things, and they thought this the most glorious of dangers, so they chose to take that vengeance at this risk and to let the rest go. They entrusted to hope the uncertainty of success, but in action, with regard to what was already before their eyes, they resolved to rely on themselves. And in that action they thought it better to resist and to suffer than to give way and be saved. So they fled the shameful word, but stood their ground in the deed with their bodies, and in the briefest moment of fortune, at the height not of their fear but of their glory, they passed away.

43 “So these men proved worthy of their city. The rest of you must pray for a safer outcome, but you must resolve to have a spirit toward the enemy no less daring. Do not judge the worth of such a spirit only from words, which someone might draw out at length, telling you, who know it as well as he does, of all the good there is in defending yourselves against the enemy. Rather, fix your eyes every day on the power of the city as it truly is, and become her lovers. And when she seems great to you, reflect that men acquired all this by daring, by knowing what had to be done, and by a sense of honor in action; and that whenever they failed in some attempt, they did not think it right to deprive the city of their courage, but offered it to her as the finest contribution they could make. For they gave their bodies in common and received, each for himself, the praise that never grows old, and the most distinguished of tombs, not so much the one in which they lie, but the one in which their glory is laid up, to be remembered forever, on every occasion for word or deed that arises. For the whole earth is the tomb of famous men. Not only does the inscription on monuments in their own land mark them, but even in foreign lands there lives in each person an unwritten memorial, of their spirit rather than of their deed. Make these men your models, then. Judge that happiness is freedom and freedom is courage, and do not look anxiously at the dangers of war. For it is not the unfortunate, who have no hope of good, who have the best reason to be unsparing of their lives, but those who still risk a reversal for the worse in life, and for whom the difference would be greatest if they should stumble. To a man of spirit, humiliation that comes with cowardice is more painful than a death that comes unfelt, in the midst of strength and shared hope.

44 “That is why I do not lament with the parents of these men, those of you who are here, so much as comfort them. They know that they were brought up amid the many turns of fortune.

Fortunate are those who are allotted the most glorious end, as these men now, or the most glorious grief, as you, and those whose life has been measured out so that their happiness and their death came together. I know that it is hard to persuade you of this, since you will often be reminded of them by the good fortune of others, in which you too once took delight. And grief is felt not for good things one is deprived of without ever having tried them, but for something one has grown used to and has lost. Those of you who are still of an age to have children must bear up in the hope of other sons. In private, the children who are born will help some of you to forget those who are no more, and the city will gain doubly, in not being left empty and in its safety. For men cannot give fair and just counsel unless they too have children to stake in the danger on equal terms with others. As for those of you who are past that age, count as gain the greater part of your life in which you were fortunate, remember that what remains will be short, and take comfort in the glory of these men. For only the love of honor does not grow old, and in the uselessness of old age it is not making money, as some say, that gives more pleasure, but being honored.

45 "For you who are the sons or brothers of these men, I see a great struggle ahead (for everyone is accustomed to praise the dead), and even by surpassing excellence you would hardly be judged their equals, but only a little inferior. For the living feel envy toward a rival, but what no longer stands in the way is honored with a goodwill that has no competitor. If I must also say something about the excellence of women, to those of you who will now be widows, I will express it all in a brief piece of advice. Great is your glory if you do not fall below the nature that is yours, and great is hers who is least spoken of among men, whether in praise or in blame.

46 "I have said, in word and in accordance with the custom, what I had that was fitting; and in deed those being buried have already received part of their honors, while for the rest, the city will bring up their children at public expense from this day until they come of age. This is the useful crown she offers, to these men and to those left behind, for such contests. For where the greatest prizes for excellence are set, there the best men are citizens. And now, when each of you has finished lamenting his own, depart."

47 Such was the funeral held in this winter; and with the end of the winter the first year of this war came to an end. At the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before, invaded Attica under the command of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and encamped and ravaged the land. They had not yet been many days in Attica when the plague first broke out among the Athenians. It was said to have struck in many places before, around Lemnos and elsewhere, but nowhere was there any memory of a pestilence so great or of so great a destruction of human life. The doctors were of no help at first, treating it in ignorance; in fact they died most of all, since they came into contact with it most. Nor was any other human skill of any use. All the prayers they made at temples, and their recourse to oracles and the like, were all useless, and in the end they gave them up, overwhelmed by the disaster.

48 It began first, so it is said, in Ethiopia beyond Egypt, and then came down into Egypt and Libya and into most of the King's land. It fell on the city of Athens suddenly, and first attacked the people in Piraeus, so that they even said the Peloponnesians had thrown poison into the cisterns; for there were no fountains there yet. Later it reached the upper city as well, and from then on the deaths were far more numerous. Let each man, doctor or layman, say what he thinks about it: from what source it probably arose,

and what causes he believes were strong enough to produce so great a change. I will describe what it was like, and I will set out the symptoms from which anyone who studies them, if it should ever strike again, would best be able to recognize it, knowing something in advance. I had the disease myself, and I saw others suffering from it.

49 That year, as everyone agreed, happened to be more free of other illnesses than any other; and if anyone had some illness before, it all turned into this. Others, for no apparent cause, but suddenly, while they were in good health, were seized first by violent heat in the head and redness and inflammation of the eyes. Inside, the throat and the tongue at once became bloody, and the breath was strange and foul. Next came sneezing and hoarseness, and before long the pain went down into the chest, with a violent cough. When it settled in the stomach, it turned it upside down, and every discharge of bile that the doctors have named followed, accompanied by great distress. Most of them were then attacked by empty retching, which brought violent convulsions; in some these abated after the earlier symptoms, in others much later. To the touch the outside of the body was not very hot, nor pale, but reddish and livid, breaking out in small blisters and sores. But inside they burned so much that they could not bear to have on them even the lightest clothing or linen sheets, or anything but to be naked, and they would have liked best to throw themselves into cold water. Many of those who were left uncared for actually did so, plunging into cisterns, in the grip of a thirst that could not be quenched; and it made no difference whether they drank much or little. They were tormented all the while by restlessness and sleeplessness. As long as the disease was at its height, the body did not waste away but held out against the suffering beyond all expectation, so that most of them either died on the ninth or seventh day from the internal burning while they still had some strength, or, if

they survived that, the disease descended into the bowels, severe ulceration set in there together with uncontrollable diarrhea, and most of them later died from the weakness this caused. For the disease, which first settled in the head, passed through the whole body from the top down, and if anyone survived the worst of it, its grip on the extremities still left its mark. It attacked the genitals and the tips of the hands and feet, and many survived with the loss of these, some also with the loss of their eyes. Others again, as soon as they recovered, were seized by a total loss of memory, and did not know themselves or their friends.

50 The nature of the disease was beyond description. In general it fell on each victim more cruelly than human nature can bear, and in one respect especially it showed that it was something other than the familiar illnesses. The birds and beasts that feed on human flesh, though many bodies lay unburied, either did not come near them or died after tasting them. Here is the evidence. There was a marked disappearance of birds of this kind, and they were not seen around the bodies or anywhere else. The dogs, because they live with people, made the effect easier to observe.

51 Such, then, was the disease in its general form, if one passes over many other peculiarities, since it happened to each person in a somewhat different way from another. At that time none of the usual illnesses troubled them; or whatever did occur ended in this. Some died from neglect, others despite every care. There was not one remedy, so to speak, that could be established as one that would help if applied, for what did one person good did another harm. No constitution proved strong enough against it, whether in strength or weakness, but it carried off all alike, even those treated with every kind of regimen. The most terrible thing in the whole calamity was the despair when anyone realized he was sick, for their minds turned at once to hopelessness, so that they abandoned themselves far more readily and did not resist; and the fact

that they caught it from nursing one another and died like sheep. This caused the greatest loss of life. For if they were afraid and unwilling to go near one another, they died alone, and many houses were emptied for lack of anyone to care for the sick. If they did go near, they died, especially those who had any claim to decency; for they were ashamed to spare themselves and went in to their friends, since in the end even the members of the family grew weary of their lamentations for the dying, overcome by the vastness of the calamity. Yet those who had come through it showed still more pity for the dying and the suffering, because they knew it from experience and were themselves now confident; for it did not attack the same person twice, at least not fatally. They were congratulated by others, and they themselves, in the exhilaration of the moment, had some vain hope that in future too they would never die of any other disease.

52 In addition to the existing hardship, they were oppressed still more by the crowding in from the country to the city, and the newcomers not least. There were no houses for them, and they were living in stifling huts in the hot season of the year, so they died in total disorder. The bodies of the dying lay one on top of another, and half-dead men staggered about in the streets and around all the fountains, longing for water. The temples where they had camped were full of the corpses of those who had died there. For the calamity was overwhelming, and men, not knowing what would become of them, came to disregard everything, sacred and profane alike. All the customs they had previously observed in burials were thrown into confusion, and they buried their dead as each one could. Many, lacking the necessary means because so many of their family had already died, turned to shameless ways of disposing of the dead. Some would put their own dead on a pyre that others had built, getting there before the builders, and set it

alight; others threw the body they were carrying on top of another that was already burning, and went away.

53 In other respects too the plague was the beginning of greater lawlessness in the city. Men now more readily dared to indulge openly in pleasures they would once have hidden, seeing how swift the reversal was: the prosperous dying suddenly, and those who had possessed nothing before taking over their property at once. So they thought it right to seek quick gratification, aimed at pleasure, regarding their lives and their money alike as things of a day. No one was eager to persevere in what was thought honorable, since he thought it uncertain whether he would die before he attained it. Whatever was pleasant for the moment, and whatever contributed to that from any source, became both honorable and useful. No fear of the gods or law of men restrained them. As for the gods, they judged it the same whether they worshiped them or not, seeing all alike perishing; and as for offenses, no one expected to live until he was brought to trial and paid the penalty. Much heavier, they thought, was the sentence already passed on them and hanging over their heads, and before it fell it was only reasonable to get some enjoyment out of life.

54 Such was the calamity that had fallen on the Athenians and was weighing them down, with men dying inside the walls and the land being ravaged outside. In their distress they naturally recalled this verse, which the older men said had been chanted long ago: "A Dorian war shall come, and plague with it." There was a dispute about whether the word the ancients used in the verse was not *loimos*, plague, but *limos*, famine; but under the circumstances the view naturally prevailed that it was "plague," for men shaped their memory to fit what they were suffering. But I think that if another Dorian war should ever come after this one, and a famine should happen to occur, they will in all likelihood recite it that way. Those

who knew of it also remembered the oracle given to the Lacedaemonians, when they asked the god whether they should go to war, and he answered that if they fought with all their might, victory would be theirs, and that he himself would take their part. As for the oracle, they supposed that what was happening matched it. The disease began immediately after the Peloponnesians had invaded, and it did not enter the Peloponnese, at least not to any extent worth mentioning, but it spread through Athens above all, and then through the most populous of the other places. That is the history of the plague.

55 After the Peloponnesians had ravaged the plain, they advanced into the so-called Paralus region as far as Laurium, where the Athenians have their silver mines. First they ravaged the part that faces the Peloponnese, then the part that faces toward Euboea and Andros. Pericles, who was general at this time too, held the same view as in the earlier invasion, that the Athenians should not go out against them.

56 While the Peloponnesians were still in the plain, before they went on to the coast, he prepared an expedition of a hundred ships against the Peloponnese, and when it was ready, he put to sea. He took on board four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry in horse transports, which were then made for the first time out of old ships; the Chians and Lesbians also joined the expedition with fifty ships. When this Athenian force put to sea, they left the Peloponnesians in Attica, in the coastal region. Arriving at Epidaurus in the Peloponnese, they ravaged most of the land, and when they assaulted the city they came to hope that they would take it, but they did not succeed. Putting out from Epidaurus, they ravaged the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all of which are on the coast of the Peloponnese. Setting out from there, they came to Prasiae, a small coastal town in Laconia, ravaged part of its land, and took the town itself and

sacked it. After doing this they went home. They found that the Peloponnesians were no longer in Attica but had withdrawn.

57 All the time the Peloponnesians were in Athenian territory and the Athenians were campaigning with the fleet, the plague was killing Athenians both in the army and in the city. It was even said that the Peloponnesians left the country sooner than they would have because they were afraid of the disease, since they heard from deserters that it was in the city and could also see the burials. Yet in this invasion they stayed longest and ravaged the whole country, for they were in Attica about forty days.

58 In the same summer Hagnon son of Nicias and Cleopompus son of Clinias, Pericles' fellow generals, took the force he had used and marched at once against the Chalcidians on the Thracian coast and against Potidaea, which was still under siege. When they arrived, they brought siege engines against Potidaea and tried by every means to take it. But neither the capture of the city nor anything else went as well as their resources deserved. For the plague broke out there too and pressed the Athenians very hard, ravaging the army, so that even the Athenian troops who had been there before and had been healthy until then caught it from Hagnon's force. Phormio and his sixteen hundred men were no longer in Chalcidice. So Hagnon returned with the fleet to Athens, having lost to the plague 1,050 out of four thousand hoplites in about forty days; the soldiers who had been there before stayed where they were and continued the siege of Potidaea.

59 After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians, since their land had been ravaged a second time and the plague and the war were weighing on them together, the Athenians changed their minds. They blamed Pericles for having persuaded them to go to war, holding that it was because of him that they had fallen into these misfortunes, and they were eager to come to terms with the Lacedaemonians. They even sent envoys to them, but accom-

plished nothing. At their wits' end in every direction, they turned on Pericles. When he saw them angry at the situation and doing everything just as he had expected, he called a meeting (he was still general), wanting to put heart into them, to draw the anger out of their minds, and to bring them to a calmer and less fearful state. He came forward and spoke as follows.

60 "I expected these outbursts of your anger against me, for I understand the reasons for them, and I have called this assembly for that purpose: to remind you of certain things and to rebuke you if your anger with me is unjustified, or if you are giving way to your misfortunes. I believe that a city which prospers as a whole does its private citizens more good than one in which each citizen does well while the community as a whole goes down. A man who prospers in his own affairs is ruined all the same if his country is destroyed, while one who is unfortunate in a fortunate country is far more likely to come through safely. Since, then, a city can bear the misfortunes of its individuals, but no single individual can bear the city's, surely all must defend it, and not do what you are doing now. Stunned by your troubles at home, you are abandoning the common safety, and you are blaming both me, who advised you to go to war, and yourselves, who voted for it with me. And yet the man you are angry with is one who, I believe, is inferior to no one in knowing what must be done and in explaining it, a man who loves his city and is above money. For a man who has knowledge but fails to explain it clearly is no better off than if he had never thought of it; one who has both abilities but is ill disposed to the city will not speak as a friend would; and one who has this loyalty too, but can be overcome by money, would sell everything for that alone. So if you were persuaded to go to war because you thought I had these qualities even to a moderate degree more than others, it would not be reasonable for me to be charged now with having done wrong.

61 "For those who have a choice, and are prospering in other respects, it is great folly to go to war. But if the necessity was either to give way and at once submit to our neighbors, or to run the risk and prevail, then the man who flees the danger is more to blame than the one who stands up to it. I am the same man, and I have not shifted my position. It is you who are changing. You were persuaded while you were unhurt, and you repent now that you are suffering, and my argument appears wrong to you because your judgment is weak. For each of you already feels what hurts, while the benefit has not yet become clear to all; and now that a great reversal has come on you, and that within a short time, your minds are too dispirited to persevere in what you resolved. For what is sudden and unexpected, and what happens wholly contrary to calculation, enslaves the spirit; and this has happened to you, not least with the plague, on top of everything else. Nevertheless, as citizens of a great city, brought up in a way of life worthy of it, you must be willing to stand up even to the greatest misfortunes and not let your reputation fade. (For men think it equally right to blame anyone who, through softness, falls short of the reputation he has, and to hate anyone who, through presumption, reaches for a reputation that does not belong to him.) You must put aside your private griefs and take hold of the common safety.

62 "As for the hardship of the war, and your fear that it may be great and that we may be no nearer to winning, let it be enough for you that I have often shown on other occasions that this suspicion is unfounded. But I will also point out this advantage you have regarding the greatness of your empire, which I think you have never yet considered yourselves, and which I did not mention in my earlier speeches. Nor would I mention it now, since the claim sounds rather boastful, if I did not see you discouraged beyond reason. You think your empire extends only over your allies. But I

declare to you that of the two parts of the world that lie open to man's use, land and sea, you are absolute masters of the whole of one, both as far as you now control it and farther if you wish. There is no one, neither the King nor any other people on earth today, who will stop you from sailing where you will with the naval force you now possess. So this power is of quite another order from the use of your houses and land, which you think it a great loss to be deprived of. Nor is it reasonable to take their loss hard, rather than to make light of them, regarding them, in comparison with this power, as a little garden and an ornament of wealth. You should recognize that freedom, if we hold on to it and preserve it, will easily recover these things, while those who submit to others tend to lose even what they had before. You should not prove worse in either respect than your fathers, who won these things by their own toil and did not inherit them from others, and then held them and preserved them and handed them down to you (and it is more disgraceful to be robbed of what one has than to fail in trying to acquire it). Go to meet your enemies not with spirit alone but with disdain. For boastfulness can come even from a lucky ignorance, even to a coward; but disdain belongs to the man who is confident, by his judgment, that he is superior to his enemy, and that is our position. And where fortune is equal, intelligence, from a sense of superiority, makes daring more secure, since it relies less on hope, whose strength lies in desperate situations, and more on judgment based on the facts, whose foresight is more certain.

63 "It is right for you to support the city's dignity, which she derives from her empire and in which you all take pride, and not to shun the burdens unless you also give up pursuing the honors. And do not suppose that you are fighting over a single issue, slavery or freedom; at stake also is the loss of your empire, and the danger from the hatred you have incurred in ruling it. Nor is it

possible for you any longer to give it up, if anyone, out of fear in the present situation, is playing the honest man by advocating a quiet life. For by now the empire you hold is like a tyranny: to take it may seem unjust, but to let it go is dangerous. Men of that kind would very quickly ruin a city if they persuaded others, and they would do the same if they settled somewhere on their own as an independent state. For the quiet life cannot survive unless it is ranged alongside men of action; and it is of no advantage in a ruling city, but only in a subject one, where it means safe servitude.

64 "Do not be led astray by citizens like these, and do not be angry with me, since you yourselves joined me in voting for war, even if the enemy has invaded and done what was to be expected once you refused to submit, and even if, beyond everything we anticipated, this plague has come upon us, the one thing of all that has proved beyond our foresight. I know that I am hated somewhat more because of it, unjustly, unless you will also credit me whenever you have some unexpected stroke of good fortune. One must bear what the gods send as necessity, and what comes from the enemy with courage. That was the habit of this city in the past; let it not be checked now in you. Recognize that she has the greatest name among all mankind because she does not give way to misfortunes, and because she has spent more lives and labor in war than any other, and has won the greatest power that has existed down to our time. The memory of it will be left to those who come after us forever, even if we should now give way a little at some point (for all things are born to decline): that we, Hellenes, ruled the greatest number of Hellenes, that we held out in the greatest wars against them, both all together and separately, and that we lived in the city that was richest in all things and greatest. The man who prefers a quiet life may find fault with this, but the man who wants to act himself will emulate it, and anyone who has not achieved it will envy it. To be hated and resented for the present has always

been the lot of all who have presumed to rule others; but whoever incurs envy for the greatest ends judges rightly. Hatred does not last long, but present brilliance and future glory are left behind, remembered forever. You must look ahead to future honor and to present freedom from disgrace, and win both by your eagerness now. Do not send heralds to the Lacedaemonians, and do not let them see that you are weighed down by your present hardships. For those who are least distressed in spirit by misfortune and resist it most firmly in action are the strongest, both among cities and among individuals."

65 With words like these Pericles tried to free the Athenians from their anger against him and to turn their minds away from their present troubles. Publicly they were persuaded by his arguments; they sent no more envoys to the Lacedaemonians and were more eager for the war. But privately they were pained by their sufferings: the common people because, having had little to begin with, they had been deprived even of that; the powerful because they had lost fine estates in the country, with their buildings and costly furnishings; and most of all because they had war instead of peace. And indeed they did not as a whole give up their anger against him until they had fined him. Not long afterward, however, as a crowd tends to do, they elected him general again and entrusted all their affairs to him, for by now each man felt his private sorrows less keenly, and they judged him the most valuable man for what the city as a whole needed. For as long as he led the city in peacetime, he guided it with moderation and kept it safe, and under him it reached its greatest height; and when the war broke out, he evidently foresaw the city's strength in this too. He lived for two years and six months after it began,[6] and after his death his foresight about the war was recognized still more. He had told them that they would prevail if they kept quiet, looked after their navy, did not try to extend their empire during the war,

and did not put the city at risk. They did the very opposite of all this, and in other matters that seemed to have nothing to do with the war they pursued policies, out of private ambition and private gain, that were bad for themselves and for their allies. When these succeeded, the honor and advantage went mostly to individuals; when they failed, the damage fell on the city in the war. The reason was that Pericles, powerful through his standing and his judgment, and conspicuously incorruptible, restrained the people freely. He led them rather than being led by them, because he had not acquired his power by improper means and did not speak to please them; he had such standing that he could even contradict them to their anger. Whenever he saw them insolently overconfident at the wrong time, he would speak and strike them into fear; and when they were unreasonably afraid, he would restore them to confidence. What was in name a democracy was in fact rule by the first man. His successors, who were more on a level with one another and each of whom was striving to be first, turned to pleasing the people and even handing over affairs to them. From this, as was to be expected in a great city with an empire, came many mistakes, among them the expedition to Sicily.[7] This was not so much an error of judgment about the people they were attacking as a failure on the part of those who sent it out to follow it up with what the men who had gone needed. Instead, absorbed in their private intrigues over the leadership of the people, they blunted the army's efforts and for the first time fell into civil strife with one another at home. Yet even after their disaster in Sicily, where they lost the rest of their armament and the greater part of their fleet, and when the city was already in civil strife, they held out for three years[8] against their former enemies, against the Sicilians who had joined them, against most of their allies, who were now in revolt, and later against Cyrus, the King's son, who joined them and provided money to the Peloponnesians for their

fleet. And they did not give in until they had brought themselves down by falling on one another in their private quarrels. So abundant, then, were the grounds Pericles had at the time for his foresight, and for his belief that the city would very easily prevail in the war over the Peloponnesians alone.

66 In the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies made an expedition with a hundred ships against the island of Zacynthus, which lies opposite Elis. The Zacynthians are colonists of the Achaeans from the Peloponnese, and they were allies of the Athenians. On board were a thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, and Cnemus, a Spartiate, was admiral. They landed and ravaged most of the country, and when the people would not come to terms, they sailed back home.

67 At the end of the same summer Aristeus of Corinth, the Lacedaemonian envoys Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodamus, Timagoras of Tegea, and Pollis of Argos, who was acting in a private capacity, were on their way to Asia, to the King, to see if they could persuade him to supply money and join in the war. They went first to Sitalces son of Teres in Thrace, wanting to persuade him, if they could, to leave the Athenian alliance and march on Potidaea, where an Athenian army was conducting the siege, and also, with his help, to travel as they intended across the Hellespont to Pharnaces son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them on up to the King. But Athenian envoys happened to be with Sitalces, Learchus son of Callimachus and Ameiniades son of Philemon, and they persuaded Sadocus, the son of Sitalces who had been made an Athenian, to hand the men over to them, so that they would not get across to the King and do harm to his city, which in part was his own. He was persuaded, and as they were traveling through Thrace to the boat in which they were to cross the Hellespont, he arrested them before they could board, sending men along with Learchus and Ameiniades with orders to hand them over to these

two. They took them and brought them to Athens. When they arrived, the Athenians were afraid that Aristeus, if he escaped, would do them still more harm, since he had evidently been responsible for everything at Potidaea and on the Thracian coast before this. So, without trial, and though they wanted to say something, they put them all to death that same day and threw them into a pit. They thought it right to retaliate in the same way as the Lacedaemonians had begun, for these had killed and thrown into pits the traders of the Athenians and their allies whom they had caught sailing around the Peloponnese in merchant ships. For at the beginning of the war the Lacedaemonians killed as enemies all whom they caught at sea, both those fighting on the Athenian side and those who were on neither side.

68 At about the same time, at the end of the summer, the Ambraciots, with many of the barbarians whom they had called to arms, made an expedition against Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia. Their enmity toward the Argives had first arisen in the following way. Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia were founded after the Trojan War by Amphilochus son of Amphiaraus, who on returning home was dissatisfied with the state of affairs in Argos and founded them on the Ambracian Gulf, naming the city Argos after his own country. (This city was the largest in Amphilochia and had the most powerful inhabitants.) Many generations later, under the pressure of misfortunes, they called in the Ambraciots, their neighbors on the Amphilochian border, to share the city, and they first learned the Greek they now speak from the Ambraciots who settled with them; the rest of the Amphilochians are barbarians. In time the Ambraciots drove out the Argives and held the city themselves. When this happened, the Amphilochians put themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians, and together the two of them called in the Athenians, who sent them Phormio as general with thirty ships. When

Phormio arrived, they took Argos by storm and enslaved the Ambraciots, and the Amphilochians and Acarnanians settled it in common. After this the alliance between the Athenians and the Acarnanians was first made. The Ambraciots first conceived their hatred of the Argives from the enslavement of their own people, and later in the war they made this expedition with their own forces, the Chaonians, and some others of the neighboring barbarians. They came to Argos and were masters of the countryside, but when they could not take the city by assault, they went home and disbanded, each people to its own land. These were the events of the summer.

69 The following winter the Athenians sent twenty ships around the Peloponnese under the general Phormio, who made Naupactus his base and kept watch so that no one could sail out of Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf or into it; and six others to Caria and Lycia under the general Melesander, to collect money there and to prevent Peloponnesian privateers from using those parts as a base and harming the merchant ships sailing from Phaselis and Phoenicia and the mainland in that region. Melesander went inland into Lycia with a force of Athenians from the ships and allies, and he was defeated in battle and killed, and lost part of his force.

70 In the same winter the Potidaeans could no longer hold out under siege. The Peloponnesian invasions of Attica had done nothing to make the Athenians withdraw, their grain had run out, and many other things had already happened there in the struggle for something to eat; some had even eaten one another. So at last they made proposals for surrender to the Athenian generals posted against them, Xenophon son of Euripides, Hestiodorus son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus. The generals accepted, seeing the hardship the army was suffering in an exposed winter position, and since the city had already spent two

thousand talents on the siege. They came to terms on these conditions: the Potidaeans, with their children, their wives, and their mercenaries, were to leave the city, the men with one garment each and the women with two, taking a fixed sum of money for the journey. So they left under the truce for Chalcidice and wherever each of them could go. The Athenians blamed the generals for having made terms without consulting them (for they thought they could have taken the city on whatever terms they wished), and later they sent settlers of their own to Potidaea and colonized it. These were the events of the winter, and with it ended the second year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

71 The following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies did not invade Attica but marched against Plataea, under the command of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He encamped his army and was about to ravage the land, but the Plataeans at once sent envoys to him, who spoke as follows. "Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, you are not acting justly, nor in a manner worthy of yourselves or of the fathers whose sons you are, in marching against the land of the Plataeans. When Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, had freed Hellas from the Medes, together with those Hellenes who were willing to share the danger of the battle that was fought in our land, he offered sacrifice in the marketplace of Plataea to Zeus the Liberator, called together all the allies, and gave back to the Plataeans their land and their city, to hold and to live in as an independent people; no one was ever to march against them unjustly or to enslave them, and if anyone did, the allies then present were to defend them with all their strength. These are the rights your fathers gave us for the courage and zeal we showed in those dangers. But you are doing the opposite, for you have come with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, to enslave us. We call to witness the gods who were invoked in the oaths at that time, the gods of

your fathers, and the gods of our country, and we tell you not to wrong the land of Plataea or to break your oaths, but to let us live independent, as Pausanias granted."

72 When the Plataeans had said this much, Archidamus answered: "What you say is just, men of Plataea, if your actions match your words. Be independent yourselves, as Pausanias granted you, and help us to free the others, who shared the dangers of that time and swore the oaths together with you, and are now under the Athenians. It is for their sake, and for the freedom of the rest, that this great armament and this war have come about. Best of all, take part in that liberation yourselves and abide by the oaths. If not, then do what we have already proposed to you before: keep quiet, enjoying what is your own, and take neither side; receive both sides as friends, but neither for purposes of war. That will satisfy us." This was what Archidamus said. When the Plataean envoys had heard it, they went into the city, reported what had been said to the people, and then answered him that it was impossible for them to do what he proposed without the Athenians, for their children and wives were at Athens. They feared too for the whole city, that once the Lacedaemonians had withdrawn, the Athenians would come and not allow it, or that the Thebans, on the grounds that they were included in the oath to receive both sides, would again try to seize their city. To reassure them on these points he said: "Then hand over your city and your houses to us Lacedaemonians, show us the boundaries of your land, the number of your trees, and anything else that can be counted, and go away yourselves wherever you like for as long as the war lasts. When it is over, we will give back to you whatever we have received. Until then we will hold it in trust, working the land and paying you whatever rent will be enough for you."

73 When they heard this, they went back into the city, and after consulting with the people they said that they wished first to com-

municate his proposals to the Athenians, and if they could persuade them, they would do as he asked; until then, they asked him to grant them a truce and not to ravage the land. He granted them a truce for the number of days it would probably take for the journey, and did not ravage the land. The envoys went to the Athenians, consulted with them, and came back with the following message for those in the city. “Men of Plataea, the Athenians say that never before, since we became their allies, have they abandoned you to be wronged by anyone, and that they will not stand by now, but will help you with all their strength. And they adjure you by the oaths your fathers swore to make no change in the alliance.”

74 When the envoys had reported this, the Plataeans resolved not to betray the Athenians, but to endure even seeing their land ravaged, if they must, and to suffer whatever else might happen. No one was to go out any more; they would answer from the wall that it was impossible for them to do what the Lacedaemonians proposed. When they had given their answer, King Archidamus first called on the gods and heroes of the country to witness, saying: “All you gods and heroes who hold the land of Plataea, be our witnesses that we did not wrongfully invade this land in the first place, but only after these people had first abandoned our common oath. In this land our fathers prayed to you and defeated the Medes, and you made it a propitious place for the Hellenes to fight in. Nor shall we do wrong now, whatever we may do; for we have made many reasonable proposals and have not obtained them. Grant then that those who began the wrong may be punished for it, and that those who seek vengeance lawfully may obtain it.”

75 Having made this appeal to the gods, he set his army to the work of war. First they surrounded the city with a stockade made of the trees they had cut down, so that no one could get out. Then they began to raise a mound against the city, hoping that with so

large an army at work the capture would be very quick. They cut timber on Cithaeron and built it up on either side of the mound, laying it crosswise like a lattice to serve as walls, so that the mound would not spread out too far. Into it they carried brushwood, stones, earth, and anything else that would help to fill it when thrown in. They went on piling it up for seventy days[9] and nights without a break, divided into relays, so that some were carrying while others took sleep and food; and the Lacedaemonian officers in charge of the contingents of each city stood over them and kept them at the work. When the Plataeans saw the mound rising, they put together a wooden framework, set it on top of their own wall where the mound was being built against it, and filled it in with bricks taken from the nearby houses. The timbers held it together, so that the structure would not be weak as it grew high, and it had a covering of hides and skins, so that the workmen and the timbers would be protected and not struck by fire arrows. The height of the wall rose a great deal, and the mound rose no more slowly to meet it. Then the Plataeans thought of something else. They broke through the part of the wall where the mound was against it and carried the earth into the city.

76 When the Peloponnesians noticed this, they packed clay into baskets of reed and threw these into the breach, so that it would not crumble and be carried away like the loose earth. Shut off in this direction, the Plataeans stopped this, but they dug a tunnel from the city, calculated where it would come under the mound, and began once more to draw the earth away from underneath into the city. For a long time those outside did not notice, so that for all they threw on they made less progress, since their mound was being drawn away from below and kept settling into the space being emptied. But the Plataeans were afraid that even so, few as they were, they would not be able to hold out against so many, and they devised a further measure. They stopped working on the high

structure opposite the mound, and starting from the low wall at either end of it, they built a crescent-shaped wall on the inside, curving in toward the city, so that if the high wall were taken, this one would hold, and the enemy would have to build another mound against it and, as they advanced inside, would have double the labor and be more exposed to attack from both sides. Along with the mound, the Peloponnesians also brought up siege engines against the city. One, which was brought up on the mound against the high structure, shook down a great part of it and terrified the Plataeans; others were brought against other parts of the wall. The Plataeans threw nooses around these and broke them off. They also hung great beams on long iron chains from both ends of two poles that were leaned out and projected over the wall, hauled the beams up crosswise, and whenever the engine was about to strike anywhere, they let the beam go, with the chains slack and no longer held in their hands; and it fell with a rush and snapped off the head of the ram.

77 After this, since their engines were doing no good and a counter-wall was being built against their mound, the Peloponnesians concluded that it was impossible to take the city by the means at hand, and they prepared to wall it in. But first they decided to try fire, to see if they could burn the city, which was not large, when a wind rose; for they were thinking of every possible method by which it might be brought over to them without expense and a siege. They brought bundles of brushwood and threw them down from the mound, first into the space between the wall and the mound. When this was quickly filled, since many hands were at work, they heaped more on, over as much of the rest of the city as they could reach from the height; then they threw in fire with sulfur and pitch and set the wood alight. A blaze arose such as no one had ever yet seen, at least up to that time, made by human hands; for in the mountains, before now, forests

rubbed together by the winds have caught fire of their own accord and sent up flames from it. This fire was great, and it came very near to destroying the Plataeans after they had escaped everything else. Over a large area of the city it was impossible to come near it, and if a wind had risen to carry the fire on, as the enemy hoped, they would not have escaped. As it was, it is said that this too happened: heavy rain and thunder came on and put out the blaze, and so the danger ended.

78 When the Peloponnesians had failed in this too, they kept part of their army there, dismissed the greater part, and began to build a wall around the city in a circle, dividing the ground among the cities. There was a ditch inside the wall and another outside, from which they made their bricks. When the whole was finished, about the rising of Arcturus,[10] they left guards for half the wall (the Boeotians guarded the other half), withdrew with the army, and disbanded to their cities. The Plataeans had earlier sent away to Athens their children and wives, the oldest men, and the rest of the people who were of no use. Those left behind to be besieged were four hundred of their own men and eighty Athenians, with a hundred and ten women to make bread. That was their total number when they were first besieged, and there was no one else inside the walls, slave or free. So the siege of Plataea was set in place.

79 In the same summer, at the same time as the expedition against Plataea, the Athenians marched with two thousand of their own hoplites and two hundred cavalry against the Chalcidians on the Thracian coast and the Bottiaeans, when the grain was ripe. Xenophon son of Euripides was in command, with two others. They came to Spartolus in Bottice and destroyed the grain. It was thought, too, that the city would come over to them through the efforts of some people inside. But those who were against this sent to Olynthus, and hoplites and other troops came to garrison the

city. These came out from Spartolus to fight, and the Athenians formed up for battle under the city itself. The Chalcidian hoplites, with some mercenaries, were defeated by the Athenians and withdrew into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian cavalry and light-armed troops defeated the Athenian cavalry and light-armed. The Chalcidians had a few peltasts from the land called Crusis. Just after the battle had been fought, more peltasts came to help from Olynthus. When the light-armed troops in Spartolus saw them, they were encouraged by the reinforcements and by the fact that they had not been beaten before, and together with the Chalcidian cavalry and the newcomers they attacked the Athenians again. The Athenians fell back on the two companies they had left with the baggage. Whenever the Athenians advanced, the enemy gave way, but when they retired, the enemy pressed hard on them and hurled javelins at them. The Chalcidian cavalry rode up and charged wherever it seemed best, and, causing the greatest panic, they routed the Athenians and pursued them a long way. The Athenians took refuge in Potidaea, and later, after recovering their dead under a truce, they returned to Athens with what was left of the army. Four hundred and thirty of them had been killed, and all the generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans set up a trophy, took up their own dead, and dispersed to their cities.

80 In the same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots and the Chaonians, wanting to subdue the whole of Acarnania and detach it from the Athenians, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to prepare a fleet from their alliance and to send a thousand hoplites against Acarnania. They said that if the Lacedaemonians came with ships and infantry together, alongside them, the Acarnanians on the coast would be unable to come to the help of the rest, and they would easily take Acarnania and then be masters of Zacynthus and Cephallenia as well, and the Athenians would no longer be able to sail around the Peloponnese as before; there was

also hope of taking Naupactus. The Lacedaemonians were persuaded and at once sent Cnemus, who was still admiral, and the hoplites on a few ships, and sent word around to the fleet to get ready and sail to Leucas as quickly as possible. The Corinthians were especially eager to help the Ambraciots, who were their colonists. The ships from Corinth, Sicyon, and the places in that region were still being got ready, while those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia had arrived first and were waiting at Leucas. Cnemus and his thousand hoplites, once they had crossed over without being noticed by Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian ships on guard off Naupactus, at once began to prepare the campaign by land. Of the Hellenes he had with him the Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians he had brought himself; of the barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who have no king and were led by Photius and Nicanor, holding the annual leadership from the ruling family. With the Chaonians marched the Thesprotians, who also have no king. Sabylinthus, guardian of King Tharyps, who was still a boy, led the Molossians and the Atintanians, and Oroedus, their king, led the Paravaeans. A thousand Orestians, whose king was Antiochus, marched with the Paravaeans, Antiochus having entrusted them to Oroedus. Perdiccas too, without the knowledge of the Athenians, sent a thousand Macedonians, who arrived too late. With this army Cnemus set out, without waiting for the fleet from Corinth. Passing through the territory of Argos, they sacked Limnaea, an unwalled village. They came to Stratus, the largest city of Acarnania, thinking that if they took it first, the rest would easily come over to them.

81 When the Acarnanians learned that a large army had invaded by land and that the enemy would also be there from the sea with ships, they did not unite to resist but each guarded his own territory, and they sent to Phormio asking him to help them. He replied

that he could not leave Naupactus unprotected when a fleet was about to sail out of Corinth. The Peloponnesians and their allies divided themselves into three divisions and advanced on the city of the Stratians, intending to camp near it and, if they could not persuade them by words, to try the wall by force. The Chaonians and the other barbarians advanced in the center; on their right were the Leucadians, the Anactorians, and those with them; on the left were Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and the Ambraciots. They were far apart from one another, and at times not even within sight. The Hellenes advanced in order and kept on guard until they had camped in a suitable place. But the Chaonians, confident in themselves and regarded by the people of that mainland as the best fighters, did not stop to take up a position for a camp; rushing forward with the other barbarians, they thought they would take the city at the first shout and that the achievement would be theirs. The Stratians, learning that they were still advancing, thought that if they could defeat them while they were on their own, the Hellenes would no longer be so ready to come against them. So they set ambushes around the city, and when the barbarians were near, they fell on them both from the city, charging at close quarters, and from the ambushes. The Chaonians panicked and many of them were killed, and when the other barbarians saw them give way, they did not stand their ground either but took to flight. Neither of the Hellenic divisions noticed the battle, because the barbarians had gone so far ahead and they supposed that they were hurrying on to find a site for a camp. But when the barbarians in their flight burst in upon them, they took them in, united their two camps, and stayed quiet where they were for the rest of the day. The Stratians did not come to close quarters with them, since the rest of the Acarnanians had not yet come to their help, but used slings on them from a distance and put them in

great difficulty, for they could not move without armor. The Acarnanians are thought to be the best at this kind of fighting.

82 When night came, Cnemus withdrew his army quickly to the river Anapus, eighty stades from Stratus, and the next day he recovered the dead under a truce. The Oeniadae had joined him out of friendship, and he withdrew into their territory before the Acarnanian reinforcements arrived. From there each went home. The Stratians set up a trophy for the battle against the barbarians.

83 The fleet from Corinth and the other allies from the Crisaean Gulf, which was supposed to join Cnemus and prevent the coastal Acarnanians from coming to help those inland, did not arrive. Instead, at about the same time as the battle at Stratus, they were forced to fight at sea against Phormio and the twenty Athenian ships on guard at Naupactus. For Phormio was watching them as they sailed along the coast out of the gulf, wanting to attack them in open water. The Corinthians and their allies were not sailing as if for a sea battle, but were equipped rather for military operations in Acarnania, and they never imagined that the Athenians with their twenty ships would dare to give battle to their own forty-seven. But they saw the Athenians keeping pace with them along the opposite shore while they themselves were coasting along their own side, and when they tried to cross from Patrae in Achaea to the mainland opposite, heading for Acarnania, they caught sight of the Athenians sailing toward them from Chalcis and the river Evenus; they had not escaped notice by slipping out of their anchorage at night. So they were forced to fight in the middle of the strait. Each city had its own generals, who were preparing its contingent; those of the Corinthians were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians formed their ships into a circle as large as they could without leaving room for the enemy to break through, prows outward and sterns inward, and inside it they placed the light craft that were

sailing with them and the five fastest ships, so that they could sail out quickly and be on hand wherever the enemy attacked.

84 The Athenians, in single file, sailed around them in a circle and drove them into a narrower space, always just grazing them as they went by and giving the impression that they were about to charge at any moment. But Phormio had ordered them beforehand not to attack until he gave the signal. For he hoped that the Peloponnesians would not keep their formation, as an army does on land, but that the ships would fall foul of one another and the small craft would add to the confusion. And if the wind blew out of the gulf, as it usually did toward dawn and for which he was waiting as he sailed around, he expected they would not keep steady for a moment. As for the attack, he thought it was in his own hands, whenever he wished, since his ships were the better sailers, and that this would be the best moment for it. When the wind came down and the ships, already in a narrow space, were thrown into confusion by both the wind and the small craft pressing on them at once, ship fell against ship and they were pushing each other off with poles. With their shouting, their warnings to one another, and their abuse, they could hear nothing of the orders or the boatswains' calls; and the men, inexperienced as they were, could not lift their oars clear in the swell, which made the ships less responsive to their helmsmen. At that moment, then, Phormio gave the signal. The Athenians charged and first sank one of the admirals' ships, then destroyed the others wherever they went, and reduced them to such a state that in the confusion not one of them turned to resist, but they fled to Patrae and Dyme in Achaea. The Athenians pursued them and captured twelve ships, took on board most of the men from them, and sailed off to Molycrium. They set up a trophy on the Rhium, dedicated a ship to Poseidon, and returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians, too, at once sailed with their remaining ships from Dyme and Patrae along the

coast to Cyllene, the port of the Eleans. Cnemus also arrived at Cyllene from Leucas after the battle at Stratus, with the ships from there that were supposed to have joined this fleet.

85 The Lacedaemonians sent Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron to Cnemus as advisers for the fleet, with orders to prepare for another and better sea battle and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships. For it seemed to them, especially since this was their first attempt at a sea battle, that the outcome was very much against expectation; they did not think their fleet was so inferior, but that there had been some cowardice, and they did not weigh the long experience of the Athenians against their own brief practice. So they sent the advisers in anger. When these arrived, they and Cnemus sent around to the cities for more ships and fitted out those they already had for a sea battle. Phormio too sent messengers to Athens to report their preparations and to tell of the battle they had won, and he asked the Athenians to send him as many ships as possible quickly, since there was always the prospect of a battle any day. They sent him twenty ships, but ordered the man bringing them to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortyn who was their proxenus, persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, saying he would bring it over to them, though it was hostile. He was in fact bringing them in as a favor to the Polichnitans, neighbors of the Cydonians. So the commander took the ships and went to Crete, and with the Polichnitans he ravaged the land of the Cydonians, and because of winds and bad sailing weather he spent no little time there.

86 While the Athenians were held up around Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, prepared for a sea battle, sailed along the coast to Panormus in Achaea, where the Peloponnesian land army had come to support them. Phormio also sailed along the coast to Molycrian Rhium and anchored outside it with the twenty ships with which he had fought before. This Rhium was friendly to

the Athenians; the other Rhium is opposite it, in the Peloponnese. They are about seven stades apart across the sea, and this is the mouth of the Crisaean Gulf. So the Peloponnesians, with seventy-seven ships, anchored off Achaean Rhium, which is not far from Panormus, where their land forces were, once they had seen the Athenians. For six or seven days the two fleets lay at anchor facing each other, practicing and preparing for the battle. The Peloponnesians were resolved not to sail out beyond the Rhia into open water, for fear of a repetition of their earlier disaster; the Athenians were resolved not to sail into the narrows, since they thought a battle in a confined space was to the enemy's advantage. Then Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, wanting to fight quickly before reinforcements came from Athens, first called the soldiers together. Seeing that most of them were afraid because of their earlier defeat and were not eager, they encouraged them, speaking as follows.

87 "Peloponnesians, if any of you is afraid of the coming battle because of the one that has been fought, that battle gives you no just reason for fear. Its preparations, as you know, were inadequate, and we were sailing not so much for a sea battle as for a military expedition. It happened, too, that chance worked against us in no small way, and perhaps our inexperience, fighting at sea for the first time, also made us fail. So our defeat did not come about through cowardice on our part. And it is not right that our spirit, which was not overcome by force and has something to say for itself, should be blunted by the outcome of the misfortune. Rather, you should consider that men may suffer setbacks by fortune, but that the same men, in spirit, are always rightly brave, and that while courage is present, they could not reasonably plead inexperience as an excuse for being cowards on any occasion. In your case, your inexperience falls short less than your daring surpasses. The skill of these men, which you fear most, will, if joined

with courage, also have the presence of mind in danger to carry out what it has learned; but without a brave spirit no skill is of any use against danger. For fear drives out presence of mind, and skill without valor is of no help. So against their greater experience set your greater daring, and against your fear because of your defeat set the fact that you happened to be unprepared at the time. You have the advantage in the number of ships and in fighting close to land that is friendly, with your hoplites present; and for the most part victory goes to those who are more numerous and better prepared. So we find not a single reason why we should be likely to fail. And the very mistakes we made before, added to our experience, will now serve as lessons. Take heart, then, helmsmen and sailors, and each of you follow his orders, not leaving the post to which he is assigned. We will prepare the attack no worse than your former commanders, and we will give no one an excuse to be a coward. But if anyone does choose to be one, he will be punished as he deserves, and the brave will be honored with the rewards that befit their courage."

88 In this way the Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men. Phormio, too, was afraid of the nervousness of his men, and he noticed that they were gathering in groups among themselves and were frightened by the number of the enemy ships. He wanted to call them together and give them heart and encouragement in the present situation. Before this he had always told them and prepared their minds to believe that no number of ships was so great, if it sailed against them, that they could not stand up to it, and the men had long ago come to hold this conviction among themselves, that as Athenians they would never give way before any mass of Peloponnesian ships. But now, seeing that they were discouraged by the sight before them, he wanted to remind them of the reasons for confidence, and he called the Athenians together and spoke as follows.

89 “Soldiers, I have called you together because I see that you are frightened by the enemy’s numbers, and I do not think it right that you should be in dread of what is not to be feared. In the first place, these men have prepared this great number of ships, and not an equal force, because they have already been defeated and do not themselves believe that they are a match for us. Secondly, as for what they chiefly rely on as they come against us, the belief that it is their birthright to be brave, their confidence comes from nothing else than their success in most things through their experience on land, and they think it will do the same for them at sea. By rights the same advantage should now be ours at sea, if it is theirs on land, since they are in no way superior in courage; and each side is the more confident in the field where it is more experienced. Then too, the Lacedaemonians, who lead them, are bringing the majority into danger against their will, for the sake of their own reputation; otherwise, after being so badly beaten, they would never have attempted to fight at sea again. So do not be afraid of their daring. You inspire much more fear in them, and with better reason, both because you have already defeated them and because they believe you would not be standing up to them unless you meant to do something worthy of the odds. For opponents who are more numerous, as these are, come on trusting more in their strength than in their judgment; but those who face them from much weaker resources, and that without compulsion, dare to do so because they have something great to rely on in the firmness of their resolve. Reckoning this, they fear us more because our conduct is unexpected than they would a force in proportion to their own. Many armies before now have been overthrown by smaller forces through inexperience, some also through lack of daring; and neither of these applies to us now. As for the battle, I will not fight it in the gulf if I can help it, nor will I sail into it. For I see that a confined space is no advantage to a few experienced and faster

ships against many unskilled ones. One cannot charge properly to ram without seeing the enemy from a long way off, nor can one back away at the right moment when hard pressed; there is no room to break through the line or to wheel around, which are the tactics of faster ships. The sea battle would necessarily become a land battle, and in that the larger number of ships has the advantage. I will look after these things as best I can. You must stay in good order at your ships and take your orders promptly, especially since the enemy is anchored so close to us; and in action, put discipline and silence above everything. This is useful in most military operations, and not least in a sea battle. Fight these men in a manner worthy of what you have already done. The contest before you is a great one: either to destroy the Peloponnesians' hope of a navy, or to bring nearer to the Athenians the fear for their command of the sea. I remind you again that you have defeated most of them already, and men who have been beaten do not face the same dangers again with the same spirit."

90 Such was the encouragement Phormio gave. When the Athenians did not sail against them into the gulf and the narrows, the Peloponnesians, wanting to draw them in against their will, put out at dawn and sailed with their ships formed four deep along their own coast, toward the inner part of the gulf, with their right wing leading, as they had been lying at anchor. On this wing they had placed their twenty fastest ships, so that if Phormio, thinking they were sailing against Naupactus, should also sail along the coast to its defense, the Athenians would not be able to escape their attack by sailing past outside their wing, but these ships would close them in. Phormio did what they expected. Alarmed for the place, which was unguarded, when he saw them putting out, he put his men aboard hurriedly and against his will and sailed along the coast, while the Messenian infantry marched along the shore to help. When the Peloponnesians saw them sailing along in

single file, already inside the gulf and close to the land, which was exactly what they wanted, at a single signal they suddenly turned their ships and sailed in line abreast at the Athenians as fast as each could, hoping to cut off all their ships. Of the Athenian ships, the eleven in the lead escaped the Peloponnesian wing and its turning movement into open water; but the others were caught as they tried to escape, driven ashore, and disabled, and those of the Athenians on board who did not swim away were killed. The Peloponnesians took some of the ships in tow and dragged them off empty (one they had already taken with its crew), but some were rescued by the Messenians, who came to their help, waded into the sea in their armor, boarded them, and fought from the decks, just as they were being towed away.

91 In this part of the battle, then, the Peloponnesians were victorious and disabled the Athenian ships. But their twenty ships on the right wing were chasing the eleven Athenian ships that had escaped the turning movement into open water. These, all but one, got away from them and reached Naupactus first; they put in at the temple of Apollo, turned their prows outward, and prepared to defend themselves if the enemy sailed in to the shore against them. The Peloponnesians came up later, singing the paean as they sailed, as though they had won, and a single Leucadian ship, far ahead of the rest, was chasing the one Athenian ship that had been left behind. There happened to be a merchant ship anchored offshore. The Athenian ship got to it first, circled around it, rammed the pursuing Leucadian amidships, and sank it. This unexpected and astonishing event threw the Peloponnesians into a panic. Besides, they had been chasing in disorder because they were winning. Some of the ships dropped their oars and stopped, intending to wait for the main body, which was a bad move with the enemy so close and ready to charge; others, through ignorance of the waters, ran aground on the shoals.

92 When the Athenians saw this happening, they took heart, and at a single word of command they raised a shout and charged them. Because of the mistakes they had made and their present disorder, the Peloponnesians held out only a short time and then fled to Panormus, from where they had put out. The Athenians pursued them, captured the six ships nearest to them, and recovered their own ships, which the Peloponnesians had disabled near the shore at the start and taken in tow. Some of the men they killed, and some they took prisoner. On board the Leucadian ship that was sunk near the merchant ship was Timocrates the Lacedaemonian, and when the ship was going down he killed himself; his body was washed up in the harbor of Naupactus. The Athenians withdrew and set up a trophy at the place from which they had put out to win their victory. They took up the dead and the wreckage that lay off their own coast, and gave back to the enemy their dead under a truce. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy, as victors, for the rout of the ships they had disabled near the shore, and they dedicated the ship they had taken on Achaean Rhium beside the trophy. After this, fearing the arrival of Athenian reinforcements, they all sailed by night into the Crisaean Gulf and to Corinth, except the Leucadians. Not long after their withdrawal, the Athenians from Crete, with the twenty ships that should have joined Phormio before the battle, arrived at Naupactus. And the summer ended.

93 Before dispersing the fleet that had withdrawn to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, at the beginning of the winter, wanted to make an attempt on Piraeus, the harbor of the Athenians, at the suggestion of the Megarians. It was unguarded and not closed off, naturally enough, since the Athenians had such a great superiority at sea. The plan was for each of the sailors to take his oar, his cushion, and his oar-loop and go on foot from

Corinth to the sea on the side facing Athens, then hurry to Megara, launch from Nisaea, their dockyard, forty ships that happened to be there, and sail straight for Piraeus. For there was no fleet on guard there, and no one had any expectation that the enemy would ever make a surprise attack in this way, since it was thought they would not dare to do it openly and at leisure, and that if they planned it, it would be found out in advance. Once they had decided, they set out at once. They arrived at night, launched the ships from Nisaea, and sailed, not for Piraeus any longer, as they had intended, since they took fright at the danger (and it is said a wind also prevented them), but for the headland of Salamis that faces Megara. There was a fort on it and a guard of three ships to prevent anything from sailing in or out of Megara. They attacked the fort, towed away the triremes empty, and fell on the rest of Salamis unexpectedly and plundered it.

94 Fire signals were raised to warn Athens of the enemy, and a panic arose there as great as any in the war. Those in the city thought the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus, and those in Piraeus thought Salamis had been taken and that the enemy were all but sailing in on them. And this could easily have happened if they had been willing not to lose their nerve; no wind would have stopped them. At daybreak the Athenians rushed in full force to Piraeus, launched ships, went aboard in haste and with great uproar, and sailed with the ships for Salamis, while with the infantry they posted guards at Piraeus. When the Peloponnesians learned that help was coming, they quickly sailed off for Nisaea, after overrunning most of Salamis and taking people and plunder and the three ships from the fort at Budorum. For they were also somewhat afraid of their ships, which had been launched after a long time out of the water and were not at all watertight. When they reached Megara, they went back on foot to Corinth. The Athenians, no longer finding them at Salamis, also sailed back, and

after this they guarded Piraeus more carefully in future, closing the harbors and taking other precautions.

95 At about the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces son of Teres, the Odrysian, king of the Thracians, marched against Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and against the Chalcidians on the Thracian coast, wanting to enforce one promise and to fulfill another himself. Perdiccas had made him a promise, if he would reconcile him with the Athenians, who had been pressing him hard at the beginning of the war, and if he would not restore his brother Philip, who was his enemy, to the throne; and Perdiccas did not fulfill what he had undertaken. Sitalces himself, for his part, had agreed with the Athenians, when he made the alliance, to bring the Chalcidian war on the Thracian coast to an end. So he made the expedition for both reasons, and he brought with him Amyntas son of Philip, to make him king of the Macedonians, and the Athenian envoys who happened to be with him on this business, and Hagnon as their leader; for the Athenians too were to join him against the Chalcidians with ships and as large an army as possible.

96 Setting out from the Odrysians, he called up first the Thracians within Mount Haemus and Rhodope, all those he ruled as far as the sea, and then the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other peoples who lived south of the river Ister, toward the coast of the Euxine Sea. The Getae and the people of that region border on the Scythians and are equipped as they are, all mounted archers. He also called on many of the mountain Thracians who are independent and carry swords, who are called the Dii and live mostly on Rhodope. Some of them he won over with pay, and others followed as volunteers. He also called up the Agrianians, the Laeaeans, and the other Paeonian peoples he ruled; these were at the edge of his empire. For his empire extended toward the Paeonians, who were independent from there on, as far as the

Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scombrus through the Agrianians and Laeaeans. On the side of the Triballi, who were also independent, its boundary was formed by the Treres and the Tilataeans. These live north of Mount Scombrus and extend westward as far as the river Oscius. This river flows from the same mountain as the Nestus and the Hebrus. The mountain is uninhabited and large, adjoining Rhodope.

97 The empire of the Odrysians extended along the coast from the city of Abdera to the Euxine Sea as far as the river Ister. The voyage around this coast by the shortest route, if the wind is always astern, takes a merchant ship four days and as many nights; by land, a man traveling light covers the shortest route from Abdera to the Ister in eleven days. Such was its extent along the coast. Inland, from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and the Strymon (for here it reached farthest from the sea), it was a thirteen days' journey for a man traveling light. The tribute from all the barbarian territory and from the Hellenic cities, at the highest it reached under Seuthes, who reigned after Sitalces and raised it the most, was worth about four hundred talents of silver, paid in gold and silver. Gifts of gold and silver no less in value than this were brought as well, besides woven and plain stuffs and other goods, and these not only to the king but also to the lesser rulers and the nobles of the Odrysians. For they had established a custom that was the opposite of that of the Persian kingdom, namely to take rather than to give (and it was more shameful not to give when asked than to ask and be refused). The other Thracians also had this custom, but the Odrysians, because of their power, made more use of it; it was impossible to get anything done without giving gifts. So the kingdom reached great strength. Of all the kingdoms in Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea, it was the greatest in revenue and general prosperity, though in mili-

tary strength and the size of its army it came a long way second to the Scythians. With the Scythians no nation in Europe can compare, nor indeed in Asia is there any single people that could stand up to the Scythians if they were all united. Yet in good counsel and intelligence about the ordinary business of life they are not equal to others.

98 Sitalces, then, king of so great a country, prepared his army. When he was ready, he set out and marched on Macedonia, first through his own territory, then over Cercine, an uninhabited mountain on the border between the Sinti and the Paeonians. He crossed it by the road he had made earlier himself, cutting through the forest, when he campaigned against the Paeonians. Crossing the mountain from the Odrysian side, they had the Paeonians on their right and the Sinti and Maedi on their left. When they had crossed it, they reached Doberus in Paeonia. On the march his army lost no one except through sickness, but rather grew, for many of the independent Thracians followed uninvited in the hope of plunder, so that the whole number is said to have been no less than a hundred and fifty thousand. Most of this was infantry, about a third cavalry. The Odrysians themselves provided most of the cavalry, and after them the Getae. Of the infantry, the most warlike were the sword-bearing independents who came down from Rhodope; the rest followed as a mixed horde, most formidable for its numbers.

99 So they gathered at Doberus and made ready to descend over the heights into lower Macedonia, which Perdiccas ruled. For the Macedonians also include the Lyncestians, the Elimiotes, and other peoples of the uplands, which are allies and subjects of the lower Macedonians but have kingdoms of their own. The Macedonia along the sea, as it now is, was first acquired by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, who were originally Temenids from Argos. They became kings there after

defeating and driving out the Pierians from Pieria, who later settled in Phagres and other places below Mount Pangaeus beyond the Strymon (and even now the land below Pangaeus toward the sea is called the Pierian Gulf), and the Bottiaeans from the region called Bottia, who now live on the borders of the Chalcidians. They also acquired a narrow strip of Paeonia along the river Axius, stretching down from the interior to Pella and the sea, and beyond the Axius they occupy as far as the Strymon the region called Mygdonia, after driving out the Edonians. They also drove out the Eordians from what is now called Eordia, most of whom were destroyed, though a small remnant of them is settled around Physca, and the Almopians from Almopia. These Macedonians also made themselves masters of other peoples, whose lands they still hold: Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. The whole is called Macedonia, and Perdiccas son of Alexander was its king when Sitalces invaded.

100 These Macedonians, unable to defend themselves against so great an invading army, withdrew into the strongholds and fortified places that there were in the country. These were not many. Later Archelaus son of Perdiccas, when he became king, built those that are in the country now, cut straight roads, and in other respects organized the country for war, with horses, arms, and other equipment, better than all the eight kings before him put together. The Thracian army, setting out from Doberus, invaded first what had formerly been Philip's kingdom. It took Idomene by storm, and Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places came over to it by agreement out of friendship for Amyntas son of Philip, who was present. They besieged Europus but could not take it. Then Sitalces advanced into the rest of Macedonia, to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Beyond these, into Bottiaea and Pieria, they did not go, but ravaged Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians did not even think of defending themselves with

infantry, but sent for horsemen from their allies in the uplands, and wherever it seemed good, few against many, they charged into the Thracian army. Wherever they attacked, no one could stand up to them, good horsemen as they were and protected by breastplates; but being hemmed in by the mass of the enemy, they put themselves in danger against a horde many times their number, so that in the end they kept quiet, thinking they were not strong enough to risk an engagement with so many.

101 Sitalces opened discussions with Perdiccas about the matters for which he had made the expedition. Since the Athenians had not come with their ships, not believing that he would come, but had sent him gifts and envoys, he sent part of his army against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, shut them up inside their walls, and ravaged their land. While he was encamped in these parts, the Thessalians to the south, the Magnesians, and the other subjects of the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae, were afraid that the army might advance against them too, and made preparations. The Thracians beyond the Strymon to the north who held the plains, the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersaeans, all of them independent, were also afraid. It even gave rise to talk among the Hellenes who were enemies of the Athenians that the Thracians might be brought against them too by the Athenians, under the alliance. Meanwhile Sitalces overran and laid waste Chalcidice, Bottice, and Macedonia at the same time. But since nothing he had invaded for was being achieved, and his army had no food and was suffering from the winter, he was persuaded by Seuthes son of Sparadocus, his nephew and the most powerful man after himself, to leave quickly. Perdiccas had secretly won Seuthes over by promising to give him his sister in marriage, with money besides. Sitalces was persuaded, and after staying thirty days in all, eight of them among the Chalcidians, he withdrew with his army in haste to his own country. Later

Perdiccas gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes, as he had promised. So went the expedition of Sitalces.

102 In the same winter, after the Peloponnesian fleet had dispersed, the Athenians at Naupactus made an expedition under Phormio. They sailed along the coast to Astacus, landed, and marched into the interior of Acarnania with four hundred Athenian hoplites from the ships and four hundred Messenians. They expelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places men who were thought to be unreliable, restored Cynes son of Theolytus to Coronta, and returned to their ships. For they did not think it possible to campaign in winter against Oeniadae, which alone of the Acarnanian towns had always been hostile. The river Achelous, flowing from Mount Pindus through Dolopia, the land of the Agraeans and the Amphilochians, and the Acarnanian plain, past the city of Stratus in its upper course, empties into the sea near Oeniadae and makes a marsh around their city, so that the water makes a winter campaign impossible. Most of the islands called the Echinades lie opposite Oeniadae, very close to the mouth of the Achelous, so that the river, which is large, is constantly silting them up, and some of the islands have already become part of the mainland; and it is likely that in no long time all of them will suffer the same fate. For the current is strong, abundant, and muddy, and the islands are close together and serve to bind the deposits of silt together, since they lie in staggered fashion, not in a line, and leave no straight channels for the water to reach the open sea. They are uninhabited and not large. It is said that when Alcmaeon son of Amphiaraus was wandering after the murder of his mother, Apollo gave him an oracle to live in this land. The god intimated that there would be no release from his terrors until he found and settled in a land that had not yet been seen by the sun, and was not even land, when he killed his mother, since all the rest of the earth was polluted for him. In his perplexity, so they say, he at last

noticed this deposit of the Achelous, and he thought that enough land might have been piled up to support him in the long time he had been wandering since he killed his mother. He settled in the area around Oeniadae, became its ruler, and left the country its name from his son Acarnan. That is the story we have received about Alcmaeon.

103 The Athenians and Phormio set out from Acarnania and came to Naupactus, and at the beginning of spring they sailed back to Athens, bringing with them the free men among the prisoners from the sea battles, who were exchanged man for man, and the ships they had captured. So the winter ended, and with it the third year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

Notes

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1. The traditional dating synchronizes three systems: the priestess of Hera at Argos, the eponymous ephor at Sparta, and the eponymous archon at Athens. The attack on Plataea fell in early spring 431 BC.

2. The Lacedaemonians had demanded that Athens drive out "the curse of the goddess," the pollution of the Alcmaeonid family, to which Pericles was related through his mother, for the killing of Cylon's supporters (1.126–127).

3. The Synoecia ("Feast of Union"), held in the month of Hecatombaeon, commemorated the unification of Attica under Theseus.

4. In 446 BC.

5. The eclipse of 3 August 431 BC.

6. Pericles died in the autumn of 429 BC.

7. The Sicilian expedition of 415–413 BC, narrated in Books 6 and 7.

8. The manuscripts read "three," which our text marks as corrupt: Athens in fact held out from the Sicilian disaster of 413 BC until its surrender in 404 BC. Editors have proposed other figures, such as "eight" or "ten."

9. The figure is doubtful in the manuscripts and may be corrupt.

10. The morning rising of Arcturus, in mid-September.

Book 3

1 The following summer, when the grain was at its height, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica, led by Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. They settled in and laid waste the land. The Athenian cavalry made attacks, as usual, wherever the ground allowed, and kept the great mass of the light-armed troops from venturing out beyond the main body of hoplites and doing damage near the city. The invaders stayed as long as their provisions lasted; then they withdrew and dispersed to their several cities.

2 Immediately after this invasion of the Peloponnesians, Lesbos, all except Methymna, revolted from Athens. The Lesbians had wanted to do so even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians would not take them in; and now they were forced to make even this revolt sooner than they had planned. They were waiting for the completion of the moles across their harbors, the building of their walls, and the construction of their ships, and for the arrival of what they were to get from the Pontus, archers and grain, and of other things they had sent for. But the people of Tenedos, who were at odds with them, and those of Methymna, and certain Mytilenians acting privately on account of faction, men who were proxeni of the Athenians (local citizens who represented Athens' interests), turned informer to the Athenians: the Mytilenians, they said, were forcibly concentrating all Lesbos into Mytilene, and were hurrying on all their preparations for revolt together with the Lacedaemonians and the Boeotians, who were their kinsmen;

and unless someone forestalled them at once, Athens would lose Lesbos.

3 The Athenians had been worn down by the plague and by the war, which had only just begun and was at its height, and they thought it a serious matter to take on Lesbos as an enemy as well, with its navy and its strength intact. At first they would not accept the charges, giving more weight to their wish that they were not true. But when they had sent envoys and could not persuade the Mytilenians to break up the concentration and the preparations, they took alarm and wanted to strike first. They sent off, without warning, forty ships that happened to be fitted out for a voyage around the Peloponnese; Cleippides son of Deinias commanded them, with two others. They had been told that there was a festival of Apollo Maloeis outside the city, which the Mytilenians celebrate in a body, and that there was hope, if they made haste, of falling on them by surprise. If the attempt succeeded, well and good; if not, the generals were to tell the Mytilenians to surrender their ships and pull down their walls, and if they did not comply, to make war. So the ships went off. The Athenians detained the ten Mytilenian triremes that happened to be with them as auxiliaries under the terms of the alliance, and put their crews under guard. But a man crossed from Athens to Euboea, went on foot to Geraestus, found a merchant ship putting out, took passage, and reached Mytilene on the third day from Athens with news of the expedition. The Mytilenians did not go out to the temple of Maloeis, and they barricaded the half-finished parts of their walls and harbors and kept guard.

4 Not long afterward the Athenians sailed in and saw how things stood. The generals delivered their orders, and when the Mytilenians would not listen, they began the war. The Mytilenians, unprepared and suddenly forced to fight, made a sortie with their ships a little way out from the harbor as if to give battle; then,

chased back by the Attic ships, they at once began making proposals to the generals, wanting to get rid of the fleet for the present by some reasonable agreement if they could. The Athenian generals accepted, being afraid themselves that they were not strong enough to fight all Lesbos. An armistice was made, and the Mytilenians sent to Athens one of the informers, who already regretted what he had done, and others, in the hope of persuading the Athenians to withdraw the fleet on the ground that Mytilene intended no revolution. Meanwhile they also sent envoys to Lacedaemon in a trireme, slipping past the Athenian fleet, which was anchored at Malea to the north of the city; for they had no confidence that the mission to Athens would succeed. These envoys reached Lacedaemon after a hard passage over the open sea, and set to work to get help sent.

5 When the envoys came back from Athens having achieved nothing, the Mytilenians and the rest of Lesbos, except Methymna, went to war. The Methymnians had come to help the Athenians, and so had the people of Imbros and Lemnos and a few of the other allies. The Mytilenians made a sortie in full force against the Athenian camp, and a battle was fought in which they did not get the worse of it; yet they did not camp on the field, nor did they trust themselves, but withdrew. After that they kept quiet, unwilling to risk battle without the addition of forces from the Peloponnese and other resources. For Meleas, a Laconian, and Hermaeondas, a Theban, now came to them. These two had been sent out before the revolt, but being unable to arrive ahead of the Athenian expedition, they sailed in secretly in a trireme after the battle, and urged them to send another trireme and envoys back with them. The Mytilenians did so.

6 The Athenians took great heart from the inaction of the Mytilenians. They called in allies, who came much more quickly when they saw that nothing vigorous was coming from the

Lesbians, and they moved their anchorage round to the south of the city and fortified two camps, one on each side of the city, and established blockades off both harbors. So they shut the Mytilenians off from the sea. On land, the Mytilenians and the other Lesbians, who had by now come to their aid, held everything except a small area around the camps, which the Athenians occupied; and Malea served the Athenians rather as a station for their ships and a market. That was how the war around Mytilene was being fought.

7 At about the same time this summer the Athenians also sent thirty ships around the Peloponnese under Asopius son of Phormio as general; the Acarnanians had asked them to send a son or kinsman of Phormio as their commander. The ships sailed along the coast of Laconia and ravaged the places by the sea. Then Asopius sent most of the ships back home and went on himself with twelve to Naupactus. Later he raised the Acarnanians in full force and marched against Oeniadae; his ships sailed up the Achelous while the army on land ravaged the country. When the place would not come over, he dismissed the land force, sailed himself to Leucas, and made a landing at Nericus; as he was withdrawing, he and part of his force were killed by the men of the district who rallied against him and by a small garrison. Afterward the Athenians sailed off, having recovered their dead from the Leucadians under a truce.

8 The Mytilenian envoys sent out on the first ship were told by the Lacedaemonians to appear at Olympia, so that the other allies too might hear them and deliberate. They went to Olympia. It was the Olympiad in which Dorieus of Rhodes won for the second time.[1] When after the festival they were given a hearing, they spoke as follows.

9 "Lacedaemonians and allies, we know the established rule among the Hellenes. Those who revolt in wartime and abandon

their former alliance are welcomed by those who receive them for as long as they are useful; but they are thought worse of, as betrayers of their former friends. And this estimate is not unjust, when the rebels and those they break from are equal in sentiment and goodwill, matched in resources and power, and when no reasonable ground for the revolt exists. None of this held between us and the Athenians. Let no one think the worse of us, then, because we were honored by them in peace and are revolting from them in danger.

10 "For we shall speak first of justice and good faith, especially since we are asking for an alliance. We know that no friendship between private men is ever firm, and no partnership between cities comes to anything, unless they deal with one another in evident good faith and are alike in other ways as well; for it is in a difference of mind that differences in action take root. Our alliance with the Athenians began when you withdrew from the Persian War and they stayed on to finish the work that remained. But we became allies not of the Athenians for the enslavement of the Hellenes, but of the Hellenes for their liberation from the Mede. As long as they led on a footing of equality, we followed them with a will. But when we saw them relaxing their hostility to the Mede and pressing on with the enslavement of the allies, we were no longer without fear. The allies, unable to unite in self-defense because they had so many votes, were enslaved, all but ourselves and the Chians; we went on campaigning with them, independent and free in name. And we no longer trusted the Athenians as leaders, taking warning from what had already happened. It was not likely that they would subdue those they had brought into the treaty along with us, and not do the same to the rest if they were ever able.

11 "If we had all still been independent, we could have been surer that they would attempt no revolution against us. But since

they held most of the allies in subjection and dealt with us alone as equals, they were naturally going to find it harder to bear that ours should be the only power that still stood up to theirs, when the majority had already given way, the more so as they grew stronger and we more isolated. Mutual fear is the only sure basis of an alliance; for the party that wants to break faith is held back by the thought that he would not have the advantage if he attacked. We were left independent for no other reason than that they thought they could best acquire their empire by fair-seeming words and by the methods of policy rather than of force. For one thing, they used us as evidence that those who had an equal vote would not join their campaigns against their will unless the people attacked were in the wrong. At the same time they brought the strongest states with them against the weaker ones first, and left the strongest for last, expecting to find them weaker once everything else had been stripped away. If they had begun with us, while all the allies still had their own strength and something to rally to, they would not have subdued them so easily. Our navy also gave them some fear that it might one day unite with yours or with someone else's and become a danger to them. And partly too we survived by courting their people and whoever was leading it at the time. Yet we did not expect to last much longer, judging by the examples of how they had treated the others, if this war had not broken out.

12 "What sort of friendship was this, then, or what sure freedom, when we received each other against our true feelings? They courted us in war because they feared us; we did the same to them in peace. What in other cases goodwill does most to make trust firm, in ours fear supplied; it was dread more than friendship that held us in alliance; and whichever side first gained the confidence that safety gives was going to be the first to break faith. So if anyone thinks we did wrong in revolting first, because they were still delaying the harm they meant us, without our waiting to find out

for certain whether any of it would happen, he does not judge rightly. If we had been able, on equal terms, to plot against them in return and to delay in return, what need would there have been for us, their equals, to be at their mercy? But since the power to attack was always theirs, the power to defend ourselves in advance must be ours.

13 "Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, were the grounds and grievances for which we revolted. They are clear enough for those who hear them to see that we acted reasonably, and strong enough to frighten us and turn us toward some means of safety. We wanted to do this long ago, when in time of peace we sent to you about revolting, and we were prevented because you would not take us in. Now, when the Boeotians invited us, we answered at once. We thought we were making a double break: from the Hellenes, so as not to join the Athenians in doing them harm but to join in freeing them; and from the Athenians, so as not to be destroyed by them later but to act first. Our revolt, however, has come sooner than we meant, and unprepared; which is all the more reason for you to accept us as allies and to send help quickly, so that you may be seen protecting those you ought to protect and at the same stroke harming your enemies. There has never been such an opportunity. The Athenians have been ruined by the plague and by the expense of money; some of their ships are cruising round your coasts, and others are posted against us. So they are not likely to have any ships to spare if you invade a second time this summer by sea and land together. Either they will not resist you when you sail against them, or they will withdraw from both places. And let no one think that he will be running a risk of his own for a country that is not his. The man who thinks Lesbos is far away will find its usefulness close at hand. For the war will not be decided in Attica, as some suppose, but in the places from which Attica draws its strength. Their revenue comes from the

allies, and it will be still greater if they subdue us; for no one else will revolt, our resources will be added to theirs, and we would suffer worse things than those who were enslaved before us. But if you help us with a will, you will gain a city that has a great navy, the thing you most need; you will more easily bring down the Athenians by drawing their allies away from them, for everyone will come over to you more boldly; and you will escape the charge you have borne of not helping those who revolt. If you are seen as liberators, your mastery in the war will be more secure.

14 "Respect, then, the hopes the Hellenes have placed in you, and respect Olympian Zeus, in whose sanctuary we stand as good as suppliants. Become allies of the Mytilenians and defend them. Do not abandon us. The risk to our lives is ours alone; but the benefit if we succeed will be shared by all, and the harm still more widely shared if we fail because you would not listen. Be the men the Hellenes think you are and our fear requires you to be."

15 So the Mytilenians spoke. When the Lacedaemonians and their allies had heard them, they accepted their arguments and made the Lesbians allies. They told the allies who were present to go quickly to the Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces for the invasion of Attica, and they themselves arrived there first and began preparing hauling machines at the Isthmus for the ships, meaning to carry them across from Corinth to the sea on the Athens side and to attack by sea and land together. The Lacedaemonians went about this zealously; but the other allies were slow in gathering, for they were busy bringing in their harvest and were sick of campaigning.

16 The Athenians saw that the enemy were making these preparations because they took Athens for weak, and they wanted to show that this judgment was wrong and that they could easily beat off an attack from the Peloponnese without moving the fleet off Lesbos. They manned a hundred ships, going on board them-

selves, citizens of every class except the horsemen and the five-hundred-bushel men, together with the resident aliens; and they put out along the Isthmus, making a display of their strength and landing in the Peloponnese wherever they pleased. When the Lacedaemonians saw how far things had gone against their reckoning, they concluded that what the Lesbians had told them was untrue. They thought the scheme impracticable, since their allies had not come in, and they were also receiving word that the thirty Athenian ships around the Peloponnese were ravaging the lands of their Perioeci; so they went home. Later, however, they began preparing a fleet to send to Lesbos, ordered a total of forty ships from the cities, and appointed Alcidas as admiral to sail with it. The Athenians too withdrew with their hundred ships once they saw the Lacedaemonians go.

17 [At the time when this fleet was at sea, Athens had about the largest number of ships in active service, and of the finest, that she ever had at one time, though at the beginning of the war she had as many or even more.[2] A hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, and another hundred were around the Peloponnese, not counting those at Potidaea and in other places, so that in a single summer the total came to two hundred and fifty. This, along with Potidaea, was what chiefly drained the treasury. At Potidaea the hoplites served for two drachmas a day (each man drew a drachma for himself and one for his servant): there were 3,000 at first, and no fewer than that stayed through the whole siege, besides 1,600 with Phormio, who left before the end; and all the ships drew the same pay. That was how the money was drained away at first, and that was the largest number of ships ever manned.]

18 At the same time as the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the Mytilenians and their auxiliaries marched by land against Methymna, expecting it to be betrayed to them. They attacked the city, but when things did not go as they had

expected, they went off to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, put matters in those cities on a firmer footing, strengthened their walls, and returned home in haste. When they had gone, the Methymnians in turn marched against Antissa; but a sortie was made, and they were beaten by the Antissaeans and the auxiliaries, many were killed, and the rest withdrew in haste. When the Athenians learned of this, that the Mytilenians were masters of the land and that their own soldiers were not enough to hold them in, they sent Paches son of Epicurus as general, with a thousand of their own hoplites, at about the beginning of autumn. These men rowed their own ships out, and when they arrived they enclosed Mytilene all the way round with a single wall, with forts built into it at some of the strong points. Mytilene was now shut in by force on both sides, by land and by sea; and the winter was beginning.

19 The Athenians needed more money for the siege, and for the first time they themselves paid in a property tax of two hundred talents. They also sent out twelve ships to collect money from the allies, with Lysicles and four others as generals. He collected money in various places and sailed round, and in Caria he marched inland from Myus across the plain of the Maeander as far as the hill of Sandius; there the Carians and the Anaeitans attacked, and he and many of the rest of his force were killed.

20 The same winter the Plataeans, who were still besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, were hard pressed as their grain gave out; there was no hope of relief from Athens and no other means of rescue in sight. So they and the Athenians who were besieged with them made a plan. At first they meant all to go out and get over the enemy's walls, if they could force a way. The attempt was proposed to them by Theaenetus son of Tolmides, a soothsayer, and Eupompides son of Daimachus, who was also one of their generals. Then half of them somehow lost heart, thinking the danger too great; but about 220 held to the plan of breaking

out, of their own free will, in the following way. They made ladders equal in height to the enemy's wall. They calculated the height by the courses of bricks, at a point where the wall on their side happened not to be plastered over. Many men counted the courses at once; some were bound to miss, but most would hit on the true count, especially since they counted many times and were not far off, but could easily see the stretch of wall they wanted. So they worked out the measurement for the ladders, estimating it from the thickness of a brick.

21 The Peloponnesian wall was built like this. It had two circuits, one facing Plataea and one facing out, in case anyone should attack from Athens; the two circuits were about sixteen feet apart. The space between, the sixteen feet, had been built up into quarters allotted to the guards, and these were continuous, so that it looked like one thick wall with battlements on both sides. At every tenth battlement there were large towers as wide as the wall, reaching to both its inner and its outer face, so that there was no way past a tower; the men went through the middle of them. On nights of stormy, wet weather they would leave the battlements and keep watch from the towers, which were not far apart and were roofed over. Such was the wall that encircled the Plataeans.

22 When everything was ready, they waited for a night of storm, with rain and wind and no moon, and went out. They were led by the men who had proposed the attempt. First they crossed the ditch that ran around their city; then they reached the enemy's wall unnoticed by the guards, who could not see them ahead in the darkness and could not hear the sound of their approach, since the wind drowned it with its own noise. They also kept well apart as they went, so that their weapons would not knock against one another and give them away. They were lightly equipped and had only the left foot shod, to keep from slipping in the mud. They came up to the battlements at a point between two towers, know-

ing that these were unmanned. First came the men carrying the ladders, and they set them up; then twelve light-armed men with daggers and breastplates went up, led by Ammeas son of Coroebus, who was the first to climb. His followers came up after him, six against each of the two towers. Behind them came other light-armed men with short spears, while still others behind them carried their shields, so that they could climb more easily, and were to hand the shields over when they were at close quarters with the enemy. When a good number of them were up, the guards in the towers heard them; for one of the Plataeans, catching hold of the battlements, knocked off a tile, which made a crash as it fell. At once there was a shout, and the army rushed to the wall. They did not know what the danger was, since the night was dark and stormy; and at the same time the Plataeans left in the city came out and attacked the Peloponnesian wall on the side opposite to where their men were crossing, so that the enemy would pay as little attention as possible to them. So the besiegers were in confusion and stayed at their posts, and no one dared leave his own station to help; they were at a loss to guess what was happening. Their three hundred, who had been assigned to go wherever help was needed, went outside the wall toward the shouting. Fire signals warning of the enemy were raised toward Thebes. But the Plataeans in the city also raised many fire signals from their wall, prepared beforehand for this very purpose, so that the enemy's signals would be unclear and the Thebans, taking what was happening for something other than it was, would not come to help before the men who had gone out escaped and reached safety.

23 Meanwhile, as for the Plataeans who were crossing: when the first of them had got up and had taken both towers, killing the guards, they posted themselves in the passageways of the towers and kept anyone from coming through to help. They set ladders

against the towers from the wall and sent more men up, and those on the towers kept off the men coming to help, both below and above, with missiles, while the main body set up many ladders at once, pushed down the battlements, and went over between the towers. As each man got across, he took his stand on the edge of the ditch, and from there they shot arrows and threw javelins at anyone coming along the wall to block the crossing. When they were all over, the men on the towers came down, the last of them with difficulty, and made for the ditch; and at that moment the three hundred came at them carrying torches. The Plataeans, standing in the dark on the edge of the ditch, could see them better, and shot arrows and hurled javelins at their exposed flanks, while they themselves, in the dark, were harder to see because of the torches. So even the last of the Plataeans got across the ditch in time, though with difficulty and by main force. Ice had formed in it, not firm enough to walk on, but watery, as it is with an east wind; and the night, with snow falling in that wind, had put a great deal of water in the ditch, so that they could barely keep their heads above it as they crossed. In fact it was chiefly the severity of the storm that made their escape possible.

24 Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went in a body along the road that leads to Thebes, keeping the shrine of the hero Androcrates on their right. They reckoned that the enemy would least suspect them of taking this road, the one toward their enemies; and they could see the Peloponnesians with torches pursuing along the road to Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae, the one that leads to Athens. For six or seven stades the Plataeans went along the Thebes road; then they turned off onto the road leading to the mountains, toward Erythrae and Hysiae, and reaching the hills they escaped to Athens, 212 men out of a larger number. For some of them had turned back to the city before crossing, and one, an archer, was captured at the outer ditch. The Peloponnesians gave

up the pursuit and went back to their posts. The Plataeans in the city knew nothing of what had happened, and since those who had turned back reported that no one was left alive, they sent out a herald at daybreak to ask for a truce to recover the dead; when they learned the truth, they stopped. That was how these Plataeans got over the wall and saved themselves.

25 At the end of the same winter, Salaethus the Lacedaemonian was sent out from Lacedaemon to Mytilene in a trireme. He sailed to Pyrrha, went on from there by land along a ravine where the siege wall could be crossed, got into Mytilene unnoticed, and told the presiding magistrates that there would be an invasion of Attica and that at the same time the forty ships that were to help them would arrive; he himself had been sent ahead to tell them this and also to take charge of affairs generally. The Mytilenians took heart and were less inclined to come to terms with the Athenians. So the winter ended, and with it the fourth year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

26 The following summer the Peloponnesians sent off the forty-two ships to Mytilene under the command of Alcidas, their admiral, and then they and their allies invaded Attica, so that the Athenians, harassed on both sides, would be less able to send help against the ships sailing for Mytilene. The leader of this invasion was Cleomenes, acting for Pausanias son of Pleistoanax, who was king but still a minor; Cleomenes was his father's brother. They ravaged whatever had grown up again in the parts of Attica already laid waste and whatever had been passed over in the earlier invasions. This invasion was the hardest on the Athenians after the second. For they stayed on, always waiting to hear from Lesbos of some achievement by the fleet, which they supposed had by now crossed over, and they went over most of the country, cutting as they went. When nothing they expected came about and their grain had run out, they withdrew and dispersed to their cities.

27 Meanwhile the Mytilenians, since the ships had not come from the Peloponnese but were taking their time, and since their grain had run out, were forced to come to terms with the Athenians, for the following reason. Salaethus himself no longer expected the ships, and he armed the common people, who had been light-armed before, intending to make a sortie against the Athenians. But once the people had arms, they no longer obeyed the authorities. They gathered in groups and told the men of power either to bring the grain out into the open and share it among everyone, or they would come to terms with the Athenians on their own and hand over the city.

28 Those in charge of affairs saw that they could not prevent this, and that they would be in danger if they were left out of the agreement. So they made a general settlement with Paches and the army: the Athenians were to be free to decide whatever they wished about the Mytilenians, and the Mytilenians were to admit the army into the city and send an embassy to Athens on their own behalf; until the envoys returned, Paches was not to imprison, enslave, or kill any Mytilenian. That was the agreement. But those Mytilenians who had been most deeply involved with the Lacedaemonians were terrified, and when the army came in they could not hold out, but took refuge at the altars all the same. Paches raised them up, promising to do them no harm, and put them away on Tenedos until the Athenians should come to some decision. He also sent triremes to Antissa and took it over, and arranged other military matters as he thought best.

29 The Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who should have arrived quickly, wasted time sailing around the Peloponnese itself and went slowly on the rest of the voyage. They escaped the notice of the Athenians at home until they reached Delos; but when they put in from there at Icarus and Myconus, they first learned that Mytilene had fallen. Wanting to know for certain, they

sailed to Embatum in the territory of Erythrae; it was about seven days after Mytilene had fallen when they put in at Embatum. When they had learned the truth, they discussed what to do in the circumstances, and Teutiaplus, a man of Elis, spoke to them as follows.

30 "Alcidas, and you Peloponnesians who are here as commanders of the force: I think we should sail against Mytilene just as we are, before anyone hears of us. In all likelihood we shall find a great deal unguarded, as you would expect with men who have only lately taken a city. This is especially true by sea, where they do not expect any enemy to come at them and where our strength happens chiefly to lie. Their land forces too are probably scattered rather carelessly among the houses, as victors would be. So if we fell on them suddenly and by night, I hope that with the help of those inside, if anyone well disposed to us is left, we could take control of the situation. Let us not shrink from the risk. Let us bear in mind that this is exactly what the surprises of war consist of; and the general who guards against them in himself, and sees them in the enemy and attacks, will most often succeed."

31 That was all he said, and he did not persuade Alcidas. Some others, exiles from Ionia, and the Lesbians who were sailing with the fleet urged him, since he was afraid of this risk, to seize one of the cities in Ionia or Cyme in Aeolis. With a city as a base, they could bring Ionia to revolt; there was hope of this, since no one had been unhappy to see them come. They would take away this, the Athenians' greatest source of revenue, and at the same time, if the Athenians blockaded them, it would cost Athens money. They thought they could also persuade Pissuthnes to join the war.[3] But Alcidas would not accept this either. His chief thought, since he was too late for Mytilene, was to get back to the Peloponnese as quickly as possible.

32 He put out from Embatum and sailed along the coast. Putting in at Myonnesus, in the territory of Teos, he slaughtered most of the prisoners he had taken on the voyage. When he anchored at Ephesus, envoys came to him from the Samians of Anaea and told him that this was a poor way to liberate Hellas, killing men who had not raised a hand against him and were not enemies but allies of the Athenians by necessity; if he did not stop, he would win few of his enemies over to friendship and would turn far more of his friends into enemies. He was persuaded, and he let go all the Chians he still held and some of the others. For when people saw his ships they did not run away; they came up to them, taking them for Attic ships, and had not the slightest expectation that, while the Athenians commanded the sea, Peloponnesian ships would ever cross over to Ionia.

33 From Ephesus Alcidas sailed in haste and made his escape; for he had been sighted, while still at anchor off Clarus, by the Salaminia and the Paralus, the Athenian state ships, which happened to be on a voyage from Athens. Fearing pursuit, he sailed across the open sea, determined not to touch land willingly anywhere but in the Peloponnese. News of him came to Paches and the Athenians from the territory of Erythrae, and indeed from every quarter. For Ionia was unwalled, and there was great fear that the Peloponnesians, sailing along the coast, might fall on the cities and sack them, even if they did not mean to stay. And the Paralus and the Salaminia brought word themselves of having seen him at Clarus. Paches took up the pursuit in haste and chased him as far as the island of Patmos; but when it was clear that he could no longer be overtaken, he turned back. Since he had not come upon the enemy ships in the open sea, he counted it a gain that they had not been caught anywhere near the coast and forced to make camp, so that he would have had to guard and blockade them.

34 On his way back along the coast he put in at Notium, the port of Colophon. The Colophonians had settled there after the upper city was taken by Itamanes and the barbarians, who had been called in by one party in a civil conflict; the city had been taken at about the time of the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. The refugees who had settled at Notium fell into faction again. One side had brought in auxiliaries, Arcadians and barbarians, from Pissuthnes and held them in a walled-off quarter, and the Colophonians of the upper city who had gone over to the Mede had joined them there and were running the city with them. The other side had slipped away from them, and these exiles now brought in Paches. He invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the walled quarter, to a parley, on the understanding that if he said nothing acceptable, Paches would put him back inside the fortification safe and sound. Hippias came out to him; Paches kept him under guard, though not in chains, and suddenly attacked the fortification while the defenders were off their guard, took it, and killed the Arcadians and all the barbarians who were inside. Then he took Hippias back in, as he had agreed, and as soon as he was inside, seized him and had him shot down with arrows. He handed Notium over to the Colophonians, except for those who had sided with the Mede. Later the Athenians sent out founders and resettled Notium under their own laws, gathering in all the Colophonians from the cities wherever any were to be found.

35 When Paches returned to Mytilene, he reduced Pyrrha and Eresus. He found Salaethus the Lacedaemonian hiding in the city, captured him, and sent him off to Athens, together with the Mytilenians he had put away on Tenedos and anyone else he thought responsible for the revolt. He also sent away the greater part of his army, and stayed on with the rest to settle affairs at Mytilene and in the rest of Lesbos as he thought best.

36 When the men and Salaethus arrived, the Athenians at once put Salaethus to death, although he offered, among other things, to get the Peloponnesians to withdraw from Plataea, which was still under siege. About the other men they held a debate, and in their anger they decided to put to death not only those who were there but all the grown men of Mytilene, and to enslave the women and children. They charged against them the revolt in general, because they had made it without being subjects like the others; and it added not a little to their fury that Peloponnesian ships had dared to risk the voyage to Ionia to help them, for this made the revolt seem the work of long premeditation. So they sent a trireme to Paches to announce what they had decided, with orders to put the Mytilenians to death at once. The next day there was a sudden change of heart, and they began to reflect that the decision they had made was savage and monstrous, to destroy a whole city rather than those who were guilty. When the Mytilenian envoys who were present and their Athenian supporters saw this, they got the authorities to put the question again; and they persuaded them the more easily because the authorities too could see that most of the citizens wanted someone to give them a chance to reconsider. An assembly was called at once. Various opinions were expressed on each side, and Cleon son of Cleaenetus,[4] who had carried the earlier motion to put them to death, the most violent of the citizens in general and at that time by far the most persuasive with the people, came forward again and spoke as follows.

37 "I have often before now, on other occasions, seen that a democracy is incapable of ruling others, but never more clearly than in your present change of heart about the Mytilenians. Because your daily life among yourselves is free from fear and intrigue, you take the same attitude toward your allies. You do not see that whenever you make a mistake because their arguments have persuaded you, or give way out of pity, your weakness is dan-

gerous to you and wins you no gratitude from them. You do not consider that your empire is a tyranny, imposed on people who plot against you and are ruled against their will; who obey you not because of any favors you may do them to your own harm, but because of the superiority you win by strength rather than by their goodwill. The most dreadful thing of all is if nothing we decide is ever to stand firm, and if we will not recognize that a city with worse laws that are never changed is stronger than one with good laws that have no force; that ignorance joined with restraint is more useful than cleverness joined with license; and that ordinary people, compared with the more intelligent, generally run their cities better. The intelligent want to appear wiser than the laws and to win every argument in public debate, as though there were no weightier matters on which to show their judgment; and this is how they so often bring their cities down. The others, distrusting their own intelligence, are content to be less learned than the laws and less able to pick holes in the speech of a good speaker; and being impartial judges rather than competitors, they usually get things right. That, then, is how we too should act, and not be carried away by cleverness and contests of wit into giving you, the people, advice against our own judgment.

38 "I, for my part, hold the same opinion as before. I am amazed at those who have brought the question of the Mytilenians up again and so caused delay, which works in favor of the wrongdoers. For the victim then goes after the offender with his anger dulled, whereas the punishment that follows closest on the injury is the one that matches it best and exacts the fullest vengeance. And I wonder, too, who will speak against me and undertake to show that the crimes of the Mytilenians are good for us and that our misfortunes are harmful to our allies. Clearly he will either rely on his eloquence and strive to prove that what has been thoroughly resolved has not been resolved at all, or he will be moved

by gain to work up some plausible speech and try to lead you astray. In contests like these the city gives the prizes to others and takes the dangers on itself. You are to blame, for you stage these contests badly. You have made a habit of being spectators of words and listeners to deeds. Whether future deeds can be done, you judge from those who speak well about them; and of deeds already done, you do not trust the fact you saw with your own eyes more than what you heard, but believe those who find fine-sounding fault with them. You are the best at being deceived by a novel argument and the least willing to follow an approved one; slaves to every new paradox, scorners of the familiar. Each of you wishes above all to be able to speak himself; failing that, you compete with the speakers so as not to seem to lag behind their thought, applauding a clever point before it is out, quick to anticipate what is said and slow to foresee where it will lead. You seek, so to speak, some world other than the one we live in, and you do not think clearly enough even about what is in front of you. In short, you are overcome by the pleasure of listening and are more like an audience sitting at the feet of sophists than men deliberating about a city.

39 "It is from all this that I am trying to turn you away, and I tell you that the Mytilenians have done you more wrong than any single city ever has. I can make allowance for those who revolt because they cannot bear your rule, or because the enemy forces them to. But these men held an island with walls; they feared our enemies only by sea, and even there they were not without protection, with a force of triremes of their own; they lived independent, and we honored them above all others. What have men like these done, if not conspired against us and risen up, rather than revolted? For revolt is what people do who are treated with violence. They have tried to destroy us by taking their stand with our bitterest enemies. And that is worse than if they had made war on

us by building up a power of their own. The disasters of their neighbors, who had already revolted and been subdued, were no lesson to them; nor did their present prosperity make them hesitate to run into danger. Bold toward the future, with hopes beyond their power though short of their desires, they went to war, deciding to put might before right. For at the moment when they thought they would come out on top, they attacked us, though they had suffered no wrong. It is usual for cities that come to great prosperity most suddenly and unexpectedly to turn to insolence; and in general success is safer for men when it comes according to calculation than when it comes against expectation; they find it easier, you might say, to fight off adversity than to preserve prosperity. We ought never to have given the Mytilenians any more honor than the rest, and then they would not have gone so far in their insolence; for it is human nature anyway to despise those who court us and to admire those who will not give way. Let them be punished now as their crime deserves. Do not lay the blame on the few and let the people off. All of them alike attacked you, though they could have turned to us and would now be back in their city. Instead they thought the risk they ran with the few the safer one and joined in the revolt. And consider your allies. If you impose the same penalties on those who are forced to revolt by the enemy and on those who revolt of their own will, who do you think will not revolt on the slightest pretext, when success means freedom and failure means nothing irreparable? We, meanwhile, shall have to risk our money and our lives against each city in turn. If we succeed, we recover a ruined city and are deprived for the future of its revenue, which is our strength; if we fail, we shall have fresh enemies in addition to those we have, and the time we should spend resisting our present enemies we shall spend fighting our own allies.

40 "We must not, then, hold out any hope, whether secured by eloquence or bought with money, that they will be pardoned because their error was only human. They did us no harm unwillingly; they plotted against us knowingly; and only what is involuntary deserves pardon. So I, both then at the first and now, insist that you should not reverse your earlier decision, nor be led into error by the three things most fatal to an empire: pity, the pleasure of speeches, and leniency. Mercy is rightly given in return to those who are like us, not to those who will show none in return and who are, of necessity, our enemies forever. The orators who delight us with their speeches will have other, lesser contests to show off in, and not one in which the city, for a brief pleasure, pays a heavy penalty, while they themselves get handsome rewards for their handsome speaking. And leniency is better shown to those who are going to be our friends in future than to those who remain just as they were and no less our enemies. To sum up in a word: if you take my advice, you will do what is just toward the Mytilenians and at the same time what is expedient; if you decide otherwise, you will not win their gratitude, but you will rather pass sentence on yourselves. For if they were right to revolt, you must be wrong to rule. But if, right or wrong, you still claim to rule, then these people too must be punished, against equity if need be, for your own advantage; or else you must give up your empire and play the honest man from a position of safety. Resolve to repay them with the same penalty, and do not show yourselves, who escaped their plot, less sensitive than those who laid it. Think what they would likely have done to you if they had won, especially since they were the aggressors. It is those who harm another without cause who pursue him to the end and destroy him, seeing the danger of an enemy who survives; for a man who has suffered for no good reason is more dangerous if he escapes than an enemy on equal terms. Do not, then, be traitors to

yourselves. Put yourselves as nearly as you can in the moment of suffering; remember how you would have given anything to have them in your power; and pay them back now. Do not grow soft at the sight of their present plight, and do not forget the danger that so lately hung over you. Punish them as they deserve, and make of them a clear example to the other allies that anyone who revolts will be punished with death. Once they understand this, you will less often have to neglect your enemies to fight your own allies."

41 That was Cleon's speech. After him Diodotus son of Eucrates, who in the earlier assembly too had been the chief speaker against putting the Mytilenians to death, came forward on this occasion also and spoke as follows.

42 "I do not blame those who have put the question of the Mytilenians before us again, nor do I approve of those who object to repeated deliberation on matters of the greatest importance. I think the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and anger; the one usually goes with folly, the other with lack of education and narrowness of mind. And whoever insists that words are not the teachers of action is either a fool or has some private interest at stake. A fool, if he thinks there is any other way of explaining what lies in the future and is not yet clear; self-interested, if he wants to persuade you to something shameful and, not thinking he could speak well in a bad cause, thinks he can slander well and so intimidate both his opponents and his audience. Worst of all are those who also accuse a speaker beforehand of making a display for money. If they charged him only with ignorance, a speaker who failed to persuade would go away thought more foolish than dishonest; but when dishonesty is alleged, he is suspected if he succeeds, and if he fails he is thought not only a fool but dishonest too. The city gains nothing by this, for fear robs it of its advisers. It would do best of all if citizens like these had no power of speech, for then the people would least often be persuaded into

error. The good citizen ought not to frighten his opponents but to show himself the better speaker on equal terms; and the wise city should not add new honor to the man who most often gives good advice, nor yet diminish the honor he already has; and the man whose proposal fails should not only not be punished but not even be disgraced. In that way the successful speaker would be least tempted to say anything against his convictions and to please his hearers in the hope of still higher honors, and the unsuccessful one would not strive by the same means, by pleasing them, to win over the people himself.

43 "We do the opposite. Worse still, if a man is so much as suspected of speaking for his own profit, even though what he says is the best advice, we begrudge him the profit we only imagine he will make, and deprive the city of a benefit it plainly would have had. It has come to the point that good advice given straightforwardly is no less suspect than bad, so that the man who wants to carry the most dangerous measures must win the people over by deceit, and the man who gives the better advice must lie to be believed. Ours is the only city where, because of all this cleverness, no one can do good openly without deceiving; for whoever openly offers you something good is suspected of gaining something for himself in secret. Yet on matters of the greatest importance, and in a situation like this, we who advise you must be expected to look somewhat further ahead than you, who give things only a brief consideration; especially since we are accountable for our advice, while you are not accountable for your listening. If the man who gave the advice and the men who followed it suffered alike, you would judge more prudently. As it is, whenever you meet with disaster, you give way to the anger of the moment and punish the single judgment of the man who persuaded you, and not your own, though there were many of you who shared in the mistake.

44 "I have come forward neither to speak in defense of the Mytilenians nor to accuse them. If we are sensible, the question before us is not their guilt but our own good judgment. Even if I prove them utterly guilty, I shall not on that account tell you to put them to death, unless it is to our advantage; and even if they deserve some pardon, I shall not tell you to pardon them, if that does not appear good for the city. I think we are deliberating about the future rather than the present. Cleon insists above all that it will be to our advantage in future to impose death as the penalty, so that there will be fewer revolts; and I, who equally insist on what is good for the future, hold the opposite view. I ask you not to reject the usefulness of my argument for the attractiveness of his. His argument is the more just one, and in your present anger against the Mytilenians it may well win you over. But we are not in a court of law with them, where we would need to consider what is just; we are deliberating about them, and how they may be made useful to us.

45 "Now in cities the death penalty has been laid down for many offenses, and those not as great as this one but lesser; yet men are carried away by hope and take the risk, and no one has ever yet entered into danger convinced that his plot would fail. What city that revolted ever made the attempt believing that its resources, its own or those its allies would bring, were too weak for it? All men, in private and in public, are by nature disposed to do wrong, and there is no law that will keep them from it. Men have gone through the whole list of penalties, adding to them, in the hope of suffering less at the hands of wrongdoers. It is likely that in ancient times the penalties for the greatest crimes were milder, and that as they were disregarded, they were in time mostly raised to death; and even this is disregarded. Either, then, some fear more terrible than this must be found, or this at least is no restraint. Poverty gives daring through necessity; abundance

gives greed for more through insolence and pride; and the other conditions of life, as each of them is gripped by some incurable and overmastering power, lead men on into danger through their passions. Hope and desire are everywhere, desire leading and hope following, desire devising the plan and hope suggesting that fortune will provide; they do the most harm, and, being unseen, they are stronger than the dangers that are seen. Fortune too contributes no less to the excitement. For she sometimes appears unexpectedly and leads men on to take risks even when their means are inferior; and this is true of cities no less than of individuals, inasmuch as the stakes are the highest, freedom or rule over others, and each man, carried along with all the rest, irrationally overrates his own strength. In short, it is impossible, and the mark of great simplicity, for anyone to suppose that when human nature is bent on doing something, it can be turned aside by force of law or by any other terror.

46 "We must not, therefore, make a bad decision by trusting in the death penalty as a safeguard, nor leave rebels without hope, as though there would be no chance to repent and to put an end to their error as soon as possible. Consider: as things are now, if a city has revolted and sees that it cannot succeed, it may come to terms while it is still able to pay the costs and to keep up its tribute in future. But in the other case, what city do you think will not prepare better than now and hold out under siege to the last, if it makes no difference whether it comes to terms late or soon? And how is it not a loss to us to spend money sitting before a city because it will not surrender, and, if we take it, to get back a ruined city and lose its revenue for the future? It is by that revenue that we are strong against our enemies. So we must not be strict judges of the offenders to our own harm. We must rather see how, by moderate punishment, we can keep the cities in future in a condition to be useful to us financially; and we should seek our

security not in the severity of the laws but in the care we take in our actions. At present we do the opposite. When a free people, ruled by force, has naturally revolted to win its independence and we have subdued it, we think we must take a harsh revenge. But it is not when free men revolt that we should punish them severely; we should watch them severely before they revolt, and forestall them so that the idea never even enters their minds; and when we have subdued them, we should lay the blame on as few of them as possible.

47 "Consider too how great a mistake you would make in this respect if you took Cleon's advice. As things are, the people in all the cities are well disposed to you. Either they do not join the few in revolting, or, if they are forced to, they are at once the enemies of those who brought the revolt about; and when you go to war, you have the masses of the rebel city on your side. But if you destroy the people of Mytilene, who took no part in the revolt and who, as soon as they got hold of arms, willingly handed over the city, you will first of all commit a crime by killing your benefactors, and you will then give the men of power everywhere what they most want. For when they bring a city to revolt, they will at once have the people on their side, since you will have shown in advance that the same punishment is laid down for the guilty and the innocent alike. On the contrary, even if they were guilty, we should pretend not to know it, so that the only class still allied to us may not become our enemy. And I consider it much more useful for keeping our empire that we should suffer wrong willingly than that we should justly destroy those whom we ought not to destroy. As for Cleon's idea that in this punishment justice and advantage are one and the same, it turns out that the two cannot both be had at once.

48 "Recognize, then, that this is the better course. Do not give too much weight to pity or to leniency, for I too would not have

you be swayed by them; but on the merits of the advice itself, take my counsel: judge at your leisure those Mytilenians whom Paches sent here as guilty, and let the rest live in their city. This is good for the future and alarming to our enemies already. For whoever deliberates well is stronger against his opponents than one who goes at them with mere force and folly."

49 That was what Diodotus said. When these opinions, so directly opposed to each other, had been expressed, the Athenians, despite their change of heart, were still divided, and in the show of hands the two sides were nearly equal; but the motion of Diodotus carried. At once they sent off a second trireme in all haste, so that they would not find the city destroyed because the first had arrived ahead of it; it had about a day and a night's start. The Mytilenian envoys provided wine and barley meal for the ship and promised great rewards if they got there first, and the voyage was made with such haste that the men ate barley meal kneaded with wine and oil as they rowed, and slept and rowed by turns. As luck would have it, there was no wind against them; and since the first ship was in no hurry on its monstrous errand, while the second was pressing on in the way described, the first arrived only so far ahead that Paches had read the decree and was about to carry out what had been decided, when the second put in after it and prevented the slaughter. By so narrow a margin did Mytilene escape its danger.

50 The other men, whom Paches had sent to Athens as the ones most responsible for the revolt, the Athenians put to death on Cleon's motion; there were a little more than a thousand of them.[5] They pulled down the walls of Mytilene and took over its ships. Afterward they did not impose tribute on the Lesbians, but divided the land, except that of Methymna, into 3,000 lots. Three hundred they set aside as sacred to the gods, and for the rest they sent out men of their own, chosen by lot, as lot-holders. The

Lesbians agreed to pay them two minas a year for each lot and worked the land themselves. The Athenians also took over the towns on the mainland that the Mytilenians had controlled, and these were afterward subject to Athens. That was how things went on Lesbos.

51 In the same summer, after the capture of Lesbos, the Athenians under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus made an expedition against the island of Minoa, which lies off Megara. The Megarians had built a tower on it and used it as a fort. Nicias wanted the Athenians to keep their watch from there, at closer range, and not from Budorum and Salamis; he wanted to stop the Peloponnesians from using it as a base to put out unobserved, as had happened before, with triremes and by sending out privateers, and at the same time to stop anything from sailing in to the Megarians. So first he took two towers projecting from Nisaea, using siege engines from the sea, and cleared the way into the channel between the island and the mainland. Then he walled off the side facing the mainland as well, where help could reach the island across a bridge over the shallows, for the island is not far from the mainland. When this had been completed in a few days, he built a fort on the island too, left a garrison there, and withdrew with his army.

52 At about the same time this summer the Plataeans, who had no more grain and could no longer endure the siege, came to terms with the Peloponnesians in the following way. The Peloponnesians were attacking their wall, and the Plataeans were unable to defend it. The Lacedaemonian commander saw how weak they were, but he did not want to take the city by force. He had instructions from Lacedaemon to this effect: if a treaty should ever be made with the Athenians, and the two sides agreed to give back the places each had taken in war, Plataea was not to be among those given back, on the ground that its people had come

over of their own accord. So he sent them a herald to ask whether they were willing to surrender their city voluntarily to the Lacedaemonians and accept them as judges; the guilty would be punished, but no one against justice. That was what the herald said, and the Plataeans, who were now at their weakest, surrendered the city. The Peloponnesians fed the Plataeans for some days, until the judges arrived from Lacedaemon, five men. When they came, no charge was brought. They called the Plataeans before them and asked them only this: whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and their allies any good in the present war. The Plataeans asked leave to speak at greater length, and put forward Astymachus son of Asopolaus and Lacon son of Aeimnestus, who was proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, to speak for them. These came forward and spoke as follows.

53 "Lacedaemonians, we surrendered our city because we trusted you. We did not expect to undergo a trial like this, but something more lawful; and we agreed to be judged by no one but you, as we now are, believing that from you above all we would get fair treatment. Now we fear that we have been wrong on both counts. We have good reason to suspect that this trial is for our lives, and that you will not prove impartial. We infer this because no accusation has been made beforehand that we might answer (we ourselves had to ask leave to speak), and because the question is a short one, to which the true answer tells against us, while a false one can be refuted. We are at a loss on every side, and we are forced, and it seems safer, to say something and take our chances. For men in our position, a speech left unmade might give us cause to say afterward that it would have saved us, had it been made. Besides everything else, persuasion is hard for us. If we were strangers to each other, we might help ourselves by bringing in evidence of things you did not know; but as it is, everything will be said to men who know it all already. What we fear is not that you

have judged our merits beforehand to be inferior to yours and are making that a charge against us, but that, to oblige others, we are being brought before a court whose verdict has already been decided.

54 "Nevertheless we shall present what just claims we have, both as regards our quarrel with the Thebans and toward you and the rest of the Hellenes; we shall remind you of our good services and try to persuade you. To the short question, whether we have done the Lacedaemonians and their allies any good in this war, we answer this. If you ask us as enemies, you are not wronged if you have received no good from us; if you think of us as friends, then it is you who are more at fault, for having marched against us. In peace, and against the Mede, we have proved ourselves good men: we were not the first to break the peace now; and then we alone of the Boeotians joined in attacking the Mede for the freedom of Hellas. Inland people though we are, we fought in the sea battle at Artemisium; in the battle fought in our own land we stood beside you and Pausanias; and in whatever other danger threatened the Hellenes at that time, we took our part in all of it beyond our strength. And to you in particular, Lacedaemonians, when the greatest fear surrounded Sparta after the earthquake, when the Helots revolted and withdrew to Ithome, we sent a third of our own men to help. These are not things you should forget.

55 "Such were the men we chose to be in the great events of the past; afterward we became your enemies. But you were to blame. When the Thebans used force against us and we asked you for an alliance, you rejected us and told us to turn to the Athenians, since they were near and you lived far away. Yet in the war you have never suffered, or been in danger of suffering, anything out of the ordinary from us. If we refused to revolt from the Athenians when you told us to, we did no wrong. For they helped us against the Thebans when you hung back, and it was no longer

honorable to betray them, especially since we had received benefits from them, had sought their alliance ourselves, and had been given a share in their citizenship; it was only reasonable for us to answer their summons with a will. And when either of you leads your allies, it is not the followers who are to blame if anything wrong is done, but those who lead them into what is not right.

56 "The Thebans have wronged us in many other ways, and the last of these you know yourselves, the reason why we are suffering now. They tried to seize our city in time of truce, and on a holy day besides; and we rightly punished them, in keeping with the law established among all men, that it is righteous to repel an invading enemy. It would not be reasonable for us to be harmed on their account now. If you take as justice your own immediate interest and their hostility, you will show yourselves not true judges of what is right but servants of what is expedient. And yet, if they seem useful to you now, we and the other Hellenes were far more useful to you then, when you were in greater danger. Now it is you who go out and threaten others; but in that hour, when the barbarian was bringing slavery to all, these men were on his side. It is only just to set our zeal then against our error now, if indeed we have erred at all. You will find the zeal greater than the error, and shown at a time when it was rare for any Hellene to set his courage against the power of Xerxes; when those were praised more who did not look to their own safety and to what suited them in face of the invasion, but were willing to dare the best course in the midst of danger. We were among those men and were honored above others; and now we fear that we shall be destroyed for the very same conduct, for having chosen the Athenians justly rather than you for profit. Yet you should be seen to judge the same things in the same way, and to recognize that your true advantage lies in this: that good allies should always be

sure of gratitude for their courage, while your own immediate interest is served as well.

57 "Consider, too, that at present most of the Hellenes look on you as a model of honorable conduct. If you decide our case otherwise than is fitting (and this trial will not go unnoticed, for you who judge are praised, and we who are judged are not to be blamed either), take care that they do not refuse to accept an unworthy sentence passed on good men by judges who are better men still, or the dedication in the common sanctuaries of spoils taken from us, the benefactors of Hellas. It will seem a dreadful thing that the Lacedaemonians should sack Plataea; that your fathers should inscribe the city on the tripod at Delphi for its courage, and that you should wipe it out of the whole Hellenic world, every household, for the sake of the Thebans. For we have come to such a pitch of misfortune that when the Medes prevailed we were ruined, and now, before you who were once our dearest friends, we are losing to the Thebans; and we have faced the two greatest ordeals, then the threat of dying of hunger if we did not surrender our city, now a trial for our lives. We Plataeans, who were zealous for the Hellenes beyond our strength, are thrust aside by all, alone and undefended. None of our allies of those days is helping us; and you, Lacedaemonians, our only hope, we fear you will not stand firm.

58 "And yet we beg you, for the sake of the gods who were once sworn to in our alliance, and for our courage on behalf of the Hellenes, to relent and change your minds if the Thebans have persuaded you of anything. Ask of them in return the gift of not killing those whom it ill becomes you to kill. Win an honorable gratitude instead of a shameful one, and do not give pleasure to others only to earn disgrace yourselves. Destroying our bodies is the work of a moment; wiping out the infamy of it will be a labor. It is not enemies you would be justly punishing in us, but friends

who were forced to make war on you. So you would be giving a righteous judgment if you guaranteed our lives, bearing in mind that we surrendered of our own will and held out our hands to you (and the custom of the Hellenes is not to kill such men), and that we have been your benefactors throughout. Look at the tombs of your fathers, who were killed by the Medes and buried in our land. Every year we have honored them at public expense with garments and the other customary offerings, bringing them the first fruits of all that our land produced in season, as friends from a friendly country and allies to those who were once our comrades in arms. You would be doing the opposite if you judged wrongly. Think of it. Pausanias buried them believing that he was laying them in friendly ground and among men such as we were. But if you kill us and make the territory of Plataea Theban, what else will you be doing but leaving your fathers and kinsmen in a hostile country, among their own murderers, robbed of the honors they now receive? More than that, you will enslave the land in which the Hellenes won their freedom; you will make desolate the temples of the gods to whom they prayed before they conquered the Medes; and you will take away the ancestral sacrifices from those who founded and established them.

59 "This would not be in keeping with your reputation, Lacedaemonians: to offend against the common customs of the Hellenes and against your ancestors, or to destroy us, your benefactors, for the sake of another's enmity when you yourselves have suffered no wrong. Spare us; let your judgment bend to a wise compassion. Consider not only how terrible our fate would be, but who we are who would suffer it, and how unpredictable misfortune is, and on whom it may fall, however undeserving. We, as is fitting for us and as our need compels, call on the gods whom the Hellenes worship at the same altars and in common, and beg you to grant this. We appeal to the oaths your fathers swore, and ask

you not to forget them. We are suppliants at your fathers' tombs, and we call on the dead not to let us fall into the hands of the Thebans, not to let their dearest friends be handed over to their worst enemies. We remind you of that day on which we did the most glorious deeds with them, we who now on this day are in danger of suffering the most terrible fate. And now we must do what is necessary and hardest for men in our position, to bring our speech to an end, since with it the danger to our lives draws near. In closing we say this. It was not to the Thebans that we surrendered our city; we would rather have chosen the most shameful death, by starvation, than that. It was to you we came, trusting you; and if we do not persuade you, it is only just to put us back where we were and let us choose for ourselves the danger that falls to us. We implore you, Lacedaemonians, that we, Plataeans, who were the most zealous of all for the Hellenes, should not be handed over from your hands and from your good faith, suppliants as we are, to the Thebans, our bitterest enemies. Be our saviors; do not, while you liberate the rest of the Hellenes, destroy us."

60 So the Plataeans spoke. The Thebans were afraid that the Lacedaemonians might give way somewhat in response to this speech, so they came forward and said that they too wished to speak, since the Plataeans, contrary to what the Thebans had expected, had been allowed a longer speech than an answer to the question required. When they were told to go ahead, they spoke as follows.

61 "We would not have asked to speak if these men had answered the question briefly, and had not turned on us and made an accusation, and, about themselves, made a long defense on matters outside the issue and on which no charge had been brought, and praised themselves for things no one had found fault with. As it is, we must answer the one and refute the other, so that neither our supposed baseness nor their reputation may help

them, and you may hear the truth about both of us and decide. Our quarrel with them began like this. We founded Plataea later than the rest of Boeotia, along with other places that we took after driving out a mixed population. These men refused to accept our leadership, as had been arranged at first. They broke away from the rest of the Boeotians in breach of ancestral custom, and when pressure was put on them, they went over to the Athenians. With them they did us much harm, for which they suffered in return.

62 "When the barbarian came against Hellas, they say, they alone of the Boeotians did not side with the Mede; it is this above all that they glory in and that they reproach us with. We say that they did not side with the Mede only because the Athenians did not; and that later, in the same way, when the Athenians attacked the Hellenes, they alone of the Boeotians sided with the Athenians. But consider in what circumstances each of us acted. Our city at that time happened to be governed neither by an oligarchy with equal rights for its members nor by a democracy. What was most opposed to law and to moderate government, and closest to a tyranny, held power: a narrow clique of a few men. These men, hoping to strengthen their own power still further if the Mede should win, kept the people down by force and brought him in. The city as a whole was not its own master when it did this, and it is not fair to reproach it for errors it made when it was not under its laws. At any rate, after the Mede had gone and the city had recovered its laws, consider what happened when the Athenians later attacked the rest of Hellas and tried to bring our country under their power, and through faction already held most of it. Did we not fight at Coronea, defeat them, and free Boeotia? And are we not now zealously helping to free the others, providing horses and more resources than any other of the allies?

63 "That is our defense on the charge of siding with the Mede. Now we shall try to show that it is you who have wronged the

Hellenes more and deserve every punishment. It was to get revenge on us, you say, that you became allies and citizens of the Athenians. In that case you should have brought them in against us alone, and not joined them in attacking others. That was open to you, even if you were being drawn along by the Athenians against your will, since the alliance with these Lacedaemonians against the Mede already existed, the alliance you make so much of. It was enough to keep us off you and, what matters most, to let you deliberate without fear. But you chose the side of the Athenians of your own will, no longer under compulsion. You say that it would have been shameful to betray your benefactors. But it was far more shameful and more unjust to betray all the Hellenes, with whom you had sworn alliance, than the Athenians alone, when the Athenians were enslaving Hellas and the others were liberating it. And the return you made them was not equal to the favor, nor free from disgrace. You brought them in, you say, because you were being wronged; and you became their accomplices in wronging others. Yet it is more shameful to fail to return a favor in kind than to leave unpaid a debt that was justly incurred but could only be repaid by injustice.

64 "You have made it clear that even then it was not for the sake of the Hellenes that you alone did not side with the Mede, but because the Athenians did not either; you wanted to do the same as they did and the opposite of what we did. And now you claim to profit from a merit you owed to others. That is not reasonable. You chose the Athenians; fight it out on their side, and do not bring up the oath sworn then as if it ought to save you now. For you abandoned it; you broke it and helped to enslave the Aeginetans and others among those who had sworn it, rather than preventing it; and you did so not unwillingly, but with the same laws you have had to this day and with no one forcing you, as we were forced. And the last invitation, made to you before you were walled in, to

keep quiet and help neither side, you refused. Who could more justly be hated by all the Hellenes than you, who made a show of your courage to their harm? The good qualities you say you once showed, you have now proved were not your own; what your nature always wanted has been exposed for what it is. For you went along with the Athenians when they took the path of injustice. Such, then, is our case on our involuntary siding with the Mede and your voluntary siding with Athens.

65 "As for the last wrong you say you suffered, that we came against your city unlawfully, in time of truce and on a holy day, we do not think that even in this we were more at fault than you. If we had come to your city on our own, fought, and ravaged your land as enemies, we would be in the wrong. But if men among you, the first in wealth and birth, wanting to end your foreign alliance and bring you back to the ancestral institutions common to all the Boeotians, invited us of their own free will, what wrong are we doing? It is those who lead who break the law, rather than those who follow. But in our judgment neither they nor we did wrong. They were citizens like you, with more at stake. They opened their own gates and brought us into their own city as friends, not as enemies. They wanted to keep the worse among you from gaining any more power, and to give the better what they deserved. They meant to bring the city's policy to its senses without banishing a single citizen, bringing it back to its kin, making it no one's enemy, and at peace with all alike.

66 "Here is proof that we did not act as enemies. We harmed no one, and we made a proclamation that anyone who wished to live under the ancestral institutions of all the Boeotians should come over to us. You came over gladly and made an agreement with us, and at first you kept quiet. Later you noticed that we were few. Even if we did seem to have acted somewhat unfairly in entering without the consent of your people, you did not repay us in kind,

by refraining from violence and persuading us with words to leave. Instead you attacked us in breach of the agreement. For those you killed in the fighting we do not grieve so much; they suffered, after all, by a kind of law. But those who held out their hands, whom you took alive and afterward promised us not to kill, and then lawlessly put to death: is this not a terrible thing you have done? You committed three crimes in a short time: the agreement you broke, the killing of the men that followed, and the promise you made us, and broke, not to kill them if we did no harm to your property in the fields. And yet you say that it is we who broke the law, and you claim that you yourselves should not pay the penalty. Not so, if these judges decide rightly. You will be punished for all of it.

67 "We have gone through all this at length, Lacedaemonians, for your sake and for ours: so that you may know that you will be justly condemning them, and that we have taken a revenge that is still more righteous. Do not be softened by hearing of their old acts of courage, if there were any. Such deeds should help those who are wronged; but for those who do something shameful they should mean a double penalty, because their crime is out of keeping with their past. Do not let them profit by lamentation and pity, calling on your fathers' tombs and their own desolation. For we on our side can show you that our young men, whom these people killed, suffered a far more terrible fate. Of their fathers, some died at Coronea bringing Boeotia over to your side; others are left in their old age, with empty houses, and they make a much juster supplication to you to punish these men. Pity is more fitly given to men who suffer what they do not deserve; those who suffer justly, as these men do, should rather be a cause for rejoicing. And the desolation they now face is of their own making; for they willingly rejected the better allies. They broke the law without any previous wrong from us, deciding out of hatred rather than justice; and the punishment they will now pay is not equal to their crime. For they

will suffer by due process of law, not, as they claim, holding out their hands on the battlefield, but having surrendered themselves to trial by agreement. Lacedaemonians, defend the law of the Hellenes, which these men have broken; and to us, who have suffered lawless treatment, give a just return for the zeal we have shown. Do not let their speeches push us aside in your esteem. Show the Hellenes by example that you will set before them contests not of words but of deeds. When the deeds are good, a brief report is enough; when they are wrong, speeches dressed in fine phrases become a veil for them. But if leaders like you now sum up the question and decide it for all alike, men will be less inclined to look for fine words to cover unjust acts."

68 That is what the Thebans said. The Lacedaemonian judges thought that their question, whether the Plataeans had received any good from them in the war, would be the right one to put. Their reasoning was this. All along they had asked the Plataeans, supposedly, to remain neutral in keeping with the old treaty made by Pausanias after the Persian War; and later, before the siege wall was built, they had offered them terms, to be neutral according to that treaty; and the Plataeans had not accepted. So, considering that by their own just proposal they were now released from the treaty, and that they had suffered harm at the Plataeans' hands, they brought them forward again one by one and asked each the same question, whether he had done the Lacedaemonians and their allies any good in the war. When a man said he had not, they took him away and killed him; they made no exceptions. They put to death no fewer than two hundred of the Plataeans themselves, and twenty-five Athenians who had been besieged with them; the women they enslaved. The city they gave for about a year to some Megarians who had been driven out in a civil conflict, and to those Plataeans of their own party who survived, to live in. Afterward they razed it entirely to the ground, from the foundations, and

built near the temple of Hera an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all round, below and above, using the roofs and doors of the Plataeans; and from the other materials found inside the walls, bronze and iron, they made couches and dedicated them to Hera, and they built her a stone temple a hundred feet long. The land they confiscated and leased out for ten years, and Thebans farmed it. Almost the whole of the Lacedaemonians' hostility toward the Plataeans was for the sake of the Thebans, whom they thought useful to them in the war that was then just beginning. That was the end of Plataea, in the ninety-third year after it became the ally of Athens.[6]

69 The forty Peloponnesian ships that had gone to help the Lesbians, after fleeing across the open sea as described, chased by the Athenians and caught in a storm off Crete, had been carried from there in scattered groups to the Peloponnese. At Cyllene they found thirteen triremes of the Leucadians and Ambraciots, and Brasidas son of Tellis, who had come to act as adviser to Alcidas. Having failed at Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians wanted to strengthen their fleet and sail to Corcyra, which was in the grip of civil strife. There were only twelve Athenian ships at Naupactus, and they meant to arrive before any larger fleet could come to help from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas were preparing for this.

70 The civil strife at Corcyra had begun when the prisoners taken in the sea battles off Epidamnus returned, released by the Corinthians.[7] In name they had been released on a security of eight hundred talents pledged by their proxeni; in fact they had been persuaded to win Corcyra over for Corinth. These men set to work, approaching each of the citizens in turn, to bring the city to revolt from Athens. An Attic ship and a Corinthian ship arrived, bringing envoys, and after the discussions the Corcyraeans voted to remain allies of the Athenians under the existing terms, and friends of the Peloponnesians as before. There was a man named

Peithias, who was a volunteer proxenus of the Athenians and the leader of the people. These men brought him to trial, alleging that he was enslaving Corcyra to Athens. He was acquitted, and in turn he prosecuted the five richest of them, alleging that they were cutting vine stakes in the precinct of Zeus and of Alcinous; the fine was a stater for each stake. They were convicted, and because the fine was so large they sat as suppliants at the temples, asking to pay it in installments. But Peithias, who happened also to be a member of the council, persuaded it to apply the law. Shut out by the law, and learning at the same time that Peithias meant, while he was still on the council, to persuade the people to have the same friends and enemies as the Athenians, they banded together, took daggers, burst suddenly into the council, and killed Peithias and about sixty others, councilors and private citizens. A few who shared Peithias' views took refuge in the Attic trireme, which was still there.

71 When they had done this, they called the Corcyraeans together and told them that it was all for the best and that now they would be least likely to be enslaved by the Athenians. In future, they said, they should receive neither side except with a single ship at a time and peaceably, and should treat any larger force as hostile. Having said this, they forced the assembly to ratify the proposal. They also sent envoys to Athens at once to explain that what had been done was expedient, and to persuade the men who had fled there to take no hostile action, so that there would be no reprisal.

72 When the envoys arrived, the Athenians arrested them as revolutionaries, along with all those they had won over, and put them away on Aegina. Meanwhile at Corcyra, when a Corinthian trireme arrived with Lacedaemonian envoys, those in control of affairs attacked the people and defeated them in battle. When night came on, the people took refuge on the acropolis and the

high parts of the city, gathered there, and established themselves, and they held the Hyllaic harbor. The other side seized the marketplace, where most of them lived, and the harbor beside it that faces the mainland.

73 The next day there was a little skirmishing, and both sides sent round into the countryside, calling on the slaves and offering them freedom. Most of the household slaves joined the people as allies, while the other side got eight hundred auxiliaries from the mainland.

74 After a day's interval there was another battle, and the people won, having the advantage in the strength of their positions and in numbers. Their women joined boldly in the fighting, throwing tiles from the houses and standing up to the tumult with a courage beyond their nature. The rout came late in the afternoon, and the few, afraid that the people would come on and take the dockyard at the first rush and destroy them, set fire to the houses around the marketplace and the tenement blocks, to cut off the approach. They spared neither their own nor anyone else's, so that much merchandise was burned and the whole city was in danger of being destroyed, if a wind had sprung up to carry the flames toward it. So they broke off the battle, and both sides kept quiet and stood guard for the night. The Corinthian ship slipped away, now that the people had won, and most of the auxiliaries got across to the mainland unobserved.

75 The next day Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, an Athenian general, came to help from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites. He tried to arrange a settlement, and persuaded them to agree with one another that ten men, those most responsible, should be tried (they did not wait for this), and that the rest should go on living in the city, having made peace with one another and an alliance with the Athenians, so as to have the same enemies and friends. Having done this, he was about to

sail away; but the leaders of the people persuaded him to leave them five of his ships, so that their opponents would be less inclined to make any move, and they would man the same number from their own people and send them with him. He agreed, and they began enrolling their personal enemies for the ships. These men, afraid that they would be sent off to Athens, took refuge as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. Nicostratus tried to raise them up and reassure them. When he could not persuade them, the people armed themselves on this pretext, claiming that their refusal to sail showed that they meant no good; they took the weapons from their houses, and would have killed some of those they came upon if Nicostratus had not stopped them. When the others saw what was happening, they took refuge as suppliants in the temple of Hera, no fewer than four hundred of them. The people, fearing that they might start a revolt, persuaded them to get up, and took them across to the island in front of the temple of Hera, where provisions were sent over to them.

76 At this stage of the civil strife, on the fourth or fifth day after the men had been taken to the island, the Peloponnesian ships from Cyllene, which had been lying there since the voyage from Ionia, arrived, fifty-three of them. Alcidas commanded them as before, and Brasidas sailed with him as adviser. They anchored at Sybota, a harbor on the mainland, and at dawn sailed against Corcyra.

77 The Corcyraeans were in great confusion and alarm, both at the state of the city and at the attack. They began fitting out sixty ships, and sent them out against the enemy as each was manned, although the Athenians urged them to let them sail out first, and to follow afterward with all their ships together. When their ships came up to the enemy scattered like this, two deserted at once, and in others the men on board were fighting one another; there was no order in anything they did. When the Peloponnesians saw

the confusion, they deployed twenty ships against the Corcyraeans and the rest against the twelve Athenian ships, two of which were the Salaminia and the Paralus.

78 The Corcyraeans, attacking badly and a few ships at a time, got into difficulties in their part of the battle. The Athenians, fearing the enemy's numbers and being surrounded, did not attack the ships deployed against them in a body or in the center, but fell on a wing and sank one ship. After this, when the enemy had formed a circle, they sailed around it and tried to throw it into confusion. Those facing the Corcyraeans saw this, and afraid that what had happened at Naupactus might happen again, came to help; and the ships, now all together, advanced against the Athenians at once. The Athenians began to retreat, backing water, and at the same time they wanted the Corcyraean ships to escape first, as far as possible, while they themselves withdrew slowly with the enemy ranged against them. Such was the sea battle, and it ended at sunset.

79 The Corcyraeans were afraid that the enemy, as victors, would sail against the city and either take off the men from the island or make some other revolutionary move. So they brought the men from the island back to the temple of Hera and guarded the city. But the Peloponnesians, though they had won the sea battle, did not dare to sail against the city; they sailed back with thirteen Corcyraean ships they had taken to the mainland, the place they had put out from. The next day they still did not sail against the city, although the Corcyraeans were in great confusion and fear and Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas to do so; but Brasidas did not have an equal vote. Instead they landed at the promontory of Leucimme and ravaged the countryside.

80 Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, terrified that the ships would sail against them, entered into talks with the suppliants and the others about how the city might be saved, and persuaded

some of them to go on board the ships; for in spite of everything they had manned thirty, expecting the attack. The Peloponnesians, after ravaging the land until midday, sailed away; and toward nightfall fire signals told them that sixty Athenian ships were approaching from Leucas. The Athenians had sent these, under the general Eurymedon son of Thucles, when they learned of the civil strife and that the ships with Alcidas were about to sail against Corcyra.

81 So the Peloponnesians at once set off home that night in haste, keeping close to the shore; they hauled their ships across the isthmus of Leucas, so as not to be seen sailing round, and got away. When the Corcyraeans saw that the Attic ships were approaching and the enemy's ships had gone, they took the Messenians, who had been outside the walls, and brought them into the city. They ordered the ships they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbor, and while these were on their way round, they killed any of their enemies they could lay hands on. Those whom they had persuaded to go on board the ships they took off and put to death. They went to the temple of Hera, persuaded about fifty of the suppliants to stand trial, and condemned them all to death. When they saw what was happening, most of the suppliants, those who had not been persuaded, killed one another there in the sanctuary; some hanged themselves from the trees, and others made away with themselves as each could. For the seven days that Eurymedon stayed after his arrival with the sixty ships, the Corcyraeans went on butchering those of their fellow citizens whom they considered their enemies. The charge they brought was conspiring to overthrow the democracy, but some were killed because of private hatred, and others by their debtors because of money owed to them. Death took every form; and, as usually happens at such times, there was nothing that did not happen, and worse besides. A father killed his son; men were dragged

from the altars and killed beside them; and some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there.

82 To such savagery did the civil strife proceed; and it seemed all the more savage because it was among the first. Later, of course, virtually the whole Hellenic world was convulsed, since in every city there were quarrels between the leaders of the people, who wanted to bring in the Athenians, and the few, who wanted to bring in the Lacedaemonians. In peacetime they would have had no pretext for calling them in, and no inclination to; but in war, when each side had an alliance ready to hand, both for harming its opponents and, by the same means, for strengthening itself, those who wanted to make a revolution easily found occasions to bring in outside help. Many terrible things befell the cities through civil strife, things that happen and always will happen as long as human nature remains the same, though they may be more violent or milder and differ in their forms, according to the changes of circumstance in each case. In peace and prosperity both cities and individuals have better minds, because they are not plunged into necessities they did not choose. But war, which takes away the easy supply of daily life, is a violent teacher, and it brings most people's passions down to the level of their circumstances. So the cities fell into civil strife, and those that came to it later, hearing what had been done elsewhere, went much further still in devising new ideas, both in the ingenuity of their enterprises and in the monstrousness of their reprisals. They changed the accepted meaning of words in relation to deeds as they saw fit. Reckless daring was now regarded as the courage of a loyal partisan; prudent hesitation, as cowardice dressed up; moderation, as a cover for unmanliness; and the ability to understand a question from every side, as an inability to act on any of them. Frantic impulsiveness was counted the mark of a real man, and to plot with an eye to one's own safety was a plausible excuse for backing out. The

man who raged was always trusted; the man who spoke against him was suspect. A man who plotted and succeeded was clever, and one who saw a plot coming was cleverer still; but a man who planned ahead so as to need neither was a wrecker of his party and afraid of the other side. In short, a man was praised if he struck first at someone about to do harm, and also if he egged on to wrongdoing someone who had never thought of it. Even blood became a weaker tie than party, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why. For such associations were formed not for mutual help under the established laws but in defiance of them, for greed. Their members confirmed their pledges to one another not by divine law so much as by having broken the law together. Fair proposals from their opponents they accepted, if those opponents had the upper hand, with precautions in deed, not in a spirit of generosity. To take revenge on someone was valued more than never to have been injured in the first place. If ever oaths of reconciliation were sworn, they were given by each side for the moment, to meet a difficulty, and held only so long as neither had strength from any other source. But when the chance came, whoever first took courage, if he saw his opponent off guard, took his revenge with more pleasure because of the pledge than he would have openly. He reckoned that it was safe, and that by winning through treachery he had also won a prize for intelligence. Most people would rather be called clever when they are villains than good when they are simple; they are ashamed of the one and glory in the other. The cause of all this was power pursued out of greed and ambition, and from these came the fervor of men once they were caught up in rivalry. For the leaders in the cities, on each side, used fine-sounding names: one side professed political equality for the masses, the other a moderate aristocracy. They served the public interest in words while making it their prize; and striving in every way to get the better of one another,

they dared the most terrible deeds and pursued revenges more terrible still. They set them not within the limits of justice and the good of the city but by whatever, on either side, gave them pleasure at the moment, and they were ready, whether by an unjust verdict of condemnation or by seizing power with their own hands, to glut the rivalry of the hour. So neither side had any regard for piety; but those who managed to accomplish some odious deed under cover of a fine phrase were the more highly spoken of. The citizens who stood in between were destroyed by both sides, either because they would not join in the struggle or out of envy that they should survive.

83 Thus every form of wickedness arose in the Hellenic world through civil strife. Simplicity, which is so large a part of a noble nature, was laughed out of existence. Mutual opposition of mind, with no trust on either side, prevailed far and wide. For there was nothing to reconcile them, no word that could be relied on, no oath that inspired fear. All of them, when they had the upper hand, reckoning that security was not to be hoped for, looked to avoiding injury rather than being able to trust. And it was generally the men of meaner intelligence who survived. Afraid of their own shortcomings and of their opponents' intelligence, afraid of being beaten in argument and of being outmaneuvered first by their opponents' versatile minds, they went boldly to action. Their opponents, contemptuous and supposing that they would see it coming, and that there was no need to take by action what they could get by intelligence, were caught off guard and destroyed in greater numbers.

84 [It was in Corcyra, then, that most of these things were first dared:[8] all that men who are ruled with insolence rather than moderation will do in retaliation when they get the chance, against those who have given them cause for vengeance; all that men longing to be rid of their habitual poverty, and above all passion-

ately coveting their neighbors' goods, will plan against justice; and all that men who attack not for gain but as equals, carried away by the wildness of their anger, will carry out with savage and pitiless cruelty. With the life of the city thrown into confusion at this crisis, human nature, which is accustomed to do wrong even in spite of the laws, now mastered the laws and gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion, stronger than justice, and the enemy of all superiority. For men would not have put revenge above piety, and gain above not doing wrong, if envy had not had a power to do harm. And men claim the right, in taking revenge on others, to do away beforehand with the common laws on such matters, on which all can rest their hope of being saved themselves if they come to grief; they do not leave them standing for the day when they may be in danger and need them.]

85 So the Corcyraeans in the city vented these first passions on one another, and Eurymedon and the Athenians sailed away with their ships. Later the Corcyraean exiles (about five hundred of them had escaped) seized forts on the mainland, made themselves masters of the territory across the strait that belonged to Corcyra, and using it as a base plundered the people on the island and did much damage, and there was a severe famine in the city. They also sent embassies to Lacedaemon and Corinth about their return; and when nothing came of this, they afterward got together boats and mercenaries and crossed over to the island, about six hundred in all. They burned their boats, so that they would have no hope except to make themselves masters of the land, went up Mount Istone, built a fort there, and began destroying the people in the city and became masters of the countryside.

86 At the end of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships to Sicily under Laches son of Melanopus and Charoeades son of Euphiletus as generals.[9] The Syracusans and the Leontines had gone to war with each other. On the side of the Syracusans were

all the Dorian cities except Camarina, the same cities that at the very beginning of the war had been enrolled in the Lacedaemonian alliance, though they had taken no active part in the fighting. On the side of the Leontines were the Chalcidian cities and Camarina. In Italy the Locrians were with the Syracusans, and the Rhegians, as kinsmen, with the Leontines. The allies of the Leontines sent to Athens, appealing to an old alliance and to the fact that they were Ionians, and persuaded the Athenians to send them ships; for they were being shut off by the Syracusans from both land and sea. The Athenians sent them, on the pretext of kinship, but in fact because they wanted to stop grain from being shipped from there to the Peloponnese, and to make a preliminary trial whether affairs in Sicily could be brought under their control. So they established themselves at Rhegium in Italy and carried on the war together with their allies. And the summer ended.

87 The following winter the plague attacked the Athenians a second time. It had never entirely left them, though there had been something of a respite. This second outbreak lasted no less than a year, the first one two years; so that nothing did more than this to crush the Athenians and to cripple their power. No fewer than 4,400 hoplites from the regular ranks died of it, and three hundred cavalry, and of the rest of the population a number that was never discovered. At this time too there were the many earthquakes, at Athens, in Euboea, and in Boeotia, especially at Orchomenus in Boeotia.

88 The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships against the so-called islands of Aeolus; in summer it was impossible to campaign there for lack of water. The islands are held by the Liparaeans, who are colonists from Cnidus. They live on one of the islands, which is not large and is called Lipara, and from there they go out and farm the others, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. The people there believe that

Hephaestus has his forge on Hiera, because at night it can be seen sending up a great deal of fire, and smoke by day. These islands lie off the territory of the Sicels and the Messanians, and they were allies of Syracuse. The Athenians laid waste their land, and when they would not come over, sailed back to Rhegium. So the winter ended, and with it the fifth year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

89 The following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies came as far as the Isthmus, intending to invade Attica, under the leadership of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians; but there were many earthquakes, and they turned back, and no invasion took place. At about this time, while the earthquakes were going on, the sea at Orobiae in Euboea drew back from what was then the shoreline, then rose in a great wave and came over part of the town. Some of it flooded and some of it subsided, so that what was once land is now sea; and it killed all the people who could not run up to higher ground in time. Near Atalanta, the island off Opuntian Locris, there was a similar flood, which carried away part of the Athenian fort there and wrecked one of two ships that had been hauled up on the beach. At Peparethus too the sea drew back somewhat, though there was no flood; and an earthquake threw down part of the wall, the town hall, and a few other houses. The cause of such a thing, in my opinion, is this: at the point where the earthquake was strongest, the sea is driven back, and then suddenly drawn in again with greater violence and makes the flood. Without an earthquake, I do not think such a thing could happen.

90 The same summer there was fighting in Sicily, by various parties as circumstances led each of them, the Sicilian Greeks campaigning against one another and the Athenians together with their allies. I shall mention the things most worth recording that were done by the allies together with the Athenians, or against the

Athenians by their enemies. Charoeades, the Athenian general, had by now been killed by the Syracusans in battle, and Laches, who had sole command of the fleet, made an expedition with the allies against Mylae, which belonged to Messana. Two tribal regiments of the Messanians happened to be on garrison duty at Mylae, and they had laid an ambush for the men from the ships. The Athenians and their allies routed the men from the ambush and killed many of them, then attacked the fortification and forced the garrison to surrender the citadel by agreement and to march with them against Messana. After this, when the Athenians and their allies came against Messana, its people too came over, giving hostages and the other guarantees.

91 The same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships around the Peloponnese under the command of Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes and Procles son of Theodorus, and sixty ships and two thousand hoplites to Melos under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus. They wanted to bring the Melians over, for although they were islanders, they were unwilling to be subjects or even to join the Athenian alliance. When the Melians did not come over, even though their land was laid waste, the Athenians left Melos and sailed to Oropus, in the Graean district. They put in at nightfall, and the hoplites at once disembarked and marched overland to Tanagra in Boeotia. The Athenians from the city in full force, under the command of Hipponicus son of Callias and Eurymedon son of Thucles, met them there by land at a signal. They camped that day at Tanagra, ravaged the land, and spent the night there. The next day they defeated in battle the Tanagraeans who came out against them, along with some Thebans who had come to help; they took up the arms of the dead, set up a trophy, and withdrew, the one force to the city and the other to the ships. Nicias sailed along the coast of Locris with his sixty ships, laid waste the places by the sea, and returned home.

92 At about this time the Lacedaemonians founded their colony of Heraclea in Trachis, with the following purpose. The Malians as a whole are made up of three parts, the Paralians, the Hierians, and the Trachinians. The Trachinians had been ruined in war by their neighbors the Oetaeans. At first they meant to attach themselves to the Athenians, but fearing that they could not be trusted, they sent to Lacedaemon, choosing Tisamenus as their envoy. The Dorians, the mother country of the Lacedaemonians, joined in the embassy and made the same request, for they too were suffering at the hands of the Oetaeans. When the Lacedaemonians heard them, they decided to send out the colony. They wanted to help both the Trachinians and the Dorians; and the city also seemed to them well placed for the war against the Athenians. A fleet could be fitted out there against Euboea, so that the crossing would be short, and it would be useful for the route to Thrace. All in all, they were eager to found the place. First they consulted the god at Delphi, and when he told them to go ahead, they sent out the settlers, both from among themselves and from the Perioeci, and invited any of the other Hellenes who wished to join them, except Ionians, Achaeans, and certain other peoples. Three Lacedaemonians led it as founders, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. Once established, they walled the city anew; it is now called Heraclea and lies about forty stades from Thermopylae and twenty from the sea. They also began building dockyards, and they closed off the approach by Thermopylae at the narrows themselves, so that it would be easy to guard.

93 While this city was being settled, the Athenians at first were alarmed, thinking that it was being founded chiefly as a threat to Euboea, since the crossing from there to Cenaeum in Euboea is short. Later, however, things turned out contrary to their expectation, for no harm came from it. The reasons were these. The Thessalians, who were the power in that region and on whose land

it was being founded, were afraid that it might become a powerful neighbor, and they kept harassing and making war on the new settlers without letup until they had worn them down, though at first there had been a great many of them; for everyone went there with confidence, since it was the Lacedaemonians who were founding it, and he thought the city secure. Not least, however, it was the Lacedaemonian governors who came out there who ruined things and reduced the population, frightening most of the settlers away by their harsh and sometimes unjust administration; so that their neighbors could now more easily get the better of them.

94 The same summer, at about the time when the Athenians were held up at Melos, the Athenians in the thirty ships around the Peloponnese first ambushed and killed some guards at Ellomenus in Leucadian territory, and later came against Leucas with a larger force: all the Acarnanians, who followed in full force except for Oeniadae, the Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen Corcyraean ships. The Leucadians kept quiet, overwhelmed by numbers, while their land was ravaged both outside the isthmus and within it, where Leucas itself and the temple of Apollo are. The Acarnanians asked Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to wall them off, thinking they could easily reduce them by siege and be rid of a city that had always been hostile to them. But at this time Demosthenes was persuaded by the Messenians that it would be a fine thing, with so large an army assembled, to attack the Aetolians. They were enemies of Naupactus, and if he defeated them he would easily win over to the Athenians the rest of the mainland in that region as well. The Aetolian nation, they explained, was large and warlike, but it lived in unwalled villages that were far apart and used light equipment, so it would not be hard to subdue them before they could combine. They urged him to attack first the Apodotians, then the Ophionians, and after them

the Eurytanians, who are the largest part of the Aetolians and are said to speak a most unintelligible language and to eat their meat raw. Once these were taken, the rest would come over easily.

95 Demosthenes was persuaded, partly to oblige the Messenians, but chiefly because he thought that without forces from Athens, with his mainland allies and the Aetolians, he could go by land against Boeotia. He would go through the territory of the Ozolian Locrians to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right, until he came down among the Phocians. They, he thought, would gladly join the campaign because of their long-standing friendship with Athens, or could be forced to; and Phocis is already on the border of Boeotia. So he set out with his whole army from Leucas, against the wishes of the Acarnanians, and sailed along the coast to Sollium. He told the Acarnanians of his plan, but they would not accept it because he had refused to wall off Leucas; so he made the expedition against the Aetolians himself with the rest of his army, the Cephallenians, Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian marines from his own ships, the fifteen Corcyraean ships having gone home. He set out from Oeneon in Locris. These Ozolian Locrians were allies, and they were to meet the Athenians in full force in the interior. Since they were neighbors of the Aetolians and armed in the same way, it was thought that they would be of great use on the campaign, with their knowledge of how the Aetolians fought and of the country.

96 He camped with his army in the sanctuary of Nemean Zeus, where the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the people of the district, after an oracle had told him that he would suffer this at Nemea. At dawn he set out and marched into Aetolia. On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Crocyleium, and on the third Teichium. There he stayed, and sent the plunder off to Eupalium in Locris. His plan was to subdue the rest in this way and

afterward, if the Ophionians would not come to terms, to go back to Naupactus and make a separate expedition against them. But these preparations had not escaped the Aetolians, either when they were first being planned or later; and as soon as the army had invaded, they all came to the rescue in great force, so that even the most remote of the Ophionians, the Bomiaeans and Callians, whose territory reaches down toward the Malian Gulf, came to help.

97 The Messenians gave Demosthenes the same sort of advice as before. Assuring him, as they had at the start, that the Aetolians would be easy to conquer, they urged him to go against the villages as quickly as possible and not wait until they had all gathered and could form up against him, but to try to take whatever village lay in his path. He was persuaded by them, and trusting to his luck, since nothing had gone against him, he did not wait for the Locrians, who were to come and support him (he was very short of light-armed javelin men), but advanced against Aegitium and took it by storm at the first assault. The inhabitants had slipped away and were sitting on the hills above the town; for it stood on high ground about eighty stades from the sea. The Aetolians, who had by now come to the relief of Aegitium, attacked the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills from every direction and hurling javelins. When the Athenian army advanced, they fell back, and when it retreated, they pressed on it. The fighting went on like this for a long time, pursuits and retreats, and in both the Athenians had the worse of it.

98 As long as the archers had arrows and were able to use them, the Athenians held out, for the Aetolians, being lightly armed, were kept back by the archery. But when the captain of the archers was killed, his men scattered; the soldiers themselves were worn out from long exposure to the same toil, and the Aetolians kept pressing on them and hurling javelins. Then at last

they turned and fled. Falling into ravines from which there was no way out and into country they did not know, they were destroyed; for their guide, Chromon the Messenian, happened to have been killed. The Aetolians, who were quick on their feet and lightly armed, kept throwing javelins and caught and killed many of them there in the rout. Most of them lost their way and got into a wood with no paths through it, and the Aetolians brought fire and burned the wood around them. Every form of flight and death befell the Athenian army, and the survivors barely escaped to the sea and to Oeneon in Locris, where they had started from. Many of the allies were killed, and of the Athenians themselves about 120 hoplites. So many men, all of the same age, the best men indeed whom the city of Athens lost in this war, perished here; and the other general, Procles, was also killed. They recovered their dead from the Aetolians under a truce, withdrew to Naupactus, and later were carried back by ship to Athens. Demosthenes stayed behind in the neighborhood of Naupactus, afraid of the Athenians after what had happened.

99 At about the same time the Athenians in Sicily sailed to Locris, defeated in a landing the Locrians who came out against them, and took a frontier post on the river Halex.

100 The same summer the Aetolians, who had earlier sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon, Tolophus the Ophionian, Boriades the Eurytanian, and Tisander the Apodotian, persuaded them to send an army against Naupactus because it had brought in the Athenians. Toward autumn the Lacedaemonians sent out three thousand hoplites of the allies. Five hundred of these came from Heraclea in Trachis, the newly founded city. A Spartiate, Eurylochus, commanded the force, and with him went the Spartiates Macarius and Menedaius.

101 When the army had assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Ozolian Locrians; for the road to Naupactus ran

through their country, and he also wanted to detach them from the Athenians. Of the Locrians, the people of Amphissa helped him most, since they were afraid because of their enmity with the Phocians. They gave hostages first themselves, and persuaded the others to do so, since they feared the approaching army: first their neighbors the Myoneans, who held the most difficult approach into Locris, then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeantheans. All these also joined the expedition. The Olpaeans gave hostages but did not follow; the Hyaeans would not give hostages until the Peloponnesians took one of their villages, called Polis.

102 When everything was ready and he had deposited the hostages at Cytinium in Doris, Eurylochus advanced with his army through Locris against Naupactus. On his march he took Oeneon and Eupalium, two of their towns, since they would not come over. Arriving in the territory of Naupactus, where the Aetolians had by now joined them, they ravaged the land and took the suburb, which was unwalled. Then they went against Molycreium, a Corinthian colony subject to Athens, and took it. But Demosthenes the Athenian, who happened still to be in the neighborhood of Naupactus after the Aetolian affair, learned of the army in advance and feared for the city. He went and persuaded the Acarnanians, though with difficulty because of his withdrawal from Leucas, to help Naupactus. They sent with him, on board ships, a thousand hoplites, who got in and saved the place; for there was a danger that, the wall being large and the defenders few, they could not hold out. When Eurylochus and his men saw that the force had got in and that it was impossible to take the city by storm, they withdrew, not to the Peloponnese, but to Aeolis, as Calydon and Pleuron and the places around them are now called, and to Proschium in Aetolia. For the Ambraciots came to them and persuaded them to join in attacking Amphilochian Argos and the rest

of Amphilochia, and Acarnania too, telling them that if they conquered these places, the whole mainland would come into alliance with the Lacedaemonians. Eurylochus was persuaded, dismissed the Aetolians, and waited quietly with his army in that region until the time came to help the Ambraciots when they took the field against Argos. And the summer ended.

103 The following winter the Athenians in Sicily, with their Hellenic allies and those of the Sicels who had been ruled by force by the Syracusans or had been their allies and had revolted and were fighting on the Athenian side, attacked the Sicel town of Inessa, whose citadel was held by the Syracusans. When they could not take it, they went away. During the withdrawal the Syracusans from the fort attacked the allies of the Athenians, who were retreating behind them; they fell on them, routed part of the army, and killed a good many. After this Laches and the Athenians made several landings from their ships in Locris; on the river Caecinus they defeated in battle about three hundred Locrians who came out against them with Proxenus son of Capaton, took up their arms, and went away.

104 The same winter the Athenians also purified Delos, in obedience, it seems, to some oracle.[10] Peisistratus the tyrant had purified it before, though not all of it, only as much of the island as could be seen from the sanctuary. This time the whole island was purified, in the following way. They took up all the graves of the dead that were on Delos, and proclaimed that in future no one should die or give birth on the island, but should be carried across to Rheneia. Rheneia is so close to Delos that Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, who for some time was powerful at sea and ruled the other islands, captured Rheneia and dedicated it to Delian Apollo by binding it to Delos with a chain. After the purification the Athenians held the four-yearly festival, the Delia, for the first time. In ancient times too there had been a great gathering at Delos of

the Ionians and the neighboring islanders. They came to the festival with their wives and children, as the Ionians now do to the Ephesia, and there were contests there, athletic and musical, and the cities brought choruses. Homer shows most clearly that this was so in the following verses, from his hymn to Apollo: "But when, Phoebus, your heart takes most delight in Delos, / where the Ionians in their trailing robes gather / with their children and their wives along your way, / there they remember you and delight you with boxing, / with dancing and with song, whenever they hold the contest." That there was also a musical contest, and that men went there to compete, he shows again in these lines from the same hymn. After celebrating the Delian chorus of women, he ended his praise with the following verses, in which he also made mention of himself: "But come now, may Apollo be gracious, and Artemis with him; / and farewell to you all. Remember me hereafter, / whenever some other man of those who live on earth, / some stranger who has suffered much, comes here and asks: / 'Girls, which of the singers who come here is sweetest to you, / and in whom do you most delight?' Then all of you answer / with one voice, and kindly: 'A blind man; he lives in rocky Chios.'" That much evidence Homer has given that there was a great gathering and festival at Delos even in ancient times. Later the islanders and the Athenians went on sending choruses with offerings, but the contests and most of the rest were abandoned, probably because of misfortunes, until on this occasion the Athenians restored the contest and added horse races, which had not been held before.

105 The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had promised Eurylochus when they kept his army there, marched against Amphilochian Argos with three thousand hoplites. They invaded the territory of Argos and seized Olpae, a strong fort on a hill by the sea, which the Acarnanians had once fortified and used as a

common court of justice; it is about twenty-five stades from the city of Argos, which lies on the coast. Some of the Acarnanians came to the relief of Argos, while others encamped at a place in Amphilochia called Crenae, to watch for the Peloponnesians under Eurylochus and keep them from getting through to the Ambraciots unnoticed. They also sent for Demosthenes, the Athenian who had commanded in Aetolia, to be their leader, and for the twenty Athenian ships that happened to be off the Peloponnese under the command of Aristoteles son of Timocrates and Hierophon son of Antimnestus. The Ambraciots at Olpae, for their part, sent a messenger to their city, urging them to come to their help in full force. They were afraid that Eurylochus and his men might not be able to get past the Acarnanians, and that they would then have to fight alone, or would not be able to retreat safely if they wanted to.

106 When Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians learned that the Ambraciots had arrived at Olpae, they set out from Proschium and went to help them in haste. They crossed the Achelous and marched through Acarnania, which was empty of men because they had gone to the relief of Argos, keeping the city of Stratus and its garrison on their right and the rest of Acarnania on their left. Having crossed the territory of Stratus, they went on through Phytia, then past the edge of Medeon, then through Limnaea, and so came into the country of the Agraeans, which is no longer Acarnanian and was friendly to them. They reached Mount Thyamus, which belongs to the Agraeans, crossed it, and came down into the territory of Argos when it was already night. Passing between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian outpost at Crenae, they got through unseen and joined the Ambraciots at Olpae.

107 United now, at daybreak they took up a position at the place called Metropolis and made camp there. Not long afterward the Athenians arrived in the Ambracian Gulf with their twenty ships to help the Argives, and Demosthenes with two hundred

Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian archers. The ships lay off the hill of Olpae on the seaward side. The Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians (the greater number were held down by force by the Ambraciots) had by now gathered at Argos and were preparing to fight the enemy, and they chose Demosthenes as leader of the whole allied force, together with their own generals. He led them up near Olpae and made camp; a large ravine separated the two armies. For five days they kept quiet; on the sixth both sides drew up for battle. The Peloponnesian army was the larger and overlapped his own, so Demosthenes, fearing that he would be surrounded, placed an ambush of about four hundred hoplites and light-armed troops together in a sunken road overgrown with brush, so that at the very moment of contact they could rise up and take the overlapping part of the enemy line in the rear. When both sides were ready, they closed. Demosthenes held the right wing with the Messenians and a few Athenians; the rest of the line was held by the Acarnanians, drawn up by cities, and the Amphilochian javelin men who were present. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up mixed together, except for the Mantineans. These were massed rather toward the left, though not on the very end of the wing; Eurylochus and his men held the extreme left, opposite the Messenians and Demosthenes.

108 When they were already at close quarters and the Peloponnesians with their wing were overlapping and beginning to encircle the enemy's right, the Acarnanians from the ambush came up behind them, fell on them, and routed them, so that they did not stand to fight; and in their panic they set the greater part of the army fleeing too. For when the others saw Eurylochus' division, the strongest part of the army, being destroyed, they were all the more afraid. The Messenians, who were in this part of the field with Demosthenes, did most of the work. Meanwhile the Ambraciots and the others on the right wing defeated the troops

facing them and pursued them toward Argos; for they happen to be the most warlike people in that part of the world. But as they came back and saw that the main body had been defeated, and the rest of the Acarnanians pressed them, they barely got through to Olpae, and many of them were killed, rushing in without order or discipline, except the Mantineans, who kept their ranks better than any in the whole army as they withdrew. The battle ended in the evening.

109 The next day Menedaius, since Eurylochus and Macarius had been killed, took over the command himself. After so great a defeat he did not know how he could either stay and stand a siege, cut off as he was by land and by sea by the Attic ships, or withdraw in safety. So he made proposals to Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals for a truce and a withdrawal, and at the same time for the recovery of the dead. They gave back the dead, set up a trophy themselves, and took up their own dead, about three hundred. They would not grant a withdrawal openly to all. But Demosthenes and his fellow generals of the Acarnanians made a secret agreement with the Mantineans, Menedaius, and the other Peloponnesian commanders and the most important men among them, allowing them to leave quickly. He wanted to strip the Ambraciots and the mercenary rabble of their support, and above all to discredit the Lacedaemonians and the Peloponnesians among the Hellenes of that region as men who had betrayed their allies and put their own interests first. So the Peloponnesians took up their dead, buried them hastily as best they could, and those who had been granted permission secretly planned their withdrawal.

110 Demosthenes and the Acarnanians now received word that the Ambraciots from the city, in response to the first message from Olpae, were coming to help in full force through Amphilochia, intending to join their men at Olpae, and knew noth-

ing of what had happened. He at once sent part of his army ahead to lay ambushes on the roads and seize the strong points, and at the same time prepared to march against them with the rest of his force.

111 In the meantime the Mantineans and the others included in the agreement went out on the pretext of gathering vegetables and firewood, and slipped away in small groups, picking up as they went the things they had supposedly come out for. When they had got some way from Olpae, they went off more quickly. The Ambraciots and the others who happened to have come out with them in a body, when they realized that they were leaving, rushed after them at a run, wanting to catch up. At first the Acarnanians thought that all of them alike were leaving without any agreement, and pursued the Peloponnesians. When some of their generals tried to stop them and said that there was an agreement with these men, one soldier threw a javelin at them, thinking they were being betrayed. Afterward, however, they let the Mantineans and the Peloponnesians go and killed the Ambraciots. There was much dispute and uncertainty whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. They killed some two hundred of them; the rest escaped to the neighboring territory of the Agraeans, where Salynthius, the king of the Agraeans, who was friendly to them, took them in.

112 Meanwhile the Ambraciots from the city reached Idomene. Idomene consists of two high hills. The men sent ahead by Demosthenes from the camp seized the larger of the two after nightfall, unobserved and before the enemy could get there; the Ambraciots had happened to climb the smaller one first and had camped there. After supper Demosthenes set out with the rest of the army at once, as soon as it was evening, he himself with half of it toward the pass, the other half through the Amphilochian hills. At first light he fell on the Ambraciots while they were still in their

beds. They had no idea what had happened and took the attackers much rather for their own men; for Demosthenes had purposely put the Messenians in front and told them to call out to the enemy in their Doric dialect and so win the trust of the sentries, who could not make them out by sight, since it was still night. So when he fell on their army, they routed it and killed most of them on the spot; the rest fled into the mountains. But the roads had been occupied in advance, and the Amphilochians knew their own country and were light-armed against hoplites, while the Ambraciots did not know it and had no idea which way to turn. They fell into ravines and into the ambushes that had been laid for them, and were destroyed. They tried every way of escape, and some even turned toward the sea, which was not far off; and seeing the Attic ships sailing along the coast just as the action was taking place, they swam out to them, thinking in the fear of the moment that it was better, if they must die, to be killed by the men in the ships than by the barbarian Amphilochians, their bitterest enemies. In this way the Ambraciots were cut to pieces, and few out of many got back safely to their city. The Acarnanians stripped the dead, set up trophies, and returned to Argos.

113 The next day a herald came to them from the Ambraciots who had fled from Olpae to the Agraeans, to ask for the recovery of the dead who had been killed after the first battle, when they had come out with the Mantineans and the others who were under the agreement, though they were not included in it themselves. When the herald saw the arms of the Ambraciots from the city, he was amazed at their number; he did not know of the disaster, but thought they belonged to the men of his own party. Someone asked him what he was amazed at and how many of their men had been killed, the questioner in turn supposing that the herald came from the men at Idomene. The herald said about two hundred. The questioner answered, “These arms do not look like

it; they look like more than a thousand." The herald said again, "Then they are not the arms of those who fought with us." The other replied, "They are, if it was you who fought at Idomene yesterday." "But we fought with no one yesterday; it was the day before, in the retreat." "Well, we certainly fought these men yesterday, the ones who came to help from the city of Ambracia." When the herald heard this and understood that the relief force from the city had been destroyed, he cried out in grief and, stunned by the magnitude of the disaster, went away at once without doing what he had come for, and no longer asked for the dead. This was indeed the greatest disaster to befall any single Hellenic city in so few days in the whole of this war. I have not recorded the number of the dead, because the number said to have been lost is incredible in proportion to the size of the city. I do know this, that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had been willing to follow the advice of the Athenians and Demosthenes and destroy Ambracia, they would have taken it at the first assault. But they were afraid that if the Athenians held it they would be more troublesome neighbors than the Ambraciots.

114 After this they allotted a third of the spoils to the Athenians and divided the rest among their cities. The Athenians' share was captured at sea; the arms that are now dedicated in the Attic temples are three hundred full suits of armor that were set aside for Demosthenes, and he brought them home with him when he sailed. After his disaster in Aetolia, this success made his return less dangerous. The Athenians in the twenty ships also went back to Naupactus. After the Athenians and Demosthenes had gone, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a truce with the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had fled to Salynthius and the Agraeans, allowing them to withdraw from Oeniadae, to which they had moved from Salynthius' country. For the future the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a treaty and alliance with the Ambraciots

for a hundred years, on these terms: the Ambraciots were not to join the Acarnanians in making war on the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians to join the Ambraciots against the Athenians; each was to help defend the other's territory; the Ambraciots were to give back whatever places or hostages of the Amphilochians they held; and they were not to help Anactorium, which was at war with the Acarnanians. Having agreed to these terms, they brought the war to an end. After this the Corinthians sent a garrison of their own to Ambracia, about three hundred hoplites, under the command of Xenocleidas son of Euthycles; they made their way overland with difficulty and arrived. That was how things went at Ambracia.

115 The same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a landing from their ships in the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who had invaded the borders of Himera from the interior, and they also sailed against the islands of Aeolus. When they returned to Rhegium, they found there the Athenian general Pythodorus son of Isolochus, who had come to take over the command of the ships from Laches. The allies in Sicily had sailed to Athens and persuaded the Athenians to send them help with more ships. For the Syracusans were masters of their land, and although they were themselves kept off the sea by a few ships, they were gathering a fleet and preparing not to put up with this. The Athenians began manning forty ships to send them, thinking that the war there would be ended sooner, and at the same time wanting to give their navy practice. So they sent off one of the generals, Pythodorus, with a few ships, and were about to send Sophocles son of Sostratides and Eurymedon son of Thucles with the main fleet. Pythodorus, having now taken over Laches' command of the ships, sailed at the end of the winter against the Locrian fort that Laches had taken earlier, and was defeated in battle by the Locrians and withdrew.

116 At about the beginning of this spring the stream of fire flowed from Etna, as it had before, and destroyed some of the land of the Catanaeans, who live below Mount Etna, the largest mountain in Sicily. This eruption is said to have come fifty years after the previous one, and in all there have been three since Sicily was settled by the Hellenes.[11] These things happened during this winter; and so ended the sixth year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

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1. The Olympic festival of 428 BC. Dorieus of Rhodes, a famous boxer and wrestler, won the pancratium three times running.

2. Many editors regard chapter 17 as an insertion, possibly displaced from the account of the war's first year; the text of its first sentence is also corrupt. It is given here in brackets, as in the edition followed.

3. Pissuthnes, the Persian satrap at Sardis, governor of the King's province of western Asia Minor.

4. Cleon, the leading popular politician at Athens after the death of Pericles (429 BC); this is his first appearance in the *History*.

5. The figure has been doubted, and some editors would emend it to a much smaller number; the manuscripts agree on "a little more than a thousand."

6. Plataea's alliance with Athens is usually dated to 519 BC; its fall here belongs to the summer of 427 BC.

7. The Corcyraean prisoners taken by Corinth in the fighting over Epidamnus in 433 BC (Book 1, chapter 55).

8. Chapter 84 was already doubted in antiquity, and many editors consider it an imitation of chapter 82 by a later hand. It is given in brackets, as in the edition followed.

9. The first Athenian expedition to Sicily (427 BC), a forerunner of the great expedition of 415 BC described in Books 6 and 7.

10. Delos, the sacred island of Apollo in the Cyclades, was the original seat of the Athenian-led alliance. The verses quoted below come from the *Homeric*

Hymn to Apollo, which Thucydides, like his contemporaries, ascribes to Homer.

11. The eruption described here took place in 425 BC; the previous one is usually dated to about 475 BC.

Book 4

1 The following summer, about the time the grain puts out its ears, ten Syracusan ships and an equal number from Locri sailed to Messana in Sicily and took the city, at the invitation of the Messanians themselves; and Messana revolted from the Athenians. The Syracusans did this chiefly because they saw that the place gave access to Sicily and feared that the Athenians might one day use it as a base to come against them with a larger force; the Locrians did it out of enmity toward the Rhegians, wanting to make war on them from both sides. The Locrians had at the same time invaded the territory of Rhegium in full force, so that the Rhegians could not go to the aid of the Messanians, and also because Rhegian exiles who were with them urged them on; for Rhegium had been torn by civil strife for a long time and was unable for the present to defend itself against the Locrians, which was one more reason for attacking it. After laying the land waste, the Locrians withdrew their infantry, while the ships stayed to guard Messana; and others that were being manned were to anchor there and carry on the war from that base.

2 At about the same time in the spring, before the grain was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica (they were led by Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians), and they settled in and laid waste the land. The Athenians sent off the forty ships to Sicily, as they had been preparing to do, and the remaining generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles; for Pythodorus, the third of them, had already gone ahead to Sicily. They also instructed the generals to look after the Corcyraeans in the city on

their way past, since these were being raided by the exiles on the mountain; sixty Peloponnesian ships had sailed there to support the men on the mountain, expecting, because there was a great famine in the city, to get control of affairs easily. Demosthenes, who had held no office since his return from Acarnania, had asked to be allowed to use these ships around the Peloponnese, and they told him he might, if he wished.

3 When they were off the coast of Laconia and learned that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles wanted to hurry on to Corcyra, but Demosthenes urged them to put in first at Pylos, do what was needed there, and then make the voyage. While they were objecting, a storm happened to come up and carried the ships into Pylos. Demosthenes at once asked them to fortify the place (that, he said, was why he had come along on the voyage), and he pointed out that there was a great supply of timber and stone, that the place was strong by nature, and that both it and much of the country around it were deserted. Pylos is about four hundred stades from Sparta and lies in what was once Messenian land; the Lacedaemonians call it Coryphasium.[1] The generals said there were many deserted headlands in the Peloponnese if he wanted to occupy them and spend the city's money. But to him this place seemed different from any other: it had a harbor, and the Messenians, who had belonged to it from of old and spoke the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could do them the greatest harm using it as a base, and would at the same time be reliable guards of the place.

4 When he could persuade neither the generals nor the soldiers, and later also failed after laying the plan before the taxiarchs, he waited idle, because the weather kept them from sailing, until the soldiers themselves, having nothing to do, were seized by an impulse to gather around and fortify the place. They set to work. They had no iron tools for cutting stone, but they brought

stones picked out by hand and set each one wherever it would fit; and where mud was needed, for lack of hods they carried it on their backs, bending forward so that it would stay on as well as possible and locking their hands behind them so that it would not slip off. They hurried in every way they could to finish the most vulnerable points before the Lacedaemonians could come to the rescue; for most of the place was strong in itself and needed no wall.

5 The Lacedaemonians happened to be celebrating a festival, and when they heard the news they made light of it, thinking that when they marched out the Athenians would either not wait for them or that they would easily take the place by force; and the fact that their army was still at Athens also held them back somewhat. The Athenians fortified the side of the place facing the mainland and the points where it was most needed in six days; then they left Demosthenes there with five ships to guard it and hurried on with the greater part of the fleet on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

6 When the Peloponnesians in Attica learned that Pylos had been occupied, they went home in haste, the Lacedaemonians and King Agis thinking that the affair at Pylos touched them closely. Besides, they had invaded early, while the grain was still green, and most of them were short of food; and bad weather, colder than usual for the season, came on and distressed the army. So for many reasons it came about that they withdrew early and that this invasion was the shortest; they stayed in Attica fifteen days.

7 At about the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, collected a few Athenians from the garrisons and a large number of the allies in that region and took Eion in the Thracian region, a colony of Mende that was hostile to Athens, which was being betrayed to him. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans came at once to its aid, and he was driven out and lost many of his soldiers.

8 When the Peloponnesians had withdrawn from Attica, the Spartiates themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci set out at once for Pylos, but the other Lacedaemonians were slower to come, having just returned from another campaign. They also sent word around the Peloponnese to come to Pylos as quickly as possible, and they sent for their sixty ships at Corcyra; these were hauled across the isthmus of Leucas, slipped past the Attic ships at Zacynthus without being seen, and arrived at Pylos, where the land army was already present. While the Peloponnesians were still sailing up, Demosthenes managed to send off two ships in time to tell Eurymedon and the Athenians on the ships at Zacynthus to come, since the place was in danger. The ships sailed in haste as Demosthenes had instructed; and the Lacedaemonians prepared to attack the fort by land and by sea, expecting to take with ease a structure built in a hurry and held by few men. But since they also expected relief from the Attic ships at Zacynthus, they intended, if they did not take the place first, to block the entrances of the harbor as well, so that the Athenians could not anchor in it. For the island called Sphacteria, stretching along the harbor and lying close in front of it, makes the harbor secure and the entrances narrow: on one side there is a passage for two ships, by the Athenian fort and Pylos, and on the other, toward the rest of the mainland, for eight or nine. The island was wooded throughout and, being uninhabited, had no paths, and it was about fifteen stades in length. They intended to close the entrances with ships packed side by side, prows facing outward. As for the island, they feared the enemy might use it to make war on them, so they carried hoplites across to it and posted others along the mainland. In this way, they reasoned, both the island and the mainland would be hostile to the Athenians, and the mainland offered no landing (the coast of Pylos itself outside the entrance, facing the open sea, had no harbors, so the Athenians would have nowhere to set out

from to help their men); and they themselves would in all likelihood take the place by siege, without a sea battle and without risk, since there was no grain inside and it had been occupied with little preparation. When they had decided this, they began carrying the hoplites across to the island, choosing them by lot from all the companies. Others had crossed before in relays, but the last group, the men who were caught there, numbered 420, with the Helots who attended them; their commander was Epitadas son of Molobrus.

9 Demosthenes, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were about to attack with ships and infantry together, made his own preparations. He hauled up under the fort the triremes that remained to him from the squadron left there and protected them with a stockade, and he armed their sailors with poor shields, most of them made of wicker; for it was impossible to get arms in a deserted place, and even these they had taken from a Messenian privateer, a thirty-oared ship and a light boat, that happened to come by. There were about forty hoplites among these Messenians, and he used them with the rest. He posted most of his men, both unarmed and armed, at the fortified and strongest points of the place, facing the mainland, with orders to drive back the infantry if it attacked. He himself picked out sixty hoplites and a few archers from the whole force and went outside the wall toward the sea, where he most expected the enemy to try to land. The ground there was difficult and rocky and faced the open sea, but because the wall was weakest at that point he thought they would be eager to force a way in; for the Athenians, never expecting to be beaten at sea, had not built a strong wall there, and if the enemy forced a landing the place could be taken. So he went to that point, down to the very edge of the sea, and drew up his hoplites to keep them off if he could, and he encouraged them as follows.

10 "Men who have joined me in this danger, let none of you, in a crisis like this, want to look clever by counting up all the peril that surrounds us; rather, go straight at the enemy without weighing the odds, full of hope, and expect to come through this as well. Where things have reached necessity, as here, there is no room for calculation; what is needed is to face the danger as quickly as possible. I see that most of the advantages are on our side, if we are willing to stand firm and not, struck with fear at their numbers, throw away the advantages we have. I count the difficulty of landing here as ours: if we stand our ground it becomes our ally, but if we give way, then however hard the ground is, it will be easy going with no one to stop them, and we shall find the enemy more dangerous, because his retreat will not be easy if we press him hard. (On their ships they are easiest to fight off; once landed, they are on equal terms with us.) Nor must we fear their numbers too much. Large as their force is, it will fight a few at a time, because there is nowhere to bring the ships to shore; and it is not an army on land, superior on equal terms, but one fighting from ships, which need many things to go right at sea. So I consider their difficulties a match for our numbers. And at the same time I ask of you, as Athenians who know from experience of landing from ships on other men's shores that a landing can never be forced if the defender stands his ground and does not give way out of fear of the surf and of the terror of ships bearing in, that you now stand firm yourselves and, fighting off the enemy at the water's very edge, save both yourselves and the place."

11 When Demosthenes had encouraged them in this way, the Athenians took more heart, and they went down and formed up along the very edge of the sea. The Lacedaemonians set out and attacked the fort with their land army and at the same time with their ships, which numbered forty-three; their admiral, who sailed with them, was the Spartiate Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles. He

attacked just where Demosthenes had expected. The Athenians defended themselves on both sides, from the land and from the sea. The enemy divided their ships into small groups, because it was not possible for more to put in, and, resting by turns, kept making their attacks, with all their energy and with shouts of encouragement, in the hope that they might somehow force their way in and take the fort. Brasidas was the most conspicuous of all. He was commanding a trireme, and when he saw that, because the ground was difficult, the trierarchs and helmsmen were hanging back even where a landing seemed possible, and were taking care not to wreck their ships, he shouted at them that it made no sense to spare timber and let the enemy build a fort in their country. He ordered them to break up their own ships to force a landing, and he told the allies not to shrink from giving up their ships to the Lacedaemonians at this moment in return for the great benefits they had received, but to run them aground, get ashore by any means, and make themselves masters of the men and the place.

12 He was urging the others on in this way, and he forced his own helmsman to run his ship aground and went to the gangway. As he tried to land he was beaten back by the Athenians; after receiving many wounds he fainted, and as he fell onto the outrigger his shield slipped off into the sea. It was carried ashore, and the Athenians picked it up and later used it for the trophy they set up for this attack. The rest were eager, but they could not land, because of the difficulty of the ground and because the Athenians held fast and gave no ground at all. Fortune had turned things around so far that the Athenians were fighting off the Lacedaemonians from the land, and Laconian land at that, while the Lacedaemonians sailed against it, and the Lacedaemonians were trying to land from ships on their own country, now hostile, against the Athenians. For at that time a great part of the reputation of the one people was that they were above all a land power

and the strongest in infantry, and of the other that they were a sea power and far superior with ships.

13 After making attacks that day and part of the next, they stopped. On the third day they sent some of their ships to Asine for timber for siege engines, hoping that, although the wall by the harbor was high, they could take it with engines, since there landing was easiest. Meanwhile the Athenian ships from Zacynthus arrived, forty in number; for some of the guard ships from Naupactus and four Chian ships had joined them. When they saw the mainland and the island full of hoplites, and the ships in the harbor making no move to come out, they were at a loss where to anchor. For the moment they sailed to the island of Prote, which is not far off and is uninhabited, and camped there; the next day they put out, prepared for a sea battle, intending to fight in open water if the enemy were willing to come out against them, and if not, to sail in themselves. The Lacedaemonians did not put out to meet them, nor had they, as it turned out, done what they had planned, which was to block the entrances. They stayed quietly on land, manning their ships and getting ready, if anyone sailed in, to fight in the harbor, which was not a small one.

14 The Athenians, seeing this, rushed at them through both entrances. Falling on most of the enemy ships, which were already afloat and facing them, they put them to flight, and in the pursuit, which was short, they damaged many and took five, one of them with its crew; and they rammed the rest, which had fled to the shore. Some ships were struck while their crews were still going aboard, before they could put out; and the Athenians tied ropes to some empty ones and towed them off, their crews having fled. Seeing this, and in agony at the disaster, because their men were being cut off on the island, the Lacedaemonians came to help. They waded into the sea in their armor, seized hold of the ships, and pulled them back; and in this struggle each man thought that

wherever he was not taking part himself, the effort was being held back. There was great confusion, and the usual roles of the two sides around the ships were reversed: the Lacedaemonians, in their eagerness and dismay, were fighting a sea battle, so to speak, from the land, while the Athenians, winning and wanting to push their present good fortune as far as possible, were fighting a land battle from ships. After giving each other much trouble and inflicting wounds, they separated, and the Lacedaemonians saved their empty ships, apart from those taken at the start. Both sides returned to their camps. The Athenians set up a trophy, gave back the dead, and took possession of the wrecks, and at once began sailing round the island and keeping it under guard, since the men on it were cut off; while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, now joined by reinforcements from every quarter, stayed where they were at Pylos.

15 When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, they decided that, since this was a great disaster, the authorities should go down to the camp and decide on the spot, seeing things for themselves, whatever seemed best. When they saw that it was impossible to help the men, and they were unwilling to run the risk that they might either suffer from hunger or be overpowered by numbers and taken, they decided to make a truce at Pylos with the Athenian generals, if they were willing, and to send envoys to Athens about an agreement and try to recover the men as quickly as possible.

16 The generals accepted the proposal, and a truce was made on these terms. The Lacedaemonians were to bring to Pylos and hand over to the Athenians the ships with which they had fought and all the warships in Laconia, and were not to bear arms against the fort by land or by sea. The Athenians were to allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send to the men on the island a fixed amount of grain, already kneaded: two Attic choenixes of

barley meal for each man, two cotylae of wine,[2] and a piece of meat, and half these rations for a servant. These were to be sent in under the eyes of the Athenians, and no boat was to sail in secretly. The Athenians were to keep guarding the island no less than before, but without landing on it, and were not to bear arms against the Peloponnesian army by land or by sea. If either side broke any of these terms in any way at all, the truce was at once to be void. It was to hold until the Lacedaemonian envoys returned from Athens; the Athenians were to take them there in a trireme and bring them back. When they returned, this truce was to end, and the Athenians were to give back the ships in the same condition as they received them. The truce was made on these terms, the ships were handed over, about sixty of them, and the envoys were sent off. When they arrived at Athens, they spoke as follows.

17 "Athenians, the Lacedaemonians have sent us about the men on the island, to arrange whatever we can persuade you is to your advantage and will at the same time, as matters now stand, bring us the most honor possible in our misfortune. If we speak at some length, it will not be against our custom; it is our native way not to use many words where few will do, but to use more when the moment calls for showing something important and so accomplishing, by words, what has to be done. Take what we say not in a hostile spirit, nor as though you were being taught like men without understanding, but as a reminder, offered to those who know, of how to decide well. You can put your present good fortune to good use, keeping what you hold and gaining honor and glory besides, and avoid what happens to men who come into some good thing they are not used to: they always reach out for more in hope, because their present good fortune also came unexpectedly. But those who have met with the most reversals both ways have every reason to be the most distrustful of success; and that is a

lesson your city, from experience, and we above all, might reasonably have learned.

18 "You can see it by looking at our present misfortunes. We, who have the highest standing among the Hellenes, have come to you, when formerly we thought we were the ones with the power to grant what we have now come to ask of you. Yet this did not happen to us from any lack of strength, nor because some increase of strength made us overbearing; we were deceived in our judgment about the resources we always had, a thing that can happen to anyone alike. So it would not be reasonable for you, because of the strength your city now has and what it has gained, to think that fortune too will always be on your side. Prudent men put their good things safely aside, knowing they are uncertain (such men would also meet misfortune more wisely), and they recognize that war does not go along with whatever part of it a man chooses to handle, but goes where chance leads it. Such men will stumble least, because they are not carried away by trust in their success, and they will be most willing to come to terms while they are fortunate. That is what you would do well to do now, Athenians, with us, and not have it thought later, if you refuse and then meet with failure, as you very well may, that even your present successes were won by chance, when you might leave behind you, without risk, a reputation for strength and good sense for the future.

19 "The Lacedaemonians invite you to make a treaty and end the war. They offer peace, an alliance, and friendship and close relations in every other way; and in return they ask for the men on the island, thinking it better for both sides that the matter not be fought out to the end, whether the men escape by force, if some way of safety should turn up, or are reduced by siege and captured. We think that great hatreds are most surely ended, not when one side retaliates and, having gained the upper hand in most of the war, binds the other by forced oaths to an agreement

on unequal terms, but when, though able to do just that, he takes the course of fairness, outdoes the other in generosity, and makes peace on moderate terms beyond what the other expected. For then the enemy owes him, not revenge for having been forced, but generosity in return, and shame makes him readier to keep what he agreed. Men do this more toward their greatest enemies than toward those with whom they have had only moderate differences; and it is their nature to give way gladly in turn to those who yield of their own accord, but against arrogance to run every risk, even against their own judgment.

20 "For both of us, if ever, it is a good moment for reconciliation, before something irreparable happens in the meantime and overtakes us. Then we must hold toward you an eternal hatred, personal as well as public, and you must lose what we are now offering. While the issue is still undecided, while you gain glory and our friendship besides, and we, before anything shameful has happened, settle our misfortune on moderate terms, let us be reconciled. Let us choose peace instead of war for ourselves, and give the other Hellenes a rest from their troubles; they will consider you the more responsible for it. Now they are at war without knowing clearly which side began it; but if the war is ended, and you are now chiefly the ones who decide that, they will give the credit to you. If you decide for it, you can become firm friends of the Lacedaemonians, since they themselves are inviting it and you would be doing them a favor rather than forcing them. Consider how many good things are likely to follow from this: if we and you speak with one voice, you may be sure that the rest of Hellas, being weaker, will pay us the highest respect."

21 That was what the Lacedaemonians said, thinking that the Athenians had wanted a treaty in the past and had been prevented by their own opposition, and that now, when peace was offered, they would gladly accept it and give back the men. But the

Athenians thought that as long as they held the men on the island, a treaty was already theirs whenever they chose to make one with the Lacedaemonians, and they reached out for more. The man who pushed them most was Cleon son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader at that time and the most persuasive with the people. He persuaded them to answer that the men on the island must first surrender their arms and themselves and be brought to Athens; then, when they had come, the Lacedaemonians must give back Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea, which they had not taken in war but had got under the earlier agreement,[3] when the Athenians gave them up because of their misfortunes and were then rather in need of a treaty; and then they could recover the men and make a treaty for as long as both sides thought fit.

22 The envoys made no objection to this answer but asked them to choose commissioners to meet with them, who would discuss each point, speaking and listening, and come quietly to whatever terms they could persuade each other to accept. At this Cleon came down hard on them. He said he had known before that they had nothing honest in mind, and it was clear now, since they were unwilling to say anything before the people and wanted to sit in council with a few men; if they meant anything sound, he told them to say it in front of everyone. The Lacedaemonians saw that they could not speak before the people, even if their misfortune led them to think some concession advisable, for fear that if they spoke and failed they would be discredited with their allies; and they saw that the Athenians would not grant what they asked on moderate terms. So they left Athens with nothing done.

23 When they returned, the truce at Pylos was at once at an end, and the Lacedaemonians asked for their ships back as had been agreed. But the Athenians charged them with an attack on the fort in breach of the truce and with other things that did not seem worth mentioning, and refused to give them back, insisting

that it had been stated that the truce would be void if it were broken in any way at all. The Lacedaemonians protested, called the business of the ships an injustice, and went away and resumed the war. Both sides now fought at Pylos with all their strength. The Athenians kept two ships always sailing around the island in opposite directions by day (at night all their ships lay at anchor around it, except on the seaward side when there was wind; and twenty more ships came from Athens to join the guard, so that there were seventy in all); and the Peloponnesians stayed encamped on the mainland and made attacks on the fort, watching for any chance that might come to save the men.

24 Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans and their allies brought up the rest of the fleet they had been preparing to join the ships on guard at Messana, and carried on the war from Messana. The Locrians urged them on most, out of enmity toward the Rhegians, and they themselves had also invaded Rhegian territory in full force. They wanted to try a sea battle, seeing that the Athenians had only a few ships on the spot and hearing that the larger number that was to come was blockading the island. If they won at sea, they hoped to blockade Rhegium by land and sea and take it easily, and then their position would be strong at once; for since the promontory of Rhegium in Italy and Messana in Sicily lie close together, the Athenians would not be able to keep station there and control the strait. The strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messana, where Sicily is nearest to the mainland; this is the so-called Charybdis, through which Odysseus is said to have sailed. Because it is narrow and the sea rushes into it from two great seas, the Tyrrhenian and the Sicilian, and runs in strong currents, it has with good reason been thought dangerous.

25 In this narrow water, then, the Syracusans and their allies, with a little more than thirty ships, were forced late in the day to fight over a boat that was crossing, putting out against sixteen

Athenian ships and eight from Rhegium. They were beaten by the Athenians and sailed off in haste, each to their own camp, the one at Messana or the one at Rhegium, as each happened to be, having lost one ship; and night came on during the action. After this the Locrians left Rhegian territory, and the ships of the Syracusans and their allies assembled and anchored at Pelorus in the territory of Messana, where their infantry joined them. The Athenians and Rhegians sailed up, and seeing the ships unmanned, attacked them; but a grappling iron was thrown onto one of their own ships and they lost it, though the crew swam away. After this the Syracusans went aboard their ships and were being towed along the shore toward Messana, when the Athenians attacked again; but the Syracusans swung out to sea, struck first, and the Athenians lost another ship. Having held their own in the voyage along the coast and in a sea battle of this kind, the Syracusans went on into the harbor at Messana. The Athenians, hearing that Camarina was being betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed there. Meanwhile the Messanians marched in full force by land, and with their ships at the same time, against their neighbor Naxos, a Chalcidian city. On the first day they forced the Naxians inside their walls and laid waste their land; on the next they sailed around with their ships and laid waste the land along the river Acesines, while their infantry made an attack on the city. Meanwhile the Sicels came down from the heights in large numbers to help against the Messanians. When the Naxians saw them, they took courage, urging one another on with the cry that the Leontines and their other Hellenic allies were coming to their aid; they suddenly ran out of the city, fell on the Messanians, routed them, and killed more than a thousand, and the rest got home with difficulty, for the barbarians fell on them along the roads and killed most of them. The ships put in at Messana and later dispersed, each to its own home. The Leontines and their allies, with the

Athenians, at once marched against Messana, thinking it had been weakened; they attacked, the Athenians trying the harbor with their ships while the infantry went against the city. But the Messanians, with some Locrians under Demoteles who had been left there as a garrison after the disaster, made a sally, fell on them suddenly, routed most of the Leontine army, and killed many. When the Athenians saw this, they landed from their ships and came to help, fell on the Messanians while they were in disorder, and chased them back into the city; and they set up a trophy and went back to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily campaigned against one another by land without the Athenians.

26 At Pylos the Athenians were still besieging the Lacedaemonians on the island, and the Peloponnesian army on the mainland stayed where it was. The blockade was hard on the Athenians because of the lack of food and water. There was no spring except one on the acropolis of Pylos itself, and that not a large one; most of them scraped away the shingle on the beach and drank such water as you would expect. They were cramped, camping in a small space, and since the ships had no anchorage, some took their meals on land in turn while the others lay at anchor offshore. What discouraged them most was the time it was taking, beyond all calculation; they had expected to starve out within a few days men who were on a deserted island and had only brackish water to drink. The cause was that the Lacedaemonians had called for volunteers to bring into the island ground grain, wine, cheese, and any other food that might be useful in a siege, offering a high price in silver and promising freedom to any Helot who brought supplies in. Many took the risk, the Helots above all, setting out from any point of the Peloponnese they could and running in by night to the seaward side of the island. They watched especially for a wind to carry them in; for they slipped past the guard of triremes more easily when the wind was blowing from

the sea, since it became impossible for the ships to keep station around the island, while the Helots landed with no thought for the cost; for they ran their boats aground, the value of which had been assessed in money beforehand, and the hoplites on the island kept watch at the landing places. But all who ventured in calm weather were caught. Divers also swam in underwater by way of the harbor, towing by a cord skins filled with poppy seed mixed with honey and pounded linseed; at first they went unnoticed, but later guards were posted. Each side used every device, the one to send the food in, the other to stop it from getting through unnoticed.

27 At Athens, when they learned that the army was in difficulties and that food was getting through to the men on the island, they were at a loss and afraid that winter would overtake them while they were still on guard. They saw that it would be impossible to bring supplies around the Peloponnese, especially to a deserted place, when even in summer they could not send around enough, and that the blockade could not be kept up where there were no harbors. Either the guard would be relaxed and the men would survive, or they would watch for bad weather and escape in the boats that brought them their food. Above all they were afraid of the Lacedaemonians, because they thought that, since they had something strong to rely on, they were no longer sending heralds to them; and they regretted not accepting the treaty. Cleon, knowing that they suspected him of having blocked the agreement, said that those who brought the news were not telling the truth. The messengers who had come advised them, if they did not believe them, to send some inspectors, and the Athenians chose Cleon himself as an inspector, together with Theagenes. Seeing that he would be forced either to report the same things as the men he was accusing or to be shown a liar if he said the opposite, and seeing too that the Athenians were rather inclined in their minds to send an expedition, he advised them not to send inspectors or

delay and let the opportunity slip, but, if they thought the reports were true, to sail against the men. And he pointed at Nicias son of Niceratus, who was a general, being his enemy and taunting him: it was easy, he said, if the generals were men, to sail with a force and take the men on the island, and he himself, if he were in command, would do it.

28 Nicias, since the Athenians had started to raise an outcry against Cleon, asking why he did not sail now if it seemed so easy to him, and since he saw that Cleon was taunting him, told him to take whatever force he wanted and make the attempt, as far as the generals were concerned. Cleon at first thought he was giving up the command only in word and was ready to accept; but when he realized that Nicias really meant to hand it over, he drew back and said that Nicias, not he, was general. He was frightened now and had not thought Nicias would dare to give way to him. But Nicias again urged him, resigned the command at Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness. The Athenians, as a crowd is apt to do, urged Nicias all the more to hand over the command, and shouted all the more at Cleon to sail, the more he tried to escape the voyage and back out of what he had said. So, unable any longer to get out of what he had said, he undertook the voyage. He came forward and said that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, and that he would sail without taking a single man from the city, only the Lemnians and Imbrians who were in Athens, the peltasts who had come to help from Aenus, and four hundred archers from other places. With these, he said, added to the soldiers at Pylos, within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedaemonians back alive or kill them there. The Athenians were somewhat amused at his empty boasting; still, the sensible men were pleased, reckoning that they would get one of two good things: either they would be rid of Cleon, which they rather expected, or, if they were wrong about that, he would put the Lacedaemonians in their hands.

29 When he had settled everything in the assembly and the Athenians had voted him the expedition, he chose one of the generals at Pylos, Demosthenes, as his colleague and put to sea in haste. He chose Demosthenes because he heard that he was planning a landing on the island. The soldiers, suffering from the hardships of the place and more besieged than besieging, were eager to risk a decisive action, and the burning of the island had given Demosthenes still more confidence. Before, since it was for the most part wooded and had no paths because it had always been uninhabited, he had been afraid, and he thought this was to the enemy's advantage: if he landed a large army, they could attack it from cover and do it harm. His own side's mistakes and preparations, he thought, would be fully visible to the enemy, while theirs would not be equally visible to him because of the woods; so the enemy could fall on them unexpectedly wherever they liked, since the choice of attack would be theirs. And if he forced his way into the thick woods to come to close quarters, he thought that a smaller force that knew the ground would be stronger than a larger one that did not; and his own army, large as it was, might be destroyed without knowing it, since the men would not be able to see where they needed to help one another.

30 It was not least the disaster in Aetolia, which had been caused in part by the woods, that brought these thoughts to his mind. But the soldiers were forced by the lack of space to land on the edges of the island and take their midday meal there with an outpost on guard, and one of them set fire to a little of the wood by accident; then a wind came up, and most of it burned down before anyone realized. In this way Demosthenes saw more clearly that the Lacedaemonians were more numerous than he had supposed when he suspected that the food was being sent in for fewer men, and that the island was easier to land on; and then, judging the prize worthy of a greater effort by the Athenians, he prepared

the attack, sending for troops from the allies nearby and getting everything else ready. Cleon, who had sent a messenger ahead to say that he was coming, arrived at Pylos with the army he had asked for. When the two were together, they first sent a herald to the camp on the mainland, proposing that, if they wished, the Lacedaemonians should order the men on the island to surrender their arms and themselves without a fight, on condition that they would be kept under moderate guard until some general agreement was reached.

31 When they did not accept, the Athenians waited one day. On the next, they put to sea by night, after putting all the hoplites aboard a few ships, and a little before dawn they landed on both sides of the island, from the open sea and from the harbor, about eight hundred hoplites, and advanced at a run against the first guard post on the island. The enemy had been posted as follows. In this first post there were about thirty hoplites; the middle of the island, the most level part and around the water, was held by most of them, with Epitadas their commander; and a small detachment guarded the very end of the island, toward Pylos, which was sheer on the side of the sea and hardest of all to attack from the land. For there was also an old fort there, built of stones picked out by hand, which they thought would be of use to them if they were forced into a retreat. That was how they were posted.

32 The Athenians ran at the first guards and killed them at once, some still in their beds and others as they were taking up their arms; the landing had gone unnoticed, since the guards thought the ships were sailing as usual to their stations for the night. At daybreak the rest of the army also began landing: from a little more than seventy ships, all the crews except the lowest rank of rowers, each man armed as he could manage; eight hundred archers and no fewer peltasts; the Messenians who had come to help; and all the others who were holding the area around Pylos,

except the guards on the wall. On Demosthenes' orders they divided into groups of two hundred and more, in some places fewer, and occupied the highest points, so that the enemy, surrounded on every side, would be at the greatest possible loss and have nothing to form up against, but would be exposed to attack from many sides at once: if they advanced against those in front, they would be shot at from behind, and if against those on one flank, by those posted on the other. Wherever they went, the enemy would always be at their backs: light-armed troops, the hardest of all to deal with, whose strength lay in arrows, javelins, stones, and slings at long range, and whom it was impossible even to get at; for they won by running away and pressed hard when the enemy fell back. Such was the plan by which Demosthenes first conceived the landing and drew up his men in the action.

33 Epitadas and his men, who were the main body on the island, when they saw that the first post had been destroyed and an army was advancing on them, closed ranks and went against the Athenian hoplites, wanting to come to close quarters; for the hoplites were posted in front of them, and the light-armed troops on their flanks and behind. But they could not engage the hoplites or make use of their own experience; for the light-armed troops kept them off by shooting at them from both sides, and meanwhile the hoplites did not advance against them but stayed where they were. Wherever the light-armed troops ran in and pressed them hardest, the Lacedaemonians drove them back; but these turned and fought again, being lightly equipped men who easily got a head start in flight, over ground that was difficult and rough from having been uninhabited, where the Lacedaemonians, in their armor, could not pursue.

34 For a short time they skirmished with each other in this way. But when the Lacedaemonians could no longer dash out quickly where they were attacked, the light-armed troops saw that they

were slowing in their defense. They had gained most of their confidence from the sight of their own numbers, many times greater than the enemy's, and they had grown more used to the Lacedaemonians, who no longer seemed as terrible to them as before, since they had not at once suffered what they had expected when they first landed, their spirits cowed at the thought of going against Lacedaemonians. Now, scorning them, they raised a shout and rushed at them in a mass, pelting them with stones, arrows, and javelins, whatever each man had at hand. The shouting that came with the charge struck terror into men unused to this kind of fighting, and the ash from the newly burned wood rose up thick, so that it was impossible to see what was in front of you for the arrows and stones that came flying, with the ash, from so many men. At this point the action became hard for the Lacedaemonians. Their felt caps did not keep out the arrows; the javelin shafts had broken off in them where they were struck; and they could do nothing for themselves, since they were blocked from seeing ahead, could not hear the orders given among them for the louder shouting of the enemy, and with danger surrounding them on every side had no hope of any way to defend themselves and survive.

35 At last, as many were now wounded from always turning back and forth in the same place, they closed ranks and fell back to the fort at the end of the island, which was not far off, and to their own men on guard there. When they gave way, the light-armed troops, now bolder still, pressed on them with much louder shouting. All the Lacedaemonians who were caught as they retreated were killed, but most of them escaped to the fort, and with the guards stationed there they formed up all along it to defend it wherever it could be attacked. The Athenians followed, but because the place was strong they could not go around and encircle them, so they came at them from the front and tried to drive

them back. For a long time, most of the day, both sides held out, worn down by the fighting, by thirst, and by the sun, the one side trying to drive the enemy off the height, the other not to give way. The Lacedaemonians defended themselves more easily than before, since they could not be encircled on the flanks.

36 When there was no end to it, the commander of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes and told them that they were laboring in vain; but if they would give him some of the archers and the light-armed troops to go around behind the enemy by whatever path he could find, he thought he could force the approach. He was given what he asked for and set out from a point out of sight, so that the enemy would not see him. Making his way along the cliffs of the island wherever they gave a foothold, and where the Lacedaemonians, trusting in the strength of the ground, had posted no guard, he got around with great difficulty and barely, without being noticed, and suddenly appeared on the height behind them. He struck the enemy with terror by the surprise, and greatly strengthened his own side, who saw what they had been waiting for. The Lacedaemonians were now under fire from both sides, and had fallen into the same predicament, to compare small things with great, as the men at Thermopylae; for those were destroyed when the Persians came around by the path, and these, now attacked from both sides, no longer held out. Fighting few against many, and weak in body from lack of food, they began to give ground, and the Athenians were now masters of the approaches.

37 Cleon and Demosthenes, seeing that if the Lacedaemonians gave way even a little more they would be destroyed by their army, stopped the fighting and held their own men back. They wanted to bring them to Athens alive, in case, on hearing the herald's proclamation, their resolve might break, so that they would surrender their arms and yield to the danger they were in. So they pro-

claimed that the Lacedaemonians might, if they wished, surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be dealt with as the Athenians should decide.

38 On hearing this, most of them lowered their shields and waved their hands above their heads, showing that they accepted the proclamation. After this, a halt in the fighting was made, and Cleon and Demosthenes met for talks with Styphon son of Pharax for the Lacedaemonians. Of the earlier commanders, the first, Epitadas, had been killed, and the man chosen to succeed him, Hippagretas, was lying among the dead, still alive but taken for dead; Styphon himself had been chosen third in command, according to the law, in case anything happened to the others. Styphon and those with him said that they wanted to send a herald across to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to ask what they should do. The Athenians would let none of them go, but they themselves called heralds over from the mainland, and after questions had passed two or three times, the last man who crossed over to them from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland brought this message: "The Lacedaemonians tell you to decide for yourselves about yourselves, doing nothing dishonorable." They consulted among themselves and surrendered their arms and themselves. That day and the following night the Athenians kept them under guard; the next day the Athenians set up a trophy on the island and made everything else ready for the voyage, and distributed the men among the trierarchs to be guarded; and the Lacedaemonians sent a herald and took away their dead. The number killed on the island and taken alive was as follows. In all, 420 hoplites had crossed over; of these, 292 were brought away alive, and the rest had been killed. Of the living, about 120 were Spartiates. Not many Athenians were killed, for it was not a pitched battle.

39 The whole time the men on the island were besieged, from the sea battle to the battle on the island, was seventy-two days. For about twenty of these days, while the envoys were away about the truce, they were given rations; for the rest they lived on what was smuggled in. Some grain was still on the island, and other food was found there; for their commander Epitadas had been giving each man less than the supplies allowed. So the Athenians and the Peloponnesians each withdrew their forces from Pylos and went home; and Cleon's promise, mad as it was, came true; for within twenty days he brought back the men, as he had undertaken.

40 Of all the events of the war, this was what the Hellenes least expected. They had thought that neither hunger nor any necessity would make Lacedaemonians surrender their arms, but that they would keep them and die fighting as best they could. They could not believe that the men who surrendered were the equals of those who had died; and when one of the Athenian allies, some time later, asked one of the prisoners from the island, to insult him, whether their dead had been brave men, he answered that the spindle (he meant the arrow) would be worth a great deal if it could pick out the brave, meaning that whoever happened to be in the way of the stones and arrows was killed.

41 When the men had been brought to Athens, the Athenians decided to keep them in chains until some agreement was reached, and if before that the Peloponnesians invaded their land, to bring them out and kill them. They set up a garrison at Pylos; and the Messenians from Naupactus, regarding it as their homeland (for Pylos is in what was once Messenian land), sent the most suitable of their men there, who plundered Laconia and did great damage, since they spoke the same dialect. The Lacedaemonians, who had no experience before this of raiding or of warfare of this kind, found it hard to bear, with Helots deserting and with the fear that the unrest in their country might go further. Though they did

not want their state of mind known to the Athenians, they sent envoys to them and tried to recover Pylos and the men. But the Athenians reached out for more, and though the envoys came many times, they sent them away with nothing done. Such were the events at Pylos.

42 In the same summer, right after this, the Athenians made an expedition against the territory of Corinth with eighty ships, two thousand of their own hoplites, and two hundred cavalry in horse transports. Allies also went with them, Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, and the commander was Nicias son of Niceratus, with two colleagues. They sailed and at dawn put in between Chersonesus and Rheitus, at the beach below the Solygean hill. On that hill in ancient times Dorians had established themselves and made war on the Corinthians in the city, who were Aeolians; and there is now a village on it called Solygeia. From this beach where the ships put in, the village is twelve stades away, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty. The Corinthians had learned in advance from Argos that the Athenian army was coming, and they had long since gone to the Isthmus in force, all except those who lived beyond the Isthmus; and five hundred of them were away on garrison duty in Ambracia and Leucas. The rest, in full force, were watching to see where the Athenians would put in. But when the Athenians sailed in at night without their knowing it and the signals were raised for them, they left half their force at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should go against Crommyon, and hurried to the rescue.

43 Battus, one of their two generals (there were two present at the battle), took a company and went to the village of Solygeia to guard it, since it had no wall; Lycophron engaged with the rest. First the Corinthians attacked the right wing of the Athenians, which had just landed in front of Chersonesus, and then the rest of the army. The battle was hard and fought hand to hand through-

out. The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for the Carystians were posted at the end of the line) received the Corinthians and with difficulty pushed them back. The Corinthians fell back to a stone wall (for the ground all sloped upward), threw stones down from above, and raising the paean came on again; the Athenians received them, and the battle was hand to hand once more. Then a company of Corinthians came to the help of their own left wing, routed the Athenian right, and chased it down to the sea; but at the ships the Athenians and Carystians turned back again. The rest of the two armies kept fighting without a break, especially the Corinthian right wing, where Lycophron was, fighting off the Athenian left; for they expected the Athenians to make an attempt on the village of Solygeia.

44 For a long time they held out, neither giving way to the other. Then (for the Athenians had the help of their cavalry, while the other side had no horses) the Corinthians were routed and fell back to the hill, where they grounded their arms and came down no more, but stayed where they were. In this rout on the right wing most of their losses were suffered, and their general Lycophron was killed. The rest of the army, in this way, without being hotly pursued or running in headlong flight, fell back, once it had been forced, and established itself on the high ground. The Athenians, since the enemy no longer came against them to fight, stripped the enemy dead, took up their own, and at once set up a trophy. The other half of the Corinthians, who had been stationed at Cenchreae to watch in case the Athenians sailed against Crommyon, could not see the battle because of Mount Oneium; but when they saw the dust and realized what it meant, they came at once to help. The older men of Corinth also came out from the city when they learned what had happened. When the Athenians saw them all coming on together, they thought it was a relief force from the neighboring Peloponnesians, and they withdrew in haste

to their ships, taking the spoils and their own dead except two, whom they left behind because they could not find them. They went aboard and crossed to the islands that lie off the coast, and from there sent a herald and took up under truce the dead they had left behind. Two hundred and twelve Corinthians were killed in the battle, and of the Athenians a little under fifty.

45 The Athenians set out from the islands and sailed the same day to Crommyon, in Corinthian territory, which is 120 stades from the city. They anchored there, laid waste the land, and camped for the night. The next day they sailed along the coast first to the territory of Epidaurus, where they made a landing, and then came to Methana, between Epidaurus and Troezen. They cut off the isthmus of the peninsula with a wall and built a fort there, and from it in the time that followed they plundered the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus. When they had finished the fortifications, they sailed home with the ships.

46 At the same time as these things were happening, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after leaving Pylos for Sicily with the Athenian fleet, arrived at Corcyra and joined the men of the city in an expedition against the Corcyraeans who had established themselves on Mount Istone. These had crossed over after the civil strife, made themselves masters of the countryside, and were doing great harm. The Athenians attacked and took their fort, but the men fled together to a height and came to terms: they would give up their mercenaries, and as for themselves, they would surrender their arms and the Athenian people would decide their fate. The generals took them across under truce to the island of Ptychia to be kept under guard until they could be sent to Athens, on condition that if any one of them was caught trying to escape, the truce would be void for all. The leaders of the Corcyraean popular party, afraid that the Athenians would not put the prisoners to death when they arrived, contrived a scheme of this kind. They

persuaded a few of the men on the island by secretly sending friends to them, who were instructed to say, as if out of goodwill, that their best course was to escape as soon as possible, and that they themselves would get a boat ready; for the Athenian generals, they said, were about to hand them over to the Corcyraean people.

47 When they had been persuaded, and were caught sailing out in the boat that had been arranged, the truce was void and all of them were handed over to the Corcyraeans. Not least among those who helped this happen, so that the pretext held good and the men who contrived it acted with less fear, were the Athenian generals, who made it plain that they did not want the men to be taken to Athens by others, and the credit to go to those who brought them, since they themselves were sailing for Sicily. The Corcyraeans took charge of them and shut them up in a large building. Later they brought them out twenty at a time and led them between two lines of hoplites drawn up on either side, tied to one another and struck and stabbed by the men in the lines, whenever any of them saw a personal enemy; and men with whips walked alongside and hurried on those who went too slowly.

48 They brought out some sixty men in this way and killed them before the men in the building noticed (for they thought the others were being moved somewhere else). But when they realized it and someone told them, they called on the Athenians and told them to kill them themselves, if they wished. They refused to come out of the building any longer and said they would not allow anyone to come in, as far as they could prevent it. The Corcyraeans for their part had no intention of forcing the doors. They climbed onto the roof of the building, broke open the ceiling, and threw tiles and shot arrows down on them. The men inside protected themselves as well as they could, and at the same time most of them began to destroy themselves, driving into their throats the arrows that the others shot at them, and hanging themselves with

the cords from some beds that happened to be there and with strips torn from their clothes. In every way, for most of the night (for night fell on their sufferings), they did away with themselves or were struck down by those above, and perished. When day came, the Corcyraeans threw them crosswise onto wagons, like mats, and carried them out of the city. All the women who had been captured in the fort they sold into slavery. In this way the Corcyraeans from the mountain were destroyed by the people; and the civil strife, which had been great, ended in this, at least as far as this war was concerned; for nothing worth mentioning was left of the other side. The Athenians sailed away to Sicily, where they had been bound from the start, and carried on the war with their allies there.

49 At the end of the summer the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made an expedition against Anactorium, a Corinthian city at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and took it by betrayal. The Acarnanians expelled the inhabitants and occupied the place themselves with settlers drawn from all their communities. And the summer ended.

50 The following winter Aristides son of Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian ships sent out to the allies to collect money, arrested at Eion on the Strymon Artaphernes, a Persian, who was on his way from the King to Lacedaemon. He was brought to Athens, and the Athenians had his letters transcribed from the Assyrian script and read them. Among many other things written there, the main point addressed to the Lacedaemonians was that the King did not know what they wanted; for many envoys had come, and no two said the same thing. If, then, they had anything clear to say, they should send men to him with the Persian. Later the Athenians sent Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and envoys with him; but these learned there that King

Artaxerxes son of Xerxes had recently died (for he died at about this time)[4], and returned home.

51 In the same winter the Chians pulled down their new wall at the order of the Athenians, who suspected that they were planning a revolt against them; but they first obtained from the Athenians pledges and such assurance as they could that no harsh measures would be taken against them. So the winter ended, and with it the seventh year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

52 At the very beginning of the following summer there was a partial eclipse of the sun at the new moon, and early in the same month an earthquake. The exiles from Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, setting out most of them from the mainland, hired mercenaries from the Peloponnese, gathered others on the spot, and took Rhoeteum; they received two thousand Phocaean staters and gave it back, having done it no harm. After this they marched against Antandrus and took the city by betrayal. Their plan was to free the other cities called the Actaean cities, which the Mytilenians had formerly occupied and the Athenians now held, and Antandrus above all. Once they had made it strong (for it was easy to build ships there, since timber was on the spot and Mount Ida close above it, and the rest of the equipment as well), they would easily use it as a base to harass Lesbos, which was near, and to bring under their control the Aeolian towns on the mainland. That was what they were preparing to do.

53 In the same summer the Athenians made an expedition against Cythera with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, a few cavalry, and some of their allies, Milesians and others. Their generals were Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus. Cythera is an island lying off Laconia, opposite Malea. Its inhabitants are Lacedaemonians of the Perioeci, and an official called the judge of Cythera crossed over from Sparta every year; the Lacedaemonians also kept sending a

garrison of hoplites there and took great care of the island. For it was a landing place for the merchant ships from Egypt and Libya, and at the same time it made pirates less troublesome to Laconia from the sea, which was the only side from which it could be harmed; for the whole country juts out into the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

54 The Athenians put in with their force. With ten ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites they took the city on the sea called Scandea, and with the rest of the army they landed on the side of the island facing Malea and advanced against the city of the Cytherians; and they found at once that all the inhabitants had encamped in the field. A battle was fought, and the Cytherians held out for a short time; then they were routed and fled to the upper city, and later came to terms with Nicias and his colleagues, surrendering themselves to the Athenians' discretion, except that their lives were to be spared. Nicias had already had some talks with certain of the Cytherians, and so the terms of the agreement were settled more quickly and more favorably for them, both for the moment and for the future; otherwise the Athenians would have removed the Cytherians, since they were Lacedaemonians and the island lay so close off Laconia. After the agreement the Athenians took over Scandea, the town by the harbor, put a garrison in Cythera, and sailed to Asine, Helos, and most of the places along the coast. Making landings and camping at whatever points seemed opportune, they laid waste the land for about seven days.

55 When the Lacedaemonians saw the Athenians holding Cythera and expected them to make landings of the same kind on their own land, they nowhere opposed them with their full force concentrated, but sent garrisons around the country, a number of hoplites wherever they were needed, and in other respects kept a close watch. They were afraid that there might be some revolution against their established order. The disaster on the island had

been great and unexpected, Pylos and Cythera were held, and on every side a war was closing round them, quick and impossible to guard against. So, contrary to their custom, they raised a force of four hundred cavalry, and archers as well, and in military matters they became more hesitant than ever before. They found themselves engaged, contrary to the established character of their own preparations, in a naval contest, and that against Athenians, for whom anything left unattempted was always so much lost from what they reckoned to achieve. At the same time the many strokes of fortune that had befallen them in a short time, against all calculation, filled them with the greatest dismay, and they were afraid that some disaster like the one on the island might again overtake them. For this reason they were less daring in battle; and whatever move they made, they thought they would go wrong, because their confidence had become unsure, from their former inexperience of misfortune.

56 So while the Athenians were laying waste the coast, for the most part they kept quiet, whenever a landing was made near one of their garrisons, each garrison thinking itself too few in numbers in a situation of this kind. One garrison, however, which did fight back, near Cotyrta and Aphroditia, charged and scattered the crowd of light-armed troops, who were spread out, but fell back again when the hoplites received them. A few of its men were killed and some arms were taken, and the Athenians set up a trophy and sailed back to Cythera. From there they sailed around to Epidaurus Limera, laid waste part of the land, and came to Thyrea, which is in the district called Cynuria, on the border of the Argolid and Laconia. The Lacedaemonians, who possessed it, had given it to the Aeginetans to live in after they were expelled from Aegina, because of the services the Aeginetans had done them at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots, and because,

though subjects of the Athenians, they had always sided with the Lacedaemonians in their policy.

57 While the Athenians were still sailing up, the Aeginetans abandoned the wall by the sea that they happened to be building and withdrew to the upper city where they lived, about ten stades from the sea. One of the Lacedaemonian garrisons in the district, which had been helping them build the wall, refused to go into the walls with them, though the Aeginetans begged them to; it seemed dangerous to them to be shut up inside the wall. They withdrew to the high ground and, since they did not think themselves a match for the enemy, kept quiet. Meanwhile the Athenians put in, advanced at once with their whole army, and took Thyrea. They burned the city and plundered what was in it, and they brought back to Athens all the Aeginetans who had not been killed in the fighting, along with the Lacedaemonian commander who was with them, Tantalus son of Patrocles; he had been taken alive, wounded. They also brought a few men from Cythera whom they thought it safer to remove. The Athenians decided to settle these men on the islands; that the other Cytherians should keep their own land and pay a tribute of four talents; that all the Aeginetans who had been captured should be put to death, because of the old and constant enmity between them; and that Tantalus should be put in chains with the other Lacedaemonians from the island.

58 In the same summer, in Sicily, an armistice was made first between the Camarinaeans and the Geloans. Then the other Sicilian Greeks also met at Gela, with envoys from all the cities, and entered into talks with one another to see whether they could be reconciled. Many opinions were expressed on both sides, as they disputed and made claims, each according to where they thought they were being put at a disadvantage; and Hermocrates son of Hermon, a Syracusan, who did most to persuade them, spoke to the assembly as follows.

59 "Sicilians, I shall speak not as a citizen of the least of cities, nor of the one that suffers most from the war, but to set before you all the opinion that seems to me best for Sicily as a whole. As to war, why should anyone go through all its evils at length to men who know them? No one is driven into it by ignorance, and no one who thinks he will gain something by it is turned back by fear. What happens is that to one side the profits look greater than the dangers, while the other is willing to face the risks rather than accept an immediate loss. And if it happens that both sides are pursuing these aims at the wrong moment, advice to come to terms is useful. And that is what would be worth most to us now, if we would listen. For it was in planning well, as we thought, to secure each his own interests that we went to war in the first place, and it is for the same reason that we are now trying, by debating with one another, to be reconciled; and if it turns out that each cannot leave with his fair share, we shall go to war again.

60 "Yet we must recognize that this conference, if we are wise, will concern not only our separate interests but whether we can still save Sicily as a whole, which, in my judgment, is the object of Athenian designs. And we must regard the Athenians as far more compelling peacemakers on this point than any words of mine. They have the greatest power of all the Hellenes; they are here with a few ships, watching for our mistakes; and under the lawful name of alliance they are plausibly turning to their own advantage the hostility that is natural to them. If we go to war and call them in, men who march even against those who do not call them in, if we do ourselves harm at our own expense and at the same time pave the way for their empire, then it is likely that when they see we are worn out, they will one day come with a larger expedition and try to bring all of this under their control.

61 "Yet if we are wise, each of us should call in allies and take on risks in order to gain what does not belong to us, rather than to

damage what we already have; and we should recognize that civil strife is the greatest ruin of cities, and of Sicily, whose inhabitants are all the targets of a plot together while we are divided city against city. Knowing this, we should be reconciled, citizen with citizen and city with city, and try together to save the whole of Sicily. Let no one suppose that the Dorians among us are enemies of the Athenians while the Chalcidians are safe because of their Ionian kinship. The Athenians do not attack because the peoples are divided by nature, out of hatred for one of them, but because they covet the good things of Sicily, which we hold in common. They have shown this now in the appeal of the Chalcidian people: to men who had never once come to their aid under the alliance, they eagerly gave more than they were owed under the treaty. That the Athenians should be grasping for more and should plan accordingly is very forgivable. I do not blame those who want to rule, but those who are readier to submit; for it is human nature always to rule what yields and to guard against what attacks. But those of us who know all this and do not look ahead properly, or anyone who has come here without judging that the first thing of all is for everyone to deal well with the common danger, are making a mistake. We would be rid of it quickest if we came to terms with one another; for the Athenians do not set out from their own country but from that of those who call them in. In this way war is not ended by war, but our differences are ended by peace without trouble, and those who were called in, having come plausibly to do injustice, will go away with good reason and with nothing done.

62 "So much good is found, where the Athenians are concerned, by those who decide well. As for peace, which all agree is the best thing, why should we not make it among ourselves as well? Or do you think that if one man has something good and another the reverse, it is not peace rather than war that would end the troubles of the one and preserve the advantages of the other?

And that peace does not hold honors and glories with less risk, and all the other things that one might go through at length, as one could about war? Considering this, you should not disregard my words, but each of you should rather see in them, in good time, his own safety. And if anyone thinks he will surely gain some end, whether by justice or by force, let him not be painfully deceived by the failure of his hopes. Let him know that many before now have pursued with vengeance those who wronged them, and others have hoped to gain more by some power they had; and the first not only failed to avenge themselves but did not even survive, while the second, instead of gaining more, ended by losing what they had besides. For vengeance does not succeed by right merely because a wrong was done, nor is strength secure because it is full of hope. It is the incalculable future that prevails for the most part; it is the most treacherous thing of all, and yet it is also plainly the most useful; for when we are equally afraid, we think twice before attacking one another.

63 "So now, alarmed on both counts, by the dread of this uncertain future that no one can foresee and by the presence of the Athenians, already formidable among us,[5] and judging that our failure to achieve what each of us thought he would has been sufficiently explained by these obstacles, let us send away from our country the enemies who stand over it. Let us ourselves make an everlasting peace, if possible; if not, let us make a truce for as long as we can and put off our private quarrels to another time. In short, let us recognize that if we listen to me, each of us will have a free city, and from it, as our own masters, we will repay with equal courage whoever treats us well or ill. But if we refuse and obey others, the question will no longer be one of punishing anyone; even if we were very fortunate, we would become, of necessity, friends of our worst enemies and enemies of those with whom we ought not to quarrel.

64 "For my part, as I said at the beginning, though I represent the greatest city and am more likely to attack than to need to defend myself, I think it right to foresee these things and make concessions; not to harm my enemies in such a way that I suffer more harm myself, nor, out of foolish contentiousness, to think that I am as much master of fortune, which I do not control, as of my own judgment, but to give way as far as is reasonable. And I ask the rest of you to do as I do, and to give way at one another's hands rather than the enemy's. There is no shame in kinsmen giving way to kinsmen, a Dorian to a Dorian or a Chalcidian to those of his own stock; we are, in a word, neighbors, living together in one land, an island, and called by one name, Sicilians. We will go to war, I suppose, when it happens, and we will make peace again among ourselves through talks held in common; but if we are wise, we will always unite to repel foreign invaders, since when any one of us is harmed, all of us are in danger; and we will never in future call in allies or peacemakers. By doing this, we shall not deprive Sicily of two good things at present, being rid of the Athenians and of a war at home, and for the future we shall keep it free by ourselves and less exposed to the designs of others."

65 When Hermocrates had spoken in this way, the Sicilians were persuaded and came to an agreement among themselves that they would end the war, each keeping what they held, except that Morgantina was to go to the Camarinaeans on payment of a fixed sum of money to the Syracusans. The allies of the Athenians called in the Athenian commanders and told them that they were going to come to terms and that the treaty would include the Athenians as well. The Athenians approved, and they made the agreement; and after this the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily. When the generals came home, the Athenians in the city punished two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, with exile, and fined the third, Eurymedon, on the charge that when they could

have subdued Sicily they had been bribed to withdraw. So, with the good fortune they were then enjoying, they expected that nothing should stand in their way, and that they could accomplish the possible and the more difficult alike, with a large force or a weaker one. The reason was their unexpected success in most things, which lent strength to their hopes.

66 In the same summer the Megarians in the city were hard pressed both by the Athenians in the war, since they invaded the land in full force twice every year, and by their own exiles at Pegae, who had been expelled by the popular party in a civil conflict and were doing them harm by raiding. They began to say to one another that they ought to take the exiles back and not let the city be ruined from both sides. The friends of the exiles, aware of the talk, also began to press for this proposal, more openly than before. The leaders of the popular party saw that the people, worn down by their troubles, would not be able to hold out with them. They were afraid, and opened talks with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, wanting to betray the city to them and thinking this less dangerous for themselves than the return of the men they had driven out. They agreed that first the Athenians would take the Long Walls (these ran for about eight stades from the city to Nisaea, their port), so that the Peloponnesians could not come to help from Nisaea, where they alone made up the garrison to keep Megara secure; and that after this the Megarians would try to betray the upper city as well. Once that was done, they expected, the city would come over more easily.

67 So the Athenians, when everything had been prepared on both sides, in deed and in word, sailed at nightfall to Minoa, the island belonging to Megara, with six hundred hoplites under the command of Hippocrates, and took up a position in a pit from which bricks had been dug for the walls, not far off. The force with

the other general, Demosthenes, Plataean light-armed troops and some frontier guards, lay in ambush at the shrine of Enyalius, which is closer still. No one knew of it that night except the men whose business it was to know. As dawn was about to break, the Megarian traitors did the following. For a long time they had been securing the opening of the gates in this way: with the commander's consent, they used to carry a sculling boat on a wagon by night through the ditch down to the sea, as if they were raiders, and sail out; and before daylight they would bring it back on the wagon and take it into the walls through the gates, so that, as they said, the Athenians on Minoa would have no idea of their patrols, since no boat would be visible in the harbor. This time the wagon was already at the gates, and when they were opened as usual for the boat, the Athenians, who saw it (for this was done by prearranged signal), ran at full speed out of the ambush, wanting to get there before the gates were shut again and while the wagon was still in them, keeping them from being closed; and at the same moment the Megarians who were acting with them killed the guards at the gates. First Demosthenes' men, the Plataeans and frontier guards, ran in where the trophy now stands; and just inside the gates (for the nearest Peloponnesians had noticed) the Plataeans fought those who came to help, beat them, and held the gates secure for the Athenian hoplites as they came on.

68 Then the Athenians, each man as he got inside, went on toward the wall. The Peloponnesian garrison at first held out and defended themselves, few as they were, and some of them were killed; but most of them took to flight, frightened by an enemy falling on them at night and by the Megarian traitors fighting against them, and thinking that the Megarians as a whole had betrayed them. For it happened besides that the Athenian herald, on his own judgment, proclaimed that any Megarian who wished might come and take his stand under arms with the Athenians. When the

garrison heard this they waited no longer, but, believing now that they really were being fought by both together, fled to Nisaea. At dawn, with the walls already taken and the Megarians in the city in an uproar, those who had dealt with the Athenians, and with them another crowd that was in the secret, said that the gates must be opened and the army must go out to battle. It had been agreed among them that when the gates were opened the Athenians would burst in, while they themselves would be easy to tell apart (they were to anoint themselves with oil), so that they would not be harmed. They felt all the safer about opening the gates because the four thousand Athenian hoplites from Eleusis and the six hundred horsemen, marching through the night as agreed, had arrived. But when they had anointed themselves and were already at the gates, someone who was in the secret disclosed the plot to the other side. These banded together and came in a body, and said that they must neither go out (for they had never before dared to do so even when they were stronger) nor lead the city into open danger; and if anyone did not obey, the battle would be fought right there. They gave no sign that they knew what was going on, but insisted as men giving the best advice, and at the same time stayed by the gates and guarded them, so that the plotters could not do what they had intended.

69 The Athenian generals saw that some obstacle had arisen and that they would not be able to take the city by force, and at once began to wall in Nisaea, thinking that if they took it before anyone came to its aid, Megara too would come over the sooner (iron arrived quickly from Athens, and stonemasons, and everything else that was needed). Starting from the wall they held, they built a cross wall on the side facing Megara, and from it the army, dividing the work, carried a ditch and walls down to the sea on both sides of Nisaea, using stones and bricks from the suburb; they also cut down trees and timber and put up a stockade wher-

ever one was needed; and the houses of the suburb, once battlements were added, themselves served as a fortification. They worked all that day; and on the next, toward evening, the wall was all but finished. Then the men in Nisaea took fright. They were short of food (they used to get it day by day from the upper city); they did not think the Peloponnesians would come quickly to their aid; and they regarded the Megarians as enemies. So they came to terms with the Athenians: each man was to be released for a fixed ransom in silver after giving up his arms, and the Athenians were to deal as they pleased with the Lacedaemonians, both the commander and any other who was inside. On these terms they agreed and came out; and the Athenians broke the Long Walls away from the city of Megara, took over Nisaea, and set about their other preparations.

70 At this time Brasidas son of Tellis, a Lacedaemonian, happened to be in the neighborhood of Sicyon and Corinth, preparing an expedition to the Thracian region. When he learned of the capture of the walls, he was afraid both for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and that Megara would be taken. He sent to the Boeotians, telling them to meet him quickly with an army at Tripodiscus (this is a village of the Megarid by that name, below Mount Geraneia), and he himself came with 2,700 Corinthian hoplites, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and those of his own men who had already been mustered, thinking that he would still find Nisaea uncaptured. When he learned the truth (for he happened to have set out for Tripodiscus by night), he picked three hundred men from the army and, before word of his coming could get out, approached the city of Megara without being seen by the Athenians, who were down by the sea. His aim, as he gave it out, was to make an attempt on Nisaea, and in fact, if he could, to make one; but above all he wanted to get into the city of Megara and

secure it. He asked them to admit his men, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.

71 But the factions of the Megarians were afraid: the one that he would bring in the exiles and drive them out; the other that the people, fearing just this, would attack them, and that the city, fighting within itself with the Athenians lying in wait close by, would be destroyed. So they did not admit him, and both sides thought it best to keep quiet and watch what would happen. For each of them expected that there would be a battle between the Athenians and the relieving force, and that it was safer for them to go over to whichever side they favored after that side had won. Brasidas, when he could not persuade them, went back to the rest of his army.

72 At dawn the Boeotians arrived. Even before Brasidas sent, they had intended to come to the aid of Megara, since they did not regard the danger as someone else's, and they were already at Plataea in full force. When the messenger came as well, they were all the more encouraged; they sent on 2,200 hoplites and six hundred horsemen, and went back home with the larger part. With the whole army now present, not less than six thousand hoplites, and with the Athenian hoplites drawn up around Nisaea and by the sea and their light-armed troops scattered over the plain, the Boeotian horsemen fell on the light-armed troops unexpectedly and drove them toward the sea (for until then no help had yet come to the Megarians from anywhere). The Athenian horsemen rode out against them in turn and came to close quarters, and a cavalry battle went on for a long time, in which each side claims to have had no worse of it. The Athenians killed the Boeotian cavalry commander and a few others who had ridden right up to Nisaea, and stripped them; and having taken possession of these bodies they gave them back under a truce and set up a trophy. In the action as a whole, however, neither side came away with a decisive

result when they separated, the Boeotians going back to their own army and the Athenians to Nisaea.

73 After this Brasidas and his army moved nearer to the sea and to the city of Megara, and taking up a favorable position they drew up in line and waited. They thought that the Athenians would attack them, and they knew that the Megarians were watching to see which side would win. They considered that their position was good on both counts. In the first place, they were not attacking first or willingly starting a battle and a risk; since they had shown openly that they were ready to defend themselves, the victory could fairly be awarded to them almost without a fight. At the same time it worked out rightly for them with regard to the Megarians as well. For if they had not been seen to come, nothing would have been left to chance: they would plainly have lost the city at once, as if they had been beaten. As it was, the Athenians too might well choose not to fight, so that they would gain what they had come for without a battle. And this is just what happened. The Megarians waited, and the Athenians came out and drew up beside the Long Walls but themselves kept quiet when no attack was made on them. Their generals, too, reckoned that the risk was not an even one for them. Most things had already gone their way; if they began a battle against a larger force, they would either take Megara by winning or, if they failed, lose the best of their hoplites; whereas on the other side each of the contingents present was risking only a part of its whole force, and so would naturally be willing to dare. After waiting some time, when nothing was attempted by either side, the Athenians withdrew first to Nisaea, and then the Peloponnesians to the place from which they had set out. So at last the Megarians who were friends of the exiles took heart, on the ground that Brasidas had prevailed and the Athenians had no longer been willing to fight. They opened the gates to Brasidas himself and to the commanders from the cities, received

them, and entered into talks with them, while the party that had dealt with the Athenians was already thoroughly cowed.

74 Later, when the allies had dispersed to their cities, Brasidas himself went back to Corinth and prepared his expedition to the Thracian region, which had been his purpose from the first. As for the Megarians in the city, once the Athenians too had gone home, those who had taken the largest part in the dealings with the Athenians, knowing that they had been found out, at once slipped away; the rest, after consulting with the friends of the exiles, brought back the exiles from Pegae, having bound them by solemn oaths to bear no grudge for the past and to give the city the best counsel. But once these men were in office, they held a review of arms, separated the companies, and picked out about a hundred men from among their enemies and those who seemed to have had the largest share in the dealings with the Athenians. They forced the people to vote on these men openly, and when they were condemned, put them to death; and they brought the city as near to a complete oligarchy as could be. And this change of government, made by a very few as the result of civil strife, lasted for a very long time.

75 In the same summer, when the Mytilenians were about to fortify Antandrus, as they intended, the generals of the Athenian ships that collected money, Demodocus and Aristides, were in the Hellespont (their third colleague, Lamachus, had sailed into the Pontus with ten ships). They learned of the preparations at the place, and it seemed a serious danger to them that it might become like Anaea opposite Samos, where the Samian exiles had established themselves and were helping the Peloponnesians by sending them helmsmen for their fleets, throwing the Samians in the city into turmoil, and taking in those who left it. So they gathered an army from the allies and sailed there, defeated in battle the men who came out from Antandrus against them, and recov-

ered the place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus, anchored in the river Cales in the territory of Heraclea and lost his ships, when rain fell inland and the flood came down suddenly. He himself and his army went by land through the Bithynian Thracians, who live across the water in Asia, and reached Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

76 In the same summer Demosthenes, an Athenian general, also arrived at Naupactus with forty ships, immediately after the withdrawal from the Megarid. For certain men in the Boeotian cities were negotiating with him and Hippocrates about affairs in Boeotia, wishing to change the constitution and turn it into a democracy like that of the Athenians; and it was chiefly at the instigation of Ptoeodorus, an exile from Thebes, that the following plan was prepared for them. Some were to betray Siphae (Siphae is in the territory of Thespiae, on the sea, on the Crisaean Gulf). Chaeronea, which is a dependency of Orchomenus, formerly called Minyan Orchomenus and now Boeotian, was to be handed over by others from Orchomenus; and the Orchomenian exiles were taking the most active part in the plot and were hiring men from the Peloponnese (Chaeronea is the last place in Boeotia toward Phanoteus in Phocis), and some of the Phocians were also involved. The Athenians were to seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo in the territory of Tanagra, facing Euboea; and all this was to happen at the same time on a fixed day, so that the Boeotians would not come in a body to the relief of Delium but each would be held at home by trouble in his own district. If the attempt succeeded and Delium was fortified, they expected that, even if there were no immediate revolution in the governments of the Boeotians, with these places held, the land plundered, and a refuge close at hand for each district, matters would not stay where they were; in time, with the Athenians supporting those who had

revolted and the Boeotians not having their forces united, they would settle things to their advantage.

77 Such was the plot being prepared. Hippocrates himself, with a force from the city, was to march into Boeotia when the moment came, and he sent Demosthenes ahead with the forty ships to Naupactus, so that he might collect an army from that region, of Acarnanians and the other allies, and sail against Siphae, which was to be betrayed. A day had been named to them on which they were to do these things together. Demosthenes, on his arrival, found that Oeniadae had been forced by all the Acarnanians into the Athenian alliance; he himself raised all the allied forces in that quarter, marched first against Salynthius and the Agraeans and won them over, and then made his other preparations so as to be at Siphae when he was needed.

78 About the same time in the summer, Brasidas was on his march to the Thracian region with 1,700 hoplites. When he reached Heraclea in Trachis, he sent a messenger ahead to his friends at Pharsalus, asking them to conduct him and his army through; and Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus, who was proxenus of the Chalcidians (the citizen who looked after their interests in his own city), came to meet him at Melitia in Achaea. Then he set out. Other Thessalians also escorted him, and from Larisa Niconidas, a friend of Perdiccas. For Thessaly was not easy to cross without an escort in any case, and certainly not under arms; and among all the Hellenes alike it was regarded as suspect to cross a neighbor's land without its consent. Besides, the mass of the Thessalian people had always been well disposed to the Athenians. So if the Thessalians had not been governed in their native fashion by a narrow ruling group rather than under equal laws, he would never have got through; for even then, as he was on his march, others of the opposite party met him at the river Enipeus and tried to stop him, saying that he was doing

wrong in going on without the consent of the whole nation. His escort said that they would not take him through against their will, but that he had come unexpectedly and they, as his hosts, were conducting him. Brasidas himself also said that he came as a friend to the land of the Thessalians and to themselves, that he was bearing arms against the Athenians, who were his enemies, and not against them; that he knew of no enmity between the Thessalians and the Lacedaemonians that would keep them from using each other's land; that he would not go on now against their will (nor could he), but that he did not think he ought to be stopped. Hearing this, they went away; and he, on the advice of his escort, went on at a run without stopping, before a larger force could gather to prevent him. On that day, the day he set out from Melitia, he got as far as Pharsalus and camped on the river Apidanus; from there he went to Phacium, and from there into Perrhaebia. At this point his Thessalian escort turned back, and the Perrhaebians, who are subjects of the Thessalians, brought him to Dium in the dominion of Perdiccas, a town of Macedonia that lies below Olympus, facing Thessaly.

79 In this way Brasidas ran through Thessaly before anyone could get ready to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidice. For when things went well for the Athenians, the peoples in the Thracian region who had revolted from Athens and Perdiccas had taken fright and brought the army out of the Peloponnese. The Chalcidians thought that the Athenians would attack them first (and at the same time the neighboring cities that had not revolted were secretly joining in inviting the army). Perdiccas was not an open enemy, but he too was afraid of the old differences with the Athenians, and above all he wanted to bring Arrhabaeus, the king of the Lyncestians, to submission. And it helped them to bring an army out of the Peloponnese more easily that the Lacedaemonians were faring badly at the time.

80 For since the Athenians were pressing hard on the Peloponnese, and not least on their own land, the Lacedaemonians hoped that the best way to divert them was to harass them in return by sending an army against their allies, especially as the allies were ready to maintain it and were calling them in to help them revolt. At the same time they were glad to have a pretext to send out some of the Helots, for fear that with Pylos in enemy hands they might attempt some revolt. For they had once done the following as well, out of fear of the Helots' obstinacy and their numbers (for with the Lacedaemonians most institutions had always been arranged chiefly with a view to guarding against the Helots). They proclaimed that those of the Helots who claimed to have done them the best service in their wars should be picked out, on the understanding that they would be freed. This was a test: they thought that those who, out of high spirit, claimed each to be the first to be freed would also be the most likely to attack them. About two thousand were selected; they put on garlands and went around the temples as men set free; but not long afterward the Lacedaemonians made away with them, and no one knew in what way each of them was destroyed. So now they gladly sent seven hundred of them as hoplites with Brasidas; the rest he brought from the Peloponnese, hired with pay.

81 The Lacedaemonians sent Brasidas himself, chiefly at his own wish (though the Chalcidians too were eager for it). At Sparta he was thought to be a man of energy in everything, and after he went abroad he proved of the greatest value to the Lacedaemonians. For in the immediate situation, by showing himself just and moderate toward the cities, he brought most of them to revolt, and some of the places he took by betrayal; so that when the Lacedaemonians wished to come to terms, as they did, they had places to give back in exchange for places, and a respite from the war for the Peloponnese. And in the war that came later, after

the events in Sicily, it was the excellence and intelligence Brasidas showed at that time, known to some by experience and believed by others from report, that did most to give the allies of the Athenians a desire for the Lacedaemonians. For he was the first to go out, and since he was thought to be a good man in every respect, he left behind him a firm hope that the others too were of the same kind.

82 At that time, then, when he had arrived in the Thracian region, the Athenians, learning of it, declared Perdiccas an enemy, holding him responsible for the expedition's passage, and set a stronger guard over their allies in that quarter.

83 Perdiccas at once took Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, and marched against his neighbor Arrhabaeus son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, with whom he had a quarrel and whom he wished to subdue. But when he and Brasidas with the army reached the pass into Lyncus, Brasidas said that before going to war he wished first to go and try by argument to make Arrhabaeus an ally of the Lacedaemonians, if he could. For Arrhabaeus had in fact been sending heralds, ready to submit the matter to Brasidas as arbitrator; and the Chalcidian envoys who were with him advised him not to remove Perdiccas' dangers for him, so that they would find him all the more eager to serve their own interests. At the same time Perdiccas' envoys at Lacedaemon had said something to the effect that he would make many of the places around him allies of theirs, so that on that ground Brasidas thought he had a right to deal with the affair of Arrhabaeus in the common interest. Perdiccas said that he had not brought Brasidas to be a judge of their quarrels but rather to destroy whatever enemies he himself pointed out to him, and that Brasidas would be doing wrong if he held talks with Arrhabaeus while he, Perdiccas, was feeding half the army. Brasidas met with Arrhabaeus against Perdiccas' will and in open disagreement with him, was persuaded

by what he said, and led the army away before it invaded the country. After this Perdiccas paid a third of the army's upkeep instead of half, thinking himself wronged.

84 In the same summer, immediately afterward, Brasidas, with the Chalcidians as well, marched against Acanthus, the colony of the Andrians, a little before the vintage. The Acanthians were divided among themselves over whether to admit him, those who were joining the Chalcidians in inviting him against the people. Nevertheless, out of fear for their crop, which was still out in the fields, the mass of them were persuaded by Brasidas to admit him alone and to hear him before deciding, and they admitted him. He stood before the people (and he was not, for a Lacedaemonian, an incapable speaker) and spoke as follows.

85 "Men of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me and my army out to make good the reason we gave at the beginning of the war, when we declared that we would fight the Athenians to free Hellas. If we have come late, because we were disappointed in our expectations of the war over there, by which we hoped to destroy the Athenians quickly by ourselves without any risk to you, let no one blame us; for now that the chance has come, we are here, and with you we will try to bring them down. But I am surprised that you have shut your gates against me, and that my coming is not welcome to you. We Lacedaemonians thought that we were coming to allies, who even before we arrived in fact would be with us at least in spirit and would want us; and with that in mind we took this great risk, making a march of many days through foreign territory and showing every possible zeal. If you have something else in mind, or mean to stand in the way of your own freedom and that of the other Hellenes, it would be a terrible thing. It is not only that you yourselves are resisting; whoever else I approach will be less willing to come over to me, since they will take it hard that you, the first I came to, with a city of conse-

quence to offer and a reputation for good sense, did not receive me. And I will have no believable reason to show for it, but will seem either to be offering a freedom that is unjust or to have come too weak and powerless to protect you against the Athenians if they attack. Yet when I came to the relief of Nisaea with the very army I have now, the Athenians, though more numerous, were not willing to engage it; so it is not likely that they will send against you, by sea, a force equal to the army they had at Nisaea.

86 "I myself have come here not for harm but for the liberation of the Hellenes, having bound the authorities at Lacedaemon by the most solemn oaths that those whom I win over shall truly be allies and independent. And we have not come to have you as allies by winning you over through force or deceit, but, on the contrary, to fight as your allies, since you are enslaved by the Athenians. I do not think, then, that I should be suspected, when I am giving the strongest pledges, or be thought a protector without power; and I ask you to come over to us with confidence. And if anyone is holding back because he privately fears some man, fearing that I might put the city into the hands of certain men, let him trust me most of all. For I have not come to take part in faction, and I do not think that I would be bringing you real freedom if I disregarded your ancestral constitution and enslaved the many to the few or the few to the many. That would be harsher than the rule of a foreigner; and we Lacedaemonians would win, not gratitude for our pains, but blame instead of honor and glory; and the charges on which we are making war on the Athenians we would be seen to deserve ourselves, and more hatefully than the man who never made a show of virtue. For men of standing it is more shameful to get the better of others by specious deceit than by open force: the one attacks with the claim of right that strength, given by fortune, confers; the other by the scheming of an unjust mind.

87 "So great is the care we take in matters of the greatest importance to us, and you could get no better assurance, beyond the oaths, than from men whose deeds, when weighed against their words, give you the necessary conviction that their interest lies exactly where they have said. If, when I offer this, you say that you cannot accept it, and claim, as men who are well disposed, that you should be allowed to decline without suffering for it; if you say that freedom does not seem to you to be without danger, and that it is right to bring it to those who can receive it but to force it on no one against his will, then I will call the gods and heroes of your country to witness that I came for your good and could not persuade you, and I will try to compel you by ravaging your land. I will no longer think that I am doing wrong; I will have reason on my side, and two necessities. The Lacedaemonians must not, through your good will toward us, be harmed by the money you pay to the Athenians if you are not brought over; and the Hellenes must not be prevented by you from escaping slavery. Otherwise we would not be justified in acting so; nor are we Lacedaemonians obliged to free those who are unwilling, except for the sake of some common good. Nor again are we seeking empire; we are eager rather to stop others from holding it, and we would wrong the greater number if, when we are bringing independence to all, we allowed you to oppose us. Consider all this well. Strive to be the first to begin freedom for the Hellenes and to lay up glory forever; to keep your own property from harm; and to give your whole city the fairest of names."

88 That was what Brasidas said. The Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides, voted in secret, and the majority, because of Brasidas' persuasive words and from fear for their crop, decided to revolt from the Athenians. They made him pledge his good faith by the oaths that the Lacedaemonian authorities had sworn when they sent him out, that those whom he won over

should truly be allies and independent; and on those terms they received the army. Not long afterward Stagirus, also a colony of the Andrians, joined in the revolt. These, then, were the events of this summer.

89 At the very beginning of the following winter, the plan in Boeotia was being carried through for Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals: Demosthenes was to be at Siphae with the ships, and Hippocrates at Delium. But a mistake was made in the days on which both were to march. Demosthenes sailed to Siphae too early, with Acarnanians and many of the allies from that quarter on board, and accomplished nothing, because the plot had been revealed by Nicomachus, a Phocian from Phanoteus, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians. The whole of Boeotia came to the rescue (for Hippocrates was not yet in the country to distract them), and Siphae and Chaeronea were occupied in advance. When the plotters learned of the mistake, they made no move in the cities.

90 Hippocrates called out the Athenians in full levy, the citizens themselves, the resident aliens, and all the foreigners who were in the city, and arrived at Delium after the event, when the Boeotians had already withdrawn from Siphae. He encamped his army and fortified Delium in the following way. They dug a ditch all around the sanctuary and the temple, and threw up the earth from the trench to serve as a wall; along it they drove in stakes and threw in the vines they cut from around the sanctuary, together with stones and bricks they pulled down from the houses nearby, and they raised the fortification by every means. They also set up wooden towers where they were needed and where there was no building belonging to the sanctuary; for the colonnade that had stood there had fallen down. They began work on the third day after setting out from home, and worked on that day and the fourth and on the fifth until the midday meal. Then, when most of

it was finished, the army withdrew first from Delium about ten stades, as if marching home; most of the light-armed troops went on at once, while the hoplites grounded their arms and halted. Hippocrates, staying behind, was still posting guards and arranging for the completion of what remained of the outworks.

91 During these days the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra. When the men from all the cities had arrived and they learned that the Athenians were moving off homeward, the other Boeotarchs (the Boeotian federal commanders, of whom there are eleven) did not approve of fighting, since the enemy were no longer in Boeotia (for the Athenians were just about on the borders of the territory of Oropus when they grounded their arms). But Pagondas son of Aeoladas, one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes, the other being Arianthidas son of Lysimachidas, held the command; he wished to fight and thought it better to take the risk. Calling up the men company by company, so that they would not all leave their posts at once, he urged the Boeotians to march against the Athenians and give battle, speaking as follows.

92 "Men of Boeotia, it ought never to have occurred to any of us commanders that it would not be right to come to battle with the Athenians if we no longer catch them in Boeotia. For they have come from a country on our border, built a fort in Boeotia, and mean to ravage it; and surely they are enemies, in whatever place they are caught and wherever they come from to commit acts of war. Now, if anyone thought it the safer course, let him change his mind. For men attacked by another, forethought for their own country does not allow the same calculation as for a man who holds what is his own and, reaching out for more, attacks someone of his own free will. It is your ancestral custom to repel a foreign army that comes against you, whether in your own land or in a neighbor's alike. Against the Athenians, who are our neighbors besides, this is needed most of all. For everyone's freedom consists

in being a match for the neighbors; and against these men above all, who try to enslave not only those near but those far away, how can we not go to the last extremity of the struggle? (We have as an example the Euboeans across the strait, and how most of the rest of Hellas stands with them.) We must recognize that while other neighbors fight battles over the boundaries of their land, for us, if we are defeated, one boundary, beyond dispute, will be fixed for the whole country; for they will come in and hold what is ours by force. So much more dangerous than others' is the neighbor we have. It is the habit of those who, trusting in their strength, attack their neighbors, as the Athenians are doing now, to march more fearlessly against the man who stays quiet and defends himself only in his own land, and to be less ready to grapple with the man who goes out to meet them beyond his borders and, if he has the chance, begins the war himself. We have experience of this with these very men: when we defeated them at Coronea,[6] at the time when they had seized our land while we were in civil strife, we established great security for Boeotia that has lasted to this day. Remembering this, the older men among us must be like their former deeds, and the younger, the sons of fathers who proved brave then, must try not to disgrace the courage that is their inheritance. Trusting that the god whose sanctuary they have fortified and are occupying in defiance of the law will be on our side, and trusting the sacrifices, which have proved favorable to us, we must close with these men and show them that they may get what they want by attacking those who do not defend themselves; but from men whose noble custom it is always to free their own land in battle and not unjustly to enslave another's, they will not go away without a fight."

93 With such exhortations Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to march against the Athenians. He broke camp quickly and led the army on (for it was already late in the day), and when he had come

near their army he halted at a place where, because a hill lay between them, the two sides could not see each other, and there he drew up his men and made ready for battle. Hippocrates was at Delium when word was brought to him that the Boeotians were advancing. He sent to the army, ordering it to form up in line, and not long afterward came up himself, having left about three hundred horsemen at Delium, both to guard it in case anyone attacked it and to watch for an opportunity to fall on the Boeotians during the battle. The Boeotians posted a detachment to deal with these, and when everything was ready, they appeared over the top of the hill and grounded their arms in the order in which they meant to fight: about seven thousand hoplites, more than ten thousand light-armed troops, a thousand horsemen, and five hundred peltasts. The Thebans and those grouped with them held the right wing; in the center were the men of Haliartus, Coronea, and Copae and the others who live around the lake; the left was held by the men of Thespiae, Tanagra, and Orchomenus. On each wing were the horsemen and the light-armed troops. The Thebans were drawn up twenty-five shields deep, the others as each happened to be. Such were the forces of the Boeotians and their order of battle.

94 On the Athenian side, the hoplites, who were about equal in number to the enemy, were drawn up eight deep along the whole line, with the horsemen on each wing. Regularly armed light troops were not present on this occasion, nor did the city have any. Those who had joined in the invasion, many times more numerous than the enemy's, had for the most part followed without arms, since this was a general levy of the foreigners present and the citizens; and having been the first to start for home, they were not there, except for a few. When the troops had taken their places in line and were about to engage, Hippocrates the general

went along the Athenian army encouraging them, and spoke as follows.

95 "Athenians, my exhortation will be brief, but to brave men it has the same force, and it is more a reminder than a command. Let none of you think that we are taking this great risk in a foreign country, where we have no business. The struggle will be in their land, but it will be for ours; and if we win, the Peloponnesians will never again invade your country without the Boeotian cavalry, and in one battle you will gain this land and set that one more fully free. So advance against them in a manner worthy of the city, which each of you is proud to have as his country, the first in Hellas, and worthy of your fathers, who once defeated these men in battle under Myronides at Oenophyta[7] and held Boeotia."

96 While Hippocrates was giving this exhortation and had got as far as the middle of the army but had no time for the rest, the Boeotians, after Pagondas had again given them a brief exhortation there as well, raised the paean and came on from the hill. The Athenians advanced against them and they met at a run. The outermost wings of both armies did not come to blows, but both were checked alike: watercourses stood between them. The rest of the line was locked in a hard fight, shield pushing against shield. The Boeotian left, as far as the center, was beaten by the Athenians, who pressed hard on the others in that quarter and not least on the Thespians. For when the men drawn up beside them gave way, the Thespians were surrounded in a narrow space, and those of them who perished were cut down fighting hand to hand; and some of the Athenians, thrown into confusion by the encircling movement, failed to recognize one another and killed each other. On that side, then, the Boeotians were beaten and fled to the part of the line that was still fighting. But the right, where the Thebans were, was getting the better of the Athenians; they pushed them back, little by little at first, and followed them up. Then Pagondas

sent two squadrons of cavalry around the hill out of sight, because his left was in trouble, and when they suddenly appeared over the top, the victorious wing of the Athenians, thinking that another army was coming against them, took fright. And so, on both sides now, because of this and because of the Thebans following up and breaking through, the whole Athenian army was put to flight. Some made for Delium and the sea, some for Oropus, others for Mount Parnes, and others wherever each had some hope of safety. The Boeotians followed them up and killed them, especially their horsemen and the Locrians, who had come to their aid just as the rout was beginning; but night overtook the action, and the mass of the fugitives got away more easily. The next day the men from Oropus and from Delium, leaving a garrison in Delium (for they still held it nonetheless), were carried home by sea.

97 The Boeotians set up a trophy, took up their own dead, stripped those of the enemy, and left a guard over them; then they withdrew to Tanagra and made plans to attack Delium. A herald from the Athenians, coming for the dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned him back, telling him that he would accomplish nothing until he himself had returned. The Boeotian herald then came before the Athenians and delivered the message from the Boeotians: that they had acted unjustly in transgressing the customs of the Hellenes. It was a rule established among all, he said, that when they invaded one another's country they kept their hands off the sanctuaries in it; but the Athenians had fortified Delium and were living in it, and everything that men do in an unconsecrated place was being done there; and they were drawing for their own use the water that the Boeotians themselves were forbidden to touch except for the lustral water used in the rites. Therefore, on behalf of the god and of themselves, the Boeotians, calling on the divinities who shared the altar and on Apollo, gave

them notice to leave the sanctuary and then take away what belonged to them.

98 When the herald had said this, the Athenians sent their own herald to the Boeotians. They said that they had done no wrong to the sanctuary and would do it no harm in the future if they could help it; for they had not entered it with that purpose in the first place, but in order to defend themselves from it against those who were really wronging them. The law among the Hellenes, they said, was that whoever held power over a land, whether larger or smaller, also always had possession of its sanctuaries, to be tended in the customary ways as far as they were able. For the Boeotians too, and most others who had driven people out and held their land by force, had at first attacked sanctuaries that were not theirs and now possessed them as their own. They themselves, if they had been able to conquer more of the Boeotians' land, would have held that too; as it was, they would not willingly leave the part where they were, since they regarded it as their own. As for the water, they had disturbed it under necessity, which they had not brought on themselves out of insolence: they had been forced to use it while defending themselves against the Boeotians, who had first invaded their land. And it was reasonable that anything done under the constraint of war and of some danger should find pardon even with the god. For the altars were a refuge for involuntary offenses, and the name of lawlessness was given to wrongs done without necessity, not to those who had ventured something under pressure of misfortune. The Boeotians, they said, were far more impious in demanding sanctuaries in exchange for the dead than they themselves, who refused to recover what was their due at the price of sanctuaries. And they told them to say plainly that they might take up their dead not on condition of leaving the land of the Boeotians (for they were no longer in the Boeotians' land

but in land they had won by the spear), but under a truce according to ancestral custom.

99 The Boeotians answered that if they were in Boeotia, they must leave their land and then take away what was theirs; but if they were in their own land, the Athenians themselves knew what to do. They thought that the territory of Oropus, where the dead happened to be lying, since the battle had been fought on the border, belonged to the Athenians as a subject district, and that the Athenians could not get possession of the bodies against the Boeotians' will; and of course they would not make a truce for the Athenians' own land. But to answer "leave our land and take back what you ask for" seemed to them a plausible reply. The Athenian herald heard this and went away with nothing accomplished.

100 The Boeotians at once sent for javelin men and slingers from the Malian Gulf, and with two thousand Corinthian hoplites who had come to help them after the battle, the Peloponnesian garrison that had come out of Nisaea, and some Megarians as well, they marched against Delium and attacked the fortification. Among other methods they tried, they brought up an engine, which took it, of the following kind. They sawed a great beam in two, hollowed it out all along, and fitted it together again exactly, like a pipe. At the end they hung a cauldron on chains, and an iron tube ran down into it from the beam, which was itself plated with iron for a great part of its length. They brought it up from a distance on wagons to the part of the wall that had been built mostly of vines and timber; and when it was close, they inserted large bellows into their own end of the beam and worked them. The blast, passing airtight into the cauldron, which held lighted coals, sulfur, and pitch, made a great flame and set the wall on fire, so that no one could stay on it any longer; the defenders abandoned it and fled, and in this way the fortification was taken. Of the garrison,

some were killed and two hundred were captured; most of the rest got on board the ships and were carried home.

101 Delium was taken on the seventeenth day after the battle, and the herald from the Athenians, who knew nothing of what had happened, came again not long afterward about the dead; this time the Boeotians gave them back and no longer made the same answer. In the battle a little less than five hundred of the Boeotians were killed, and of the Athenians a little less than a thousand, with Hippocrates the general, besides a great number of light-armed troops and baggage carriers. Shortly after this battle Demosthenes too, since the betrayal at Siphae had not come off when he sailed there, made a landing in the territory of Sicyon with the army he had on his ships, the Acarnanians and Agraeans and four hundred Athenian hoplites. Before all the ships had come in to shore, the Sicyonians came to the rescue, routed those who had landed, and chased them back to the ships, killing some and taking others alive. They set up a trophy and gave back the dead under a truce. About the same days as the events at Delium, Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, also died, after marching against the Triballi and being defeated in battle. Seuthes son of Sparadocus, his nephew, became king of the Odrysians and of the rest of the part of Thrace that Sitalces had ruled.

102 In the same winter Brasidas, with the allies in the Thracian region, marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon. Aristagoras of Miletus, when he was fleeing from King Darius, had tried before to settle the site on which the city now stands, but he was driven off by the Edonians; and then thirty-two years later the Athenians tried it, sending ten thousand settlers, from their own people and any others who wished to go, and these were destroyed at Drabescus by the Thracians. In the twenty-ninth year after that the Athenians came again, with Hagnon son of Nicias sent out as founder, drove out the Edonians,

and founded the place, which had formerly been called the Nine Ways.[8] They set out from Eion, a trading post they held on the sea at the mouth of the river, twenty-five stades from the present city. Hagnon named it Amphipolis because, with the Strymon flowing around it on both sides, he cut it off with a long wall from river to river and settled it as a city conspicuous both toward the sea and toward the land.

103 It was against this city, then, that Brasidas set out with his army from Arnae in Chalcidice. Arriving toward evening at Aulon and Bormiscus, where Lake Bolbe flows out into the sea, he had his men eat supper and marched on through the night. It was stormy and snowing a little, which made him all the more eager to press on, because he wanted to escape the notice of the people in Amphipolis, except for those who were betraying it. For there were settlers from Argilus living in it (the Argilians are colonists of the Andrians), and others who were working with them, some at the prompting of Perdiccas, some of the Chalcidians. Above all the Argilians, who lived close by, had always been suspect to the Athenians and had designs on the place. When the opportunity came and Brasidas arrived, they had already for some time been negotiating with their fellow citizens who lived there to have the city betrayed; and now they received him into their own city, revolted from the Athenians, and that same night, before dawn, brought the army to the bridge over the river. The town is some distance from the crossing, and walls did not run down to it then as they do now, but a small guard had been posted. Brasidas easily forced it, partly because of the treachery, partly because of the storm and the surprise of his attack; he crossed the bridge and at once had possession of everything belonging to the Amphipolitans who lived outside the walls throughout the whole district.

104 His crossing had come suddenly upon the people in the city, and of those outside many were being captured and others

were fleeing into the walls; the Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion, especially as they were suspicious of one another. And it is said that if Brasidas had not been willing to let his army turn to plunder, but had marched straight on the city, he would probably have taken it. As it was, he settled his army there after overrunning the area outside, and when nothing came of what he expected from those inside, he waited. Those opposed to the traitors, prevailing by their numbers so that the gates were not opened at once, joined Eucles the general, who had come from Athens to guard the place, in sending to the other general in the Thracian region, Thucydides son of Olorus, who wrote this history. He was at Thasos (the island is a colony of the Parians, about half a day's sail from Amphipolis), and they asked him to come to their aid. When he heard, he sailed at full speed with seven ships that happened to be there, wishing above all to reach Amphipolis before it gave in, or, failing that, to seize Eion first.

105 Meanwhile Brasidas, fearing the relief by sea from Thasos, and learning that Thucydides held rights to work gold mines in that part of Thrace and through them was among the most influential men of the mainland, made haste to gain the city first, if he could. He feared that if Thucydides arrived, the people of Amphipolis would hope that he would gather allies from the sea and from Thrace and save them, and would then no longer come over. He therefore offered moderate terms, making the following proclamation: any of the Amphipolitans and Athenians in the city who wished might stay in possession of his own property, sharing equal and like rights; anyone unwilling might leave within five days, taking his property with him.

106 When the mass of the people heard this, their minds changed, especially as only a small part of the citizen body was Athenian and most were of mixed origin, and many of those inside had relatives among the men captured outside. They regarded the

proclamation as fair compared with what they feared: the Athenians because they would be glad to get out, since they thought the danger was not the same for them as for the others and at the same time did not expect help soon; the rest of the population because they would not lose their city and their equal rights, and would be released from danger beyond their expectation. So the party working for Brasidas now justified the terms openly, seeing that the people had turned and were no longer listening to the Athenian general who was there; and the agreement was made, and they accepted him on the terms he had proclaimed. In this way they surrendered the city. Thucydides and the ships sailed into Eion late on the same day. Brasidas had just taken Amphipolis, and he came within a night of taking Eion; for if the ships had not come to its aid quickly, it would have been taken at dawn.

107 After this Thucydides set things in order at Eion, so that it would be safe both at once, if Brasidas attacked, and afterward; and he received those who had chosen to come there from upriver under the terms of the agreement. Brasidas suddenly sailed down the river to Eion with many boats, to see whether he could take the point that juts out from the wall and so control the entrance, and at the same time tried an attack by land; but he was beaten off on both sides, and he turned to setting the affairs of Amphipolis in order. Myrcinus, an Edonian town, came over to him, after Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, had been killed by the sons of Goaxis and by his own wife Brauro; and not long afterward Galepsus and Oesyme, which are colonies of the Thasians. Perdiccas too came immediately after the capture and helped him to settle these matters.

108 With Amphipolis in enemy hands, the Athenians fell into great alarm. The city was valuable to them for the timber it sent for shipbuilding and for the revenue it brought in. Besides, the

Lacedaemonians had had a way open as far as the Strymon to reach the Athenian allies, with the Thessalians conducting them; but so long as they did not hold the bridge, since above it the river forms a large lake for a long way and on the side toward Eion they were watched by triremes, they could not have gone further; now it seemed that this had become easy. And they were afraid that their allies would revolt. For Brasidas was moderate in his conduct generally, and in his speeches he declared everywhere that he had been sent out to free Hellas. The cities subject to the Athenians, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis, of the terms he offered, and of his mildness, were more eager than ever for revolt. They sent messages to him secretly, urging him to come, each wanting to be the first to revolt. For it seemed to them that there was nothing to fear. They were mistaken about the Athenians' power, which was as great as it afterward proved to be; and they judged more by uncertain wishes than by sure foresight, for it is the habit of men to entrust what they desire to unthinking hope, and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do not want. At the same time the Athenians had just been beaten in Boeotia, and Brasidas was saying what was enticing but not true: that at Nisaea the Athenians had not been willing to engage him with his own army alone. So they took heart and were confident that no one would come against them. Most of all, because of the pleasure of the moment, and because they would be making their first trial of the Lacedaemonians at a time when the Lacedaemonians were full of zeal, they were ready to run any risk. Seeing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the cities, as far as was possible at short notice and in winter. Brasidas sent to Lacedaemon asking them to send him more troops, and himself prepared to build triremes on the Strymon. But the Lacedaemonians did not support him, partly out of jealousy on the part of their leading men, and partly because

they wanted rather to recover the men from the island and to end the war.

109 In the same winter the Megarians captured the Long Walls, which the Athenians had been holding, and razed them to the ground. And Brasidas, after the capture of Amphipolis, marched with his allies against the so-called Acte. This is the peninsula that projects from the King's canal, and its high mountain, Athos, ends it at the Aegean Sea. Its cities are Sane, a colony of the Andrians, right by the canal, facing the sea toward Euboea, and the others, Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium. These are inhabited by mixed peoples of barbarians who speak two languages. There is a small Chalcidian element, but most are Pelasgians, of those Tyrrhenians who once lived in Lemnos and Athens, and Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians; they live in small towns. Most of them came over to Brasidas, but Sane and Dium held out, and he stayed there with his army and ravaged their land.

110 When they would not listen, he marched at once against Torone in Chalcidice, which was held by the Athenians. A few men were inviting him, ready to hand over the city. He arrived while it was still night, and toward daybreak he halted with his army near the temple of the Dioscuri, about three stades from the city. The rest of the city of Torone and the Athenians in garrison did not notice him; but those working for him knew that he would come, and a few of them had gone out secretly and were watching for his approach. When they knew he was there, they brought in to themselves seven light-armed men with daggers (for of twenty first assigned, only these seven were not afraid to go in; their leader was Lysistratus of Olynthus). These slipped through the wall on the seaward side and, without being noticed, went up and killed the guards at the highest guardpost (for the city is on a hill), and began to break open the postern facing Canastraeum.

111 Brasidas, after advancing a little, waited with the rest of his army, and sent ahead a hundred peltasts so that, whenever any gates were opened and the signal that had been agreed was raised, they might be the first to rush in. As time went by and they were wondering at the delay, they gradually came up close to the city. The Toronaeans inside who were making the preparations with the men who had entered, once the postern had been broken open and the gates by the marketplace had been opened by cutting through the bar, first brought some men around and let them in through the postern, so as suddenly to terrify, from behind and on both sides, the people in the city, who knew nothing; then they raised the fire signal as had been arranged, and let in the rest of the peltasts through the gates by the marketplace.

112 When Brasidas saw the signal he set off at a run, rousing his army, who raised a shout all together and struck great terror into the people in the city. Some of them burst in at once through the gates, others over some squared beams that happened to be lying against the wall, which had fallen down and was being rebuilt, for hauling up stones. Brasidas and the main body at once turned upward to the high parts of the city, wishing to take it from the top and securely; the rest of the crowd scattered in every direction alike.

113 While the city was being taken, most of the Toronaeans, who knew nothing, were in confusion, but the plotters and those who approved of what they were doing at once joined the men who had come in. The Athenians (about fifty hoplites happened to be sleeping in the marketplace), when they realized what was happening, lost a few men killed there fighting hand to hand; of the rest, some by land and some on board the two ships that were on guard got away and escaped to Lecythus, the fort that they had seized and were holding, a height of the city that runs out into the

sea, cut off by a narrow isthmus. Those of the Toronaeans who were friendly to them also fled to them there.

114 When it was full day and the city was firmly held, Brasidas made a proclamation to the Toronaeans who had fled with the Athenians that any who wished might come out to their property and live as citizens without fear. To the Athenians he sent a herald and told them to leave Lecythus under a truce, with their property, since it belonged to the Chalcidians. They said that they would not leave it, but asked him to grant them a truce for one day to take up their dead. He granted two. During these he himself strengthened the houses nearby, and the Athenians their own position. He called an assembly of the Toronaeans and spoke to them much as he had to the people of Acanthus. He said that it was not right to regard those who had worked with him for the taking of the city as worse men or as traitors (for they had not done this to enslave it, nor because they were bribed, but for the good and freedom of the city); nor should those who had taken no part think that they would not get the same treatment; for he had not come to destroy either a city or any private man. He had made the proclamation to those who had fled to the Athenians for this reason: that he thought them no worse for their friendship with them; and once they had tried the Lacedaemonians, he did not think they would be less well disposed toward them, but far more, the more justly the Lacedaemonians acted; it was only from inexperience that they were afraid now. He told them all to prepare to be steadfast allies, and to be held responsible from now on for whatever wrong they did; as for the past, it was not the Lacedaemonians who had been wronged, but rather the Toronaeans, by others who were stronger, and it was pardonable if they had opposed him in anything.

115 After saying this and encouraging them, when the truce had expired he began his attacks on Lecythus. The Athenians defended

themselves from a poor fortification and from houses that had battlements, and for one day they beat off the attack. On the next day the enemy were about to bring up an engine against them, from which they meant to throw fire onto the wooden breastworks; and as the army was already advancing, at the point where they thought the enemy would most likely bring up the engine and which was most open to attack, the Athenians set up a wooden tower on top of a building and carried up many jars and casks of water and large stones, and many men climbed up. But the building, taking too great a load, suddenly broke down with a great crash. The Athenians who were near and saw it were more distressed than frightened; but those farther off, and especially those farthest away, thought that the place had already been taken at that point, and fled to the sea and the ships.

116 When Brasidas saw that they were leaving the battlements, and saw what was happening, he charged with his army, took the fort at once, and killed everyone he caught in it. The Athenians, having abandoned the place in this way, crossed over in their boats and ships to Pallene. Now there is a temple of Athena in Lecythus, and Brasidas had proclaimed, when he was about to attack, that he would give thirty minas of silver to the first man to mount the wall. Thinking that the capture had come about by some means other than human, he gave the thirty minas to the goddess for the temple, and he pulled down Lecythus, cleared the site, and dedicated the whole of it as a sacred precinct. For the rest of the winter he settled the places he held and laid plans against the others. So the winter ended, and with it the eighth year of this war.

117 At the very beginning of spring the following summer, the Lacedaemonians and Athenians made an armistice for a year. The Athenians thought that Brasidas would then bring no more of their cities to revolt before they could prepare at leisure, and at the same time that, if it suited them, they could also come to a general

settlement. The Lacedaemonians believed that the Athenians feared just what they did in fact fear, and that, once they had a respite from troubles and hardship and had tasted it, they would be more eager to be reconciled, give back the men, and make a treaty for a longer time. For they set great store by getting the men back while Brasidas was still having good fortune; whereas if he went further and put matters on an equal footing, they would lose the men, and for the rest would be defending themselves on even terms, running risks even if they prevailed. So the armistice was made, for themselves and their allies, as follows.

118 "Concerning the sanctuary and oracle of Pythian Apollo, we resolve that anyone who wishes may consult it without fraud and without fear, according to the ancestral laws. This is resolved by the Lacedaemonians and the allies present; and they say that they will do their best to persuade the Boeotians and Phocians by sending heralds to them. Concerning the treasure of the god, we are to take care to discover those who have done wrong, rightly and justly following the ancestral laws, you and we and any others who wish, all following the ancestral laws. Concerning these matters, then, it is resolved by the Lacedaemonians and the other allies as stated. The following is further resolved by the Lacedaemonians and the other allies, if the Athenians make a treaty: that each side shall remain in its own territory, holding what we now hold. Those in Coryphasium[9] shall stay within the hills of Buphras and Tomeus. Those in Cythera shall have no dealings with the alliance, neither we with them nor they with us. Those in Nisaea and Minoa shall not cross the road that runs from the gate by the shrine of Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, and from the temple of Poseidon straight to the bridge leading to Minoa (nor shall the Megarians and their allies cross this road); and the Athenians shall keep the island that they took, with no dealings on either side with the other; and in Troezen they shall keep what they now hold, accord-

ing to the terms agreed with the Athenians. In using the sea, as far as concerns their own coasts and the coasts of their alliance, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall sail in no warship, but in any other oared vessel of up to five hundred talents' burden. A herald and an embassy, with as many attendants as they think fit, traveling to the Peloponnese or to Athens to end the war and to settle disputes, shall have safe conduct going and returning, by land and by sea. During this time deserters shall not be received, whether free or slave, by you or by us. You shall give satisfaction to us and we to you according to ancestral custom, settling disputed questions by arbitration without war. This is resolved by the Lacedaemonians and the allies; but if anything seems to you either better or more just than this, come to Lacedaemon and explain it; for neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies will reject anything that you put forward as just. Let those who go, go with full powers, as you too require of us. The treaty shall be for one year. Resolved by the people. The tribe Acamantis held the prytany, Phaenippus was secretary, Niciades presided. Laches moved: with good fortune to the Athenians, to make the armistice on the terms to which the Lacedaemonians and their allies agree and to which they consented before the people; the armistice to be for one year, beginning this day, the fourteenth of the month of Elaphebolion.[10] During this time envoys and heralds are to go to each other and hold talks on the terms on which the war shall be ended. The generals and the prytanes are to call an assembly, and the Athenians are to deliberate first about peace ...[11] on whatever terms the embassy for ending the war shall bring in. The embassies now present are to bind themselves at once before the people by libation to abide by the treaty for the year.

119 "These terms were agreed by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with the Athenians and their allies at Lacedaemon on the twelfth of the month Gerastius. Those who agreed and poured the

libations were, for the Lacedaemonians: Taurus son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus son of Periclidas, Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas; for the Corinthians: Aeneas son of Ocytus, Euphamidas son of Aristonymus; for the Sicyonians: Damotimus son of Naucrates, Onasimus son of Megacles; for the Megarians: Nicasus son of Cecalus, Menecrates son of Amphidorus; for the Epidaurians: Amphias son of Eupaeidas; for the Athenians, the generals: Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, Nicias son of Niceratus, Autocles son of Tolmaeus." This, then, was the armistice that was made, and throughout it they kept meeting for talks about a more lasting treaty.

120 About the days when they were going back and forth to make it, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The Scionaeans say that they are Pellenians from the Peloponnese, and that their first ancestors, sailing back from Troy, were carried to this place by the storm that the Achaeans met with, and settled there. When they had revolted, Brasidas crossed over to Scione by night, with a friendly trireme sailing ahead while he himself followed some way behind in a light boat. His idea was that if he fell in with any vessel larger than the boat, the trireme would defend him; and if another trireme of equal strength came up, he thought it would turn not on the smaller craft but on the ship, and in the meantime he would get away safely. Having crossed, he called an assembly of the Scionaeans and said what he had said at Acanthus and Torone; and he added that they deserved the highest praise of all, because, although Pallene was cut off at the isthmus by the Athenians holding Potidaea and they were nothing more than islanders, they had come over to freedom of their own accord, and had not waited, through lack of daring, until necessity forced them toward what was plainly their own good. This was a sign, he said, that they would bravely endure any other trial, however great; and if matters turned out as he intended, he

would regard them as in truth the most faithful friends of the Lacedaemonians and would honor them in every other way.

121 The Scionaeans were elated by his words, and all of them alike took courage, even those who had not liked what was being done before; they made up their minds to carry on the war with zeal, and gave Brasidas a fine reception in every way. Publicly they crowned him with a golden crown as the liberator of Hellas; privately they decked him with ribbons and came up to him as they would to an athlete. For the moment he left a small garrison with them and crossed back, and not long afterward he brought over a larger army, wishing with their help to make an attempt on Mende and Potidaea; for he thought that the Athenians would come to its relief as they would to an island, and he wanted to forestall them. Something was also being arranged for him in these cities by way of betrayal.

122 He was about to attack these cities when a trireme arrived with the men who were carrying round the news of the armistice, Aristonymus for the Athenians and Athenaeus for the Lacedaemonians. The army crossed back to Torone, and the envoys announced the agreement to Brasidas; and all the Lacedaemonian allies in the Thracian region accepted what had been done. Aristonymus agreed to the rest, but when he found, by counting the days, that the Scionaeans had revolted after the date, he said that they would not be included in the treaty. Brasidas argued at length that they had revolted before, and would not give up the city. When Aristonymus reported to Athens about them, the Athenians were at once ready to march against Scione. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys and said that the Athenians would be breaking the treaty; they laid claim to the city, trusting Brasidas, and were ready to have the question decided by arbitration. But the Athenians were not willing to risk arbitration; they wanted to march as quickly as possible, angry that even islanders, as these

now were, should think fit to revolt from them, trusting in the land power of the Lacedaemonians, which could do them no good. And the truth about the revolt was rather as the Athenians maintained; for the Scionaeans revolted two days after. They at once passed a decree, on the motion of Cleon, to destroy Scione and put its people to death. And they kept quiet in other respects and prepared for this.

123 Meanwhile Mende revolted from them, a city in Pallene, a colony of the Eretrians. Brasidas received them, not thinking that he was doing wrong, because they had come over to him openly during the armistice; for there were things in which he too accused the Athenians of breaking the treaty. For this reason the Mendaeans were all the bolder, seeing that Brasidas was ready to act and judging from Scione that he would not betray them; and besides, those who were working with them were few, and once they had begun, they would not draw back, but, fearing for themselves if they were exposed, forced the many against their will. The Athenians, learning of it at once, were angrier still and prepared to move against both cities. Brasidas, expecting their attack, secretly removed the children and women of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans to Olynthus in Chalcidice, and sent across to them five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian peltasts, with Polydamidas in command of them all. And they joined in getting their defenses ready, expecting the Athenians to arrive soon.

124 Meanwhile Brasidas and Perdiccas marched together a second time against Arrhabaeus in Lyncus. Perdiccas led the forces of the Macedonians he ruled and the hoplites of the Hellenes who lived among them; Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians he had left, led Chalcidians, Acanthians, and as many as each of the others could supply. The Hellenic hoplites in all were about three thousand; the cavalry who went with them, Macedonians and

Chalcidians together, were all told nearly a thousand; and there was besides a large crowd of barbarians. They invaded the country of Arrhabaeus, and finding the Lyncestians encamped against them, they encamped opposite them in turn. The infantry on each side held a hill, with a plain between; the horsemen rode down into it and there was first a cavalry engagement on both sides. Then the Lyncestian hoplites advanced first from their hill with their cavalry and were ready to fight; Brasidas and Perdiccas led their own men against them, engaged, and routed the Lyncestians, killing many, while the rest escaped to the heights and stayed quiet. After this they set up a trophy and waited two or three days for the Illyrians, who happened to be coming to Perdiccas as mercenaries. Then Perdiccas wanted to advance against the villages of Arrhabaeus and not sit still; but Brasidas, who was anxious about Mende, in case it should suffer something if the Athenians sailed there before him, and since the Illyrians had not appeared, was not eager to go on, but rather to withdraw.

125 While they were disagreeing over this, news came that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas and gone over to Arrhabaeus. So both of them now thought it best to withdraw, out of fear of these men, who were warlike; but because of their quarrel nothing had been settled about when they should start, and night came on. The Macedonians and the mass of the barbarians at once took fright, as great armies are apt to be struck by panic for no clear reason; thinking that the enemy coming against them were many times more numerous than had actually come, and that they were all but there, they broke into sudden flight and made for home. Perdiccas, who at first did not know of it, they forced, when he learned of it, to go off before seeing Brasidas (for their camps were far apart). At dawn, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had gone on ahead and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were about to attack, he himself formed his hoplites into a square, took the light-armed

crowd into the middle, and prepared to retreat. He posted the youngest men to run out against the enemy wherever they attacked, and he himself, with three hundred picked men, intended to go last in the retreat and turn and beat off the foremost of the enemy as they pressed on him. Before the enemy came near, he gave his soldiers a hasty exhortation, as follows.

126 "Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect that you are alarmed because you have been left alone and because those coming against you are barbarians and many, I would not be giving you instruction along with my encouragement. But as it is, in view of our desertion by our own side and the numbers of the enemy, I will try, with a brief reminder and advice, to convince you of what matters most. It befits you to be brave in war, not because allies are present on each occasion, but because of your own courage, and not to fear any number of others; for you come from states where it is not the many who rule the few but rather the few who rule the many, and who won that power by nothing other than conquering in battle. As for the barbarians, whom you now fear from inexperience, you ought to learn, from the fighting you have already done against the Macedonians among them, and from what I myself infer and know from others by report, that they will not be formidable. For when an enemy that is in fact weak has the appearance of strength, true knowledge of them, once gained, has always made the defenders bolder; whereas against those who have some real advantage a man would attack with more daring if he had not known of it beforehand. These men are terrifying to the inexperienced in their threat of attack; for they are fearsome in the sight of their numbers and unbearable in the loudness of their cries, and their brandishing of weapons in the air gives some show of menace. But they are not the same in close combat with those who stand up to these things. Having no order, they would feel no shame at leaving any position when pressed; and since

flight and attack have equal credit with them as honorable, their courage is never put to the test (and a battle in which each man is his own master would be most likely to give anyone a decent pretext for saving himself). They think it safer to frighten you without risk than to come to close quarters; otherwise they would have done that rather than this. You see clearly that all the terror they held out beforehand is in fact small, however alarming to the eye and ear. If you stand up to it as it comes on and, when the moment comes, withdraw again in good order and formation, you will reach safety the sooner, and you will know in future that such mobs, against those who withstand their first onset, make a show of courage from a distance with threats and delays; but against those who give way to them, they are quick to display their bravery at their heels, where it is safe."

127 After this exhortation Brasidas began to lead his army back. When the barbarians saw it, they pressed on with loud shouting and uproar, thinking that he was running away and that they would catch and destroy him. But wherever they fell on them the skirmishers ran out to meet them, and he himself with his picked men withstood them as they pressed on; the Hellenes held firm, to the enemy's surprise, against the first rush, and after that received and beat off their attacks, and when the enemy stopped, they themselves withdrew. Then the greater part of the barbarians left the Hellenes with Brasidas alone in the open country, leaving behind only a part to follow and attack them; the rest went at a run after the fleeing Macedonians, killing any they came upon, and got first to the pass, a narrow one between two hills leading into the country of Arrhabaeus, and seized it, knowing that Brasidas had no other way of retreat. As he was approaching the most difficult part of the road itself, they began to surround him in order to cut him off.

128 Seeing this, he ordered the three hundred who were with him to charge at a run, each as fast as he could, without keeping formation, at the hill he thought easier to take, and to try to drive off the barbarians who were already on it before the larger encircling force could join them there. They fell on them and overpowered the men on the hill, and the main body of the Hellenes now made its way to it more easily. For the barbarians took fright when their own men were routed there from the height, and they no longer followed any further, thinking that the enemy were already on the frontier and had escaped. Once Brasidas had gained the heights, he went on more safely and reached Arnisa, the first place in Perdiccas' dominion, the same day. His soldiers, angry at the Macedonians for retreating ahead of them, unyoked and cut down any of their teams of oxen they came upon on the road, and took for themselves any baggage that had fallen off, as was likely to happen in a retreat by night and in panic. From this time Perdiccas for the first time regarded Brasidas as an enemy, and for the future he had a hatred of the Peloponnesians that was strange in him, given his feelings toward the Athenians; but, breaking away from what his vital interests required, he worked to find the quickest way to come to terms with the Athenians and be rid of the Peloponnesians.

129 On returning from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas found the Athenians already in possession of Mende. He stayed quiet there, thinking it now beyond his power to cross over to Pallene and give help, but he kept Torone under guard. For about the same time as the events in Lyncus the Athenians had sailed against Mende and Scione, as they had been preparing to do, with fifty ships, ten of them Chian, a thousand of their own hoplites, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and other peltasts from their allies in the region; the generals were Nicias son of Niceratus and Nicostratus son of Diitrephes. Setting out

from Potidaea with the ships and putting in at the temple of Poseidon, they advanced against the Mendaeans. These, with three hundred Scionaeans who had come to help them and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred hoplites in all, and Polydamidas their commander, happened to be encamped outside the city on a strong hill. Nicias, with 120 light-armed Methonaeans, sixty picked Athenian hoplites, and all the archers, tried to climb up to them by a path on the hill, but was wounded and could not force his way. Nicostratus, approaching by another way, from a greater distance, with all the rest of the army, against a hill that was hard to climb, was thrown into complete confusion, and the whole Athenian army came close to being defeated. On that day, since the Mendaeans and their allies did not give way, the Athenians withdrew and made camp; and when night came on the Mendaeans went back into the city.

130 The next day the Athenians sailed round to the side facing Scione, took the suburb, and spent the whole day ravaging the land, without anyone coming out against them (for there was some civil strife in the city); and on the following night the three hundred Scionaeans went home. The day after, Nicias with half the army advanced as far as the borders of Scione, ravaging the land as he went, while Nicostratus with the rest sat down before the city by the upper gates, where the road goes to Potidaea. Polydamidas (for the arms of the Mendaeans and the auxiliaries happened to be stacked in that quarter, inside the wall) drew up his men as for battle and urged the Mendaeans to make a sortie. One of the popular party answered him, in a spirit of faction, that he would not go out and that there was no need to fight; and when he said this, Polydamidas dragged him by the arm and roughly handled him. At that the people at once took up their arms in a fury and went for the Peloponnesians and for those of their own side who had acted against them with them. They fell on them and routed them, partly

by the suddenness of the fight, and partly because the Peloponnesians were frightened as the gates were opened to the Athenians; for they thought that the attack had been made on them by some prior arrangement. Those who were not killed at once fled to the acropolis, which they had held before as well. The Athenians (for Nicias had by now turned back and was at the city) burst into the city of Mende, and since it had been opened not under any agreement, they sacked it with their whole army, as if they had taken it by storm; and the generals had difficulty in restraining them from killing the inhabitants too. After this they told the Mendaeans to keep their constitution as they had been accustomed, and to judge among themselves any whom they thought responsible for the revolt. Those on the acropolis they walled off with a wall on each side running down to the sea, and set a guard over them. When they had matters around Mende in hand, they marched against Scione.

131 The Scionaeans and the Peloponnesians came out against them and took up a position on a strong hill in front of the city, which the enemy had to take before they could wall the city in. The Athenians attacked it in force, drove off the men on it in battle, encamped, set up a trophy, and prepared for the siege wall. Not long after, when they were already at work, the auxiliaries who were being besieged on the acropolis at Mende forced their way through the guard by the sea at night and arrived, and most of them, slipping past the army before Scione, got into the city.

132 While Scione was being walled in, Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals and came to an agreement with the Athenians, because of his enmity toward Brasidas over the retreat from Lyncus; he had begun to negotiate immediately after it. And it happened that at that time Ischagoras the Lacedaemonian was about to lead an army by land to Brasidas. Perdiccas, partly because Nicias told him, now that the agreement had been made,

to give the Athenians some clear proof of his good faith, and partly because he himself no longer wanted the Peloponnesians to come into his country, worked on his friends in Thessaly, with whose leading men he was always on close terms, and blocked the army and its preparations so completely that they did not even try the Thessalians. Ischagoras, however, with Ameinias and Aristeus, did reach Brasidas himself, sent by the Lacedaemonians to inspect the state of affairs; and, contrary to custom, they brought out from Sparta some of the young men, to put them in command of the cities rather than entrust these to whoever happened to be there. Clearidas son of Cleonymus was installed at Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas son of Hegesander at Torone.

133 In the same summer the Thebans pulled down the wall of Thespiae, on the charge of Atticism. They had always wanted to do this, and it was now made easier because whatever flower of manhood the Thespians had had perished in the battle against the Athenians. In the same summer the temple of Hera at Argos was burned down, when Chrysis the priestess placed a lighted lamp near the garlands and then fell asleep, so that everything caught fire and was burning before anyone noticed. Chrysis, fearing the Argives, fled at once that very night to Phlius; and they appointed another priestess under the established law, named Phaeinis. Chrysis had served for eight years of this war and half of the ninth when she fled.[12] And toward the end of the summer Scione was completely walled in, and the Athenians left a garrison there and withdrew with the rest of their army.

134 In the following winter, matters between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were quiet because of the armistice. But the Mantineans and the Tegeans, each with their allies, fought a battle at Laodocium in Oresthis, and the victory was disputed. For each side routed the wing opposite it, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. Many were killed on each side, the battle was

evenly fought, and night broke off the action; the Tegeans camped on the field and at once set up a trophy, while the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion and set up a trophy in reply afterward.

135 At the end of the same winter, toward spring, Brasidas also made an attempt on Potidaea. He came up at night and set a ladder against the wall, and got that far without being noticed; for the ladder was set up in the interval after the bell had been passed along, before the man who passed it on had come back. But then, as the defenders noticed at once, he led his army back again in haste before anyone mounted, and did not wait for day. So the winter ended, and with it the ninth year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

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1. Pylos: a headland on the west coast of Messenia, at the north end of the bay of Navarino, which the island of Sphacteria closes off. The Messenians of Naupactus were descendants of the Helots and Messenians whom the Athenians settled there after the revolt of the 460s BC (1.103).

2. The Attic choenix (dry measure) was a little over a liter; the cotyle (liquid measure) about a quarter of a liter.

3. The Thirty Years' Peace of 446/445 BC (1.115).

4. Artaxerxes I died in the winter of 425/424 BC.

5. The Greek text is corrupt at this point; the translation gives the generally accepted sense.

6. Coronea: Boeotian victory of 447 BC, which ended the Athenian control of Boeotia won at Oenophyta.

7. Oenophyta: Athenian victory over the Boeotians in 457 BC under Myronides, after which Athens dominated Boeotia for ten years.

8. The Nine Ways (Ennea Hodoi): the earlier name of the site. Aristagoras' attempt was in 497 BC, the failed Athenian settlement in 465 BC, and Hagnon's foundation of Amphipolis in 437 BC.

9. Coryphasium: Pylos (4.3), held by the Athenians since 425 BC. Buphras and Tomeus were heights nearby.

10. Elaphebolion: an Athenian month, roughly March–April; the armistice dates to 423 BC. Gerastius (4.119) is a Spartan month.

11. The Greek text is defective here; some words are lost.

12. Chrysis: priestess of Hera at Argos, by whose years of office Thucydides dated the outbreak of the war (2.2). The fire was in 423 BC.

Book 5

1 The following summer the one-year truce had run out, though it held until the Pythian games.[1] During this armistice the Athenians removed the Delians from Delos. They judged that the Delians, because of some ancient offense, had been impure when they were consecrated, and also that this was what was still lacking in the purification of the island, the one in which, as I have described earlier, they believed they had done rightly by taking up the graves of the dead. The Delians settled at Atramyttium in Asia, which Pharnaces gave them, each going there separately, as he had set out.

2 Cleon, having won the Athenians over, sailed after the armistice for the Thracian region with 1,200 Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry, a larger number of allies, and thirty ships. He put in first at Scione, which was still under siege, and took on hoplites from the besieging force there; then he sailed down to the Deaf Harbor, as it was called, in the territory of Torone, not far from the city. From there, learning from deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone and that those inside were no match for him, he advanced on the city with his land army and sent ten ships around to sail into the harbor. He came first to the outer wall that Brasidas had thrown around the city when he wanted to bring the suburb inside; he had torn down part of the old wall and made the whole one city.

3 Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian commander, and the garrison that was there came to defend this wall and tried to beat back the

Athenian assault. But when they were hard pressed, and at the same time the ships sent around were sailing into the harbor, Pasitelidas was afraid that the ships would get there first and take the city while it was empty, and that he would be caught in the outwork when it fell; he abandoned it and ran for the city. The Athenians were there first: the men from the ships took Torone, and the land army, following close behind, burst in with him through the breach in the old wall. Some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans they killed at once, hand to hand; others they took alive, among them Pasitelidas the commander. Brasidas was coming to the relief of Torone, but learned on the road that it had fallen and turned back; he was about forty stades short of getting there in time. Cleon and the Athenians set up two trophies, one by the harbor and the other by the outer wall. They enslaved the women and children of the Toronaeans, and sent the men themselves, with the Peloponnesians and any Chalcidians who were there, about seven hundred in all, to Athens. Later the Peloponnesian part of them came home under the treaty that was made; the rest were recovered by the Olynthians, man exchanged for man. About the same time the Boeotians took Panactum, an Athenian fort on the border, by betrayal. Cleon, after posting a garrison at Torone, put to sea and sailed around Athos toward Amphipolis.

4 About the same time Phaeax son of Erasistratus sailed to Italy and Sicily with two ships, as one of three envoys sent by the Athenians. After the Athenians had left Sicily following the settlement, the Leontines had enrolled many new citizens, and the people had in mind to redistribute the land. The powerful men, learning of this, brought in the Syracusans and drove out the people. The people scattered, each his own way; the powerful men came to terms with the Syracusans, abandoned their own city and left it empty, and went to live at Syracuse as citizens. Later some of

them, not satisfied there, left Syracuse again and seized a place called Phocaeae, a quarter of the city of Leontini, and Bricinniae, a stronghold in Leontine territory. Most of the people who had been driven out came to join them there, and they settled in and made war from behind the walls. When the Athenians heard of this they sent Phaeax, to see whether they could persuade their allies there, and the rest of the Sicilian Greeks if possible, to march together against the Syracusans as men who were building up their power, and so save the people of Leontini. Phaeax on his arrival persuaded the Camarinaeans and the Acragantines; but at Gela the business met resistance, and he went on to no others, seeing that he would not persuade them. He withdrew through the country of the Sicels to Catana, visiting Bricinniae on the way and encouraging the men there, and sailed away.

5 On the voyage to Sicily and back, he also negotiated with some of the cities in Italy about friendship with the Athenians. He fell in with the Locrian settlers who had been expelled from Messana. After the agreement among the Sicilian Greeks, the Messanians had fallen into civil strife, and one party had called in the Locrians, who sent out settlers; so for a time Messana belonged to the Locrians. Phaeax met these men on their way home and did them no harm, for the Locrians had reached an understanding with him about coming to terms with the Athenians. They alone of the allies had not made a treaty with the Athenians when the Sicilian Greeks were reconciled, and they would not have done so now if they had not been held down by their war with the Hipponians and the Medmaeans, who were their neighbors and their colonists. Phaeax reached Athens some time later.

6 Cleon, after sailing around from Torone toward Amphipolis, made Eion his base. He attacked Stagirus, a colony of Andros, and failed to take it, but he took Galepsus, the Thasian colony, by

storm. He sent envoys to Perdiccas, asking him to come with an army as the alliance required, and others into Thrace to Polles, king of the Odomantians, to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as they could; and he himself waited quietly at Eion. When Brasidas learned of this, he too took up a position facing him, on Cerdylium. This is a place belonging to the Argilians, on high ground across the river not far from Amphipolis, and everything could be seen from it, so that Cleon could not move out with his army without Brasidas seeing him. And Brasidas expected him to do just that: to look down on the small numbers of the enemy and march up against Amphipolis with the army he had. At the same time he prepared his forces, summoning 1,500 Thracian mercenaries and all the Edonians, peltasts and cavalry; and he had a thousand peltasts from Myrcinus and Chalcidice, besides those in Amphipolis. His hoplites, all told, came to about two thousand, and there were three hundred Hellenic cavalry. Of these, Brasidas had about 1,500 with him on Cerdylium; the rest were posted in Amphipolis under Clearidas.

7 Cleon kept quiet for a while, but then he was forced to do what Brasidas expected. His soldiers were chafing at sitting still, and they were reckoning up what ignorance and softness his leadership would bring against what experience and daring, and how unwillingly they had come out with him from home. He noticed their muttering, and, not wanting them to lose heart from sitting in the same place, he took them up and led them out. He used the same method that had succeeded at Pylos and made him think he had some sense. He did not even expect anyone to come out against him for a battle; he said he was going up rather to look over the place, and he was waiting for the larger force, not so as to have a margin of safety if he should be forced to fight, but so as to surround the city on every side and take it by storm. He came and posted his army on a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, and he

himself surveyed the marshy reaches of the Strymon and how the city lay toward Thrace. He thought he could leave without a battle whenever he chose: no one could be seen on the wall, no one came out through the gates, and they were all shut. He even thought he had made a mistake in not bringing siege engines up with him, for he could have taken the city, it was so deserted.

8 As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians on the move, he too came down from Cerdylium and went into Amphipolis. He made no sally and drew up no line against the Athenians, fearing his own forces and thinking them inferior, not in numbers (they were fairly evenly matched) but in quality: of the Athenians, the force that took the field was pure Athenian, and with it were the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians. So he prepared to attack by a stratagem. If he showed the enemy the numbers and the makeshift arms of the men with him, he thought he would be less likely to win than if he attacked without their seeing them first and before they had any well-founded contempt for them. He therefore picked out 150 hoplites for himself, put the rest under Clearidas, and planned to attack suddenly before the Athenians could leave; he did not think he would catch them isolated like this again, if their reinforcements happened to arrive. He called all his soldiers together, and, wanting to encourage them and explain his plan, he spoke as follows.

9 "Men of the Peloponnese, as for the country we come from, how it has always been free because of its courage, and the fact that you are Dorians about to fight Ionians, whom you are used to beating, let it be enough to have said it briefly. But how I mean to make the attack I will explain, so that no one is made fainthearted by our going into danger a few at a time and not all together, as though that were a weakness. I suppose that the enemy came up to the place out of contempt for us, never expecting that anyone would come out against them to fight; and now, out of order and

turned to looking at the view, they are careless. Whoever best sees such mistakes in the enemy, and makes his attack to suit his own strength, not openly and in pitched array but as the present moment makes it advantageous, will succeed most often. And those stratagems win the finest name by which a man most deceives his enemy and most helps his friends. So while they are still unprepared and confident, and are thinking more about slipping away than about staying, as far as I can see, while their minds are slack and before their resolve tightens, I will take the men with me and, if I can, get there first and fall on the center of their army at a run. And you, Clearidas, afterward, when you see me already pressing them and, as is likely, frightening them, take your own men and the Amphipolitans and the other allies, open the gates suddenly, charge out, and press on to close with them as fast as you can. That is our best hope of throwing them into panic, for a force that comes on afterward is more terrible to an enemy than the one that is already there and fighting. Be a brave man yourself, as befits you, since you are a Spartiate; and you, allies, follow bravely. Remember that good soldiering is three things, willingness, a sense of shame, and obedience to commanders, and that on this day, if you prove brave men, you will have freedom and the name of allies of the Lacedaemonians; if not, you will be slaves of the Athenians, even if you come off as well as you can, without being sold or put to death, and you will have a harsher slavery than you had before, and you will stand in the way of the liberation of the rest of the Hellenes. Do not be soft, then, seeing how much is at stake; and I will show that I am no better at urging others than at going into action myself."

10 After this speech Brasidas prepared his own sally, and posted the rest with Clearidas at the gates called the Thracian Gates, to charge out as had been arranged. Brasidas had been seen coming down from Cerdylium, and in the city, which can be seen from

outside, he was seen sacrificing near the temple of Athena and making these preparations. Word was brought to Cleon (he had gone forward at that time to look over the ground) that the whole enemy army could be seen in the city, and that under the gates many feet of horses and men could be glimpsed, as if they were about to come out. On hearing this he went up to see; and when he saw, not wanting to fight a battle before his reinforcements came, and thinking he would get away in time, he ordered the signal for retreat to be given, and passed the word to those leaving to move off by the left wing toward Eion, which was the only way it could be done. When he thought this was taking too long, he himself wheeled the right wing, exposing its unshielded side to the enemy, and began to lead the army off. At this point Brasidas, seeing his chance and the Athenian army on the move, said to his own men and the others, "These men will not stand up to us. You can tell by the movement of their spears and their heads; men who do that do not stand up to an attack. Someone open the gates I spoke of, and let us charge out as fast as we can, with confidence." He went out by the gate toward the palisade, the first gate in the long wall as it then stood, and ran at full speed along the straight road where the trophy now stands as you go along the steepest part of the hill. He fell on the Athenians, who were already frightened by their own disorder and stunned by his daring, struck the center of their army, and routed it. Clearidas, as had been arranged, charged out at the same moment by the Thracian Gates and bore down on them with his force. The result of the unexpected and sudden attack from both sides was that the Athenians were thrown into confusion. Their left wing, the one toward Eion, which had in fact already gone on ahead, at once broke off and fled. As it was already giving way, Brasidas moved along to the right wing and was wounded; when he fell the Athenians did not notice, and those near him picked him up and carried him off. The right wing of the

Athenians stood its ground better. Cleon, since he had never meant to stand, fled at once, and was overtaken by a Myrcinian peltast and killed; but his hoplites, rallying together on the hill, beat off Clearidas, though he attacked them two or three times, and did not give way until the Myrcinian and Chalcidian cavalry and the peltasts surrounded them, threw javelins into them, and routed them. So now the whole Athenian army was in flight, struggling off by many roads across the mountains; those who were not killed, either at once hand to hand or by the Chalcidian cavalry and the peltasts, got back to Eion. The men who had taken Brasidas up from the battle and brought him safe into the city carried him in still breathing. He knew that his men were winning, and not long after he died. The rest of the army returned with Clearidas from the pursuit, stripped the dead, and set up a trophy.

11 After this all the allies, following in arms, buried Brasidas at public expense in the city, in front of what is now the agora. From then on the Amphipolitans have fenced in his tomb, they sacrifice to him as a hero, and they have given him honors, games and yearly sacrifices; and they made over the colony to him as its founder, pulling down the buildings of Hagnon and destroying anything that might otherwise have survived as a memorial of his founding.[2] They considered that Brasidas had been their savior, and at the same time they were courting the alliance of the Lacedaemonians out of fear of the Athenians; while Hagnon, given their hostility to the Athenians, could not hold the honors with the same advantage to them, or with the same pleasure. They gave the Athenians back their dead. About six hundred of the Athenians died, and seven of their opponents, because the battle was not fought in regular line but arose rather from such an accident and from a panic beforehand. After taking up their dead, the Athenians sailed home, and Clearidas and his men set about putting the affairs of Amphipolis in order.

12 About the same time, at the end of the summer, Rhamphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedaemonians, were leading a relief force of nine hundred hoplites to the Thracian region. Arriving at Heraclea in Trachis, they set right whatever they thought was amiss there. While they were lingering there this battle took place, and the summer ended.

13 Early in the following winter Rhamphias and his men went as far as Pierium in Thessaly. But the Thessalians tried to stop them, and Brasidas, to whom they were bringing the army, was dead, so they turned back home. They thought there was no longer any occasion for it, since the Athenians had gone away defeated and they themselves were not equal to carrying out any of the plans Brasidas had had in mind. Most of all they went home because they knew that when they set out the Lacedaemonians had been inclined rather toward peace.

14 Right after the battle at Amphipolis and Rhamphias' withdrawal from Thessaly, it came about that neither side touched the war any further, and both were inclined rather toward peace. The Athenians had been struck down at Delium and again, a short time later, at Amphipolis, and they no longer had the confident hope in their strength that had made them reject a treaty earlier, when they thought their present good fortune would make them come out on top. They also feared that their allies, encouraged by these reverses, would revolt further, and they regretted not having come to terms after Pylos, when the chance was fair. The Lacedaemonians, for their part, found the war turning out against their expectation: they had thought they would destroy the power of the Athenians within a few years if they ravaged their land. Then they had met the disaster on the island, such as had never yet befallen Sparta; their country was being plundered from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting; and there was always the fear that those who stayed would rely on the ones outside and, in the

present situation, rise in revolt, as they had before. It happened, too, that their thirty years' treaty with the Argives was about to expire, and the Argives refused to make another unless someone gave them back the Cynurian land; so it seemed impossible to fight the Argives and the Athenians at the same time. And they suspected that some of the cities in the Peloponnese would go over to the Argives, as in fact happened.

15 Reckoning all this, both sides thought a settlement had to be made, and the Lacedaemonians not least, out of their desire to recover the men from the island; for the Spartiates among them were men of the first rank and kinsmen of theirs as well. They had begun negotiating at once, right after the men were captured, but the Athenians, while things were going well for them, would not hear of ending the war on equal terms. When the Athenians were defeated at Delium, the Lacedaemonians, knowing that they would now be more willing to accept, immediately concluded the one-year armistice, during which the two sides were to meet and consider a longer settlement.

16 But when the Athenians had also suffered the defeat at Amphipolis, and Cleon and Brasidas were dead, the two men who on either side had most opposed the peace (Brasidas because he was succeeding and winning honor from the war, Cleon because he thought that in quiet times his wrongdoing would be more exposed and his slanders less believed), then the men who were pressing hardest for leadership in each city, Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, who had done better than anyone of his time in his commands, became far more eager for peace. Nicias wished, while he was still unhurt and held in esteem, to preserve his good fortune; to rest from his labors for the present and to give rest to the citizens; and to leave a name to the future as one who had never brought the city to grief. He thought that this comes from avoid-

ing danger and from trusting oneself as little as possible to fortune, and that peace provides freedom from danger. Pleistoanax was being slandered by his enemies over his restoration, and was always being put forward by them as a matter for religious scruple to the Lacedaemonians whenever they suffered some setback, as though it had come about because his return had broken the law.[3] For they charged that he and his brother Aristocles had persuaded the prophetess at Delphi to give this answer to the Lacedaemonian envoys whenever they came, over a long period: "Bring back the seed of the demigod son of Zeus from the foreign land to your own; otherwise you will plow with a silver share." He had been in exile on Lycaeum because of his withdrawal from Attica long before, on the suspicion of a bribe, and was living in half of his house inside the precinct of Zeus for fear of the Lacedaemonians; and in time, they charged, she had induced the Lacedaemonians to bring him back in the nineteenth year, with the same dances and sacrifices with which they had installed their kings when they first founded Lacedaemon.

17 Vexed by this slander, he thought that in peacetime, when there were no reverses and the Lacedaemonians were getting back their men, he himself would also be beyond the reach of his enemies; whereas while there was war the leading men were always bound to be slandered for its misfortunes. So he was eager for the settlement. Through this winter they went to talks, and toward spring the Lacedaemonians held a threat over the Athenians beforehand, sending word around the cities to prepare as though for a fortified post in Attica, so that the Athenians would be more ready to listen. At the meetings both sides brought forward many claims against each other, and it was agreed that peace should be made on the basis that each would give back what it had taken in war, but that the Athenians should keep Nisaea. (When they asked for Plataea in return, the Thebans said they held the place not by

force but because its people had come over to them by agreement and not by betrayal; and the Athenians said the same of Nisaea.) Then the Lacedaemonians summoned their own allies, and all of them voted to end the war except the Boeotians, the Corinthians, the Eleans, and the Megarians, who did not like what was being done. The Lacedaemonians concluded the settlement, made a treaty with the Athenians, and swore to it, and the Athenians swore to the Lacedaemonians, as follows.

18 "The Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and their allies have made a treaty on the following terms, and have sworn to it city by city. Concerning the common sanctuaries: whoever wishes may sacrifice, travel to them, consult the oracles, and attend the festivals according to ancestral custom, by land and by sea, without fear. The sanctuary and temple of Apollo at Delphi, and the Delphians, shall be autonomous, with their own taxation and their own courts, both for their persons and for their territory, according to ancestral custom. The treaty shall be for fifty years between the Athenians and the allies of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the Lacedaemonians, without fraud and without harm, by land and by sea. It shall not be permitted to bear arms with intent to harm, neither for the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, nor for the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies, by any art or device whatever. If there is any dispute between them, they shall settle it by law and by oaths, in such manner as they may agree. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall give back Amphipolis to the Athenians. From all cities that the Lacedaemonians hand over to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be permitted to depart wherever they wish, taking their own property with them. The cities, paying the tribute fixed in the time of Aristides, shall be autonomous. Once the treaty has been made, it shall not be permitted for the Athenians or their

allies to bear arms against them with intent to harm, so long as they pay the tribute. These cities are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. They shall be allies of neither side, neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians; but if the Athenians persuade the cities, it shall be permitted for the Athenians to make them their allies, if the cities themselves are willing. The Mecybernaeans, the Sanaeans, and the Singaeans shall inhabit their own cities, as the Olynthians and the Acanthians do. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall give back Panactum to the Athenians. The Athenians shall give back to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methana, Pteleum, and Atalanta, and all Lacedaemonians who are in public custody at Athens or in public custody anywhere else in the Athenian dominions. They shall release the Peloponnesians besieged in Scione, and all other allies of the Lacedaemonians who are in Scione, and all whom Brasidas sent in, and any of the allies of the Lacedaemonians who is in public custody at Athens or in public custody anywhere else in the Athenian dominions. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall likewise give back all those of the Athenians and their allies whom they hold. Concerning Scione, Torone, and Sermyle, and any other city that the Athenians hold, the Athenians shall decide as they see fit about them and about the other cities. The Athenians shall swear oaths to the Lacedaemonians and their allies city by city. Each side shall swear the oath that is most binding in its own country, seventeen men from each city. The oath shall be as follows: 'I will abide by this agreement and this treaty justly and without fraud.' The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall swear the same oath to the Athenians. Both sides shall renew the oath every year. Pillars shall be set up at Olympia, at Pytho, at the Isthmus, at Athens on the Acropolis, and at Lacedaemon in the Amyclaeum. If either side has forgotten anything, on any matter whatever, it shall be consistent

with their oaths for both sides, the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, to make changes by just discussion, in whatever way seems good to them both.

19 "The treaty takes effect, at Lacedaemon, in the ephorate of Pleistolas, on the fourth day from the end of the month Artemisium; at Athens, in the archonship of Alcaeus, on the sixth day from the end of the month Elaphebolion. The following swore and poured the libations. For the Lacedaemonians: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinadas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. For the Athenians, the following: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes."

20 This treaty was made at the end of the winter, as spring began, right after the City Dionysia, exactly ten years and a few days more from the time when the first invasion of Attica took place and this war began.[4] Let a reader count by the seasons, and not put more trust in lists of the names of archons, or of others in each place whose office serves to date past events. That is not exact, since an event may have fallen at the beginning of their term, or in the middle, or at any point. But if he counts by summers and winters, as this has been written, each of the two halves making up a year, he will find that ten summers and as many winters went by in this first war.

21 The Lacedaemonians, who had drawn the lot to give back first what they held, at once released the prisoners they had, and sent Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to the Thracian region, ordering Clearidas to hand over Amphipolis to the Athenians and the others to accept the treaty as it applied to each of them. They refused, thinking it was not in their interest; and Clearidas did not hand over the city either, to oblige the

Chalcidians, saying that he was not able to hand it over against their will. He came himself in haste with envoys from there to Lacedaemon, to defend himself if Ischagoras and his colleagues accused him of disobedience, and also wanting to know whether the agreement could still be altered. When he found that it was already binding, he set out again in haste, the Lacedaemonians sending him back with orders to hand over the place, if possible, and otherwise to bring out all the Peloponnesians who were in it.

22 The allies happened to be present at Lacedaemon themselves, and the Lacedaemonians told those of them who had not accepted the treaty to do so. But they gave the same reason on which they had rejected it at first, and said they would not accept it unless a fairer one was made. When the allies would not listen, the Lacedaemonians sent them away and themselves made an alliance with the Athenians. They thought that in that way the Argives would be least dangerous to them (the Argives had refused to renew the treaty when Ampelidas and Lichas came, thinking the Lacedaemonians were not formidable without the Athenians), and that the rest of the Peloponnese would most likely keep quiet, for it would have gone over to the Athenians if it could. So, with envoys from the Athenians present and after discussion, they came to an agreement, and the following oaths and alliance were made.

23 "The Lacedaemonians and the Athenians shall be allies on the following terms for fifty years. If any enemy invades the territory of the Lacedaemonians and does harm to the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall help the Lacedaemonians in whatever way is most effective, to the utmost of their power. If the enemy ravages the land and departs, that city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians and shall suffer harm at the hands of both, and the two cities shall make peace together. This shall be done justly, zealously, and without fraud. If any

enemy invades the territory of the Athenians and does harm to the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall help the Athenians in whatever way is most effective, to the utmost of their power. If the enemy ravages the land and departs, that city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians and shall suffer harm at the hands of both, and the two cities shall make peace together. This shall be done justly, zealously, and without fraud. If the slave population rises in revolt, the Athenians shall come to the aid of the Lacedaemonians with all their strength, to the utmost of their power. The same persons on each side who swore the other treaty shall swear to this. The oath shall be renewed every year, the Lacedaemonians coming to Athens for the Dionysia and the Athenians going to Lacedaemon for the Hyacinthia. Each side shall set up a pillar, the one at Lacedaemon beside Apollo in the Amyclaeum, the other at Athens on the Acropolis beside Athena. If the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians decide to add anything to the alliance or take anything from it, whatever they decide, it shall be consistent with their oaths for both.

24 "For the Lacedaemonians the following swore the oath: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus; for the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes." This alliance was made not long after the treaty, and the Athenians gave back the men from the island to the Lacedaemonians, and the summer of the eleventh year began. Thus has the first war been written, which went on without a break for these ten years.

25 After the treaty and the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, which were made after the ten years' war, when Pleistolas was ephor at Lacedaemon and

Alcaeus archon at Athens, there was peace for those who had accepted them. But the Corinthians and some of the cities in the Peloponnese tried to upset what had been done, and at once a new disturbance arose between the allies and Lacedaemon. And as time went on the Lacedaemonians also came under the suspicion of the Athenians, since on some points they did not carry out what had been agreed. For six years and ten months they refrained from invading each other's territory, but abroad, under an unstable cessation of arms, they did each other all the harm they could. In the end, compelled to break the treaty made after the ten years, they went back into open war.

26 The same Thucydides the Athenian has written these events too, in order, as each happened, by summers and winters, down to the time when the Lacedaemonians and their allies put an end to the empire of the Athenians and took the Long Walls and Piraeus. Up to that point the war lasted twenty-seven years in all. If anyone does not see fit to count the settlement in between as war, he will not judge rightly. Let him look at the facts as they have been set out, and he will find that it does not make sense to call that a peace, in which neither side gave back or received all that they had agreed; and besides, there were breaches on both sides over the Mantinean and Epidaurian war and in other matters; the allies in the Thracian region were as much at war as ever; and the Boeotians kept only a ten-day truce. So, with the first, ten-year war, the suspicious cessation of arms after it, and the war that came out of it afterward, a reader will find, counting by the seasons, just that number of years, and a few days more; and for those who put their faith in oracles, this one thing alone came out firmly true. I myself remember that all along, from the beginning of the war until it ended, it was put about by many that it would last three times nine years. I lived through the whole of it, of an age to understand it and applying my mind so as to know something

exactly. It also happened that I was exiled from my own country for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis, and that, being with both sides in their affairs, and not least with the Peloponnesians because of my exile, I came to understand something more of them at leisure.[5] I will now relate the quarrel after the ten years, the breaking of the treaty, and how the war was fought after that.

27 After the fifty years' treaty was made, and then the alliance, the embassies from the Peloponnese that had been summoned for these matters left Lacedaemon. The others went home, but the Corinthians turned aside to Argos and first had talks with some of the Argives in authority. Their argument was that since the Lacedaemonians had made a treaty and an alliance with the Athenians, formerly their worst enemies, not for the good of the Peloponnese but to enslave it, the Argives ought to see to it that the Peloponnese was saved. They should pass a decree that any Hellenic city that wished, provided it was autonomous and gave and received justice on fair and equal terms, might make an alliance with the Argives for mutual defense of each other's territory; and they should appoint a few men with full powers, and not have the discussions held before the people, so that those who failed to persuade the multitude would not be exposed. They said that many would come over out of hatred of the Lacedaemonians. After giving this advice the Corinthians went home.

28 The Argives who had heard them reported the proposals to the magistrates and the people, and the Argives passed the decree and chose twelve men with whom any of the Hellenes who wished might make an alliance, except the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; neither of these was to be allowed to make a treaty without the Argive people. The Argives accepted the proposal the more readily because they saw that war with the Lacedaemonians was coming (their treaty with them was about to

expire), and because they also hoped to lead the Peloponnese. For at this time Lacedaemon stood in very ill repute and was despised because of its disasters, while the Argives were in excellent shape in every way: they had taken no part in the Attic war and had rather reaped the harvest of being at peace with both sides. So the Argives in this way began to receive into the alliance those of the Hellenes who were willing.

29 The Mantineans and their allies were the first to come over to them, out of fear of the Lacedaemonians. While the war with the Athenians was still going on, the Mantineans had subdued part of Arcadia and made it subject to them, and they thought the Lacedaemonians would not let them keep their rule, now that they had leisure. So they turned gladly to the Argives, considering theirs a great city, always at odds with the Lacedaemonians, and a democracy like their own. When the Mantineans revolted, the rest of the Peloponnese also began to murmur that they too must do the same. They thought the Mantineans had changed sides because they knew something more, and at the same time they were angry with the Lacedaemonians, among other reasons because it had been written in the Attic treaty that it would be consistent with their oaths to add or take away whatever both the cities, the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, might decide. This clause above all upset the Peloponnese and made it suspect that the Lacedaemonians, together with the Athenians, meant to enslave it, since the right thing would have been to make any change subject to all the allies. So most of them, being afraid, were moved to make alliances with the Argives on their own account as well.

30 When the Lacedaemonians saw this murmuring spread through the Peloponnese, and that the Corinthians had been the teachers of it and were about to make a treaty with Argos themselves, they sent envoys to Corinth, wanting to forestall what was

coming. They charged the Corinthians with having started the whole business, and said that if they abandoned them and became allies of the Argives, they would be breaking their oaths; they were already in the wrong, too, in not accepting the Athenian treaty, since it had been laid down that whatever the majority of the allies voted should be binding, unless there was some impediment from gods or heroes. The Corinthians, with those of their allies present who had not accepted the treaty either (they had invited them themselves beforehand), answered the Lacedaemonians. They did not openly declare the wrongs they had suffered, that they had not recovered Sollium or Anactorium from the Athenians, or anything else in which they thought they had been shortchanged; instead they made a pretext of not betraying the people in the Thracian region. They had sworn oaths to them privately, they said, when those people first revolted along with the Potidaeans, and others afterward. So they were not breaking the oaths of the alliance by not entering the Athenian treaty; for having sworn by the gods to those people, they would be forsworn if they betrayed them. It had been said, "unless there is some impediment from gods or heroes," and this, it seemed to them, was a divine impediment. That was what they said about their old oaths. As for the Argive alliance, they would consult their friends and do whatever was right. The Lacedaemonian envoys went home. Argive envoys also happened to be present in Corinth, and they urged the Corinthians to join the alliance without delay; but the Corinthians told them to come to the next meeting held at Corinth.

31 An embassy from the Eleans also came at once and first made an alliance with the Corinthians; then they went on from there to Argos and, as had been laid down, became allies of the Argives. They happened to be at odds with the Lacedaemonians over Lepreum. The Lepreans had once been at war with some of the Arcadians, and had called in the Eleans as allies for half of their

land; when the Eleans had ended the war, they left the land to the Lepreans to occupy, assessing them a talent to be paid to Olympian Zeus. They paid it until the Attic war; then, when they stopped paying on the pretext of the war, the Eleans tried to compel them, and they turned to the Lacedaemonians. The case was referred to the Lacedaemonians for judgment; but the Eleans, suspecting they would not get fair treatment, gave up the arbitration and ravaged the Leprean land. The Lacedaemonians nonetheless gave judgment that the Lepreans were autonomous and that the Eleans were in the wrong, and, on the ground that the Eleans had not abided by the arbitration, sent a garrison of hoplites into Lepreum. The Eleans, holding that the Lacedaemonians had taken in a city that had revolted from them, and citing the agreement in which it had been laid down that whatever places each party held when they entered the Attic war, they should hold the same when they came out of it, revolted to the Argives on the ground that they were not being treated fairly; and they too made the alliance as had been laid down. Immediately after them the Corinthians and the Chalcidians of the Thracian region also became allies of the Argives. The Boeotians and the Megarians, saying the same thing, kept quiet. They were being left alone by the Lacedaemonians, and they thought the Argive democracy would suit them, as oligarchies, less well than the Lacedaemonian constitution.

32 About the same time this summer the Athenians took Scione by siege, killed the men of military age, enslaved the women and children, and gave the land to the Plataeans to live on. They brought the Delians back to Delos, taking to heart their defeats in battle and the oracle of the god at Delphi. The Phocians and the Locrians began a war. The Corinthians and the Argives, now allies, went to Tegea to detach it from the Lacedaemonians; they saw that it was a large piece of territory, and they thought that if they

gained it they would have the whole Peloponnese. But when the Tegeans said they would do nothing against the Lacedaemonians, the Corinthians, who had been zealous up to this point, slackened in their contentiousness and began to fear that none of the others would come over to them now. All the same they went to the Boeotians and asked them to become allies of themselves and the Argives and to act in common with them in other matters. The Athenians and the Boeotians had a ten-day truce with each other, made not long after the fifty years' treaty; and the Corinthians asked the Boeotians to go with them to Athens and get one for them too, and, if the Athenians did not agree, to renounce the armistice and in the future make no treaty without them. When the Corinthians asked this, the Boeotians told them to wait about the Argive alliance; but they went to Athens with the Corinthians, and did not obtain the ten-day truce for them. The Athenians replied that the Corinthians had a treaty, if they were allies of the Lacedaemonians. The Boeotians did not on that account renounce the ten-day truce, though the Corinthians demanded it and accused them of having agreed to do so. And the Corinthians had a cessation of arms with the Athenians, but no treaty.

33 The same summer the Lacedaemonians marched out in full force, under the command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, against the Parrhasians in Arcadia, who were subjects of the Mantineans; a faction among them had called them in. They also meant to tear down, if they could, the fort at Cypsela, which the Mantineans had built and garrisoned themselves; it lay in Parrhasian territory, facing the Sciritis in Laconia. The Lacedaemonians ravaged the land of the Parrhasians, and the Mantineans, handing over their city to the Argives to guard, garrisoned the allied territory themselves. But they were unable to save either the fort at Cypsela or the cities in Parrhasia, and they

withdrew. The Lacedaemonians made the Parrhasians autonomous, pulled down the fort, and went home.

34 The same summer, when the soldiers who had gone out to Thrace with Brasidas had already come back, brought home by Clearidas after the treaty, the Lacedaemonians voted that the Helots who had fought with Brasidas should be free and live wherever they liked. Not long after they settled them, together with the Neodamodes, at Lepreum, which lies between Laconia and Elis, since they were already at odds with the Eleans.[6] As for their own men who had been taken on the island and had surrendered their arms, the Lacedaemonians feared that, thinking they would be lowered in status because of their misfortune, they might make some revolutionary move if they kept their full rights; so they disfranchised them, though some of them already held offices. The disfranchisement was such that they could neither hold office nor make any valid purchase or sale. Later, in time, they had their rights restored.

35 The same summer the Dians took Thyssus, on the Acte peninsula of Athos, an ally of the Athenians. All this summer there was intercourse between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, but right after the treaty the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians began to suspect each other over the failure to give back places to each other. The Lacedaemonians, who had drawn the lot to give back first, had not given back Amphipolis and the rest; they did not get their allies in the Thracian region to accept the treaty, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians, but kept saying that they would join the Athenians in compelling them if they would not. They set dates, though not in writing, by which those who did not come in were to be enemies of both sides. So the Athenians, seeing none of this happen in fact, suspected that the Lacedaemonians meant nothing honest. They would not give back Pylos when the Lacedaemonians asked for it; they even regretted having given

back the prisoners from the island; and they held on to the other places, waiting until the Lacedaemonians did what had been agreed on their side. The Lacedaemonians said they had done what they could: they had given back the Athenian prisoners they held, they had withdrawn their soldiers from the Thracian region, and anything else that was in their power. Amphipolis, they said, was not in their power to hand over; but they would try to bring the Boeotians and the Corinthians into the treaty, to recover Panactum, and to bring back the Athenians who were prisoners in Boeotia. They insisted, though, that Pylos be given back to them, or failing that, that the Messenians and the Helots at least be withdrawn from it, as they had withdrawn their own men from Thrace, and that the Athenians garrison the place themselves if they wished. After many and frequent discussions that summer, they persuaded the Athenians to withdraw the Messenians from Pylos, along with the rest, both Helots and all who had deserted from Laconia; and the Athenians settled them at Cranii in Cephallenia. So this summer there was quiet, and people went back and forth between the two sides.

36 The following winter (it happened that there were new ephors in office, not those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them were even opposed to the treaty) embassies came from the alliance, and the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians were present; they said a great deal to one another and agreed on nothing. As they were leaving for home, Cleobulus and Xenares, the ephors who most wanted to break the treaty, held private talks with the Boeotians and the Corinthians. They urged them to take the same view as far as possible, and urged the Boeotians to try first to become allies of the Argives themselves, and then to make the Argives, together with themselves, allies of the Lacedaemonians. In that way the Boeotians would be least likely to be forced into the Attic treaty, since the Lacedaemonians

would choose to have the Argives as friends and allies even at the price of the enmity of the Athenians and the breaking of the treaty; for they knew that the Lacedaemonians had always wanted Argos to be friendly to them on good terms. They thought this would make war outside the Peloponnese easier. They asked the Boeotians, however, to hand Panactum over to the Lacedaemonians, so that they might get back Pylos in exchange for it, if they could, and so more easily go to war with the Athenians.

37 The Boeotians and the Corinthians, charged with these messages by Xenares and Cleobulus and their friends among the Lacedaemonians to report to their governments, each went home. Two men of the highest office at Argos watched for them on the road as they were leaving, met them, and began talks: perhaps the Boeotians would become their allies, as the Corinthians, the Eleans, and the Mantineans had. If that went forward, they thought, it would be easy, acting on a common policy, to make war or peace, either with the Lacedaemonians, if they wished, or with anyone else if need be. The Boeotian envoys were pleased to hear it, for by chance the Argives were asking for the very things their friends at Lacedaemon had instructed them to do. When the Argive men saw that they welcomed the proposal, they said they would send envoys to the Boeotians, and left. On their return the Boeotians reported to the Boeotarchs what had been said at Lacedaemon and by the Argives who had met them. The Boeotarchs were pleased and far more eager than before, since it had turned out that on both sides their friends among the Lacedaemonians were asking for the same thing and the Argives were pressing toward the same end. Not long afterward envoys from the Argives arrived with the proposals that had been made, and the Boeotarchs sent them away with praise for what they said and a promise to send envoys to Argos about the alliance.

38 Meanwhile the Boeotarchs, the Corinthians, the Megarians, and the envoys from the Thracian region decided first to swear oaths to one another: that they would indeed come to the help of any of them who needed it, on any occasion, and would neither make war on anyone nor come to terms without a common decision; and that the Boeotians and the Megarians (who were acting together) should then make a treaty with the Argives. But before the oaths were taken, the Boeotarchs communicated these proposals to the four councils of the Boeotians, which hold all authority, and recommended that oaths be sworn with any cities willing to join them in an oath for their mutual benefit. The members of the Boeotian councils did not accept the proposal, fearing they would be acting against the Lacedaemonians if they swore an oath with the Corinthians, who had broken away from them. For the Boeotarchs had not told them what had happened at Lacedaemon: that the ephors Cleobulus and Xenares and their friends were advising them to become allies first of the Argives and the Corinthians and afterward to join the Lacedaemonians. They thought that the council, even if they did not tell it, would vote nothing but what they had decided beforehand and recommended. When the matter met resistance, the Corinthians and the envoys from the Thracian region went away with nothing done. The Boeotarchs, who had previously meant, if they carried this point, to try to make the alliance with the Argives as well, no longer brought the question of the Argives before the councils and did not send to Argos the envoys they had promised; there was a kind of neglect and delay in the whole business.

39 In this same winter the Olynthians made a sudden attack on Mecyberna, which had an Athenian garrison, and took it. After this (talks were going on all the while between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians about the places each held of the other's), the Lacedaemonians hoped that if the Athenians got Panactum back

from the Boeotians, they themselves would recover Pylos. They went on an embassy to the Boeotians and asked them to hand over to them Panactum and the Athenian prisoners, so that they might recover Pylos in exchange. The Boeotians said they would not give them back unless the Lacedaemonians made a separate alliance with them, as they had with the Athenians. The Lacedaemonians knew that they would be wronging the Athenians, since it had been agreed that neither would make a treaty or war with anyone without the other. But they wanted to get Panactum so as to recover Pylos in exchange for it, and at the same time those who were eager to wreck the treaty were pressing the Boeotian connection; so they made the alliance, at the very end of the winter, toward spring. And Panactum was at once torn down. And so the eleventh year of this war ended.

40 At the very beginning of spring the following summer, the Argives, since the envoys the Boeotians had said they would send did not come, and they learned that Panactum was being torn down and that the Boeotians had made a separate alliance with the Lacedaemonians, were afraid that they would be left isolated and that the whole alliance would go over to the Lacedaemonians. They thought that the Boeotians had been persuaded by the Lacedaemonians both to tear down Panactum and to enter the Athenian treaty, and that the Athenians knew it; so that they could no longer make an alliance even with the Athenians, whereas before they had hoped, because of the quarrels, that if their treaty with the Lacedaemonians did not last, they would at least become allies of the Athenians. At a loss, therefore, and afraid of being at war with the Lacedaemonians, the Tegeans, the Boeotians, and the Athenians all at once, the Argives, who earlier had refused the treaty with the Lacedaemonians and been full of pride, expecting to lead the Peloponnese, now sent envoys to Lacedaemon as fast as they could, Eustrophus and Aeson, who were thought to be the

men most acceptable there. They judged that under the circumstances it was best to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, on whatever terms they could get, and keep quiet.

41 The envoys arrived and discussed with the Lacedaemonians the terms on which a treaty might be made with them. At first the Argives demanded that the question of the Cynurian land be referred to arbitration, either by some city or by a private person. They are always quarreling over this land, since it is on the border; it contains the cities of Thyrea and Anthene, and the Lacedaemonians occupy it. But the Lacedaemonians would not allow any mention of it, and said that if the Argives wanted to make a treaty as before, they were ready. The Argive envoys nevertheless got the Lacedaemonians to agree to the following: that for the present a treaty should be made for fifty years; but that either side might issue a challenge, provided there was neither plague nor war at Lacedaemon or Argos, and fight it out for this land, as they had once done before, when each side claimed the victory; but that pursuit beyond the boundaries of Argos and Lacedaemon should not be permitted. At first the Lacedaemonians thought this was folly; but then, since they wanted Argos as a friend at all costs, they agreed to what was asked and drew it up in writing. The Lacedaemonians told them, however, before any of it took effect, to go back to Argos first and lay it before the people, and if it was acceptable, to come at the Hyacinthia to swear the oaths. The envoys went back.

42 During the time when the Argives were doing this, the envoys of the Lacedaemonians, Andromenes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas, who were to receive Panactum and the prisoners from the Boeotians and give them back to the Athenians, found that the Boeotians had torn down Panactum themselves. Their pretext was that long ago, after a dispute over it, the Athenians and the Boeotians had sworn oaths that neither would live in the

place but that both would graze it in common. Andromenes and his colleagues took over the Athenian prisoners whom the Boeotians held and brought them to the Athenians and gave them back; and they told them about the demolition of Panactum, considering that this too was giving it back, since no enemy of the Athenians would live in it any longer. When this was said, the Athenians were outraged. They felt they were being wronged by the Lacedaemonians, both by the demolition of Panactum, which ought to have been handed over standing, and because they learned that the Lacedaemonians had made a separate alliance with the Boeotians, though they had said earlier that they would join in compelling those who did not accept the treaty. They also considered the other points in which the Lacedaemonians had fallen short of the agreement, and thought they had been deceived. So they gave the envoys a harsh answer and sent them away.

43 With the Lacedaemonians at odds with the Athenians in this way, those at Athens who in turn wanted to break the treaty at once went to work. Among others there was Alcibiades son of Cleinias, a man still young in years at that time, as he would have been considered in any other city, but honored for the distinction of his ancestors. He thought it really was better to side with the Argives; but beyond that, he opposed the treaty out of pride and a spirit of rivalry, because the Lacedaemonians had negotiated it through Nicias and Laches and had passed him over because of his youth. Nor had they honored the old proxeny once held in his family, the role of official friend and representative of the Lacedaemonians at Athens; his grandfather had renounced it, and he himself had meant to renew it by his attentions to their prisoners from the island.[7] Feeling himself slighted on every side, he had spoken against the treaty from the start, saying that the Lacedaemonians were not to be relied on, and that they were

making the treaty only so that, having crushed the Argives with its help, they could then march against the Athenians alone. And now, when the quarrel had broken out, he at once sent a private message to Argos, telling them to come as quickly as possible with the Mantineans and the Eleans and invite Athens into alliance, since the moment had come, and he himself would do all he could to help.

44 When the Argives heard the message and realized that the alliance with the Boeotians had not been made with the Athenians' consent, but that the Athenians had fallen into a serious quarrel with the Lacedaemonians, they paid no more attention to their envoys at Lacedaemon, who happened to be away there about the treaty, and inclined rather toward the Athenians. They thought that a city friendly to them of old, a democracy like their own, and possessing great power at sea, would join them in the war if they went to war. So they at once sent envoys to the Athenians about the alliance; and the Eleans and the Mantineans sent envoys with them. Envoys of the Lacedaemonians also arrived in haste, men thought to be acceptable to the Athenians, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius. They were afraid that the Athenians in their anger would make the alliance with the Argives; and they came also to ask for Pylos in exchange for Panactum, and to defend the alliance with the Boeotians, on the ground that it had not been made to harm the Athenians.

45 They spoke in the council on these matters, and said that they had come with full powers to settle all the points in dispute. This alarmed Alcibiades, who was afraid that if they said the same things before the people, they would win over the multitude and the Argive alliance would be rejected. So Alcibiades contrived the following against them. He persuaded the Lacedaemonians, giving them his pledge, that if they did not admit before the people that they had come with full powers, he would give Pylos back to them

(he would himself persuade the Athenians, as he was now opposing it) and would settle the other points. He did this because he wanted to separate them from Nicias, and so that, by discrediting them before the people as men who had nothing honest in mind and never said the same thing twice, he might make the Argives, the Eleans, and the Mantineans allies. And so it turned out. When the envoys came before the people and, on being asked, said that they had not come with full powers, as they had said in the council, the Athenians would put up with it no longer. Alcibiades denounced the Lacedaemonians far more loudly than before, and the Athenians listened to him and were ready to bring in the Argives and their companions on the spot and make them allies. But an earthquake occurred before anything was ratified, and this assembly was adjourned.

46 In the assembly the next day, Nicias, though the Lacedaemonians themselves had been deceived and he too had been deceived over their not admitting that they had come with full powers, still said that they ought to cultivate the friendship of the Lacedaemonians rather, and, putting off the business with the Argives, send to them again and find out what they intended. He argued that the war should be postponed while their own position was good and that of the Lacedaemonians bad: for the Athenians, whose affairs stood well, it was best to preserve their prosperity as long as possible; for the Lacedaemonians, who were faring badly, it was a godsend to stake everything as soon as possible. He persuaded them to send envoys, of whom he was one, to tell the Lacedaemonians that if they had any honest intentions they should give back Panactum standing, and Amphipolis, and renounce the Boeotian alliance unless the Boeotians entered the treaty, in accordance with the clause that neither would make an agreement with anyone without the other. They told the envoys to say also that the Athenians, if they had wanted to do wrong, would

already have made the Argives their allies, since the Argives were in Athens for that very purpose. They gave them instructions on any other complaints they had, and sent Nicias and the other envoys off. When they arrived and delivered their message, ending with the statement that unless the Lacedaemonians renounced the alliance with the Boeotians if they did not enter the treaty, the Athenians would make allies of the Argives and their companions, the Lacedaemonians said they would not renounce the alliance with the Boeotians; the ephor Xenares and those of the same opinion prevailed in this. But at Nicias' request they renewed the oaths, for he was afraid of going away with nothing accomplished and being attacked, as in fact happened, since he was considered responsible for the treaty with the Lacedaemonians. When he returned and the Athenians heard that nothing had been accomplished at Lacedaemon, they were at once furious; and considering themselves wronged (the Argives and their allies happened to be present), on the motion of Alcibiades they made the following treaty and alliance with them.

47 "The Athenians and the Argives, the Mantineans, and the Eleans have made a treaty with one another for a hundred years, on behalf of themselves and the allies over whom each of them rules, without fraud and without harm, by land and by sea. It shall not be permitted to bear arms with intent to harm, neither for the Argives, the Eleans, the Mantineans, and their allies against the Athenians and the allies over whom the Athenians rule, nor for the Athenians and the allies over whom the Athenians rule against the Argives, the Eleans, the Mantineans, and their allies, by any art or device whatever. On the following terms the Athenians, the Argives, the Mantineans, and the Eleans shall be allies for a hundred years. If enemies invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, the Mantineans, and the Eleans shall come to the help of Athens, as the Athenians may call upon them to do, in whatever

way is most effective, to the utmost of their power. If the enemy ravages the land and departs, that city shall be the enemy of the Argives, the Mantineans, the Eleans, and the Athenians and shall suffer harm at the hands of all these cities; and it shall not be permitted for any of the cities to end the war against that city unless all of them so decide. The Athenians likewise shall come to the help of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis if enemies invade the territory of the Argives or the Mantineans or the Eleans, as these cities may call upon them to do, in whatever way is most effective, to the utmost of their power. If the enemy ravages the land and departs, that city shall be the enemy of the Athenians, the Argives, the Mantineans, and the Eleans and shall suffer harm at the hands of all these cities; and it shall not be permitted for any of the cities to end the war against that city unless all of them so decide. They shall not allow armed men to pass for purposes of war through their own territory or that of the allies over whom each of them rules, nor by sea, unless all the cities, the Athenians, the Argives, the Mantineans, and the Eleans, have voted to grant the passage. For troops sent to help, the city sending them shall provide rations for thirty days from their arrival in the city that called for help, and likewise on their departure. If the city that sent for the army wishes to use it for a longer time, it shall provide rations at the rate of three Aeginetan obols a day for each hoplite, light-armed soldier, and archer, and one Aeginetan drachma for each horseman. The city that sent for the army shall hold the command when the war is in its own territory; but if all the cities decide to make an expedition in common anywhere, the command shall be shared equally among all the cities. The Athenians shall swear to the treaty on behalf of themselves and their allies; the Argives, the Mantineans, the Eleans, and their allies shall swear city by city. Each shall swear the oath that is most binding in its own country, over full-grown victims. The oath shall be as follows: ‘I will abide

by the alliance according to its terms, justly, without harm, and without fraud, and I will not transgress it by any art or device whatever.' At Athens the council and the magistrates in the city shall swear, and the prytanes shall administer the oath; at Argos, the council, the Eighty, and the artynae, and the Eighty shall administer the oath; at Mantinea, the demiurgi, the council, and the other magistrates, and the theori and the polemarchs shall administer the oath; at Elis, the demiurgi, the holders of office, and the Six Hundred, and the demiurgi and the thesmophylaces shall administer the oath. The oaths shall be renewed, by the Athenians going to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos thirty days before the Olympic games, and by the Argives, the Eleans, and the Mantineans going to Athens ten days before the Great Panathenaea. The agreement concerning the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance shall be inscribed on a stone pillar, by the Athenians on the Acropolis, by the Argives in the agora in the sanctuary of Apollo, by the Mantineans in the sanctuary of Zeus in the agora; and they shall also set up a bronze pillar jointly at Olympia at the present Olympic games. If these cities think it better to add anything to what has been agreed, whatever all the cities decide in common deliberation shall be binding."

48 So the treaty and the alliance were made, and the treaty between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians was not renounced on that account by either side. The Corinthians, though allies of the Argives, did not enter into it. Even earlier, when an alliance had been made among the Eleans, the Argives, and the Mantineans, to have the same enemies and the same friends, they had not sworn to it; they said the first alliance was enough for them, a defensive one, to help one another, but to join no one in an attack. So the Corinthians stood apart from the allies and began to turn their minds back toward the Lacedaemonians.

49 The Olympic games were held this summer, the ones at which Androsthenes the Arcadian won the pancratium for the first time. The Lacedaemonians were barred from the sanctuary by the Eleans, so that they could neither sacrifice nor compete, because they had not paid the fine that the Eleans had imposed on them under the Olympic law. The Eleans claimed that the Lacedaemonians had attacked them in arms at the fort of Phyrcus and had sent their hoplites into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The fine was two thousand minas, two minas for each hoplite, as the law provides. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys and argued that the judgment against them was unjust, saying that the truce had not yet been proclaimed at Lacedaemon when they sent the hoplites in. The Eleans said that the armistice was already in force among themselves (they proclaim it first to themselves), and that while they were keeping quiet and expecting nothing, as men do in a truce, the Lacedaemonians had wronged them unawares. The Lacedaemonians replied that the Eleans had no business going on to proclaim the truce at Lacedaemon if they already considered them to be in the wrong; yet they had proclaimed it, as men who did not think so, and after that the Lacedaemonians had borne arms against them nowhere. The Eleans held to the same argument: they would never be persuaded that the Lacedaemonians had done no wrong; but if they were willing to give Lepreum back to them, they would remit their own share of the money and themselves pay on the Lacedaemonians' behalf the part that was due to the god.

50 When the Lacedaemonians would not listen to this, the Eleans proposed instead that they need not give back Lepreum, if they did not wish to, but that, since they were so eager to have the use of the sanctuary, they should go up to the altar of Olympian Zeus and swear before the Hellenes that they would indeed pay the fine later. When they would not do even this, the

Lacedaemonians were excluded from the sanctuary and sacrificed at home, and the rest of the Hellenes attended the festival, except the Lepreans. Still, the Eleans, fearing the Lacedaemonians would sacrifice by force, kept a guard of their young men under arms. The Argives and the Mantineans came to them as well, a thousand of each, and the Athenian cavalry, who waited at Harpina for the festival. Great fear fell on the gathering that the Lacedaemonians would come in arms, especially after Lichas son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, was beaten by the umpires on the course. His team had won, but since he was not allowed to compete, the Boeotian state was proclaimed the winner; and he came out onto the course and crowned the charioteer, wanting to show that the chariot was his. So everyone was far more alarmed than before, and it seemed that something was going to happen. The Lacedaemonians, however, kept quiet, and the festival went by for them in this way. After the Olympic games the Argives and their allies went to Corinth to ask the Corinthians to join them. Lacedaemonian envoys happened to be there too, and after much discussion nothing was accomplished in the end; an earthquake occurred, and they all dispersed to their homes. And the summer ended.

51 The following winter the Heracleots in Trachis fought a battle against the Aenianians, the Dolopians, the Malians, and some of the Thessalians. These peoples lived near the city and were hostile to it, for the place had been fortified against no other country than theirs. They had opposed the city from the moment it was founded, doing it all the damage they could, and now they defeated the Heracleots in battle; Xenares son of Cnidis, the Lacedaemonian commander, was killed, and others of the Heracleots also perished. So the winter ended, and with it the twelfth year of this war.

52 At the very beginning of the following summer, the Boeotians took over Heraclea, which had been badly ruined after the battle, and dismissed Agesippidas the Lacedaemonian for governing it badly. They took over the place out of fear that the Athenians would seize it while the Lacedaemonians were distracted by the troubles in the Peloponnese; the Lacedaemonians, however, were angry with them. The same summer Alcibiades son of Cleinias, now a general of the Athenians, with the Argives and their allies working with him, went into the Peloponnese with a few Athenian hoplites and archers. Picking up allies there, he went through the Peloponnese with his army, settling the affairs of the alliance among other things. He persuaded the Patreans to build walls down to the sea, and he himself meant to build another fort at the Achaean Rhium. But the Corinthians, the Sicyonians, and all to whom it would be harmful if it were built came to the rescue and prevented it.

53 The same summer war broke out between the Epidaurians and the Argives. The pretext was the offering to Apollo Pythaeus, which the Epidaurians were bound to send in payment for pasture lands and did not send; the Argives had chief authority over the temple. But even without this charge, Alcibiades and the Argives had decided to bring Epidaurus over, if they could, both to keep Corinth quiet and because the Athenians would have a shorter route for sending help from Aegina than sailing around Scyllaeum. So the Argives prepared to invade Epidaurus on their own, as if to exact payment of the offering.

54 About the same time the Lacedaemonians also marched out in full force under King Agis son of Archidamus to Leuctra, on their own frontier toward Lycaeum. No one knew where they were going, not even the cities from which the contingents had been sent. But when the sacrifices for crossing the frontier did not turn out favorably, they went home themselves and sent word around

to the allies to be ready to march after the coming month (it was the month Carneius, a holy month for the Dorians).[8] When they had withdrawn, the Argives marched out on the fourth day from the end of the month before Carneius, and, counting that same day as the date for as long as they were out, invaded Epidaurian territory and ravaged it. The Epidaurians called on their allies; some of them pleaded the month as an excuse, while others came as far as the Epidaurian border and stayed quiet there.

55 While the Argives were in Epidaurus, embassies from the cities met at Mantinea at the invitation of the Athenians. In the discussion Euphamidas the Corinthian said that their words did not agree with their deeds: they were sitting together talking about peace, while the Epidaurians and their allies and the Argives stood in arms against each other. They ought first, therefore, to go from both sides and break up the armies, and then talk about peace again. They were persuaded, went off, and got the Argives to withdraw from Epidaurian territory. Afterward they met at the same place again, but even so they could not come to an agreement, and the Argives invaded Epidaurian territory again and ravaged it. The Lacedaemonians also marched out to Caryae, but when the sacrifices for crossing the frontier did not turn out favorably there either, they went back. The Argives, after ravaging about a third of Epidaurian territory, went home. A thousand Athenian hoplites had come to their help, with Alcibiades as general; but learning that the Lacedaemonians had already marched out and gone back, and that they were no longer needed, he went away. So the summer passed.

56 The following winter the Lacedaemonians, without the Athenians' knowledge, sent a garrison of three hundred men by sea into Epidaurus, with Agesippidas in command. The Argives went to the Athenians and complained that, although it had been written in the treaty that neither side would allow enemies to pass

through its own territory, they had let them sail past along the coast; and that unless the Athenians in turn brought the Messenians and the Helots to Pylos to harass the Lacedaemonians, they themselves would consider they had been wronged. On Alcibiades' persuasion the Athenians inscribed at the foot of the Laconian pillar that the Lacedaemonians had not kept their oaths, and they brought the Helots from Cranii to Pylos to raid the country; otherwise they kept quiet. During this winter, while the Argives and the Epidaurians were at war, no regular battle took place, but there were ambushes and raids, in which some on each side were killed as chance had it. At the end of the winter, toward spring, the Argives came against Epidaurus with ladders, expecting to take it by storm because it was stripped of men by the war; and they went away with nothing done. So the winter ended, and with it the thirteenth year of this war.

57 In the middle of the following summer, since their allies the Epidaurians were in distress, and in the rest of the Peloponnese some places had revolted and others were in a bad way, the Lacedaemonians thought that if they did not act quickly to forestall it, the trouble would spread further. They marched against Argos in full force, themselves and the Helots, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. The Tegeans and all the other Arcadians who were allies of the Lacedaemonians marched with them. The allies from the rest of the Peloponnese and from outside it assembled at Phlius: of the Boeotians, five thousand hoplites, as many light-armed troops, five hundred cavalry, and the same number of foot soldiers who ran with the horses; of the Corinthians, two thousand hoplites; the others as each could; and the Phliasians in full force, since the army was in their country.

58 The Argives had learned in advance, first of the Lacedaemonian preparations, and then that they were marching

to Phlius to join the others; and at that point they marched out too. The Mantineans came to their help with their own allies, and three thousand Elean hoplites. Advancing, they met the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium in Arcadia. Each side occupied a hill. The Argives prepared to fight the Lacedaemonians while they were isolated; but Agis broke camp in the night, slipped away unnoticed, and marched to Phlius to join the other allies. When the Argives discovered this they set out at dawn, first for Argos and then along the road by Nemea, where they expected the Lacedaemonians and their allies to come down. But Agis did not take the road they expected. He gave orders to the Lacedaemonians, the Arcadians, and the Epidaurians, took another, difficult road, and came down into the plain of Argos. The Corinthians, the Pellenians, and the Phliasians marched by another steep road. The Boeotians, the Megarians, and the Sicyonians had been told to come down by the road from Nemea, where the Argives had taken up their position, so that if the Argives went down into the plain to meet his own force, they could follow on their heels and use their cavalry. Having made these dispositions, he invaded the plain and began ravaging Saminthus and other places.

59 The Argives, realizing this, came to the rescue from Nemea, by now in daylight. They ran into the army of the Phliasians and the Corinthians and killed a few of the Phliasians, but lost not many more of their own to the Corinthians. The Boeotians, the Megarians, and the Sicyonians marched as they had been told along the road toward Nemea, and found the Argives no longer there; the Argives had gone down, and when they saw their own land being ravaged they drew up for battle. The Lacedaemonians drew up against them. The Argives were caught in the middle. On the plain side the Lacedaemonians and those with them cut them off from the city; above them were the Corinthians, the Phliasians,

and the Pellenians; and on the side toward Nemea the Boeotians, the Sicyonians, and the Megarians. They had no cavalry with them, for the Athenians, alone of the allies, had not yet arrived. The mass of the Argives and their allies did not think their situation so dangerous; it seemed to them that the battle would be on favorable ground, and that they had cut off the Lacedaemonians in their own territory and close to their city. But two of the Argives, Thrasylus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, that is, the citizen who looked after Lacedaemonian interests at Argos, went to Agis when the armies were all but closing and talked with him to prevent a battle. The Argives, they said, were ready to give and receive justice on fair and equal terms, if the Lacedaemonians had any complaint against the Argives, and to make a treaty and keep the peace in the future.

60 These Argives said this on their own, without orders from the people; and Agis too accepted their proposals on his own. He did not consult the majority, and he discussed it with only one man among those in authority who were serving with the army, and made a truce for four months, in which they were to carry out what had been said. He led the army off at once, without explaining to any of the other allies. The Lacedaemonians and the allies followed his lead as the law required, but among themselves they blamed Agis severely. They thought that when they had had the chance to engage on favorable ground, with the enemy shut in on every side by cavalry and infantry, they were going away without having done anything worthy of their preparations. For this was certainly the finest Hellenic army that had ever been assembled up to that time. It was seen at its best while it was still together at Nemea: the Lacedaemonians in full force, the Arcadians, the Boeotians, the Corinthians, the Sicyonians, the Pellenians, the Phliasians, and the Megarians, all picked men from each people, who seemed a match not only for the Argive alliance but for

another one added to it. So the army withdrew, blaming Agis, and the contingents dispersed to their homes. The Argives, for their part, blamed far more severely those who had made the truce without the people; they too thought that the Lacedaemonians had escaped when they would never have a better chance, since the battle would have been fought close to their own city and with many good allies. On the way back, at the Charadrus, where they try cases arising from a campaign before entering the city, they began to stone Thrasylus. He took refuge at the altar and survived; but they confiscated his property.

61 After this a thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry arrived to help, with Laches and Nicostratus in command. The Argives, who for all that were reluctant to break the truce with the Lacedaemonians, told them to go away and would not bring them before the people when they wanted to negotiate, until the Mantineans and the Eleans (who were still there) forced them to by their insistence. The Athenians, with Alcibiades present as envoy, told the Argives and the allies that the truce had not been rightly made in the first place without the other allies, and that now (they had come at the right moment) they must take up the war. Having persuaded the allies by these arguments, they all marched at once against Orchomenus in Arcadia, all except the Argives; and they, though persuaded, stayed behind at first, but later they came too. They all sat down before Orchomenus, besieged it, and made assaults on it. They wanted to win it over for other reasons, and also because hostages from Arcadia had been lodged there by the Lacedaemonians. The Orchomenians, fearing the weakness of their wall and the size of the army, and afraid that they would perish before anyone came to help them, since no one was coming, came to terms: they would be allies, give hostages of their own to the Mantineans, and hand over those the Lacedaemonians had deposited there.

62 After this, now that they held Orchomenus, the allies discussed which of the remaining places they should go against first. The Eleans urged Lepreum, the Mantineans Tegea; and the Argives and the Athenians sided with the Mantineans. The Eleans, angry that they had not voted for Lepreum, went home; the rest of the allies made preparations at Mantinea to go against Tegea. Some of the people inside the city were also ready to hand things over to them.

63 When the Lacedaemonians had come back from Argos after making the four-month truce, they blamed Agis severely for not subduing Argos for them, when the chance had been finer than they themselves thought it had ever been before; it was not easy, they said, to get so many allies of such quality together in one place. And when news came that Orchomenus had been taken as well, they were far more indignant still, and in their anger, contrary to their character, they at once resolved that his house should be razed and that he should be fined a hundred thousand drachmas. He begged them to do none of this; he would wipe out the charges by a good deed when he took the field, or else they could do what they liked with him. They held back the fine and the razing, but they made a law for the occasion such as they had never had before: they chose ten Spartiates as his advisers, without whom he was not to have authority to lead an army out of the city.

64 Meanwhile word came to them from their friends in Tegea that unless they came quickly, Tegea would go over from them to the Argives and their allies; it had all but done so already. At this the Lacedaemonians sent a relief force, themselves and the Helots, in full strength, with a speed they had never shown before. They marched to Orestheum in Maenalia, and told those of the Arcadians who were their allies to assemble and follow close behind them to Tegea. They all went as far as Orestheum together;

from there they sent back home a sixth part of their own number, containing the oldest and the youngest, to guard things at home, and with the rest of the army they reached Tegea. Not long afterward their Arcadian allies arrived. They also sent to Corinth, the Boeotians, the Phocians, and the Locrians, telling them to come at once to help at Mantinea. But the notice was short for these, and it was not easy to get through enemy territory, which lay across the way between them, unless they were together and had waited for one another; still, they hurried. The Lacedaemonians took with them the Arcadian allies who were present, invaded Mantinean territory, camped near the temple of Heracles, and ravaged the land.

65 When the Argives and their allies saw them, they took up a strong position, hard to approach, and drew up as if for battle. The Lacedaemonians at once advanced against them. They came within a stone's throw or a javelin's cast; then one of the older men, seeing that they were going against a strong position, shouted to Agis that he was minded to cure one evil with another, meaning that his present untimely eagerness was meant to make up for his blameworthy withdrawal from Argos. Whether because of the shout, or because some other thought, or the same one, suddenly struck him as well, Agis led the army back again in haste before they engaged. Reaching Tegean territory, he began turning the water into Mantinean territory. The Mantineans and the Tegeans make war over this water, since it does a great deal of damage to whichever side it flows into. He wanted to bring the men down from the hill to stop the diversion of the water, once they learned of it, and to fight the battle on level ground. He stayed there that day, turning the water. The Argives and their allies were at first astonished at the sudden withdrawal at such short range and did not know what to make of it. Then, when the enemy had withdrawn out of sight and they themselves were

keeping still and not following, they once more blamed their own generals: before, the Lacedaemonians had been caught in a fine position near Argos and let go, and now they were running away and no one was pursuing; the enemy were getting off safe at their leisure and they themselves were being betrayed. The generals were thrown into confusion for the moment; later they led them down from the hill, advanced onto the level ground, and camped there, intending to go against the enemy.

66 The next day the Argives and their allies formed up in the order in which they meant to fight if they met the enemy. The Lacedaemonians, coming back from the water toward the temple of Heracles to their old camp, saw the enemy at close range, all already drawn up and advanced from the hill. At this moment the Lacedaemonians were more alarmed than at any other time they could remember. Their preparations had to be made at very short notice, and in haste they at once fell into their own order, King Agis directing each step according to the law. When a king is in command, all orders come from him. He himself tells the polemarchs what is needed; they tell the lochagi; these tell the pentecontaters; these in turn tell the enomotarchs; and these tell the enomoty. Any commands they wish to give pass along the same way and arrive quickly. For nearly the whole army of the Lacedaemonians, except a small part, consists of officers under officers, and responsibility for what is done falls on many.

67 On this occasion the Sciritae formed their left wing; they alone of the Lacedaemonians always hold this position, by themselves.[9] Next to them were Brasidas' soldiers from Thrace, and with them the Neodamodes. Then came the Lacedaemonians themselves, their lochi posted one after another, and next to them the Heraeans of Arcadia, after these the Maenalians, and on the right wing the Tegeans, with a few Lacedaemonians holding the end of the line; their cavalry were on both wings. That was how

the Lacedaemonians were drawn up. On the opposing side the Mantineans held the right wing, because the action was taking place in their territory. Next to them were their Arcadian allies, then the thousand picked men of the Argives, whom the city had long been training in warfare at public expense; beside them the rest of the Argives, and after them their allies, the Cleonaeans and the Orneates; then, last of all, the Athenians held the left wing, with their own cavalry beside them.

68 Such was the order and the array of both sides. The army of the Lacedaemonians looked larger. But I could not write down the numbers exactly, either for each contingent on each side or for the whole. The number of the Lacedaemonians was unknown because of the secrecy of their government; and the numbers on the other side were not believed, because of men's habit of boasting about their own forces. Still, from the following calculation one can examine the number of Lacedaemonians present on that occasion. Seven lochi fought, not counting the Sciritae, who numbered six hundred. In each lochus there were four pentecostyes, and in each pentecostys four enomoties. In the front rank of each enomoty four men fought. In depth they were not all drawn up alike, but as each lochagus wished; on the whole they were formed eight deep. Along the whole line, not counting the Sciritae, the front rank was 448 men.

69 When they were about to engage, the generals of each contingent gave exhortations to their own men, of the following kind. The Mantineans were told that the battle would be for their country, and at the same time for empire or slavery: that they should not be robbed of the one after having tasted it, and should not taste the other again. The Argives were told that it was for their ancient leadership and their once equal share in the Peloponnese; that they should not put up with being deprived of them forever, and that they should punish men who were at once their enemies

and their neighbors for many wrongs. The Athenians were told that it was a fine thing to fight alongside many good allies and be second to none, and that if they defeated the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese, they would make their empire more secure and greater, and no one would ever invade their land again. That was how the Argives and their allies were exhorted. The Lacedaemonians, man by man and with their war songs, gave each other the encouragement, reminding brave men of what they already knew; for they understood that long practice in deeds saves more than a fine speech of words made at short notice.

70 After this they closed. The Argives and their allies advanced eagerly and in a fury; the Lacedaemonians came on slowly, to the music of many flute players stationed among them, not for any religious reason, but so that they would advance evenly, stepping in time, and their line would not break apart, as large armies tend to do as they go in.

71 While they were still closing, King Agis decided to do the following. All armies do this: in engaging they are pushed out rather toward their right wing, and both sides overlap the enemy's left with their own right. This is because each man, out of fear, brings his unprotected side as close as he can to the shield of the man posted on his right, and thinks that the tighter the locking of shields, the better the cover. The man in the front at the end of the right wing begins it, always eager to keep his own unprotected side away from the enemy, and the rest follow him out of the same fear. On this occasion the Mantineans overlapped the Sciritae far with their wing, and the Lacedaemonians and the Tegeans overlapped the Athenians still farther, by as much as their army was larger. Agis, afraid that his left would be surrounded and thinking that the Mantineans overlapped it too far, signaled to the Sciritae and the Brasideans to move out from the main body and match their line with the Mantineans; and he ordered the polemarchs

Hipponoidas and Aristocles to pass across from the right wing with two lochi and throw them into the gap and fill it. He thought that his own right would still have more than enough, and that the line facing the Mantineans would be made firmer.

72 But since he gave the order in the very moment of the advance and at short notice, it came about that Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to move across; for this offense they were afterward banished from Sparta, being judged to have played the coward. The enemy closed with them first; and when Agis, since the lochi had not come across, ordered the Sciritae to rejoin the main body, these too were no longer able to close the gap. But it was then above all that the Lacedaemonians, though beaten in every point of skill, showed that by their courage they could prevail all the same. When they came to grips with the enemy, the Mantinean right routed their Sciritae and Brasideans, and the Mantineans with their allies and the thousand picked men of the Argives burst in through the gap that had not been closed, cut down the Lacedaemonians, surrounded them, routed them, drove them back to the wagons, and killed some of the older men posted there. In that part of the field the Lacedaemonians were beaten. But with the rest of their army, and especially in the center, where King Agis was and around him the three hundred known as the Knights, they fell on the older men of the Argives, the units called the Five Lochi, the Cleonaeans, the Orneates, and the Athenians posted beside them, and routed them. Most of these did not even wait to come to blows, but gave way the moment the Lacedaemonians came on; some were even trampled underfoot in their haste to escape being caught.

73 When the army of the Argives and their allies had given way in this part, it was now breaking off on either side. At the same time the right wing of the Lacedaemonians and the Tegeans, with the part that overlapped, was surrounding the Athenians, and dan-

ger stood around them on both sides, on one side being encircled, on the other already beaten. They would have suffered more than any part of the army if the cavalry they had with them had not been of service. It happened, too, that Agis, when he saw his left in trouble against the Mantineans and the thousand Argives, ordered the whole army to go to the help of the part that was being beaten. When this was done, the Athenians, as the army passed by and swung away from them, escaped at their leisure, and with them the beaten part of the Argives. The Mantineans, their allies, and the picked men of the Argives no longer had any thought of pressing the enemy, but, seeing their own side defeated and the Lacedaemonians bearing down on them, they turned to flight. More of the Mantineans were killed; of the picked men of the Argives most escaped. The flight and retreat, however, were not hard pressed or long; for the Lacedaemonians fight long and stubbornly until they rout the enemy, but once they have routed him, their pursuits are short and do not go far.

74 Such was the battle, or as close to this as possible: by far the greatest of the Hellenic battles for a very long time, and fought by the most considerable cities.[10] The Lacedaemonians grounded their arms before the enemy dead, at once set up a trophy, and stripped the bodies; they took up their own dead and carried them back to Tegea, where they were buried, and gave back the enemy dead under truce. There died, of the Argives, Orneates, and Cleonaeans, seven hundred; of the Mantineans, two hundred; of the Athenians with the Aeginetans, two hundred, and both their generals. On the Lacedaemonian side the allies did not suffer enough for any considerable loss; as for the Lacedaemonians themselves, it was hard to learn the truth, but about three hundred were said to have died.

75 When the battle was about to take place, Pleistoanax, the other king, had also come to the rescue with the older and the

younger men. He got as far as Tegea, learned of the victory, and went back. The Lacedaemonians sent and turned back the allies from Corinth and from beyond the Isthmus; they themselves went home, dismissed the allies, and celebrated the festival, since it happened to be the time of the Carneia. By this one action they freed themselves of the charge that the Hellenes were then bringing against them, of softness because of the disaster on the island, and of bad judgment and slowness in general. They had been disgraced by fortune, it was now thought, but in spirit they were still the same men. On the day before this battle, it happened that the Epidaurians invaded Argive territory in full force, thinking it stripped of men, and killed many of the guards who had been left behind when the Argives marched out. After the battle three thousand Elean hoplites came to help the Mantineans, and a thousand Athenians besides those already there; and all these allies marched at once against Epidaurus while the Lacedaemonians were celebrating the Carneia. They divided the work among them and began to wall the city off. The others gave up, but the Athenians at once finished the part assigned to them, the fortification of the headland where the Heraeum is. All of them joined in leaving a garrison in this fort, and then they withdrew, each to his own city. And the summer ended.

76 At the very beginning of the following winter, as soon as they had celebrated the Carneia, the Lacedaemonians marched out, and on reaching Tegea they sent proposals for a settlement ahead to Argos. They had men there who had long been friendly to them and wanted to overthrow the democracy at Argos; and now that the battle had been fought, these men were far better able to persuade the many to come to terms. Their plan was first to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, then later an alliance as well, and only then to attack the people. Lichas son of Arcesilaus, proxenus of the Argives at Lacedaemon, arrived from the Lacedaemonians at

Argos with two proposals: one setting out the terms if the Argives wished to make war, the other if they wished to keep the peace. After much argument (Alcibiades happened to be there too), the men who were working for the Lacedaemonians, now daring to act in the open, persuaded the Argives to accept the proposal for a settlement. It was as follows.

77 "The assembly of the Lacedaemonians resolves to come to an agreement with the Argives on the following terms:[11] The Argives shall give back the children to the Orchomenians and the men to the Maenalians, and shall give back to the Lacedaemonians the men in Mantinea; they shall withdraw from Epidaurus and pull down the fort there. If the Athenians do not withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be enemies of the Argives and the Lacedaemonians, and of the allies of the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the Argives. If the Lacedaemonians hold any children, they shall give them back to all the cities. Concerning the offering to the god, the Argives, if they wish, shall impose an oath on the Epidaurians; if not, they shall swear it themselves. All the cities in the Peloponnese, both small and great, shall be autonomous according to ancestral custom. If anyone from outside the Peloponnese comes against the land of the Peloponnese with intent to harm, the Peloponnesians shall take counsel together and resist him, in whatever way seems most just to them. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside the Peloponnese shall stand on the same footing as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the Argives shall stand on the same footing as the Argives, keeping their own territory. This agreement shall be shown to the allies, and they shall join in it if they so resolve. If the allies resolve otherwise, they shall send it back home."

78 The Argives accepted this proposal first, and the Lacedaemonian army withdrew from Tegea and went home. After this, now that there was intercourse between them, the same men

not long afterward brought it about that the Argives gave up their alliance with the Mantineans, the Athenians, and the Eleans and made a treaty and an alliance with the Lacedaemonians. The terms were as follows.

79 "The Lacedaemonians and the Argives resolve that there shall be a treaty and an alliance for fifty years on the following terms. They shall give and receive justice on fair and equal terms according to ancestral custom. The other cities in the Peloponnese shall share in the treaty and the alliance as autonomous and independent cities, keeping their own territory, and giving and receiving justice on fair and equal terms according to ancestral custom. All allies of the Lacedaemonians outside the Peloponnese shall stand on the same footing as the Lacedaemonians; and the allies of the Argives shall stand on the same footing as the Argives, keeping their own territory. If a joint expedition is needed anywhere, the Lacedaemonians and the Argives shall take counsel and decide in whatever way is most just for the allies. If any of the cities, either inside or outside the Peloponnese, has a dispute, whether over boundaries or over anything else, it shall be settled by arbitration. If one allied city quarrels with another, they shall go to some city that both cities consider impartial. Private citizens shall have their cases tried according to ancestral custom."

80 So this treaty and alliance had been made, and each side settled whatever it held of the other's, whether taken in war or otherwise. Acting in common now, they voted to receive no herald or embassy from the Athenians unless they left the Peloponnese and abandoned their forts, and to make no peace or war with anyone except together. They pursued their aims with vigor, and both sent envoys to the Thracian region and to Perdiccas, and persuaded Perdiccas to swear to join them. He did not, however, break with the Athenians at once, but he meant to, because he saw

that the Argives had; he himself was of Argive descent in origin. They also renewed their old oaths with the Chalcidians and swore new ones. The Argives sent envoys to the Athenians too, telling them to abandon the fort at Epidaurus. The Athenians, seeing that their men were few against the more numerous garrison who shared it, sent Demosthenes to bring their own men out. When he arrived he held an athletic contest outside the fort as a pretext, and when the rest of the garrison had gone out he shut the gates. Later the Athenians renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians and themselves gave the fort back.

81 After the Argives had left the alliance, the Mantineans too held out at first, but then, unable to do so without the Argives, they also came to terms with the Lacedaemonians and gave up their rule over the cities. The Lacedaemonians and the Argives, a thousand of each, made an expedition together: the Lacedaemonians first went to Sicyon by themselves and put its affairs more into the hands of the few; and after that the two together overthrew the democracy at Argos too, and an oligarchy friendly to the Lacedaemonians was established. These things happened toward spring, as the winter was ending. And so the fourteenth year of this war ended.

82 The following summer the Dians on Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians, and the Lacedaemonians settled affairs in Achaea, which had not before been in a state favorable to them. The people of Argos, gathering their strength little by little and recovering their courage, attacked the few, choosing the very time of the Gymnopaediae at Lacedaemon.[12] A battle was fought in the city and the people won; they killed some and drove out others. The Lacedaemonians, as long as their friends were sending for them, did not come for some time; but they put off the Gymnopaediae and came to help. At Tegea they learned that the few had been defeated, and they refused to go any farther, though

those who had escaped begged them to, and went back home and celebrated the Gymnopaediae. Later envoys came from those in the city and from the Argives outside; the allies were present, and much was said on both sides. The Lacedaemonians judged that those in the city were in the wrong and decided to march against Argos, but there were delays and postponements. Meanwhile the people of Argos, afraid of the Lacedaemonians, began to court the Athenian alliance again, believing it would be of the greatest benefit to them, and they built long walls down to the sea, so that if they were shut off from the land, they could be helped by bringing in supplies by sea with the help of the Athenians. Some of the cities in the Peloponnese were also privy to the building of the walls. The Argives built in full force, themselves, their women, and their household slaves; and carpenters and masons came to them from Athens. And the summer ended.

83 The following winter, when the Lacedaemonians learned that they were building the walls, they marched against Argos, they and their allies, except the Corinthians. They also had something being arranged for them inside Argos itself. The army was led by Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. What they thought was already prepared in the city did not go forward; but they took the walls that were being built and pulled them down, took Hysiae, a place in Argive territory, killed all the free men they captured, and withdrew and dispersed to their cities. After this the Argives in turn marched into the territory of Phlius, ravaged it, and went away, because the Phliasians were harboring their exiles; most of these had settled there. The same winter the Athenians also blockaded the Macedonians. They charged Perdiccas with the sworn league he had made with the Argives and the Lacedaemonians, and with having played false to the alliance when they had prepared to lead an army against the Chalcidians in the Thracian region and against Amphipolis under the command

of Nicias son of Niceratus; the expedition had been broken up chiefly by his withdrawal.[13] So he was an enemy. So this winter ended, and with it the fifteenth year of this war.

84 The following summer Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships and seized three hundred Argives who were thought still to be suspect and to favor the Lacedaemonians; and the Athenians deposited them in the nearby islands that they ruled. The Athenians also made an expedition against the island of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian, and with 1,200 hoplites of their own, three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers, and about 1,500 hoplites from the allies and the islanders.[14] The Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians, and they would not submit to the Athenians as the other islanders did. At first they were subject to neither side and kept quiet; then, when the Athenians tried to force them by ravaging their land, they went into open war. So the generals Cleomedes son of Lycomedes and Teisias son of Teisimachus, after encamping in their territory with this force, sent envoys to hold talks first, before doing any harm to the land. The Melians did not bring them before the people, but told them to state their business before the magistrates and the few.

85 The Athenian envoys spoke as follows. "Since our discussion is not to be held before the people, evidently so that the many will not hear from us, all at once and in an unbroken speech, arguments that are attractive and go unrefuted, and so be deceived (we understand that this is the meaning of your bringing us before the few), you who sit here should make it safer still. Do not you either judge it all in one speech; but take us up at once, point by point, wherever something does not seem to be rightly said, and decide on it. And first tell us whether what we propose is acceptable."

86 The Melian council replied: "The reasonableness of instructing one another at leisure is not to be faulted; but the acts of war,

which are already here and not in the future, plainly do not fit with it. We see that you have come to be judges yourselves of what will be said, and that the outcome is likely to be this: if we prevail on the point of justice and for that reason do not yield, it brings us war; if we are persuaded, slavery."

87 Athenians: Well, then, if you have met to reckon up suspicions about the future, or for anything else than to take counsel for the safety of your city on the basis of present facts and what you see before you, we will stop. If you are here for that, we will speak.

88 Melians: It is natural and pardonable for men in such a position to turn in many directions, in what they say and what they think. This meeting, however, is about our safety; and let the discussion go forward, if you wish, in the way you propose.

89 Athenians: For our part, we will not offer you a long and unconvincing speech with fine words: that we hold our empire by right because we overthrew the Mede, or that we are attacking you now because we have been wronged. And we ask you not to think you will persuade us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians in the war, though you are their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong. Instead, let us aim at what is possible on the basis of what both of us really think, since you know as well as we do that in human reckoning justice is decided only between those under equal necessity, while the possible is what the strong exact and the weak concede.

90 Melians: As we think, at any rate, it is useful (we must speak of the useful, since you have laid it down in this way that we talk of advantage instead of justice) that you not destroy what is a common good: that a man who is in danger should always be able to count on what is fair and just, and even to gain something by persuading others with arguments that fall short of strict proof. And

this is no less in your interest, since if you fall you would become an example to others of the heaviest vengeance.

91 Athenians: For our part, even if our empire should come to an end, we are not dismayed at its end. It is not those who rule over others, like the Lacedaemonians, who are terrible to the defeated (and besides, our contest is not with the Lacedaemonians), but subjects who of their own accord attack their former rulers and overpower them. Let that risk be left to us. What we will now show you is that we are here for the benefit of our empire, and that what we are about to say is for the safety of your city; for we want to rule you without trouble, and to have you saved to the advantage of us both.

92 Melians: And how could it turn out as advantageous for us to be slaves as for you to rule?

93 Athenians: Because you would be able to submit before suffering the most terrible things, and we would profit by not destroying you.

94 Melians: So you would not accept our keeping quiet, being friends instead of enemies, and allies of neither side?

95 Athenians: No; your hostility does not harm us as much as your friendship would. In the eyes of our subjects, your friendship would be a proof of our weakness, and your hatred a proof of our power.

96 Melians: Do your subjects regard what is reasonable in such a way that they put in the same class those who have nothing to do with you and those, most of them your own colonists and some of them rebels, whom you have subdued?

97 Athenians: They think that neither lacks a just claim, but that those who stay free do so because of their strength, and that we do not attack them because we are afraid. So, apart from adding to our empire, you would give us security by being subdued, espe-

cially if you, islanders and weaker than others, should fail to get the better of the masters of the sea.

98 Melians: And do you not think there is security in the other course? Here again, since you have driven us away from arguments of justice and are trying to persuade us to give in to your interest, we in our turn must tell you what is useful to us and try to persuade you, if it happens that the same thing is useful to you. How will you not make enemies of all who are now allies of neither side, when they look at what is happening here and conclude that some day you will come against them too? And in doing this, what are you doing but strengthening the enemies you already have, and bringing in, against their will, others who never meant to become your enemies?

99 Athenians: We do not think that those are more dangerous to us who live somewhere on the mainland, and who, being free, will be slow to take any precautions against us. We fear rather the islanders who are subject to no one, as you are, and those who are already chafing under the compulsion of our rule. These are the ones most likely to give themselves up to unreason and bring both themselves and us into a danger they can see coming.

100 Melians: Surely, then, if you run so great a risk so as not to lose your empire, and those who are already slaves run it to be rid of it, it would be great baseness and cowardice in us, who are still free, not to try everything before being enslaved.

101 Athenians: No, not if you consider it sensibly. For you the contest is not on equal terms, about courage, so as to avoid incurring disgrace; the question before you is rather about safety, about not standing up against those who are far stronger.

102 Melians: But we know that in war fortune sometimes falls more impartially than the difference in numbers on each side would suggest. And for us, to give in at once is to give up hope, while if we act, there is still a hope of standing upright.

103 Athenians: Hope is a comfort in danger. Those who use it from a position of abundance it may harm, but it does not ruin them. But for those who stake all they have on a single throw (hope is by nature extravagant), it is recognized for what it is only when they have fallen, and once it is known, it leaves them nothing with which to guard against it anymore. Do not wish to suffer this, you who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; do not be like the many who, when they could still be saved by human means, turn, once visible hopes have abandoned them in their distress, to invisible ones: to prophecy and oracles and all such things that, along with hopes, bring men to ruin.

104 Melians: We too, you may be sure, think it hard to contend against your power and against fortune, unless it is to be on equal terms. Nevertheless we trust that in fortune from the gods we will not come off worse, because we stand as men who are righteous against men who are not just; and that for what we lack in power, the alliance of the Lacedaemonians will make up. They are bound to help us, if for no other reason, then because of our kinship and for shame. So our confidence is not so altogether unreasonable.

105 Athenians: As for the gods' goodwill, we do not think that we will fall short of it either. Nothing we claim and nothing we do goes beyond what men believe about the gods or what they want for themselves. For of the gods we believe, and of men we know plainly, that by a necessity of their nature they always rule wherever they have the power. We did not lay down this law, nor were we the first to use it once laid down; we took it over as something that existed, and we will leave it to exist for all time, and we make use of it, knowing that you and anyone else, if you came to have the same power as we have, would do the same. So, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no reason to fear that we will come off worse. As for your opinion about the Lacedaemonians, your belief that they will help you out of shame, we bless your inno-

cence of evil but do not envy your folly. Among themselves, and in the customs of their own country, the Lacedaemonians practice excellence to the highest degree. But as to how they behave toward others, though there is much one could say, one could sum it up most clearly by saying that of all men we know, they most conspicuously consider what is pleasant to be honorable, and what is advantageous to be just. And such a frame of mind does not favor your present unreasonable hope of safety.

106 Melians: But that is the very point on which we now trust them most, their own advantage: that they will not want to betray the Melians, their colonists, and so be distrusted by those of the Hellenes who are friendly to them and be of use to their enemies.

107 Athenians: Then you do not think that advantage goes with safety, while justice and honor are practiced with danger? That is a danger the Lacedaemonians, for the most part, are least willing to face.

108 Melians: But we think that they would be more willing to take on dangers for our sake, and that they would consider them more secure than for others, inasmuch as we lie near the Peloponnese for action, and in sentiment are more to be trusted than others because of our kinship.

109 Athenians: What makes men who are called in to join a fight feel secure is not the goodwill of those who call them in, but a clear superiority in power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than the rest. At any rate, because they distrust their own resources, they attack their neighbors only with many allies. So it is not likely that they will cross over to an island while we are masters of the sea.

110 Melians: But they could send others. The Cretan sea is wide, and in it it is harder for those who control it to catch someone than for those who want to slip through to get away safe. And if they failed in this, they might turn against your own land, and

against the rest of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and your struggle will then be not for a country that is nothing to you, but for your own alliance and territory.

111 Athenians: One of these things might happen; then you too would learn by experience what you are not ignorant of, that the Athenians have never once withdrawn from a siege for fear of anyone else. But it strikes us that, though you said you would take counsel for your safety, you have said nothing in all this discussion that men could rely on in expecting to be saved. Your strongest supports are hopes for the future, and what you actually have is too little to prevail against the forces already ranged against you. You show great unreason in your thinking, unless, after sending us out, you reach some other decision more sensible than this. Surely you will not turn to that sense of shame which, in dangers that are disgraceful and plainly foreseen, destroys men more than anything else. Many, still seeing clearly what they were heading into, have been drawn on by the power of a seductive word, the thing called disgrace; overcome by the word, they have in fact fallen willingly into irreparable disasters, and have brought on themselves a disgrace more disgraceful, because it came with folly, than any that comes by chance. If you take counsel well, you will guard against this, and you will not think it unseemly to give way to the greatest city when it offers you moderate terms: to become allies, keeping your own land and paying tribute; and when you are given a choice between war and safety, not to insist out of contentiousness on the worse. Those who do not give way to their equals, who behave well toward their superiors, and are moderate toward their inferiors, are the most likely to succeed. So think it over when we have withdrawn, and consider again and again that it is your country you are deciding about, your only one, and that on one decision it will stand or fall, as the decision succeeds or fails.

112 The Athenians withdrew from the conference. The Melians, left to themselves, decided on much the same as they had said in reply, and answered as follows. "Our decision, Athenians, is the same as at first. We will not in a short time take away the freedom of a city that has now been inhabited for seven hundred years; we will trust in the fortune from the gods that has preserved it up to now, and in help from men, and from the Lacedaemonians, and try to save ourselves. We invite you to let us be your friends, and enemies to neither side, and to withdraw from our land after making a treaty that seems suitable to both."

113 That was the Melians' answer. The Athenians, as they were now breaking off the discussion, said: "Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these decisions, regard the future as clearer than what is before your eyes, and look on what is unseen, because you wish it, as already happening. You have staked the most on the Lacedaemonians, on fortune, and on hopes, and trusted them the most, and you will be most completely ruined."

114 The Athenian envoys went back to the army. Their generals, since the Melians would not submit at all, at once turned to war, divided the work among the cities, and walled the Melians in all around. Later the Athenians left a guard of their own and allied troops, by land and by sea, and withdrew with the greater part of the army. Those who were left stayed on and besieged the place.

115 About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius, were ambushed by the Phliasians and their own exiles, and lost about eighty men. The Athenians at Pylos took much plunder from the Lacedaemonians. Even so the Lacedaemonians did not on that account renounce the treaty and make war on them, but they proclaimed that any of their people who wished might plunder the Athenians. The Corinthians went to war with the Athenians over some private disputes of their own; the rest of the Peloponnesians kept quiet. The Melians made a night attack on the part of the

Athenian siege wall opposite the agora and took it; they killed men, brought in grain and as many other useful things as they could, and withdrew and stayed quiet. And the Athenians made better provision for the guard from then on. And the summer ended.

116 The following winter the Lacedaemonians were about to march into Argive territory, but when the sacrifices for crossing the frontier did not turn out favorably, they went back. Because of their intended invasion the Argives suspected some of the people in the city; they arrested some, and others escaped. About the same time the Melians again took another part of the Athenian siege wall, where there were not many guards. After this another army came out from Athens, commanded by Philocrates son of Demeas. Now besieged in force, and with some treachery inside as well, the Melians surrendered to the Athenians on their own initiative, on condition that the Athenians should decide their fate. The Athenians killed all the Melians of military age whom they took, and enslaved the women and children. They settled the place themselves, sending out five hundred colonists later.

Notes

1. The Pythian games at Delphi, held in late summer every fourth year; here the summer of 422 BC. The one-year truce had been made in spring 423 (Book 4).

2. Hagnon son of Nicias, an Athenian general, had founded Amphipolis as an Athenian colony in 437/6 BC. Honors as founder (*oikistēs*) were paid to him as a hero; the Amphipolitans transferred them to Brasidas.

3. Pleistoanax, king of Sparta, had withdrawn from an invasion of Attica in 446 BC and was exiled on a charge of bribery; he was recalled about 427/6 BC.

4. The Peace of Nicias, spring 421 BC. The City (Great) Dionysia was an Athenian festival in the month Elaphebolion (March–April).

5. Thucydides commanded an Athenian squadron in the Thracian region in 424 BC and failed to save Amphipolis from Brasidas (Book 4, chapters 104–107).

6. Neodamodes: Helots who had been freed by the Spartan state, often for military service.

7. A proxenus was a citizen of one city who represented the interests of another city in his own. Alcibiades' grandfather, also named Alcibiades, had renounced the Spartan proxeny.

8. The Carneia, a festival of Apollo held by Dorian states in late summer, during which campaigning was avoided. The Argives (chapter 54) kept their calendar fixed on one day so that the holy month would not begin.

9. The Sciritae came from the Sciritis, a hill district on the northern border of Laconia; they were Perioeci who served as a special unit.

10. The first battle of Mantinea, summer 418 BC.

11. The texts of this agreement and of the treaty in chapter 79 are given in the Doric dialect of Sparta.

12. The Gymnopaediae, a Spartan festival of dances by naked boys and men, held in midsummer.

13. The Greek word translated "withdrawal" is corrupt in the manuscripts; the sense is uncertain.

14. Summer 416 BC. Melos, in the southern Cyclades, was a Dorian island said to have been settled from Sparta.

Book 6

1 The same winter the Athenians wanted to sail again to Sicily, with a larger force than the one under Laches and Eurymedon,[1] and subdue it if they could. Most of them knew nothing of the size of the island or of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenes and barbarians alike, and did not realize that they were taking on a war not much smaller than their war against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage around Sicily takes a merchant ship not much less than eight days, and yet, large as it is, it is kept from being part of the mainland only by some twenty stades of sea.

2 It was settled in ancient times as follows, and these are all the peoples that held it. The oldest inhabitants are said to have been the Cyclopes and the Laestrygonians, who lived in one part of the country; but I cannot say what race they were, or where they came from, or where they went. Let what the poets have said be enough, and whatever each man happens to know of them. After them the Sicanians appear to have been the first settlers. By their own account they were there even earlier, being sprung from the soil; but the truth, as it is found, is that they were Iberians, driven out by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in Iberia. From them the island was then called Sicania; before that its name had been Trinacria. They still live today in the western part of Sicily. When Ilium was taken, some of the Trojans escaped the Achaeans and came by ship to Sicily; they settled next to the Sicanians, and all together they were called Elymians, and their cities were Eryx and Egesta. Some Phocians also settled with them, men returning from

Troy who were carried by a storm first to Libya and from there to Sicily. The Sicels crossed into Sicily from Italy, where they had been living, fleeing the Opicans; they crossed, as is likely and as is said, on rafts, waiting for the wind to come down the strait, though they may also have sailed over in some other way. There are Sicels in Italy even now, and the country got its name Italy from Italus, a king of the Sicels who bore that name. They came into Sicily as a large army, defeated the Sicanians in battle, and drove them back to the southern and western parts of it; they had the island called Sicily instead of Sicania, and they settled and held the best of the land for nearly three hundred years after their crossing, before Hellenes came to Sicily; even now they hold the center and the north of the island. Phoenicians too lived all around Sicily, having taken headlands on the sea and the small islands lying offshore for the sake of trade with the Sicels. But when the Hellenes began to sail in by sea in large numbers, they abandoned most of these places and gathered together in Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymians, where they lived, trusting in their alliance with the Elymians and in the fact that from there Carthage is the shortest voyage from Sicily. These, then, were the barbarians who lived in Sicily, and this was how they settled it.

3 Of the Hellenes, the first were Chalcidians from Euboea, who sailed with Thucles as founder and settled Naxos, and set up the altar of Apollo the Founder, which now stands outside the city; on it the sacred envoys sacrifice first whenever they sail from Sicily. Syracuse was founded the next year by Archias, one of the Heraclids, from Corinth, after he had first driven the Sicels out of the island on which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water; in time the outer city was also walled in and became populous. Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos in the fifth year after the founding of Syracuse, drove out

the Sicels by war, and founded Leontini, and after it Catana; but the Catanians themselves chose Evarchus as their founder.

4 About the same time Lamis also arrived in Sicily, leading a colony from Megara. He settled a place called Trotilus above the river Pantacyas; from there he later joined the Chalcidians at Leontini as fellow citizens for a short time, was driven out by them, founded Thapsus, and died. The rest left Thapsus and, when Hyblon, a Sicel king, handed over the land and guided them to it, they founded the settlement of the Megarians called Hyblaean. After living there two hundred and forty-five years they were driven out of the city and the country by Gelon, tyrant of the Syracusans. But before they were driven out, a hundred years after their own settlement, they sent Pamillus and founded Selinus; he had come from Megara, their mother city, and joined them in settling it. Gela was founded jointly by Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who brought settlers, in the forty-fifth year after the founding of Syracuse. The city took its name from the river Gela, but the place where the city now stands, which was the first to be walled, is called Lindii; and the institutions given them were Dorian. Very nearly a hundred and eight years after their own settlement the Geloans founded Acragas, naming the city after the river Acragas; they made Aristonous and Pystilus its founders and gave it the institutions of Gela. Zancle was first settled by pirates who came from Cumae, the Chalcidian city in Opicia; later a large body came also from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea and shared the land with them. Its founders were Perieres and Crataemenes, the one from Cumae, the other from Chalcis. Its name at first was Zancle, given it by the Sicels because the place is shaped like a sickle (the Sicels call a sickle *zanclon*). Later these settlers were driven out by Samians and other Ionians, who had put in at Sicily fleeing the Medes; and not long afterward Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, drove out the Samians, settled the city himself

with a mixed population, and renamed it Messene, after his own original homeland.

5 Himera was settled from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon. Most of those who came to the colony were Chalcidians, but exiles from Syracuse who had been defeated in civil strife, called the Myletidae, settled with them; the dialect became a blend of Chalcidian and Doric, but the Chalcidian institutions prevailed. Acrae and Casmenae were settled by the Syracusans, Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenae nearly twenty years after Acrae. Camarina was first settled by the Syracusans, very nearly a hundred and thirty-five years after the founding of Syracuse; its founders were Dascon and Menecolus. When the Camarinaeans had been driven out in war by the Syracusans for revolting, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, at a later time received the land of the Camarinaeans as ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, became founder himself, and resettled Camarina. Once more it was depopulated, by Gelon, and it was settled for the third time by the Geloans.

6 So many were the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, that inhabited Sicily, and such was the size of the island against which the Athenians were bent on sending an expedition. By the truest cause, they were aiming to rule the whole of it; at the same time they wished, as it sounded well, to help their own kinsmen and the allies they had gained there. What urged them on most of all were envoys from Egesta, who were in Athens and kept calling on them more and more urgently. The Egestaeans bordered on the Selinuntines and had gone to war with them over certain questions of marriage and over disputed land, and the Selinuntines had brought in the Syracusans as allies and were pressing them hard in the war by land and by sea. So the Egestaeans reminded the Athenians of the alliance made with the Leontines in the time of Laches and the earlier war, and begged them to send ships to their

aid. They said many other things, but the heart of it was this: if the Syracusans were left unpunished for having driven out the Leontines, and went on to destroy the allies Athens still had and to get the whole power of Sicily into their own hands, there was a danger that one day they would come with a great force, Dorians helping Dorians by kinship and colonists helping the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and would join in pulling down the power of Athens as well. It would be prudent, then, to stand against the Syracusans with the allies who were left, especially since the Egestaeans would provide enough money for the war. The Athenians heard these arguments in their assemblies, the Egestaeans and those who spoke on their side repeating them often, and voted first to send envoys to Egesta to see whether the money was there, as they claimed, in the public treasury and in the temples, and at the same time to find out how the war against the Selinuntines stood.

7 So the Athenian envoys were sent off to Sicily. The same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, marched into the Argive land, ravaged a small part of it, and carried off some grain in carts they had brought. They settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, left them a few men from the rest of the army, made a truce for a certain time on the terms that the Orneates and the Argives should not harm each other's land, and went home with the army. Not long afterward the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred hoplites, and the Argives marched out in full force with them and besieged the men in Orneae for one day; but at nightfall, while the army was bivouacked at some distance, the men in Orneae slipped away. The next day, when the Argives realized it, they razed Orneae and went back, and the Athenians afterward went home with their ships. The Athenians also brought cavalry by sea to Methone, on the border of Macedonia, both their own horsemen and the Macedonian

exiles who were with them, and raided the country of Perdiccas. The Lacedaemonians sent to the Chalcidians in Thrace, who were keeping a ten-day truce with the Athenians, and told them to join Perdiccas in the war; but they refused. So the winter ended, and with it the sixteenth year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

8 The following summer, at the beginning of spring, the Athenian envoys came back from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver as a month's pay for sixty ships, which they meant to ask the Athenians to send. The Athenians held an assembly and heard from the Egestaeans and from their own envoys much that was attractive and untrue, and in particular that the money was ready in great quantity in the temples and in the treasury. They voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, with Alcibiades son of Cleinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes as generals with full powers: they were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to resettle the Leontines as well if the war went well for them, and to manage everything else in Sicily as they judged best for the Athenians. On the fifth day after this another assembly was held, on how the fleet should be equipped as quickly as possible and on voting the generals anything further they needed for the expedition. Nicias had been chosen to command against his will; he thought the city had not decided rightly but was reaching for the whole of Sicily, a great undertaking, on a slight and fair-sounding pretext. He came forward wanting to turn them back, and advised the Athenians as follows.

9 "This assembly was called to discuss our preparations, how we are to sail to Sicily. But I think we still need to consider this very question, whether it is better to send the ships at all, and not, after so brief a deliberation on matters so great, to let men of another race persuade us to take up a war that is no concern of ours. And yet I myself gain honor from such an enterprise, and I

fear for my own person less than others do, though I hold that a man who takes some thought for his person and his property is just as good a citizen; such a man, for his own sake, would most want the city's affairs to prosper too. Still, neither in the past have I ever spoken against my judgment for the sake of being preferred to others, nor will I now; I will say what I think best. Against your character my argument would be a weak one if I urged you to keep what you have and not to risk what is in hand for things unseen and still to come. That you are in a hurry at the wrong moment, and that what you have set your hearts on is not easy to win, this I will show you.

10 "I say that you are leaving many enemies here behind you and want to sail there and bring more of them here. You may think that the treaty you have made gives you some security. As long as you keep quiet it will remain a treaty in name (for that is how men here and on the other side have managed it); but if we suffer a defeat anywhere with a sizable force, our enemies will be quick to attack us. In the first place, they came to terms under pressure of disaster and from a more shameful position than ours, by necessity; and in the second place, there are many points in the treaty itself that we dispute. Some, and not the weakest, have not yet accepted even this agreement: some are at open war with us, and others, because the Lacedaemonians are still keeping quiet, are themselves held back only by ten-day truces. And very likely, if they found our power divided, which is just what we are now hurrying to do, they would join in attacking us along with the Sicilian Greeks, whose alliance they would earlier have valued above many others. So a man must consider these things, and not think it right to run risks while the city is still unsettled, or to reach for another empire before we have secured the one we have. For the Chalcidians in Thrace, after all these years in revolt from us, are still unsubdued, and others on the mainlands are of doubtful loy-

alty. Yet we rush to help the Egestaeans, because they are our allies, if you please, and are being wronged, while we still put off punishing those who long ago revolted and are wronging us.

11 "Yet the Chalcidians, if we subdued them, we could hold; the Sicilians, even if we conquered them, we could govern only with difficulty, they are so far off and so many. It is folly to go against men whom you cannot hold if you conquer them, and if you fail, you will not be where you were before you made the attempt. And as things stand now, it seems to me, the Sicilian Greeks would be even less dangerous to us if the Syracusans ruled them, which is the prospect the Egestaeans most try to frighten us with. As things are, they might perhaps come against us, one city or another, to oblige the Lacedaemonians; but if Syracuse ruled them, it is not likely that one empire would march against another. For in whatever way they might take ours away from us with the Peloponnesians, it is likely their own would be pulled down by the same people in the same way. The Hellenes there would be most impressed by us if we did not come at all, and next if we showed our power and left again soon; for we all know that what is admired most is what is farthest off and least gives its reputation a trial. But if we suffered any setback, they would very quickly despise us and join our enemies here in attacking us. This is just what has happened to you, Athenians, with the Lacedaemonians and their allies: because you have come out on top, contrary to your expectations, in what you feared at first, you now despise them and are reaching for Sicily as well. But one should not be elated by the misfortunes of one's opponents; one should take confidence only after mastering their plans. And you should not think that the Lacedaemonians have anything else in mind, because of their disgrace, than how even now, if they can, they may trip us up and repair their own discredit, the more so since they care most and have cared longest about a reputation for

courage. So our contest, if we are wise, is not over the Egestaeans in Sicily, who are barbarians, but over how to guard ourselves keenly against a city that is plotting against us through oligarchy.

12 "We must also remember that we have only lately had a little respite from a great plague and from war, so that we have recovered somewhat in money and in men. It is right to spend these here on ourselves, and not on these exiles who beg for help, men whose interest it is to lie well and to make the risk their neighbor's, offering nothing themselves but words, and who, if they succeed, show no proper gratitude, and if they fail somewhere, bring their friends down with them. And if anyone, delighted to have been chosen to command, urges you to sail, looking only to his own interest, especially since he is still too young to command, so that he may be admired for his horse breeding and, since that is costly, make some profit from his command, do not give this man the chance to make a private show of himself at the city's risk. Consider that such men do harm to the public interest while they squander their own, and that the matter is a great one, not the sort for a young man to decide and rush into.

13 "When I see men sitting here now at the side of this same man, summoned by him, I am afraid; and I summon the older men in turn not to be shamed, if any of them is sitting next to one of these, into fearing that they will be thought cowards if they do not vote for war. Let them not, as these young men might, be sick with longing for what is far away, knowing that very little is achieved by desire and most by foresight. For the sake of their country, which is now running the greatest risk it has ever run, let them raise their hands against it and vote that the Sicilian Greeks, keeping the boundaries they now have with us, which no one can find fault with, the Ionian Gulf if one sails along the coast, the Sicilian Sea if one sails across the open water, shall enjoy their own possessions

and settle their own disputes among themselves. And to the Egestaeans in particular let us say that since they began their war with the Selinuntines without the Athenians, they should end it by themselves as well. And in the future let us not make allies, as we usually do, whom we must help when they are in trouble but from whom we shall get no help when we ourselves need it.

14 "And you, president,[2] if you think it your duty to care for the city and wish to be a good citizen, put the question to the vote and lay the matter before the Athenians again. If you are afraid to put it to the vote a second time, consider that with so many witnesses you would not be blamed for breaking the law, but would become the physician of a city that has decided badly; and that this is what it means to govern well: to do your country as much good as you can, or at least, of your own will, to do it no harm."

15 Such was Nicias' speech. Of the Athenians who came forward, most urged them to make the expedition and not to undo what had been voted, though some spoke against it. The man who pressed for the expedition most eagerly was Alcibiades son of Cleinias. He wanted to oppose Nicias, with whom he was at odds on other political questions as well and who had referred to him slanderously; above all, he was eager to be general, and he hoped to take Sicily and Carthage through his own efforts and, if he succeeded, to benefit his private fortunes in money and reputation at the same time. For he stood high in the esteem of the citizens, and his desires were larger than his actual property could support, both in horse breeding and in his other expenses. This in fact did as much as anything to destroy the city of the Athenians later. For the many were alarmed at the scale of his lawlessness in his own person and way of life, and of the ambition he showed in every single thing he took part in, and they became his enemies as a man who wanted to be tyrant; and though in public he managed the conduct of the war excellently, in private each of them was

offended by his habits, and they entrusted affairs to others and before long brought the city down. At this time, then, he came forward and advised the Athenians as follows.

16 "It belongs to me more than to others, Athenians, to command (I must begin with this, since Nicias has attacked me), and I think, too, that I am worthy of it. The things for which I am cried down bring glory to my ancestors and to me, and benefit to my country as well. The Hellenes, who had hoped that our city was worn out by the war, came to think it even greater than its power because of the magnificence of my embassy to Olympia: I entered seven chariots, more than any private man had ever entered before, and I won, and came in second and fourth, and provided everything else in a manner worthy of the victory. By custom such things bring honor, and from what is done, power too is inferred. Again, whatever splendor I display in the city in paying for choruses or in other ways naturally arouses the envy of the citizens, but to foreigners this too looks like strength. And it is no useless folly when a man at his own expense benefits not only himself but the city. Nor is it unjust for one who thinks highly of himself not to be on an equal footing with others, since the man who fares badly does not share his misfortune equally with anyone. Just as, when we are unfortunate, no one even greets us, so let a man likewise put up with being looked down on by the fortunate, or else let him deal out equal measure and claim equal measure in return. I know that such men, and all who have stood out in brilliance of any kind, are resented in their own lifetimes, most of all by their equals, and then by others too who have dealings with them; but they leave to later generations a claim of kinship with them, even where there is none, and to whatever country they belong, a boast that they were not foreigners or men who failed, but its own sons and men who did great things. This is what I aim at, and this is why my private life is cried down; but look at my handling of public affairs and see

whether it is worse than anyone's. I brought together the strongest powers of the Peloponnese, without great danger or expense to you, and forced the Lacedaemonians to stake everything on a single day at Mantinea; and though they came out of the battle victorious, even now they have not recovered their confidence.

17 "That is what my youth and my folly, supposedly so unnatural, achieved: they dealt with the power of the Peloponnesians in fitting words, made my passion inspire trust, and won them over. Do not be afraid of it now. While I am still in its flower and Nicias is thought fortunate, make full use of what each of us has to offer. Do not change your minds about the voyage to Sicily on the ground that it will be against a great power. Their cities are populous, but with mixed rabbles, and they easily change and take in new citizens. Because of this no one there is equipped, as for a homeland of his own, either with arms for his person or with proper establishments on the land; each man provides himself with whatever he thinks he can take from the common stock, by persuasive speaking or by faction, and with which, if he fails, he can go and live in another country. It is not likely that a crowd like this will listen to a proposal with one mind or turn to action together; they would quickly come over one by one if something pleasing were said to them, especially if they are in civil strife, as we hear they are. Nor, in fact, do they have as many hoplites as they boast, any more than the other Hellenes proved to be as many as each counted themselves; Hellas was badly deceived on this point and in this war has barely been adequately armed. Such, then, from what I hear, is the state of things there, and it will be even easier for us (for we will have many barbarians who, out of hatred of the Syracusans, will join us in attacking them); and things here will not hinder us, if you take the right decision. Our fathers had these same enemies whom, they tell us, we would leave behind us if we sailed, and the Mede as their enemy besides, and

they won the empire, strong in nothing else than the superiority of their navy. And now the Peloponnesians have never had less hope against us; and even if they are at the height of their strength, they are able to invade our land even if we do not sail, but with their navy they could do us no harm, for we will leave behind a navy that is a match for theirs.

18 "So what reasonable argument could we give for holding back ourselves, or what excuse could we make to our allies there for not helping them? We are bound to defend them, since we have sworn oaths to them, and not to object that they have not helped us either. We did not take them into alliance so that they might come here to help us in turn, but so that they might harass our enemies there and keep them from coming here against us. This is how we won our empire, and how all others who have held empire have won theirs: by readily coming to the aid of whoever called on them, barbarians or Hellenes. If everyone kept quiet, or picked and chose by race whom they ought to help, we would add little to the empire and would rather risk losing the empire itself. One does not only defend oneself against a superior power when it attacks; one strikes first to keep it from attacking. And we cannot set a measure, like a careful steward, on how much we want to rule. Since we are placed where we are, we must of necessity plot against some and not let go of others, because there is a danger of being ruled ourselves by others if we do not rule others. You cannot look at a quiet life from the same point of view as others do, unless you are also going to change your ways to match theirs. Let us reckon, then, that we will increase our power here if we go there, and let us make the voyage, so that we may lay low the pride of the Peloponnesians, when they see that we disdain the present quiet and sail even against Sicily. At the same time we will either, as is likely, become rulers of all Hellas when the Greeks there are added to us, or at least we will do damage to the Syracusans,

which will benefit both ourselves and our allies. Our ships will provide the security, whether to stay, if things go well, or to leave; for we will be masters of the sea against all the Sicilian Greeks together. Do not let Nicias' policy of doing nothing, and his setting the young against the old, turn you from your course. Follow our accustomed order: just as our fathers, young and old deliberating together, raised our affairs to this height, so now try in the same way to carry the city forward. Consider that youth and age can do nothing without each other, but that the common, the middling, and the most refined, blended together, are strongest; and that the city, if it keeps quiet, will wear itself out upon itself like anything else, and its skill in all things will grow old; but in constant struggle it will always be adding to its experience and will grow more used to defending itself not in word but in deed. In short, my judgment is that a city that is not inactive would very quickly be ruined, I think, by a change to inactivity, and that those men live most securely who govern according to their present character and laws, even if these are worse, with the least deviation."

19 So spoke Alcibiades. When the Athenians had heard him, and the Egestaeans and the Leontine exiles, who came forward and begged them, reminding them of their oaths and entreating them to help, they were far more eager than before to make the expedition. Nicias saw that he could no longer turn them back with the same arguments, but thought he might perhaps change their minds by the size of the force, if he demanded a large one; so he came forward again and spoke to them as follows.

20 "Since I see that you are bent on the expedition at all costs, Athenians, may it turn out as we wish; but I will tell you what I think as things now stand. From what I hear, we are about to go against cities that are large, that are not subject to one another, and that have no need of a change such as a man would gladly make from forced slavery to an easier condition; they would not

be likely to accept our rule in exchange for their freedom; and for one island there are a great many Greek cities. Apart from Naxos and Catana, which I expect to join us because of their kinship with the Leontines, there are seven others, equipped in every respect very much like our own power, and above all those we are chiefly sailing against, Selinus and Syracuse. They have many hoplites, archers, and javelin throwers, many triremes and the crowds to man them. They have money, some in private hands, some in the temples at Selinus, and the Syracusans also receive first fruits from certain barbarians; but where they most surpass us is that they own many horses and use grain grown at home, not imported.

21 "Against such a power we need more than a fleet and a paltry army; a large force of infantry must sail with it, if we want to do anything worthy of our design and not be shut out of the land by a large cavalry, especially if the cities band together in fear and no friends but the Egestaeans appear to furnish us with cavalry to defend ourselves against them. (It would be shameful to be forced to leave, or to send for more later, after deciding thoughtlessly at the start.) We must set out from here with a force equal to the task, knowing that we are going to sail far from our own land and to campaign on very different terms from when you came as allies among your subjects here against some enemy, where it was easy to bring in from friendly territory whatever else you needed; we will be cutting ourselves off in a land wholly foreign, from which in the four winter months it is not easy even for a messenger to come.

22 "So I think we must take many hoplites, both of our own and of our allies, from our subjects and from any in the Peloponnese whom we can persuade or win over with pay; many archers and slingers, to hold out against their cavalry; and a large superiority in ships, so that we may more easily bring in supplies. We must also

take grain from here in merchant ships, wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills, pressed into service in proportion and paid, so that if we are held up anywhere by weather the army may have its provisions (for so large an army it will not be every city that can receive it). Everything else we must prepare as far as possible, and not depend on others; above all, we must take as much money from here as we can. As for the money from the Egestaeans, which is said to be ready there, consider that it is most likely ready only in words.

23 "For even if we go from here with a force not merely equal to theirs (except, of course, their fighting force, the hoplites) but superior in every respect, even so we will hardly be able to conquer them and to keep ourselves safe. We must think of ourselves as men going out to found a city among foreigners and enemies, who must master the country on the very first day they land, or else know that if they fail, everything will be hostile to them. This is what I fear. I know that we need to plan well in many things and to be fortunate in still more, which is hard for men; so I want to entrust myself as little as possible to fortune when I sail, and to sail with a force that, as far as one can reasonably foresee, is safe. This I believe is surest for the whole city and the means of safety for us who are going on the expedition. If anyone thinks otherwise, I resign the command to him."

24 This was what Nicias said, thinking that by the scale of the undertaking he would either turn the Athenians back or, if he were forced to go, would in this way sail with the greatest safety. But the trouble of the preparations did not take away their desire for the voyage; they were far more eager than before, and the opposite of what he intended came about. They thought he had given good advice, and that now there would be safety in plenty. A passion to sail fell on them all alike. The older men thought they would either subdue the places they were sailing against or that so

great a force could come to no harm; the men of military age longed for the sight and spectacle of a far-off land and were confident they would come back safe; the great mass of the people and the soldiers expected to get money for the present and to win an addition to the empire that would provide pay without end. So because of the excessive desire of the majority, even if anyone was not pleased, he kept quiet, afraid of seeming disloyal to the city if he voted against it.

25 At last one of the Athenians came forward, called on Nicias, and said that he should stop making excuses and delaying, and should say now, before them all, what force the Athenians were to vote him. He said, reluctantly, that he would rather consider it at leisure with his colleagues; but so far as he could tell already, they ought to sail with no fewer than a hundred triremes (of the Athenians' own ships as many as seemed right would be troop carriers, and others must be sent for from the allies), and with no fewer than five thousand hoplites in all, Athenians and allies, and more if possible; the rest of the force would be in proportion: archers from Athens and from Crete, slingers, and anything else that seemed fitting, which they would get ready and take with them.

26 When they heard this, the Athenians at once voted that the generals should have full powers both over the size of the army and over the whole expedition, to act as they judged best. After this the preparations began. They sent to the allies and drew up muster rolls at home. The city had just recovered from the plague and from the continuous war, both in the number of young men who had grown up and in the accumulation of money because of the truce, so that everything was provided the more easily. So they were busy with their preparations.

27 Meanwhile, of the stone Herms in the city of the Athenians (these are, by local custom, the square-cut figures, many of them

standing both in the doorways of private houses and in sanctuaries),[3] most had their faces mutilated in a single night. No one knew who had done it, but large rewards were offered publicly to find the culprits, and they also voted that anyone who knew of any other act of impiety that had been committed, citizen, foreigner, or slave, should inform without fear. They took the affair very seriously. It seemed to be an omen for the expedition, and at the same time to have been done as part of a conspiracy for revolution and the overthrow of the democracy.

28 Information was given, then, by some resident aliens and attendants, not about the Herms, but that some other statues had been mutilated earlier by young men in drunken sport, and that the Mysteries were being performed in private houses in mockery;[4] and among others they accused Alcibiades. These charges were taken up by the men who most resented Alcibiades because he stood in the way of their own secure leadership of the people, and who thought that if they drove him out they would be first. They magnified them and cried out that both the affair of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms had been aimed at overthrowing the democracy, and that none of it had been done without him, adding as proof the general lawlessness of his habits, which was anything but democratic.

29 For the moment he defended himself against the informers' charges, and he was ready to stand trial before sailing, if he had done any of these things (for by now the preparations had been completed), and to pay the penalty if he had done any of them, and if acquitted, to command. He protested that they should not accept slanders about him in his absence, but put him to death at once if he was guilty, and that it would be wiser not to send him out at the head of so great an army with such a charge hanging over him, before they had decided it. But his enemies feared that he would have the army's goodwill if he were tried now, and that

the people would go soft and favor him because the Argives and some of the Mantineans were joining the expedition on his account. So they tried to turn the proposal aside and put it off, bringing forward other speakers who said that for now he should sail and not hold up the departure, and that when he came back he should be tried within a fixed number of days. Their purpose was to have him recalled and brought home for trial on a graver charge, which they would more easily get up while he was away. And it was decided that Alcibiades should sail.

30 After this, when it was already midsummer, the departure for Sicily took place. Most of the allies, the grain transports, the smaller vessels, and all the rest of the force that went with them had been ordered earlier to gather at Corcyra, so that from there they might all cross the Ionian Sea together to the Iapygian headland. The Athenians themselves, and any of the allies who were present, went down to Piraeus on the appointed day at dawn and manned the ships to put out to sea. With them went down practically the whole of the rest of the population of the city, citizens and foreigners. The citizens each went to see off their own, some their friends, some their kinsmen, some their sons; and they went with hope and with lamentation at once, hope that they would make conquests, lamentation at the thought of whether they would ever see them again, when they considered how long a voyage they were being sent on from their own land.

31 At this moment, when they were now about to leave one another amid dangers, the terrors came home to them more than when they were voting to sail; and yet, with the strength they saw before them, because of the abundance of everything they looked on, the sight gave them heart again. The foreigners and the rest of the crowd came for the spectacle, as to something worth seeing and beyond belief. For this armament, the first to sail out from a single city with a Hellenic force, was the most costly and the most

splendid of any up to that time. In the number of ships and hoplites, the expedition against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same one against Potidaea under Hagnon, had been no smaller: four thousand hoplites of the Athenians themselves, three hundred cavalry, and a hundred triremes, with fifty from the Lesbians and the Chians, and many allies besides sailed with them. But they set out on a short voyage and with a poor outfit; whereas this expedition was equipped as one that would be long, and for both kinds of service, wherever it might be needed, with ships and infantry together. The fleet had been fitted out at great expense by the trierarchs and by the city. The treasury gave each sailor a drachma a day and supplied the hulls, sixty fast ships and forty troop carriers, with the best crews of petty officers for them; the trierarchs gave bonuses on top of the state pay to the topmost rowers[5] and to the petty officers, and spent lavishly on figureheads and fittings, every one of them striving to the utmost that his own ship should stand out above all in appearance and in speed. The infantry had been picked from the best muster rolls, and the men vied with one another eagerly over their arms and their personal equipment. So it came about that there was rivalry among themselves, each in the post to which he was assigned, and that to the other Hellenes it looked more like a display of power and resources than a force against an enemy. For if anyone had reckoned up the public spending of the city and the private spending of those on the expedition: on the city's side what it had already laid out and what it was sending with the generals; on the private side what each man had spent on his own equipment and each trierarch on his ship, and what they were still going to spend; and besides this what everyone was likely to have provided for himself as traveling money for a long campaign, apart from the state pay, and whatever any soldier or merchant took aboard for trade, it would have been found that many talents in all were being carried

out of the city. The expedition became famous no less for the astonishing daring of it and the brilliance of the sight than for its overwhelming superiority to those against whom it was going, and because it was the longest voyage from home ever attempted and undertaken with the greatest hopes for the future compared with what they already had.

32 When the ships were manned and everything they meant to take with them had been put aboard, silence was signaled by the trumpet, and they offered the customary prayers before putting out, not ship by ship but all together, led by a herald. They mixed bowls of wine along the whole fleet, and the marines and the officers poured libations from cups of gold and silver. The rest of the crowd on shore, the citizens and anyone else present who wished them well, joined in the prayers. When they had sung the paean and finished the libations, they put out, sailing at first in column, and then raced one another as far as Aegina. So they hurried on to reach Corcyra, where the rest of the allied army was gathering. At Syracuse news of the expedition came in from many quarters, but for a long time none of it was believed. An assembly was held, however, and speeches of the following kind were made by various speakers, some believing the reports about the Athenian expedition, others saying the opposite; and Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward, believing that he knew the truth about it clearly, and spoke and advised them as follows.

33 "Perhaps I, like some others, will seem to you to be saying incredible things about the truth of this expedition, and I know that those who say or report what seems unbelievable not only fail to persuade but are even thought foolish. Still, I will not be frightened into holding my tongue when the city is in danger, since I am convinced that I speak with clearer knowledge than anyone else. The Athenians, though you find it hard to believe, have set out against you with a large force, both naval and infantry. Their pre-

text is their alliance with the Egestaeans and the resettlement of the Leontines; the truth is that they desire Sicily, and above all our city, thinking that if they held it they would easily have the rest as well. Expecting, then, that they will soon be here, consider how, with the means at hand, you can best defend yourselves against them, and do not let contempt cause you to be caught unprepared, or disbelief cause you to neglect the whole matter. And if anyone does believe it, let him not be dismayed by their daring and their power. They will not be able to do us more harm than they suffer, nor is the size of the force in which they come without advantage to us. On the contrary, it is much better for us with regard to the other Sicilian Greeks, who in their alarm will be more willing to become our allies; and if in the end we either destroy them or drive them off with nothing achieved of what they aim at (for I certainly do not fear that they will get what they expect), it will be a very fine achievement for us, and not one beyond my hopes. Few great expeditions, either of Hellenes or of barbarians, sent out far from home, have succeeded. They do not come in greater numbers than the inhabitants and their neighbors, for fear unites everyone; and if they fail in a foreign land for lack of supplies, they leave a name to those they plotted against, even if most of their failures were their own doing. That is how these very Athenians grew great, when the Mede failed unexpectedly in many things, on the strength of the name that it was Athens he had come against; and it is not beyond hope that something of the kind will happen to us.

34 "Let us take heart, then, and make our preparations here, and send to the Sicels to confirm some in their loyalty and try to make friendship and alliance with others. Let us send envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the danger is common to all, and to Italy, so that they may either become our allies or refuse to receive the Athenians. I think it would be better to send to Carthage as

well. They do not find it an unthinkable prospect; they are always afraid that the Athenians may one day come against their city. So perhaps, thinking that if they let this place go they too will be in trouble, they would be willing to help us, secretly or openly or in one way or another. They are the most capable of anyone now living, if they choose, for they have the most gold and silver, and it is from this that war and everything else prospers. Let us send also to Lacedaemon and to Corinth, asking them to come here quickly to our help and to stir up the war over there. There is one thing which I think the most timely of all, but which you, from your habitual quietness, would be least ready to agree to at once; still, I will say it. If all of us Sicilian Greeks, or if not all, then as many as possible with us, would launch our whole existing navy with two months' provisions and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian headland, and show them that before they fight for Sicily they will first have to fight for their crossing of the Ionian Sea, we would strike them with the greatest alarm and make them reckon that we are setting out as guards from friendly territory (for Tarentum receives us), while they have a wide stretch of open sea to cross with all their armament. It is hard, on so long a voyage, to keep formation, and the fleet would be easy for us to attack, coming on slowly and in small groups. If, on the other hand, they lightened their fast ships and attacked us in a more compact body, then, if they used their oars, we would fall on them when they were exhausted, and if we thought it unwise, we could withdraw to Tarentum. They, having crossed with few provisions, as if for a sea battle, would be at a loss in deserted country; if they stayed, they would be blockaded, and if they tried to sail along the coast, they would leave the rest of their force behind and would lose heart, not knowing for certain whether the cities would receive them. My own view is that, faced with this reckoning, they would not even set out from Corcyra; either they would deliberate and

send out scouts to find how many we are and where, and be pushed by the season into winter, or else, dismayed by the unexpected, they would give up the voyage, especially since their most experienced general, as I hear, is in command against his will and would gladly take the pretext if any sign of resolve worth the name were seen on our side. Our strength would be reported, I am sure, as greater than it is; and men's judgments are shaped by what they hear, and those who attack first, or at least make it plain to the attackers that they will defend themselves, are the more feared, since they are thought equal to the danger. This is just what would happen to the Athenians now. They are coming against us as men who will not defend themselves, and they have reason to judge so, since we did not join the Lacedaemonians in destroying them; but if they saw us daring beyond their expectation, they would be more dismayed by the surprise than by our real power. Be persuaded, then: above all, dare to do this; if not, make all other preparations for the war as quickly as possible, and let every man keep in mind that contempt for an attacker is best shown by valor in action, and that for the present it would be most useful to treat preparations made in fear as the safest, and to act as men in danger. The men are coming, I am sure they are already under way, and they are all but here."

35 That was what Hermocrates said. The people of Syracuse were in great dispute among themselves. Some said that the Athenians would never come and that what he said was not true; others, that even if they did come, what harm could they do that they would not suffer worse in return? Others treated the matter with utter contempt and turned it into a joke. Only a few believed Hermocrates and feared what was to come. Then Athenagoras came forward, who was the leader of the people and at that time the most persuasive speaker with the many, and spoke as follows.

36 "As for the Athenians, anyone who does not wish them to be so ill-advised as to come here and fall into our hands is either a coward or no friend to the city. As for those who spread such reports and make you so afraid, I do not wonder at their audacity, but at their stupidity, if they think they are not seen through. Men who are afraid on their own account want to throw the city into alarm, so as to cover their own fear under the public one. And this is what these reports now amount to: they have not arisen of themselves, but have been put together by the men who are always stirring up these things. If you are well advised, you will not judge what is likely by looking at what these men report, but at what men who are able and of wide experience, as I consider the Athenians to be, would do. It is not likely that they would leave the Peloponnesians behind them, without having yet securely ended the war there, and willingly go to another war no smaller; indeed I think they are glad that we are not coming against them, cities so many and so great as ours.

37 "And if they really were to come, as they are said to be coming, I think Sicily is better able to fight the war out than the Peloponnese, inasmuch as it is better equipped in every way, and that our city by itself is far stronger than the army that is now said to be coming, even if twice as large a one came. I know that they will bring no horses with them, nor get any here except a few from the Egestaeans, nor hoplites equal in number to ours, coming as they do on ships (it is a great thing even to bring the ships themselves, lightly laden, so long a voyage here), nor the rest of the equipment needed against a city as great as this, which is not small. So great is the difference, as I judge it, that I think even if they came with another city as large as Syracuse and settled it on our border and made war from there, they would hardly escape total destruction; how much more, then, in a Sicily wholly hostile (for it will unite against them), in a camp pitched from their ships,

with nothing but tents and the barest equipment, unable to go far from it because of our cavalry. In short, I do not think they would even become masters of the land; so much stronger do I consider our forces.

38 "But the Athenians, as I say, know this, and are, I am sure, taking good care of their own possessions, while men here make up stories of things that neither are nor ever could be. I know these men, not now for the first time but always, who want, by stories like these or even more mischievous ones, or by deeds, to frighten your multitude and get the rule of the city for themselves. And I am afraid that by trying often they may one day succeed. We are poor at taking precautions before we are suffering, and at pursuing the guilty once we perceive them. For this reason our city is seldom at rest, and takes on many factions and struggles, more against itself than against its enemies, and sometimes tyrannies and unjust cliques of the powerful. I will try, if you are willing to follow me, never to let any of this happen in our time: by persuading you, the many, and by punishing those who contrive such things, not only when they are caught in the act (for that is hard to manage), but also for what they wish to do though they cannot (for one must defend oneself in advance against an enemy not only for what he does but for what he intends, since if one does not take precautions first, one will suffer first); and as for the few, by exposing some, watching others, and also instructing others; for in this way, I think, I would best turn them from their mischief. And indeed, as I have often asked myself, what is it you want, young men? To hold office already? But that is not lawful; and the law was made because you are not competent, not to disqualify you when you are. Or is it that you do not want equal rights with the many? And how is it just that the same people should not be thought worthy of the same rights?

39 “Someone will say that democracy is neither wise nor equitable, and that those who have the money are also best at ruling. I say, first, that “the people” is the name of the whole, “oligarchy” of only a part; and next, that the rich are the best guardians of money, the intelligent would give the best counsel, and the many, after hearing, would judge best; and that in a democracy all these share equally, both in their parts and as a whole. Oligarchy gives the many a share in the dangers, but of the benefits it not only takes more than its share but takes and keeps the whole. This is what the powerful and the young among you are eager for, and in a great city it is impossible to get and hold. But even now, you most foolish of men, if you do not see that what you are hurrying toward is evil, you are either the most ignorant of all the Hellenes I know, or the most unjust, if you know it and still dare.

40 “No, learn better, or change your minds, and promote the common good of the city, which is common to all. Consider that in this the good among you would have an equal or a greater share, but if you want something else, you run the risk of being deprived of everything. Have done with reports like these, knowing that you are speaking to men who see through them and will not allow it. For this city, even if the Athenians are coming, will defend itself against them in a manner worthy of itself, and we have generals who will look to it. And if none of it is true, as I think it is not, the city will not be dismayed by your reports and choose you as its rulers and so impose on itself a slavery of its own choosing; it will look into the matter by itself and judge your words as if they were deeds, and it will not let itself be robbed of the freedom it has by listening to you, but will try to preserve it by guarding itself in deed and not giving you the opportunity.”

41 This was what Athenagoras said. One of the generals rose and allowed no one else to come forward, and himself spoke as follows on the matter in hand. “It is not wise for speakers to make

slanders against one another, or for those who listen to accept them; we should rather look to the reports that are coming in, to see how each of us and the city as a whole may be well prepared to defend ourselves against the invaders. And even if it turns out there is no need, there is no harm in the state's being furnished with horses and arms and all the other things that are the pride of war (we will see to their care and inspection), or in sending missions to the cities, both to gather information and for anything else that seems useful. Some of this we have already seen to, and whatever we learn we will report to you." And when the general had said this, the Syracusans broke up their meeting.

42 The Athenians and all their allies were now at Corcyra. First the generals held a final review of the army and arranged the order in which they were to anchor and to camp. They divided it into three divisions and allotted one to each general by lot, so that they would not run short of water, harbors, and supplies at their landing places by sailing all together, and so that they would in other respects be better ordered and easier to command, each division being assigned to a general. Then they sent three ships ahead to Italy and Sicily to find out which of the cities would receive them. These had orders to come back and meet them, so that they might know before putting in.

43 After this, with a force now of this size, the Athenians put out from Corcyra and crossed to Sicily. They had 134 triremes in all and two Rhodian penteconters. Of these, a hundred were Athenian, sixty of them fast ships and the rest troop carriers; the rest of the fleet came from the Chians and the other allies. They had 5,100 hoplites in all. Of these, the Athenians themselves provided 1,500 from the muster roll and seven hundred thetes serving as marines on the ships; the rest were allies serving with them, some from the subjects, and of the others five hundred were Argives, and 250 Mantineans and mercenaries. There were 480

archers in all, eighty of them Cretans; seven hundred Rhodian slingers; 120 light-armed Megarian exiles; and one horse transport carrying thirty horsemen.

44 That was the size of the first armament that crossed over for the war. With it went thirty merchant ships carrying grain and supplies, with the bakers, stonemasons, and carpenters, and all the tools for building walls, and a hundred boats requisitioned to sail with the merchant ships; and many other boats and merchant ships followed the army of their own accord for the sake of trade. All of these now crossed the Ionian Gulf together from Corcyra. The whole armament put in at the Iapygian headland and at Tarentum and wherever each of them could, and coasted along Italy. The cities did not receive them with a market or within their walls, but only gave them water and anchorage, and Tarentum and Locri not even these, until they came to Rhegium, the promontory of Italy. There they now gathered, and since the Rhegians would not let them inside, they set up camp outside the city in the sanctuary of Artemis, where the Rhegians provided them with a market; they hauled their ships ashore and rested. They held talks with the Rhegians, asking them as Chalcidians to help the Leontines, who were Chalcidians too; but the Rhegians said they would side with neither party but would do whatever the other Italian Greeks agreed on. The Athenians considered how they could best handle the affairs of Sicily; and at the same time they waited for the advance ships to come back from Egesta, wanting to know whether the money was really there, as the messengers had said in Athens.

45 Meanwhile clear reports were reaching the Syracusans from many quarters, and from their scouts, that the ships were at Rhegium, and in view of this they set about their preparations with all their resolve and no longer disbelieved. They sent round to the Sicels, garrisons to some and envoys to others; they brought

troops into the guard posts in the countryside; in the city they held a review of arms and horses to see whether they were complete; and they settled everything else as for a war that was coming fast and was all but upon them.

46 The three advance ships came back from Egesta to the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that the rest of the money they had promised did not exist, and that only thirty talents were to be seen. The generals were at once disheartened, because this first thing had gone against them, and because the Rhegians had refused to join the expedition, though they were the first they had tried to persuade and the most likely to agree, being kinsmen of the Leontines and always friendly to the Athenians. Nicias had expected the news from the Egestaeans; to the other two it was quite unaccountable. The Egestaeans had contrived the following trick when the first envoys of the Athenians came to them to inspect the money. They took them to the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the offerings, bowls, wine jugs, censers, and a good deal of other equipment, which, being silver, made a show far greater than the small money value it represented. And in giving private hospitality to the crews of the triremes they collected the drinking cups, gold and silver, from Egesta itself and borrowed those from the neighboring cities, Phoenician and Greek, and each brought them to the banquets as their own. Since all of them used much the same vessels, and a great deal was to be seen everywhere, it amazed the Athenians from the triremes, and when they got back to Athens they spread the word that they had seen great wealth. These men, who had been deceived themselves and had then persuaded the others, were now much blamed by the soldiers when the word went round that the money was not in Egesta; and the generals took counsel on the situation.

47 Nicias' view was that they should sail with the whole army to Selinus, which was the chief object they had been sent for. If the

Egestaeans provided money for the whole force, they would decide accordingly; if not, they should demand that they provide maintenance for the sixty ships they had asked for, and should stay until they had reconciled the Selinuntines with them, either by force or by agreement. Then they should sail along past the other cities, display the power of the city of Athens, make plain their zeal for their friends and allies, and sail home, unless they could quickly and unexpectedly either do something for the Leontines or win over some of the other cities; and they should not endanger the city by spending its own resources.

48 Alcibiades said that after sailing out with so great a force they must not go away in disgrace and with nothing done. They should send heralds to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and try to detach some of the Sicels from the Syracusans and make friends of others, so as to have grain and troops; and first of all they should win over the Messenians (for they lay right on the passage and the approach to Sicily, and their city would be the best harbor and base for the army). When they had brought the cities over and knew who would fight on their side, then they should attack Syracuse and Selinus, unless the latter came to terms with the Egestaeans and the former allowed them to resettle the Leontines.

49 Lamachus said that they should sail straight to Syracuse and fight a battle at the city as soon as possible, while the Syracusans were still unprepared and most alarmed. Every army, he said, is most terrifying at first; if it delays before showing itself, men regain their courage and, when they do see it, despise it all the more. But if they attacked suddenly, while the enemy were still awaiting them in dread, they would have the best chance of winning and would terrify them in every way: by the sight of them (for now they would appear at their most numerous), by the anticipation of what they would suffer, and most of all by the immediate

danger of battle. It was likely, too, that many people would be cut off outside in the fields, since they did not believe the Athenians would come; and while they were bringing their goods in, the army would not lack for property if it established itself victorious before the city. And in this way the other Sicilian Greeks would be the more inclined not to ally themselves with the Syracusans and to come over to the Athenians, and would not hang back watching to see which side would win. For a naval station, he said, to which they could withdraw and from which to blockade, they should use Megara, which was deserted, not far from Syracuse either by sea or by land.

50 Lamachus said this, but nevertheless gave his own support to the view of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades crossed in his own ship to Messene and talked with the Messenians about an alliance; when he could not persuade them, and they answered that they would not receive him in the city but would provide a market outside, he sailed back to Rhegium. The generals at once manned sixty ships out of the whole fleet, took provisions, and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the army at Rhegium with one of themselves. The Naxians received them into the city, and they sailed on along the coast to Catana. When the Catanians would not receive them (for there were men there who favored the Syracusans), they went on to the river Terias and bivouacked; the next day they sailed for Syracuse with the rest of the ships in column, sending ten of them ahead into the Great Harbor to sail in and see whether any fleet had been launched, and to sail close in and proclaim from the ships that the Athenians had come to restore the Leontines to their own land, by reason of their alliance and kinship; any Leontines in Syracuse, therefore, should come over without fear to the Athenians as to their friends and benefactors. When the proclamation had been made and they had looked

over the city, the harbors, and the lie of the land from which they would have to make war, they sailed back to Catana.

51 An assembly was held, and the Catanians would not receive the army, but told the generals to come in and say whatever they wished. While Alcibiades was speaking and the people in the city had their attention turned to the assembly, the soldiers broke down unnoticed a small gate that had been badly walled up, came in, and went about the market. Those of the Catanians who sided with the Syracusans, when they saw the army inside, at once took fright and slipped away, not very many of them; the rest voted an alliance with the Athenians and told them to bring the rest of their army from Rhegium. After this the Athenians sailed across to Rhegium, set out now with the whole army for Catana, and when they arrived, set about building their camp.

52 News came to them from Camarina that if they came the Camarinaeans would join them, and also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. So they sailed with the whole army first to Syracuse; and finding no fleet being manned, they coasted on again to Camarina, put in at the beach, and sent a herald. But the Camarinaeans would not receive them, saying that their oaths bound them to receive the Athenians only if they sailed in with a single ship, unless they themselves sent for more. Having accomplished nothing, the Athenians sailed away; they landed at a point in Syracusan territory and carried off plunder, and when the Syracusan cavalry came out against them and killed some of the light-armed troops who were scattered, they went back to Catana.

53 There they found the *Salaminia*[6] come from Athens for Alcibiades, with orders for him to sail home to answer the charges the city was bringing against him, and for certain others of the soldiers with him who had been denounced for impiety in the matter of the Mysteries, and some in the matter of the Herms. For after the army sailed, the Athenians had gone on no less actively

investigating what had been done concerning the Mysteries and the Herms. They did not test the informers but accepted everything in a suspicious mood, and on the word of worthless men they arrested and imprisoned citizens of the highest character, thinking it more useful to get to the bottom of the affair and find the truth than to let anyone, however good his character seemed, escape without examination because of an informer's worthlessness. For the people knew by hearsay that the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons had become harsh toward its end, and also that it had been put down not by themselves and Harmodius[7] but by the Lacedaemonians; so they were always afraid and took everything with suspicion.

54 The daring deed of Aristogeiton and Harmodius was undertaken because of a love affair, and by relating it at some length I will show that neither others nor the Athenians themselves give any accurate account of their own tyrants or of what happened. When Peisistratus died an old man, holding the tyranny, it was not Hipparchus, as most people think, but Hippias, the eldest son, who held power. Harmodius was then in the brilliant flower of youth, and Aristogeiton, a citizen of the middle rank, was his lover and had him. Harmodius was approached by Hipparchus son of Peisistratus, refused him, and told Aristogeiton. Aristogeiton was stung to the quick as a lover, and afraid that Hipparchus would use his power to take the boy by force, he at once began to plot, as far as his standing allowed, the overthrow of the tyranny. Meanwhile Hipparchus made another attempt and had no better success with Harmodius. He did not want to do anything violent, but he got ready to insult him in some covert way, so that it would not appear to be for this reason. For in general his rule was not oppressive to the many; he conducted it without giving offense. These tyrants, in fact, practiced excellence and good sense to a very high degree; they took from the Athenians only a twentieth of their produce,

adorned their city well, carried on their wars, and provided sacrifices for the temples. In other respects the city itself went on under the laws already in force, except that they always took care that one of their own family should be in office. Among others of them who held the annual archonship at Athens was Peisistratus, the son of Hippias the tyrant, named after his grandfather, who as archon dedicated the altar of the Twelve Gods in the agora and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct. The Athenian people later built on to the altar in the agora, lengthening it, and so effaced the inscription; but the inscription on the one in the Pythian precinct can still be seen, in faint letters, saying this: "Peisistratus son of Hippias set this up to mark his archonship / in the sacred precinct of Pythian Apollo."

55 That Hippias was the eldest and held power I affirm, since I know it from a more accurate tradition than others; but one could also learn it from this: of the legitimate brothers he alone appears to have had children, as the altar shows, and also the pillar about the injustice of the tyrants set up on the Athenian Acropolis, on which no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus is recorded, but five of Hippias, born to him by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias son of Hyperechides; and it was likely that the eldest would be the first to marry. On the same pillar, too, he is listed first after his father, and this also is natural, since he was the eldest after him and had been tyrant. Nor, I think, would Hippias ever have taken over the tyranny so easily on the spot if Hipparchus had been in power when he was killed and he himself had had to establish himself the same day. As it was, because of his long familiarity he was feared by the citizens and kept strict control over the mercenaries, and he prevailed with a great margin of safety, not at a loss like a younger brother who had not been used to exercising power. But it fell to Hipparchus, having become famous through the misfor-

tune of his fate, to acquire in later times the reputation of having been tyrant as well.

56 Harmodius, then, who had rejected his advances, Hipparchus insulted, as he had intended. They summoned his sister, a young girl, to come and carry a basket in a certain procession, and then turned her away, saying that they had never summoned her at all because she was not worthy. Harmodius took this hard, and for his sake Aristogeiton was far more provoked. They had arranged everything else with those who were to join them in the deed, and they were waiting for the Great Panathenaea, the only day on which it aroused no suspicion for the citizens who formed the procession to gather in a body under arms. The two of them were to strike first, and the others were to join them at once in dealing with the bodyguards. The conspirators were not many, for safety's sake; they hoped that even those not in the secret, if any number of men at all dared to act, would be willing on the spot, since they had arms in their hands, to join in winning their own freedom.

57 When the festival came, Hippias was outside the city, in the place called the Ceramicus, with his bodyguards, arranging how each part of the procession was to go forward. Harmodius and Aristogeiton, already holding their daggers, were advancing to do the deed. Then they saw one of their fellow conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias (Hippias was easy of access to everyone), and they took fright, thinking they had been informed on and were on the point of being arrested. So they wanted first, if they could, to take revenge on the man who had wronged them and for whose sake they were risking everything; and just as they were they rushed inside the gates and came upon Hipparchus by the place called the Leocorium. At once, without a thought, they fell on him, in the utmost fury, the one with a lover's anger, the other with the anger of one insulted, and struck him and killed him. Aristogeiton

escaped the bodyguards for the moment, as the crowd came running together, but was taken later and not gently dealt with; Harmodius was killed on the spot.

58 When the news was brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he went at once, not to the scene, but to the armed men in the procession, before they, being some distance away, had learned of it. Composing his face so as to betray nothing of the disaster, he pointed to a certain spot and ordered them to go there without their arms. They withdrew, thinking he had something to tell them; and he told his mercenaries to take away the arms, and at once picked out the men he held guilty, and anyone found carrying a dagger; for it was the custom to march in the processions with shield and spear only.

59 In this way, from a lover's grievance, came both the beginning of the plot and the reckless daring of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, born of sudden panic. After this the tyranny became harsher for the Athenians. Hippias, now more afraid, put many of the citizens to death, and at the same time began to look abroad, to see whether he could find some security anywhere in case of a revolution. At any rate he afterward gave his daughter Archedice, he an Athenian, to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, the son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus, because he saw that they had great influence with King Darius. Her tomb is at Lampsacus, with this inscription: "This dust covers Archedice, daughter of Hippias, / the foremost man in Hellas in his day. / Her father, husband, brothers, and sons were tyrants, / yet her mind was never lifted up to arrogance." Hippias was tyrant of the Athenians for three more years, and in the fourth was deposed by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonids. He left under a truce for Sigeum and for Lampsacus, to Aeantides, and from there went to King Darius; and setting out from his court, twenty years later, an old man by then, he marched with the Medes to Marathon.

60 The Athenian people kept these things in mind, and remembered all they knew of them by hearsay, and so were harsh and suspicious at that time toward those accused in the affair of the Mysteries, and thought that everything had been done as part of an oligarchic and tyrannical conspiracy. While they were in this angry mood, many men of note were already in prison, and there was no sign of an end to it; day by day they went further toward savagery and arrested still more. Then one of the prisoners, who was thought to be most deeply implicated, was persuaded by one of his fellow prisoners to give information, whether true or not; for there are guesses both ways, and no one, either then or later, has been able to say anything certain about those who did the deed. The other man argued and convinced him that even if he had not done it, he should secure immunity and save himself and rid the city of its present suspicion; his safety would be surer if he confessed with immunity than if he denied it and stood trial. So he gave information, against himself and against others, about the Herms. The Athenian people were glad to get what they thought was the certain truth, having been in a dreadful state before at the thought of not finding out who were plotting against their democracy. They at once released the informer and all those with him whom he had not accused; those he had accused they brought to trial, and executed all who had been arrested, and condemned to death those who had escaped and offered a reward in silver to anyone who killed them. In all this it was unclear whether those who suffered had been punished unjustly; but the rest of the city, for the present, was plainly relieved.

61 In the matter of Alcibiades, the Athenians took it hard, urged on by his enemies, the same men who had attacked him before he sailed. Since they thought they had the truth about the Herms, it seemed all the more certain that the affair of the Mysteries, of which he was accused, had been committed by him with the same

purpose, as part of the conspiracy against the democracy. It also happened that at this very time, when they were in turmoil over these things, a small Lacedaemonian army had advanced as far as the Isthmus, on some business with the Boeotians. It was thought to have come by arrangement, at his instigation, and not on account of the Boeotians, and that if they had not forestalled it by arresting the men on the information, the city would have been betrayed. For one night they even slept under arms in the Theseum within the city. At the same time Alcibiades' friends at Argos were suspected of plotting against the democracy there, and the Athenians for this reason handed over to the Argive people the Argive hostages who were kept in the islands, to be put to death. On every side suspicion surrounded Alcibiades. So, wanting to bring him to trial and put him to death, they sent the *Salaminia* to Sicily for him and for the others who had been informed against. The orders were to tell him to come home and defend himself, but not to arrest him; they were careful to avoid causing a disturbance among their soldiers in Sicily or among the enemy, and above all they wanted the Mantineans and Argives to stay, believing that it was through him they had been persuaded to join the expedition. He sailed off from Sicily in his own ship with those who had been accused with him, in company with the *Salaminia*, as if bound for Athens; but when they reached Thurii they followed no farther, but left the ship and disappeared, afraid to sail home and stand trial under such prejudice. The men from the *Salaminia* searched for Alcibiades and his companions for a time, but since they were nowhere to be found, they sailed away. Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed not long afterward in a boat from the territory of Thurii to the Peloponnese; and the Athenians condemned him and those with him to death in their absence.

62 After this the remaining Athenian generals in Sicily divided the army into two parts, each taking one by lot, and sailed with the

whole force for Selinus and Egesta. They wanted to find out whether the Egestaeans would give the money, and to look into the affairs of the Selinuntines and learn the state of their quarrel with the Egestaeans. Sailing along with Sicily on their left, on the side facing the Tyrrhenian Gulf, they put in at Himera, which is the only Hellenic city in that part of Sicily; and when it would not receive them, they went on along the coast. On the way they took Hyccara, a Sicanian town, but hostile to the Egestaeans; it was on the coast. They enslaved the inhabitants and handed the town over to the Egestaeans, whose cavalry had joined them; then the army went back on foot through the territory of the Sicels until it reached Catana, while the ships sailed around carrying the captives. Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara along the coast to Egesta, transacted his other business, received thirty talents, and rejoined the army. They sold the captives, and they brought in 120 talents. They also sailed round to their Sicel allies, telling them to send troops; and with half of their own army they went against Hybla, in the territory of Gela, which was hostile, and failed to take it. And the summer ended.

63 The following winter the Athenians at once began preparing their attack on Syracuse, and the Syracusans for their part prepared to go against them. For when the Athenians did not attack them at once, as they had expected in their first fright, they took heart more with each day that passed; and when they saw them sailing off to the far side of Sicily, a long way from them, and going to Hybla and failing to take it by assault, they despised them still more and demanded of their generals, as a crowd likes to do when it has grown bold, that they lead them to Catana, since the Athenians would not come against them. And Syracusan cavalry, constantly riding up to the Athenian army to scout, jeered at them, asking among other things whether they had come to settle with

the Syracusans themselves on foreign soil rather than to resettle the Leontines on their own.

64 The Athenian generals were aware of this. They wanted to draw the Syracusans out of their city in full force as far as possible, while they themselves sailed along the coast by night in the meantime and seized a position suitable for a camp, at their leisure. They knew they would not be able to do this so well if they had to land from the ships in the face of an enemy ready for them, or if they were seen coming by land; for the Syracusan cavalry, which was numerous while they themselves had none, would do great harm to their light-armed troops and their crowd of followers. In this way, they thought, they would seize a place where the cavalry could do them no harm worth mentioning. Syracusan exiles who were with them told them of the ground near the Olympieum, which in fact they did occupy. So the generals contrived the following stratagem to get what they wanted. They sent a man who was loyal to them, and whom the Syracusan generals would think no less well disposed to them. He was a Catanian, and said he came from men in Catana whose names the generals knew and who they knew were still left in the city among their sympathizers. He said that the Athenians were spending the nights in the city, away from their arms, and that if the Syracusans would come in full force at dawn on an appointed day against the army, their friends would shut in the Athenians who were in the city with them and set fire to the ships, while the Syracusans would easily take the army by attacking the stockade. He said that many Catanians were in this with them and were already prepared, and that he had come from them.

65 The Syracusan generals, who were confident in general and had already intended to march on Catana even without this, trusted the man far too readily. They at once agreed on a day when they would be there and sent him back; and they themselves

(for by now the Selinuntines and some others of their allies had arrived) gave notice to all the Syracusans to march out in full force. When their preparations were complete and the days on which they had agreed to come were near, they set out for Catana and bivouacked by the river Symaethus in the territory of Leontini. When the Athenians learned that they were coming, they took their whole army, and any Sicels or others who had joined them, put them aboard the ships and boats, and sailed by night for Syracuse. At dawn the Athenians were landing at the place opposite the Olympieum, to seize the ground for their camp; and the Syracusan cavalry, riding ahead first to Catana and finding that the whole army had put to sea, turned back and told the infantry, and then all of them turned about and hurried to defend the city.

66 Meanwhile, since the Syracusans had a long way to go, the Athenians set their army down at their leisure in a suitable position, where they could begin a battle whenever they chose and where the Syracusan cavalry would be least able to harass them, either in the action or before it. On one side walls, houses, trees, and a marsh shut them in, and along the other side there were cliffs. They also cut down the trees nearby, carried them down to the sea, and drove in a stockade beside the ships; at Dascon, where the enemy could most easily approach, they quickly raised a fort of rough stones and timber; and they broke down the bridge over the Anapus. While they were making these preparations, no one came out of the city to stop them. The Syracusan cavalry were the first to come up, and afterward the whole of the infantry gathered. At first they came close to the Athenian army; then, when the Athenians did not advance against them, they withdrew, crossed the Helorine road, and bivouacked.

67 The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle and drew up as follows. The Argives and Mantineans held the right wing, the Athenians the center, and the other allies the rest.

Half of their army was drawn up in front, eight deep; the other half, also eight deep, was in a hollow square by the tents, with orders to watch where any part of the army was most hard pressed and go to its support. They placed the baggage carriers inside this reserve. The Syracusans drew up all their hoplites sixteen deep. These were the whole levy of the Syracusans and such allies as were present: the Selinuntines had come to help them in the greatest number, and then the cavalry of the Geloans, about two hundred in all, and of the Camarinaeans some twenty horsemen and about fifty archers. They posted the cavalry, no fewer than 1,200, on the right, and next to them the javelin throwers. As the Athenians were about to take the offensive, Nicias went along the line to each people in turn and encouraged them all as follows.

68 "What need is there of a long exhortation, men, when we are all here for the same struggle? The force itself seems to me better able to give you confidence than fine speeches with a weak army. When we are Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the first of the islanders, how can every man among such allies, and so many, not have high hopes of victory, especially against men who are defending themselves in a mass levy and are not picked troops as we are, and Sicilian Greeks besides, who look down on us but will not stand up to us, because their skill is less than their daring? Let each man also keep this in mind: we are far from our own land and close to no friendly country except what you win yourselves by fighting. I remind you of the opposite of what, I am sure, the enemy are urging on one another. They are saying that the struggle will be for their country; I say that it will not be in our country, but in one where we must conquer or else find it hard to get away, for their numerous cavalry will be on us. Remember, then, your own worth, and go against the enemy eagerly, believing that the necessity and the straits we are in are more to be feared than the enemy."

69 After this exhortation Nicias at once led the army forward. The Syracusans were not expecting to have to fight at that moment, and some of them, since the city was close by, had even gone off; these came running back in haste to help, and though they were late, they took their places wherever each could join the main body. For the Syracusans were not lacking in eagerness or in daring, either in this battle or in the others; in courage they were not inferior so far as their skill held out, but where that failed them, they gave up their resolve against their will. Still, though they had not thought that the Athenians would attack first and were forced to defend themselves in haste, they took up their arms and at once advanced to meet them. First the stone throwers, slingers, and archers on each side skirmished in front and routed one another by turns, as light troops will; then seers brought forward the customary sacrifices, and trumpeters urged the hoplites to the charge, and they went forward: the Syracusans to fight for their country and, each of them, for his own safety now and his freedom in the future; on the other side the Athenians to win a foreign land for their own and not to harm their own land by defeat; the Argives and the independent allies to help the Athenians gain what they had come for and, victorious, to see again the country that was their own; while the subject allies were most eager for their immediate safety, of which they had no hope unless they won, and then, as a secondary aim, hoped that if they helped subdue another people, their own subjection might be lighter.

70 When they came to close quarters, both sides held out against each other for a long time. It happened that there was thunder at the same time, and lightning and heavy rain, so that those fighting for the first time and with the least experience of war felt that this too added to their fear, while to the more experienced the weather seemed something that happens at that season

of the year, and the fact that the enemy were not giving way was far more alarming. The Argives first pushed back the left wing of the Syracusans, and after them the Athenians the part opposite them, and then the rest of the Syracusan army also broke and turned to flight. The Athenians did not pursue far, for the Syracusan cavalry, numerous and undefeated, kept them off, charging their hoplites and driving them back wherever they saw any pursuing ahead of the rest; but they followed in a body as far as was safe, then withdrew and set up a trophy. The Syracusans rallied on the Helorine road and, after re-forming as well as they could in the circumstances, still sent a guard of their own to the Olympieum, afraid that the Athenians would lay hands on the treasures there; the rest went back to the city.

71 The Athenians did not go to the temple, but gathered their own dead, laid them on a pyre, and bivouacked there for the night. The next day they gave back the Syracusan dead under a truce (about 260 of the Syracusans and their allies had fallen) and collected the bones of their own (about fifty of themselves and their allies had fallen), and taking the spoils of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana. It was winter, and it did not yet seem possible to carry on the war from there until they had sent for cavalry from Athens and gathered more from their allies in Sicily, so as not to be wholly at the mercy of the enemy's horse; they also needed to collect money there and to have it come from Athens, to win over some of the cities, which they hoped would be more ready to listen to them after the battle, and to provide grain and everything else they needed, so as to attack Syracuse in the spring.

72 With this purpose they sailed off to Naxos and Catana to spend the winter. The Syracusans buried their own dead and held an assembly. Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward, a man second to none in intelligence in general, who had also proved capable in war through experience and distinguished for his

courage. He encouraged them and would not let them give way because of what had happened. Their spirit, he said, had not been defeated; it was their lack of discipline that had harmed them. Even so, they had not fallen as far short as might have been expected, especially as they had been pitted, amateurs, so to speak, against craftsmen, against the most experienced of the Hellenes. Great harm had also been done by the number of their generals and the divided command (they had fifteen generals) and by the disorderly indiscipline of the mass. But if they had a few experienced generals, and in the course of this winter prepared their hoplite force, providing arms for those who had none, so as to have as many as possible, and compelling them to train in other ways too, he said that in all likelihood they would defeat their enemies, since they had courage already and would add discipline in action. Both would grow: discipline by practice amid dangers, and courage would become bolder of itself with the assurance that skill brings. They ought to elect generals who were few and had full powers, and swear an oath to them that they would let them command as they thought best; in this way what needed to be kept secret would be better concealed, and everything else would be prepared in good order and without excuses.

73 The Syracusans heard him and voted everything as he urged. They elected as generals Hermocrates himself, Heraclides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of Execestus, these three; and they sent envoys to Corinth and to Lacedaemon, so that an alliance might come to their aid and to persuade the Lacedaemonians to carry on their war against the Athenians more decidedly and openly on behalf of the Syracusans, so that they would either draw the Athenians away from Sicily or make them less able to send further reinforcements to their army in Sicily.

74 The Athenian army at Catana sailed at once to Messene, expecting it to be betrayed to them. But what had been arranged

did not come about. When Alcibiades left his command, already recalled, knowing that he was going into exile, he gave information to the friends of the Syracusans in Messene, since he was in the secret of what was planned. They first put the men to death, and then, rising up and taking arms, those who wanted this carried their point that the Athenians should not be received. The Athenians stayed about thirteen days; then, since they were suffering from the weather and had no supplies and nothing was succeeding, they went off to Naxos, made boundaries and stockades around their camp, and spent the winter there. They also sent a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry, so that these might arrive at the beginning of spring.

75 During the winter the Syracusans too were building walls. At the city they took in the Temenites and built a wall along the whole side facing Epipolae, so that if they were defeated they could not easily be walled off by a shorter line; they fortified Megara with a garrison, and built another fort at the Olympieum; and they drove stakes into the sea along the shore wherever there were landing places. Knowing that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched in full force against Catana, ravaged part of its land, burned the Athenians' tents and camp, and went home. And learning that the Athenians were sending envoys to Camarina on the strength of the alliance made under Laches, to see whether they could win them over, they sent envoys in their turn. They suspected that the Camarinaeans had not sent with any good will what they did send for the first battle, and that for the future they might no longer wish to help them, seeing that the Athenians had done well in the battle, and might go over to them, persuaded on the ground of their former friendship. So Hermocrates and others came from Syracuse to Camarina, and from the Athenians Euphemus with others; an assembly of the Camarinaeans was held,

and Hermocrates, wanting to prejudice them against the Athenians in advance, spoke as follows.

76 "We have not come on this embassy, Camarinaeans, from fear that you would be dismayed by the force the Athenians have here, but rather from fear of the speeches they are about to make, lest they win you over before you hear anything from us. They have come to Sicily on the pretext you hear of, but with the purpose we all suspect. They do not want, I think, to resettle the Leontines, but rather to unsettle us. For it is not reasonable that they should depopulate the cities there and resettle the cities here, or that they should care for the Leontines, who are Chalcidians, out of kinship, while they hold enslaved the Chalcidians in Euboea, of whom these are colonists. It was by the same method that they took possession of those places and are now attempting these. They became leaders of the Ionians and of all the allies descended from them, who were willing, on the ground of taking vengeance on the Mede; then, charging some with failure to serve, others with making war on one another, and the rest with whatever plausible grievance they could find against each, they subdued them. So it was not for freedom, after all, that either these men stood against the Mede for the Hellenes, or the Hellenes for their own freedom; the Athenians fought to enslave the Hellenes to themselves instead of to him, and the others for a change of master, not to one less intelligent, but to one more intelligent for evil.

77 "But we have not come now to show to people who know it already how many wrongs the city of the Athenians commits, easy as it is to accuse; we have come far more to accuse ourselves. We have the examples of the Hellenes over there, how they were enslaved because they did not help one another; and now, when the same sophistries are being used against us, resettlements of Leontine kinsmen and aid to Egestaean allies, we do not band

together and show them more resolutely that here there are no Ionians, or Hellespontines and islanders, who keep changing masters, the Mede or someone else, but are always slaves; but Dorians, free men from the independent Peloponnese, living in Sicily. Or are we waiting until we are taken city by city, knowing that this is the only way in which we can be conquered, and seeing that they are turning to just this method, dividing some of us by words, setting others at war with one another by the hope of alliance, and doing harm to others as they can by saying something pleasing to each? And do we think that when a fellow islander far off is destroyed first, the danger will not come to each of us as well, but that the one who suffers before us suffers misfortune by himself alone?

78 "And if it has occurred to anyone that it is the Syracusan, not himself, who is the Athenian's enemy, and he thinks it hard to run risks for my country, let him consider that he will be fighting in my country not more for mine than equally for his own, and the more safely for it, since he will be fighting not after I have been destroyed beforehand, but with me as his ally, and not alone. Let him consider too that the Athenian does not want to punish the Syracusan's enmity, but, with me as the pretext, to make sure no less of that man's own friendship. And if anyone envies us, or even fears us (for greater powers are exposed to both), and for this reason wants Syracuse to be damaged, so that we may learn moderation, but to survive, for the sake of his own safety, he is hoping for something beyond human power. It is not possible for the same man to be the steward of his desires and of fortune alike. And if his judgment proved wrong, he might lament his own misfortunes and perhaps one day wish he could envy my good fortune again. But that will be impossible once he has abandoned me and refused to take upon himself the same dangers, which concern not names but realities. In word a man would be preserving our power, but in

deed his own safety. You above all, Camarinaeans, being our neighbors and the next to be in danger, should have foreseen this and not be such halfhearted allies as you are now. You should have come to us yourselves, and urged on us now, in the same way, what you would be begging and calling on us for if the Athenians had come first to the territory of Camarina, so that we should be seen to give way in nothing. But so far neither you nor the others have set about this.

79 "Perhaps from cowardice you will pay court to justice toward us and toward the invaders alike, saying that you have an alliance with the Athenians. But you made it not against your friends but in case any of your enemies came against you, and to help the Athenians when they were wronged by others, not when, as now, they themselves are wronging their neighbors. Why, not even the Rhegians, though they are Chalcidians, are willing to help resettle the Leontines, who are Chalcidians. And it is a strange thing if they, suspecting what lies behind this fine plea of right, show a prudence that defies the claims of kinship, while you, on a plausible pretext, want to help your natural enemies and, together with the bitterest of foes, destroy those who are your still closer kinsmen by nature. No, that is not just. You should help us and not fear their armament. It is not formidable if we all stand together, but only if we stand apart, which is just what they are hurrying to bring about; for even when they came against us alone and won the battle, they did not achieve what they wanted, but left again quickly.

80 "So if we are united, there is no reason to lose heart; we should enter into alliance the more readily, especially as help is coming from the Peloponnese, from men who are altogether better soldiers than these. And let no one think that the caution of helping neither side, as being allies of both, is fair to us and safe for you. It is not as fair in deed as it is in its claim of right. For if,

because you did not join, the victim falls and the victor prevails, what else will you have done by this same absence but fail to help the one to survive and fail to stop the other from doing evil? Yet it would be finer to join those who are wronged, and who are your kinsmen besides, and to guard the common interest of Sicily, and not let the Athenians, your friends as they are, go wrong. To sum up, we Syracusans say that there is no point in explaining clearly, either to you or to the others, things that you understand yourselves no worse than we do. But we beg you, and at the same time we call you to witness, if we do not persuade you, that we are being plotted against by Ionians, our perpetual enemies, and betrayed by you, Dorians by Dorians. And if the Athenians subdue us, they will owe their victory to your decisions, but the honor will go to their own name, and they will take as the prize of victory none other than the people who gave them the victory. And if we for our part come out on top, you will pay the penalty as well for being the cause of our dangers. Consider, then, and choose now: either slavery at once without risk, or, if you prevail with us, not to take these men as your masters in disgrace, and to escape our enmity, which would not be short-lived."

81 This was what Hermocrates said. After him Euphemus, the Athenian envoy, spoke as follows.

82 "We came to renew the former alliance; but since the Syracusan has attacked us, we must speak about our empire too, and show that we hold it with good reason. He himself has given the strongest evidence, in saying that the Ionians have always been enemies of the Dorians. And it is so. We are Ionians, and the Peloponnesians are Dorians, more numerous than we and living next to us, and we considered how we might least be subject to them. After the Persian Wars we acquired a navy and freed ourselves from the rule and leadership of the Lacedaemonians, since they had no more right to give orders to us than we to them,

except in so far as they were stronger at the time. We ourselves became leaders of those who had formerly been subjects of the King, and we live in that position, thinking that in this way we would be least under the Peloponnesians, having power with which to defend ourselves. And to speak precisely, it was not unjust of us to subdue the Ionians and the islanders, our kinsmen, whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved. For they came with the Mede against us, their mother city, and did not dare to revolt and sacrifice their homes, as we did when we abandoned our city; they chose slavery for themselves and wanted to bring the same on us.

83 "For these reasons we rule: because we deserve to, since we provided the largest navy and unhesitating zeal for the Hellenes, and because they, by readily serving the Mede in this way, were harming us; and at the same time because we were reaching for strength against the Peloponnesians. We do not use fine phrases and say that we rule with good reason because we alone overthrew the barbarian, or that we took our risks for the freedom of these people rather than for that of everyone, ourselves included. No one can be blamed for providing for his own proper safety. And now it is for the sake of our own security that we are here, and we see that the same things are in your interest too. We will show this from the very charges these men make and from your own suspicions, which lean toward the more frightening view; for we know that those who suspect something in great alarm enjoy the pleasure of a speech for the moment, but later, when it comes to action, do what is in their interest. We have said that we hold our empire there out of fear, and it is for the same reason that we have come here, to settle affairs safely with our friends, not to enslave them, but rather to prevent them from suffering slavery.

84 "Let no one suppose that we care for you though it is no concern of ours. We know that if you are preserved, and are not

too weak to hold out against the Syracusans, we are less likely to be harmed by their sending some force to the Peloponnesians. In this respect you are already of the greatest concern to us. That is also why it is reasonable for us to resettle the Leontines, not as subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but as strong as possible, so that from their own country, as neighbors of these Syracusans, they may be a thorn in their side on our behalf. Over there we are a match for our enemies by ourselves; and the Chalcidian, whom he says it is unreasonable for us to have enslaved while we free the men here, is useful to us as he is, without armament and paying money only. Here, on the other hand, the Leontines and our other friends are most useful to us when they are as independent as possible.

85 "To a tyrant or to a city that holds an empire nothing is unreasonable that is advantageous, and nothing is akin that cannot be trusted. In each case one must become enemy or friend as the moment requires. And here our advantage lies not in harming our friends, but in keeping our enemies powerless through the strength of our friends. You should not doubt this. Over there, too, we lead our allies according to the use each of them is to us: the Chians and Methymnaeans are independent and provide ships; most of them pay money, under more compulsion; others are allies on quite free terms, though they are islanders and easy to take, because they lie in convenient positions around the Peloponnese. So it is likely that here too we will arrange things to our advantage and, as we say, in view of our fear of the Syracusans. For they aim at ruling you, and want to unite you on the strength of your suspicion of us, and then, either by force or when you are left isolated after we have gone away with nothing done, to rule Sicily themselves. And that must happen if you unite with them. For neither will we any longer be able to deal easily with so great a power once

it is united, nor will these men be weak against you when we are not here.

86 "Whoever does not think so is refuted by the facts themselves. When you brought us in before, it was by holding up no other fear than this: that if we allowed you to fall under the Syracusans, we ourselves would be in danger. It is not just now to distrust the very argument by which you thought fit to persuade us, or to be suspicious because we have come with a force larger than the strength of these men. It is these men you should far rather distrust. We cannot stay here without you, and even if we turned traitors and subdued you, we could not hold you, because of the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding cities that are large and equipped like mainland powers. These men are not an army in a camp; they live next to you in a city greater than our force here, always plotting against you, never letting go of an opportunity against any of you (they have shown it in other ways already, and in the affair of the Leontines); and now they dare to call on you, as if you had no sense, against those who are stopping this and who have so far kept Sicily from falling under them. We call on you in turn, and to a far truer safety, and beg you not to betray the security that each of us has from the other, but to consider that these men, because of their numbers, will always have a ready way against you even without allies, while you will not often have the chance to defend yourselves with so great a help. If, out of suspicion, you let it go away with nothing done, or even defeated, you will yet wish to see even the smallest fraction of it, when its coming would no longer do you any good.

87 "Do not be won over by the slanders of these men, Camarinaeans, either you or the others. We have told you the whole truth about the things we are suspected of, and we will remind you of the main points once more and expect to persuade you. We say that we rule over there so as not to be subject to

another, and that we free the cities here so as not to be harmed by them; that we are compelled to do many things because we have many things to guard against; and that we have come, now and before, as allies to those of you here who are wronged, not uninvited, but called in. And do not set yourselves up as judges of what we do, or as censors, which is hard by now, and try to turn us from it; but in so far as anything in our meddlesomeness and our character serves your interest too, take that and make use of it. Consider that these things do not harm everyone alike, but in fact benefit far the greater part of the Hellenes. Everywhere, in every place, even where we are not present, the man who thinks he will be wronged and the man who is plotting wrong are both forced, the plotter to keep within bounds against his will, the threatened man to be saved without trouble to himself, because there lies beneath it a ready hope: for the threatened man, of getting help from us in return, and for the plotter, that if we come, his venture will not be without fear. Do not reject, then, this security, which is common to all who need it and is now offered to you. Do as others do, join us, and instead of always being on guard against the Syracusans, take your turn at last at plotting against them on equal terms."

88 This was what Euphemus said. The Camarinaeans were in this state of mind. They were well disposed to the Athenians, except in so far as they thought they would enslave Sicily, and they were always at odds with the Syracusans, as neighbors are. But they were no less afraid that the Syracusans, being so near, might prevail even without them; and that was why they had sent them the few horsemen at first, and why they decided for the future to give the Syracusans more help in deed, but as sparingly as they could, and for the present, so as not to seem to give the Athenians less either, since they had come out on top in the battle, to give both sides an equal answer in words. After deliberating in this way,

they answered that since both, who happened to be their allies, were at war with each other, they thought that for the present the way to keep their oaths was to help neither. And the envoys of both sides went away. The Syracusans got their own forces ready for the war, and the Athenians, encamped at Naxos, negotiated with the Sicels to bring over as many of them as possible. Most of the Sicels toward the plains, who were subjects of the Syracusans, had revolted; and the settlements of those who held the interior, which had always been independent, at once, with few exceptions, sided with the Athenians and brought grain down to the army, and some of them money too. The Athenians marched against those who did not come over and forced some of them to do so; others they were prevented from forcing because the Syracusans sent garrisons and help. For the winter they moved their base from Naxos to Catana, rebuilt the camp that had been burned by the Syracusans, and spent the winter there. They sent a trireme to Carthage to propose friendship, in case they could get some help from there, and they also sent to Tyrrhenia, since some of the cities there were themselves offering to join in the war. They sent round to the Sicels, and sent to Egesta, telling them to send as many horses as possible; and they got ready bricks, iron, and everything else they needed for the work of walling the city in, intending to take up the war with the coming of spring. The Syracusan envoys sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon tried, as they coasted along, to persuade the Italian Greeks not to stand by and watch what the Athenians were doing, since it was aimed at them as well; and when they reached Corinth, they made speeches asking the Corinthians to help them on the ground of kinship. The Corinthians at once voted, first of all, to help them with all their zeal, and sent envoys of their own to Lacedaemon along with them, to join in persuading the Lacedaemonians as well to make the war at home against the Athenians more open and to send

some help to Sicily. The envoys from Corinth arrived at Lacedaemon, and so did Alcibiades with his fellow exiles. He had crossed at once in a cargo boat from the territory of Thurii, first to Cyllene in Elis, and then later to Lacedaemon, coming under safe-conduct at the invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves; for he was afraid of them because of his part in the Mantinean affair. And so it happened that in the Lacedaemonian assembly the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Alcibiades were all making the same request and trying to persuade the Lacedaemonians. The ephors and the authorities intended to send envoys to Syracuse to keep them from coming to terms with the Athenians, but were not eager to send help; then Alcibiades came forward, roused the Lacedaemonians, and spurred them on, speaking as follows.

89 "I must speak to you first about the prejudice against me, so that you may not, out of suspicion of me, listen the worse to what concerns us all. My ancestors renounced their position as your proxenus, the citizen who looked after your interests in Athens, over a certain grievance; I myself took it up again and paid court to you in various ways, and especially after your misfortune at Pylos. And though I continued to be zealous, you made peace with the Athenians and gave power to my enemies by negotiating through them, and dishonor to me. For this reason you were justly harmed by me when I turned to the Mantineans and Argives and in all the other ways I opposed you. And now, if anyone was angry with me without reason at the time when he was suffering, let him look at it in the light of the truth and change his mind. Or if anyone thought worse of me because I inclined rather to the people, let him not suppose that in this way either he has good reason to be offended. We have always been at odds with tyrants (and everything that opposes absolute power is called the people), and from that our leadership of the masses has stayed with us. Besides, since the city was a democracy, it was necessary in most things to

conform to the established order. But we tried to be more moderate in politics than the prevailing license. There were others, both in the past and now, who led the mob toward worse things, and it was they who drove me out. We, on the other hand, were leaders of the whole people, and thought it right to help preserve the form of government under which the city happened to be greatest and most free, the form in which we had received it. For as to democracy, those of us with any sense knew what it was, and I as well as anyone, inasmuch as I could also revile it best. But about acknowledged folly nothing new could be said; and to change it did not seem safe to us while you were camped at our gates as enemies.

90 "So much for the prejudice against me. Now learn about the matters on which you must deliberate and on which I, if I know anything more, must advise you. We sailed to Sicily first to subdue the Sicilian Greeks, if we could, and after them the Italian Greeks in turn, and then to make an attempt on the empire of the Carthaginians and on Carthage itself. If all or most of this succeeded, we were then going to attack the Peloponnese, bringing with us the whole added power of the Hellenes there and hiring many barbarians, Iberians and others of the peoples there who are now acknowledged to be the most warlike of the barbarians. We would build many triremes in addition to our own, since Italy has timber in abundance; with these we would blockade the Peloponnese all around, and at the same time with our infantry attack it by land, taking some of the cities by storm and walling in others, and so we hoped to wear it down easily and after that to rule the whole Hellenic world. Money and grain, to make the work easier, the places added to us there would themselves provide in sufficient quantity, without the revenue from here.

91 "You have heard what the expedition now gone out was meant to do from the man who knows our intentions most exactly; and the generals who remain will carry them out in the same way

if they can. Now learn that unless you help, things there will not hold out. The Sicilian Greeks are inexperienced, but even now, if they were united in a body, they could still prevail. But the Syracusans alone, already defeated in battle with their whole levy and blockaded by sea at the same time, will be unable to withstand the force the Athenians now have there. And if this city is taken, the whole of Sicily is taken as well, and Italy soon after; and the danger from there which I just described would not be long in falling on you. So let no one think he is deliberating only about Sicily; it is about the Peloponnese too, unless you do the following quickly. Send an army there on ships, men who will row themselves across and serve as hoplites as soon as they land; and, what I think even more useful than the army, a Spartiate as commander, to organize the men who are there and compel those who are unwilling. In this way your existing friends will take more heart, and the waverers will come over with less fear. At the same time you must make war here more openly, so that the Syracusans, thinking you care about them, may hold out the better, and the Athenians may be less able to send further reinforcements to their men. You must fortify Decelea in Attica, which is what the Athenians have always feared most and which they think is the only hardship of the war they have not yet tried. The surest way to hurt an enemy is to find out for certain what he most fears and bring that on him; for each side is likely to know its own weak points most exactly and to fear them. Of the benefits you will gain from the fort, and of those you will deny your enemies, I will pass over many and sum up the chief ones. Most of the property with which their country is stocked will come over to you, some of it captured, some of its own accord. They will at once be deprived of the revenue from the silver mines at Laurium and of what they now get from the land and the law courts; and above all of the revenue from their allies, which will come in less regularly, since the

allies, believing that you are now waging the war in earnest, will take less account of them.

92 "Whether any of this is done quickly and zealously depends on you, Lacedaemonians; for that it is possible I am fully confident, and I do not think I am mistaken in my judgment. And I expect no one among you to think worse of me if I, who was once thought a lover of my city, now go vigorously against it with its bitterest enemies, or to suspect my words as springing from an exile's zeal. I am an exile from the villainy of those who drove me out, not, if you listen to me, from the chance of serving you; and the worst enemies are not you, who did your enemies some harm, but those who forced their friends to become enemies. Love of my city I do not feel where I am wronged, but where I enjoyed my rights in safety as a citizen. Nor do I think that I am now going against a country that is still mine; I am rather trying to win back a country that is mine no longer. The true lover of his city is not the man who, having lost it unjustly, refuses to attack it, but the man who longs for it so much that he will try by every means to recover it. So I ask you, Lacedaemonians, to make use of me without hesitation for any danger and any hardship, recognizing the argument that everyone puts forward: that if as an enemy I did you great harm, as a friend I could do you good enough, inasmuch as I know the affairs of the Athenians, while I could only guess at yours. And I ask you to consider that you are now deliberating on matters of the greatest moment, and not to shrink from the expedition to Sicily and to Attica, so that by sending a small part of your forces you may save great things there and pull down the present and future power of the Athenians, and afterward live in safety yourselves and lead the whole of Hellas, which will follow you willingly, not by force, but out of goodwill."

93 This was what Alcibiades said. The Lacedaemonians had already been intending on their own to march against Athens, but

were still delaying and looking about them; now they were much more strongly encouraged, since he had explained each of these points and they thought they had heard it from the man who knew best. So they now turned their attention to fortifying Decelea and to sending some help at once to those in Sicily. They appointed Gylippus son of Cleandridas commander for the Syracusans and told him to consult with them and with the Corinthians and to arrange how help could reach those in Sicily most effectively and quickly under the circumstances. He told the Corinthians to send him two ships at once to Asine, and to get ready as many others as they meant to send and have them prepared to sail when the time came. Having agreed on this, the envoys left Lacedaemon. The Athenian trireme that the generals had sent from Sicily for money and cavalry also arrived, and the Athenians, when they heard the request, voted to send the army its supplies and the cavalry. So the winter ended, and with it the seventeenth year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

94 The following summer, right at the beginning of spring, the Athenians in Sicily set out from Catana and sailed along the coast to Megara in Sicily, whose people the Syracusans had driven out in the time of the tyrant Gelon, as I said earlier, and whose land they now held themselves. They landed and ravaged the fields, went against a Syracusan fort and failed to take it, and then moved on again by land and sea to the river Terias, went up into the plain, ravaged it, and set fire to the grain. They came upon a few Syracusans, killed some of them, set up a trophy, and went back to the ships. They sailed back to Catana, took on provisions there, and marched with the whole army against Centoripa, a town of the Sicels; they won it over by agreement and went away, burning the grain of the Inessaeans and the Hyblaeans as they went. When they reached Catana they found that the cavalry had come from Athens, 250 horsemen with their equipment but without horses,

which were to be procured on the spot, along with thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents of silver.

95 The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos and got as far as Cleonae, but an earthquake occurred and they withdrew. After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatis, on their border, and took a great deal of plunder from the Lacedaemonians, which sold for no less than twenty-five talents. Not long afterward, in the same summer, the people of Thespiae attacked those in office but did not prevail; the Thebans came to help, and some of them were arrested, while others fled to Athens.

96 The same summer, when the Syracusans learned that the cavalry had reached the Athenians and that they were about to march against them, they thought that unless the Athenians got control of Epipolae, a steep height lying directly above the city, they could not easily be walled off even if they were beaten in battle. So they decided to guard the approaches to it, so that the enemy should not go up that way unseen; for they could not get up anywhere else. For the rest of the ground is steep, and slopes down all the way to the city, and everything on it can be seen from inside; and because it lies above the rest, the Syracusans called it Epipolae.[8] At dawn they came out in full force to the meadow beside the river Anapus (Hermocrates and his fellow generals had just taken up their command), held a review of arms, and first picked out six hundred chosen hoplites under the command of Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae and to be ready to come quickly in a body wherever else they might be needed.

97 On the night before the day of this review the Athenians, with their whole army, put in from Catana without being noticed at the place called Leon, which is six or seven stades from Epipolae; they landed the infantry and anchored the ships at Thapsus. This is a peninsula joined by a narrow isthmus, jutting out into the sea, and not far from the city of Syracuse either by sea

or by land. The Athenian naval force at Thapsus closed off the isthmus with a stockade and stayed quiet there, while the infantry went at once at a run to Epipolae and got up by Euryelus before the Syracusans noticed and came up from the meadow and the review. They came to the rescue, the others as fast as each could, and Diomilus' six hundred; but they had no less than twenty-five stades to cover from the meadow before they could engage. So the Syracusans fell on them in this way in some disorder, were beaten in battle on Epipolae, and withdrew into the city; Diomilus was killed, and about three hundred of the others. After this the Athenians set up a trophy and gave back the dead to the Syracusans under a truce. The next day they went down to the city itself; and when the Syracusans did not come out against them, they withdrew and built a fort at Labdalum, on the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae, looking toward Megara, to serve as a storehouse for their equipment and money whenever they advanced either to fight or to build walls.

98 Not long afterward three hundred cavalry came to them from Egesta, and about a hundred from the Sicels, the Naxians, and some others. The Athenians already had their 250, for whom they got horses partly from the Egestaeans and Catanians and partly by purchase; and in all 650 cavalry were assembled. They posted a garrison at Labdalum and advanced to Syca, where they took up a position and quickly built the circle.[9] The speed of the building alarmed the Syracusans, and they came out intending to give battle and not stand by. The two armies were already drawn up facing each other, when the Syracusan generals, seeing that their army was scattered and not easily formed into line, led it back again into the city, except for part of the cavalry. These stayed and tried to stop the Athenians from carrying stones and from straggling too far. Then one tribal regiment of the Athenian hoplites, with all the cavalry, charged and routed the Syracusan

cavalry, killed some of them, and set up a trophy for the cavalry battle.

99 The next day some of the Athenians began building the wall north of the circle, while others gathered stones and timber and laid them down in a line toward the place called Trogilus, along the route by which their wall of blockade would be shortest from the Great Harbor to the other sea. The Syracusans, at the urging above all of Hermocrates among their generals, no longer wanted to risk battles in full force against the Athenians, but thought it better to build a counterwall across the line on which the Athenians were going to carry their wall. If they were first, the Athenians would be cut off; and if the Athenians came against them while they were at it, they would send part of their army against them, and they themselves would occupy the approaches first with a stockade, and the Athenians would have to stop work and all turn against them. So they came out and began building, starting from their own city, carrying a cross wall below the Athenian circle, cutting down the olive trees of the sacred precinct and putting up wooden towers. The Athenian ships had not yet sailed round from Thapsus into the Great Harbor; the Syracusans still controlled the coast, and the Athenians brought in their supplies by land from Thapsus.

100 When the Syracusans thought that enough of the counterwall had been staked and built, and the Athenians did not come to stop them, being afraid that if they divided their forces they would be easier to fight, and being at the same time intent on their own wall of circumvallation, the Syracusans left one tribal regiment to guard the work and went back into the city. The Athenians destroyed their pipes, which had been laid underground to bring drinking water into the city. Then, watching for a time when the rest of the Syracusans were in their tents at midday, and some had even gone off into the city, and those at the stockade were keeping

careless guard, they told off three hundred picked men of their own and some chosen light troops, armed as hoplites, to run suddenly at full speed against the counterwall, while the rest of the army went in two divisions, one with one general toward the city, in case the Syracusans came out to help, and the other with the other general toward the stockade by the postern gate. The three hundred attacked and took the stockade, and its guards abandoned it and fled into the outwork around the Temenites. The pursuers burst in with them, but once inside they were thrown out again by force by the Syracusans, and some of the Argives and a few of the Athenians were killed there. Then the whole army came back, pulled down the counterwall, tore up the stockade, carried the stakes off to their own lines, and set up a trophy.

101 The next day the Athenians began walling from the circle toward the cliff above the marsh, which on this side of Epipolae looks toward the Great Harbor; this was the line along which their wall of circumvallation would be shortest, going down across the level ground and the marsh to the harbor. Meanwhile the Syracusans came out and began another stockade, starting again from the city and running through the middle of the marsh, and at the same time they dug a ditch alongside it, so that the Athenians could not wall them off all the way to the sea. When the Athenians had finished the part toward the cliff, they attacked the Syracusan stockade and ditch in turn. They ordered the ships to sail round from Thapsus into the Great Harbor of the Syracusans, and they themselves came down from Epipolae about first light to the level ground, laid doors and planks across the marsh where, though muddy, it was firmest, walked across on them, and at dawn took the stockade, except for a small part, and the ditch; and later they took the part that was left as well. A battle followed, and in it the Athenians were victorious. Of the Syracusans, those on the right wing fled toward the city, and those on the left along the river. The

three hundred picked men of the Athenians, wanting to cut them off from the crossing, hurried at a run toward the bridge. The Syracusans took alarm (for most of their cavalry were there too) and closed with these three hundred, routed them, and charged the right wing of the Athenians; and at their onset the first tribal regiment of that wing also panicked. Lamachus saw this and came to help from his own left with a few archers, taking the Argives with him; he crossed a ditch, was cut off with the few who had crossed with him, and was killed, he and five or six of his men. The Syracusans at once quickly snatched up their bodies and carried them across the river to safety, and then, as the rest of the Athenian army was now coming up, they withdrew.

102 Meanwhile those who had first fled toward the city, seeing what was happening, took heart again, came out from the city, and formed up against the Athenians facing them; and they sent part of their force against the circle on Epipolae, thinking they would find it unguarded and take it. They took and destroyed the outwork, which was ten plethra long, but Nicias kept them from the circle itself; he happened to have been left there because of illness. He ordered the servants to set fire to the engines and the timber that had been thrown down in front of the wall, since he saw that for lack of men they could not survive in any other way. And so it turned out: the Syracusans came no farther because of the fire, but withdrew again. For help was now coming up to the circle from the Athenians below, who had driven off the enemy there, and at the same time their ships from Thapsus were sailing into the Great Harbor, as they had been ordered. Seeing this, the men on the heights quickly withdrew, and so did the whole Syracusan army, into the city, thinking that with the forces they now had they would no longer be able to prevent the building of the wall to the sea.

103 After this the Athenians set up a trophy, gave back the dead to the Syracusans under a truce, and recovered the bodies of Lamachus and those who had fallen with him. Now that their whole force, both the fleet and the army, was with them, they began walling off the Syracusans with a double wall from Epipolae and the cliffs down to the sea. Supplies were brought in for the army from all over Italy. Many of the Sicels, who had been waiting to see which way things went, came over to the Athenians as allies, and three penteconters came from Tyrrhenia. Everything else was going forward as they had hoped. For the Syracusans no longer thought they could win the war, since no help at all had come to them from the Peloponnese either; and they were talking of terms among themselves and with Nicias, who now held the command alone, since Lamachus was dead. Nothing was settled, but, as is natural with men at a loss and more closely besieged than before, much was said to him, and still more within the city. Their present troubles even made them suspicious of one another, and they deposed the generals under whom these things had happened to them, as though they had suffered through their bad luck or their treachery, and chose others in their place, Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias.

104 Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth were already off Leucas, wanting to bring help quickly to Sicily. Since the reports reaching them were alarming and all falsely agreed that Syracuse was already completely walled off, Gylippus no longer had any hope for Sicily, but wanting to save Italy, he and Pythen the Corinthian crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum as quickly as possible with two Laconian ships and two Corinthian, while the Corinthians were to man two Leucadian and three Ambraciot ships besides their own ten and sail later. Gylippus first went on an embassy from Tarentum to Thurii and renewed his father's citizenship there;[10] but failing to win them

over, he put out and sailed along the coast of Italy. Off the Terinaean Gulf he was caught by the wind, which blows strong from the north there when it is set in that quarter, and was carried out to sea; after being battered by a very severe storm he made Tarentum again, hauled up the ships that had suffered most from the storm, and repaired them. Nicias heard that he was sailing toward them, but he made light of the small number of his ships, as the Thurians had also done, thought that they were sailing equipped more for piracy, and set no watch as yet.

105 About the same time in this summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Argos and ravaged most of the country, and the Athenians came to the help of the Argives with thirty ships. These broke their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most open way. Before this they had joined the Argives and Mantineans in the war by raiding from Pylos and by landing elsewhere around the Peloponnese rather than in Laconia; and though the Argives had often urged them merely to land with arms in Laconia, join them in ravaging the least bit of it, and leave, they had refused. But now, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and ravaged the land, and so gave the Lacedaemonians a far more plausible ground for defending themselves against the Athenians. After the Athenians had left Argos with their ships, and the Lacedaemonians too, the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius, ravaged part of its land, killed some of the inhabitants, and went home.

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1. The first Athenian expedition to Sicily, 427–424 BC, told in Books 3 and 4.

2. The *epistates*, the member of the council's presiding committee who chaired the assembly for the day and put motions to the vote. Reopening a question already decided was illegal.

3. Herms: square stone pillars topped with a head of the god Hermes, set up at house doors, crossroads, and sanctuaries as guardians. The mutilation took place in 415 BC, shortly before the fleet sailed.

4. The Eleusinian Mysteries of Demeter and Persephone, secret rites revealed only to initiates; to perform or parody them in private was a capital offense.

5. The *thranitae*, the top bank of rowers in a trireme, whose oars were the longest and whose work was the hardest.

6. One of the two Athenian state triremes, used for official missions such as carrying envoys or summoning officials home.

7. Harmodius and Aristogeiton killed Hipparchus, brother of the tyrant Hippias, in 514 BC, and were honored at Athens as the tyrant-slayers; Hippias was expelled in 510 BC.

8. The name means “the parts above,” the heights over the city.

9. A round fort at the center of the Athenian siege works, from which the walls of circumvallation were to run north and south.

10. Cleandridas, the father of Gylippus, had fled Sparta about 446 BC after being accused of taking bribes, and became a citizen of Thurii.

Book 7

1 Gylippus and Pythen, after refitting their ships at Tarentum, sailed along the coast to Epizephyrian Locri.[1] There they learned more clearly that Syracuse was not yet completely walled off, and that an army arriving by way of Epipolae could still get in; and they debated whether to keep Sicily on their right and risk the run into the harbor, or to keep it on their left, sail first to Himera, and then, taking along the Himeraeans themselves and any other force they could persuade to join, go by land. They decided to sail for Himera, especially since the four Attic ships were not yet at Rhegium; Nicias had sent them off nonetheless when he learned that the enemy were at Locri. Getting ahead of this guard, they crossed the strait, touched at Rhegium and Messana, and reached Himera. While there they persuaded the Himeraeans to join the war, both to march with them in person and to supply arms to those sailors from their ships who had none (for they had beached their ships at Himera); and they sent to the Selinuntines and told them to meet them in full force at a certain place. The Geloans and some of the Sicels also promised to send them a force, not a large one. The Sicels were ready to come over much more eagerly than before, because Archonidas had recently died, a king of some of the Sicels in those parts, a man of some power, and a friend of the Athenians, and because Gylippus seemed to have come from Lacedaemon in earnest. Gylippus took the armed men among his own sailors and marines, about seven hundred; Himeraean hoplites and light-armed troops together, a thousand, and a hundred horsemen;

some light-armed troops and horsemen from Selinus, and a few Geloans; and Sicels, about a thousand in all; and he marched for Syracuse.

2 Meanwhile the Corinthians from Leucas were hurrying to the rescue with the rest of their ships as fast as each could make it; and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who had set out last, with a single ship, arrived first at Syracuse, a little ahead of Gylippus. He found the Syracusans about to hold an assembly on ending the war. He stopped them and put heart into them, telling them that more ships were still on the way, and Gylippus son of Cleandridas, whom the Lacedaemonians had sent as commander. The Syracusans took courage and went out at once in full force to meet Gylippus, for they had learned that he was already close. He, having taken Ietae, a Sicel fort, on his way, and having drawn up his men ready for battle, reached Epipolae; he went up by Euryelus, the way the Athenians themselves had first gone, and advanced with the Syracusans against the Athenian fortification. He happened to arrive at the very moment when the Athenians had finished a double wall seven or eight stades long down to the Great Harbor, except for a short stretch at the sea, which they were still building; along the rest of the circle, toward Trogilus on the other sea, stones had already been laid down for most of the distance, and some parts had been left half built and others finished. That was how close Syracuse came to danger.

3 The Athenians were thrown into confusion at first by the sudden advance of Gylippus and the Syracusans, but they formed up for battle. Gylippus grounded arms close by and sent a herald to tell them that if they were willing to leave Sicily within five days, taking their belongings with them, he was ready to make a truce. They treated this with contempt and sent the herald away without an answer. After this the two sides made ready against each other for battle. Gylippus, seeing that the Syracusans were in disorder

and not easily getting into line, drew his army back into more open ground. Nicias did not lead the Athenians forward but kept quiet by his own wall. When Gylippus saw that they were not coming on, he led his army off to the height called Temenites, and they camped there for the night. The next day he led out the greater part of his army and drew it up facing the Athenian walls, so that they could not send help elsewhere; and he sent a detachment against the fort of Labdalum and took it, and killed everyone he captured in it. The place was out of sight of the Athenians. On the same day an Athenian trireme keeping watch off the harbor was captured by the Syracusans.

4 After this the Syracusans and their allies began to build a single wall across Epipolae, starting from the city and running up toward the cross wall, so that the Athenians, unless they could prevent it, would no longer be able to wall them off. The Athenians had by now gone up to the heights, having finished the wall by the sea; and Gylippus, since part of the Athenian wall was weak, took his army by night and moved against it. But the Athenians, who happened to be camped outside the wall, saw this and advanced to meet him, and when he saw it he quickly led his men back again. The Athenians raised that section higher and guarded it themselves, and they now posted the allies along the rest of the fortification, each at the place it was to garrison. Nicias decided to fortify the place called Plemmyrium. This is a headland opposite the city that juts out and makes the mouth of the Great Harbor narrow; if it were fortified, he thought, bringing in supplies would be easier, because they would be keeping watch on the Syracusan harbor from closer at hand and would not, as now, have to put out from the far end of the Great Harbor whenever the enemy made any move with their navy. He was by now paying more attention to the war at sea, since he saw that their prospects on land had become less hopeful since Gylippus came. So he took a force and

the ships across and built three forts; most of the equipment was stored in them, and the large boats and the warships now lay at anchor there. As a result, it was now above all that the crews first began to deteriorate. They had to use water that was scarce and not close at hand, and whenever the sailors went out to gather firewood they were cut down by the Syracusan horsemen, who were masters of the countryside; for on account of the men at Plemmyrium a third of the Syracusan cavalry had been posted at the little town at the Olympieum, to keep them from coming out to do damage. Nicias also learned that the rest of the Corinthian ships were on their way, and he sent twenty ships to watch for them, with orders to lie in wait for them around Locri and Rhegium and the approach to Sicily.

5 Gylippus went on building the wall across Epipolae, using the stones the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and at the same time kept leading the Syracusans and their allies out and drawing them up in front of the fortification; and the Athenians drew up against them. When Gylippus judged that the moment had come, he began the attack; they came to close quarters and fought between the two walls, where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use at all. The Syracusans and their allies were beaten, they took up their dead under truce, and the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus then called the army together and said that the mistake had been not theirs but his own: by drawing up their line too far inside the walls he had robbed them of the help of their cavalry and javelin men. Now he would lead them on again. He told them to keep this in mind: in equipment they would be no worse off than the enemy, and as for spirit, it would be intolerable if they, Peloponnesians and Dorians, could not bring themselves to beat Ionians and islanders and a mixed rabble and drive them out of the country.

6 After this, when the moment came, he led them on again. Nicias and the Athenians believed that even if the enemy were unwilling to begin a battle, they themselves could not stand by and let the wall be built past their own (for the Syracusan wall had already all but passed the end of the Athenian wall, and if it went farther, it would come to the same thing for them whether they won every battle they fought or did not fight at all); so they advanced against the Syracusans. Gylippus led his hoplites farther out from the walls than before and engaged there, and posted his cavalry and javelin men on the Athenians' flank, in the open ground where the works of both walls ended. In the battle the cavalry charged the Athenian left wing, which was opposite them, and routed it; and because of this the rest of the army too was beaten by the Syracusans and driven headlong into its fortifications. The next night the Syracusans managed to carry their wall past the Athenian works in time, so that they could no longer be stopped by them, and the Athenians were wholly deprived of any chance, even if they won, of walling them off.

7 After this the remaining twelve ships of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians sailed in, having slipped past the Athenian guard (Erasinides, a Corinthian, commanded them), and helped the Syracusans build the rest of the wall up to the cross wall. Gylippus went off into the rest of Sicily to raise an army, both naval and land forces, and at the same time to win over any of the cities that were either lukewarm or had kept wholly out of the war so far. Other envoys of the Syracusans and Corinthians were sent to Lacedaemon and Corinth to get another army brought across in whatever way it could, in merchant ships or boats or any other way that worked, since the Athenians too were sending for reinforcements. The Syracusans manned a fleet and began to train it, meaning to try their hand at this too, and in everything else they had taken great heart.

8 Nicias saw this and saw that the enemy's strength and his own helplessness grew day by day, and he too sent to Athens. He had often done so before, reporting each thing as it happened, but now more than ever, since he believed they were in danger and that unless the Athenians either recalled them as quickly as possible or sent out others, and not a few, there was no hope of safety. He was afraid that the men he sent, whether through lack of skill in speaking, or failures of memory, or by saying something to please the crowd, might not report the facts, and so he wrote a letter, thinking that in this way the Athenians would best learn his own judgment, with nothing of it lost in the messenger, and could deliberate on the truth. The men he sent left, carrying the letter and whatever they had to say themselves; and he attended to the camp, now managing it more by keeping on guard than by running risks of his own choosing.

9 At the end of the same summer Euetion, an Athenian general, marched with Perdiccas against Amphipolis with many Thracians. He did not take the city, but he brought triremes round into the Strymon and besieged it from the river, using Himeraeum as his base. And the summer ended.

10 The following winter the men from Nicias arrived at Athens. They said what they had been told to say by word of mouth, answered any questions put to them, and delivered the letter. The clerk of the city came forward and read it to the Athenians. It ran as follows.

11 "Athenians, you know what was done earlier from many other letters; but now it is time for you, no less than before, to learn our situation and to deliberate. We had beaten the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, in most of the battles, and had built the walls we now occupy, when Gylippus, a Lacedaemonian, came with an army from the Peloponnese and from some of the cities in Sicily. In the first battle he was beaten by us; the next day we were over-

powered by numerous horsemen and javelin men and withdrew into our walls. So now, because of the numbers against us, we have stopped walling them in and are keeping quiet (we could not use our whole army in any case, since guarding the walls has taken up part of our hoplite force); and they have built a single wall past ours, so that it is no longer possible to wall them in, unless someone attacks this counter-wall with a large army and takes it. And it has turned out that we, who are supposed to be besieging others, are ourselves the ones who suffer it, at least on land; for we cannot even go far into the countryside because of the cavalry.

12 "They have also sent envoys to the Peloponnese for another army, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily, to persuade those that are now neutral to join the war, and from others to bring, if he can, more infantry and materials for a navy. For they intend, as I learn, to try our walls with their infantry and at the same time with their ships by sea. And let none of you think it a strange thing that I say by sea as well. Our navy, as the enemy also know, was at first in its prime, both in the dryness of the ships and the soundness of the crews; but now the ships are waterlogged from being at sea so long, and the crews have been ruined. We cannot haul the ships ashore and dry them out, because the enemy's ships, equal to ours in number and more, keep us always expecting an attack. They are plainly seen training; the initiative lies with them; and they have more freedom to dry out their own ships, since they are not blockading anyone else.

13 "We, on the other hand, could hardly do this even if we had a great surplus of ships and were not forced, as we are now, to keep all of them on guard; for if we relax our watch even a little, we shall have no supplies, since even now we bring them in with difficulty past their city. Our crews have been ruined, and are still being ruined, for these reasons. Of the sailors, some are lost to the cavalry while they go far afield for firewood, for plunder, and for

water; the servants have been deserting since we came to be evenly matched; and of the foreigners, those who were pressed into service go off at once to their cities, while those who were first tempted by high pay, thinking they would make money rather than fight, now that they see, against their expectation, a navy and everything else standing against them on the enemy's side, leave either on the pretext of deserting to the enemy or in any way each of them can (and Sicily is large). There are even some who trade on their own account, persuade the trierarchs to take slaves bought at Hyccara aboard in their place, and so have destroyed the precision of our navy.

14 "I write to people who know that a crew is at its peak only for a short time, and that only a few of the sailors can get a ship under way and keep the rowing together. Of all these things the most hopeless is, first, that I as general cannot prevent them (for your natures are hard to command), and second, that we have no source from which to fill up our crews, as the enemy can from many places; both what we have now and what we lose must come out of what we brought with us. For the cities that are now our allies, Naxos and Catana, are powerless. And if one more thing is added to the enemy's side, so that the districts of Italy that feed us, seeing the state we are in and that you are not sending help, go over to them, the war will have been fought to the end for them without a battle, and we shall have been starved out by siege. I could have sent you other news more pleasant than this, but certainly not more useful, if you are to deliberate with clear knowledge of affairs here. And knowing your natures as I do, that you wish to hear what is most pleasant, but blame people afterward if anything turns out differently for you as a result, I thought it safer to show you the truth.

15 "And now, understand that as far as the purpose for which we first came is concerned, neither your soldiers nor your com-

manders have given you cause for blame. But since all Sicily is uniting, and another army is expected by them from the Peloponnese, you must now deliberate on the basis that the forces here are not equal even to the enemy now present. You must either recall these men or send out another army no smaller, both land and naval forces, and money, and not a little; and a successor for me, since I cannot stay on because of a disease of the kidneys. I think I have a claim on your indulgence; for when I was in good health I did you much good service in my commands. But whatever you mean to do, do it at the very start of spring and without delay, since the enemy will procure what they need from Sicily in a short time, and what comes from the Peloponnese more slowly; but even so, unless you pay attention, some things will escape your notice, as before, and in others they will be ahead of you."

16 That was what Nicias' letter disclosed. When the Athenians heard it, they did not relieve Nicias of his command; but until the colleagues they chose should arrive, they appointed two men already there, Menander and Euthydemus, to serve with him, so that he would not bear the strain alone in his sickness; and they voted to send another army, both naval and land forces, of Athenians from the muster roll and of the allies. As his colleagues they chose Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes and Eurymedon son of Thucles. Eurymedon they sent off to Sicily at once, around the winter solstice, with ten ships, carrying 120 talents of silver,[2] and to tell the men there that help would come and that they would be looked after.

17 Demosthenes stayed behind and prepared for the expedition, meaning to sail at the start of spring; he sent word to the allies for troops and got ready money, ships, and hoplites at home. The Athenians also sent twenty ships around the Peloponnese to see that no one crossed from Corinth or the Peloponnese to Sicily. For the Corinthians, when their envoys came back with better news

from Sicily, thought their earlier dispatch of ships had not been ill-timed and took much greater heart; they made ready to send hoplites to Sicily in merchant ships themselves, and the Lacedaemonians were to send them in the same way from the rest of the Peloponnese. The Corinthians also manned twenty-five ships, to try a sea battle with the squadron at Naupactus, and so that the Athenians at Naupactus would be less able to stop their merchant ships from putting out, being occupied with keeping watch on the Corinthian triremes drawn up against them.

18 The Lacedaemonians were also preparing for their invasion of Attica, as they had decided before, and because the Syracusans and Corinthians were urging them on, now that they learned of the reinforcements from Athens to Sicily, so that an invasion might stop them. And Alcibiades kept pressing them, urging them to fortify Decelea and not to let the war slacken. But above all the Lacedaemonians had gained a certain confidence because they thought that the Athenians, with two wars on their hands, against themselves and against the Sicilian Greeks, would be easier to destroy, and because they believed the Athenians had been the first to break the treaty. In the earlier war, they thought, the offense had been more theirs, because the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of truce, and because, although the earlier agreement had said that arms should not be brought against those who were willing to submit to arbitration, they themselves had refused when the Athenians invited them to arbitration. For this reason they thought their misfortunes deserved, and they took to heart the disaster at Pylos and any other that had befallen them. But when the Athenians, using Argos as a base, had ravaged part of the territory of Epidaurus and Prasiae and other places with their thirty ships, and at the same time were plundering from Pylos, and whenever disputes arose over any of the points in question under the treaty, refused to submit to arbitration when the

Lacedaemonians invited them, then indeed the Lacedaemonians, believing that the offense they themselves had committed before had now come round in the same form to the Athenians, were eager for the war. During this winter they sent round to their allies for iron and got ready the other tools for building the fort; and at the same time, to send help to the men in Sicily in the merchant ships, they raised troops themselves and compelled the other Peloponnesians to do the same. So the winter ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

19 At the very start of the following spring, earlier than ever before, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica. Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, was in command. First they ravaged the country around the plain; then they began to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the cities. Decelea is about 120 stades from the city of Athens, and about the same distance, not much more, from Boeotia. The fort was being built to do damage to the plain and the richest parts of the country, and it could be seen from the city of Athens itself. So the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica built their fort, while those in the Peloponnese, at about the same time, were sending the hoplites to Sicily in the merchant ships. The Lacedaemonians picked the best of the Helots and of the Neodamodes,[3] some six hundred hoplites of both together, with Eccritus, a Spartiate, in command; the Boeotians sent three hundred hoplites, commanded by Xenon and Nicon, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian. These were the first to set out, from Taenarum in Laconia, and put out to the open sea. Not long after them the Corinthians sent off five hundred hoplites, some from Corinth itself and some Arcadians they had hired, with Alexarchus, a Corinthian, placed in command. The Sicyonians too sent two hundred hoplites along with the Corinthians, commanded by Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meanwhile the twenty-five Corinthian ships that had been manned in the winter lay at anchor

facing the twenty Attic ships at Naupactus, until these hoplites had set sail from the Peloponnese in the merchant ships. That was why they had been manned in the first place: so that the Athenians would pay attention to the triremes rather than to the merchant ships.

20 Meanwhile the Athenians too, at the same time as the fortification of Decelea and at the very start of spring, sent thirty ships around the Peloponnese under Charicles son of Apollodorus, who had orders to go to Argos as well and to call on the Argives, under the terms of the alliance, for hoplites to serve on the ships. And they sent off Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had intended, with sixty Athenian ships and five Chian, twelve hundred Athenian hoplites from the muster roll, as many islanders as they could possibly get from each place, and whatever they could gather from the other subject allies that was of use for the war. He had orders first to sail around with Charicles and take part in his operations around Laconia. Demosthenes sailed to Aegina and waited there for any part of his force that had been left behind, and for Charicles to pick up the Argives.

21 In Sicily, at about the same time this spring, Gylippus too came back to Syracuse, bringing from the cities he had won over as large a force as he could get from each. He called the Syracusans together and told them they must man as many ships as they could and make trial of a sea battle; for he hoped from this to accomplish something for the war worthy of the risk. Hermocrates joined in persuading them, and not least, that they should not lose heart at attacking the Athenians with their ships. He said that the Athenians too did not have their experience of the sea from their fathers, or from all time; they had been landsmen even more than the Syracusans and had been forced to become seamen by the Medes. Against daring men such as the Athenians, he said, those who dared in return would seem the most formida-

ble; for the same means by which the Athenians terrified their neighbors, sometimes not by superior power but by attacking with boldness, the Syracusans too could use on their enemies in the same way. And he said he knew well that if the Syracusans dared, against expectation, to stand up to the Athenian navy, they would gain more from the enemy's being taken aback by such a thing than the Athenians would harm the Syracusans' inexperience with their skill. So he told them to go and make trial of their navy and not to shrink from it. The Syracusans, persuaded by Gylippus and Hermocrates and whoever else, were eager for the sea battle and began to man their ships.

22 When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out the whole land army under cover of night, intending to attack the forts at Plemmyrium himself by land; at the same time and at a signal the Syracusan triremes moved out, thirty-five sailing against the enemy from the Great Harbor, and forty-five sailing around from the smaller harbor, where their dockyard was, wishing to join the ships inside and at the same time to sail against Plemmyrium, so that the Athenians would be thrown into confusion on both sides. The Athenians quickly manned sixty ships against them, and with twenty-five of these they fought the thirty-five Syracusan ships in the Great Harbor, and with the rest they went to meet the ships sailing around from the dockyard. They fought at once in front of the mouth of the Great Harbor, and for a long time held each other off, the one side wishing to force the entrance, the other to prevent it.

23 Meanwhile, while the Athenians at Plemmyrium had gone down to the shore and were intent on the sea battle, Gylippus struck first: at dawn he fell suddenly on the forts and took the largest first, and then the two smaller ones too, since their garrisons did not stand when they saw the largest so easily taken. From the first one taken, the men who fled to the boats and to a

merchant ship had a hard time getting away to the camp, for the Syracusans were winning the sea battle with their ships in the Great Harbor, and they were chased by one fast trireme. But by the time the two forts were being taken, the Syracusans happened to be already losing, and the men fleeing from these forts sailed past more easily. For the Syracusan ships fighting in front of the mouth forced their way past the Athenian ships but sailed in with no order, fell into confusion among themselves, and handed the victory to the Athenians; for the Athenians routed these and also those by which they had at first been beaten in the harbor. They sank eleven Syracusan ships and killed most of the men aboard, except those from three ships, whom they took alive; and of their own ships three were destroyed. They hauled in the wrecks of the Syracusan ships, set up a trophy on the islet off Plemmyrium, and went back to their own camp.

24 That was how the Syracusans had fared in the sea battle; but they held the forts at Plemmyrium, and they set up three trophies for them. One of the two forts taken last they pulled down; the other two they repaired and garrisoned. Many men were killed or taken alive in the capture of the forts, and a great deal of property was taken in all; for the Athenians had been using the forts as a storehouse, and there was much property of merchants in them, and grain, and much of the trierarchs' property too, since the sails of forty triremes and the rest of their gear were captured there, and three triremes that had been hauled ashore. The capture of Plemmyrium was the greatest and the first of the blows that ruined the Athenian army. Even the entrance for bringing in supplies was no longer safe (for the Syracusans lay in wait there with ships and stopped them, and from now on supplies could be brought in only by fighting), and in other respects too it struck the army with dismay and despondency.

25 After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships with Agatharchus, a Syracusan, in command. One of them went to the Peloponnese, carrying envoys who were to report that the Syracusan cause was hopeful and to urge that the war there be pressed still harder. The other eleven sailed to Italy, on news that boats laden with goods were on their way to the Athenians. They fell in with the boats and destroyed most of them, and they burned timber for shipbuilding in the territory of Caulonia, which was lying ready for the Athenians. After this they went to Locri, and while they were at anchor there one of the merchant ships from the Peloponnese put in, bringing Thespian hoplites; the Syracusans took them on board their ships and sailed along the coast for home. The Athenians watched for them with twenty ships off Megara and took one ship, men and all, but could not take the others, which escaped to Syracuse. There was also skirmishing in the harbor over the stakes that the Syracusans had driven into the sea in front of the old ship sheds, so that their ships could lie at anchor inside them and the Athenians could not sail in and damage them by ramming. The Athenians brought up a ship of ten thousand talents' burden, fitted with wooden towers and screens, and from boats they tied ropes around the stakes and hauled them up and broke them off, or dived down and sawed them through. The Syracusans shot at them from the ship sheds, and the men on the merchant ship shot back; in the end the Athenians removed most of the stakes. The hardest part of the palisade was the hidden part; for there were some stakes they had driven in that did not rise above the surface, so that it was dangerous to sail in, for fear that a man might not see them in time and run his ship onto them as onto a reef. But divers went down and sawed off these too, for pay. Still, the Syracusans drove in stakes again. They devised many other things against each other, as was natural with the two armies close together and drawn up face to face, and

made use of skirmishes and attempts of every kind. The Syracusans also sent envoys, Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedaemonians, to the cities to report the capture of Plemmyrium, and to say of the sea battle that they had been beaten not by the enemy's strength so much as by their own confusion; and to make it known that in all else they were hopeful, and to ask them to come to their aid with ships and infantry, since the Athenians too were expected with another army, and if they could destroy the army already there before it came, the war would be finished. That was what the men in Sicily were doing.

26 When Demosthenes had gathered the force he was to take to the aid of Sicily, he set out from Aegina, sailed to the Peloponnese, and joined Charicles and the thirty Athenian ships; and taking on board the Argive hoplites, they sailed to Laconia. First they ravaged part of Epidaurus Limera; then they put in on the coast of Laconia opposite Cythera, where the temple of Apollo is, ravaged some of the land, and fortified a sort of isthmus there, so that the Helots of the Lacedaemonians could desert to it, and so that raiders could use it, as they used Pylos, as a base for plunder. Demosthenes, as soon as he had helped to occupy the place, sailed on along the coast for Corcyra, to pick up allies there too and make the voyage to Sicily as quickly as possible; Charicles waited until he had finished fortifying the place, left a garrison in it, and then went home himself with the thirty ships, and the Argives with him.

27 In this same summer there also arrived at Athens thirteen hundred peltasts, sword-bearing Thracians of the Dii tribe, who were to have sailed with Demosthenes to Sicily. Since they had come too late, the Athenians meant to send them back to Thrace, where they had come from. To keep them for the war from Decelea seemed too costly, for each man received a drachma a day. For Decelea, first fortified by the whole army in this summer

and afterward occupied, to the harm of the country, by garrisons from the cities relieving one another at intervals, did the Athenians great damage; and with its destruction of property and loss of men it was among the first things that ruined their affairs. Before, the invasions had been short and did not prevent them from enjoying their land for the rest of the time; but now the enemy sat on them continuously, and sometimes larger forces came, and sometimes the regular garrison, out of necessity, overran the country and plundered; and with the king of the Lacedaemonians, Agis, present, who did not treat the war as a side matter, the Athenians were greatly harmed. They had lost the whole of their country; more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, and most of them were craftsmen; all their sheep and draft animals had been lost; and of the horses, since the horsemen rode out every day, making raids toward Decelea and guarding the country, some were lamed on the hard ground and by continuous hardship, and others were wounded.

28 The bringing of supplies from Euboea, which had formerly been quicker overland from Oropus through Decelea, now went around Sunium by sea at great cost. The city needed everything alike from abroad, and instead of a city it became a fort. The Athenians stood guard on the battlements, by day in turns and by night all together except the horsemen, some at the arms posts and others on the wall,[4] and they wore themselves out summer and winter. What pressed them most was that they had two wars at once; and they had reached a pitch of contentiousness that no one would have believed if he had heard of it before it happened. No one would have believed that they, though themselves besieged by the fort the Peloponnesians had built, would not even so withdraw from Sicily, but would in turn besiege Syracuse there in the same way, a city in itself no smaller than Athens; or that they would so confound the Hellenes' estimate of their power and dar-

ing (for at the start of the war some thought they would hold out for a year, some for two, but no one for more than three, if the Peloponnesians invaded their country), that in the seventeenth year after the first invasion they went to Sicily, already worn down by the war in every way, and took on a war no smaller than the one they already had from the Peloponnese. For these reasons, and because Decelea was doing them great harm and other heavy expenses were falling on them, they had now become short of money. At about this time they imposed on their subjects, in place of the tribute, a duty of one twentieth on all goods carried by sea, thinking that in this way more money would come in to them. For their expenses were not as before but had become much greater, as the war had become greater, while their revenues were perishing.

29 So, because of their present shortage of money, and not wishing to spend it, they sent the Thracians who had come too late for Demosthenes straight back, appointing Diitrephes to take them home, and telling him at the same time to do the enemy what damage he could with them on the voyage along the coast (for they were going by way of the Euripus). He landed them at Tanagra and carried off some plunder quickly; then he crossed the Euripus from Chalcis in Euboea in the evening, landed them in Boeotia, and led them against Mycalessus. He spent the night unnoticed at the Hermaeum (it is about sixteen stades from Mycalessus), and at daybreak he assaulted the town, which is not a large one. He took it, falling on people who were off their guard and who never expected that anyone would come so far up from the sea to attack them; the wall was weak, and in some places had even fallen, and in others had been built low, and the gates too were open because they felt safe. The Thracians burst into Mycalessus and sacked the houses and the temples, and they slaughtered the people, sparing neither the old nor the young, but

killing everyone they met, one after another, children and women, and even the draft animals and every other living thing they saw; for the Thracian race, like the most bloodthirsty of the barbarians, is most murderous whenever it feels secure. And then there was confusion of every kind, and every form of destruction; and they fell on a boys' school, the largest in the place, which the children had just entered, and cut them all down. This disaster fell on the whole city, a disaster second to none, and more unexpected and more terrible than any.

30 The Thebans learned of it and came to the rescue. They caught up with the Thracians when they had not gone far, took the plunder from them, and drove them in panic down to the Euripus and the sea, where the boats that had brought them lay at anchor. They killed most of them as they were getting aboard, since they did not know how to swim, and the men in the boats, when they saw what was happening on land, had anchored the boats out of bowshot. In the rest of the retreat, however, the Thracians defended themselves not unskillfully against the Theban cavalry, which attacked first, dashing out and closing up again in the manner of their country, and few of them were killed in this part. Some of them were caught in the town itself while plundering and were killed. Of the thirteen hundred Thracians, two hundred and fifty were killed in all. They killed about twenty of the Thebans and the others who came to help, horsemen and hoplites together, and Scirphondas, one of the Boeotarchs of Thebes; and of the Mycalessians a part was wiped out. Such were the things that happened at Mycalessus, which suffered a calamity that, for its size, was as pitiable as any in the war.

31 Demosthenes, meanwhile, sailing for Corcyra after the fortification in Laconia, found a merchant ship lying at Pheia in Elis, in which the Corinthian hoplites were to cross to Sicily. He destroyed the ship; the men escaped, and later got another ship and sailed.

After this Demosthenes went to Zacynthus and Cephallenia, took on hoplites there, sent for some of the Messenians from Naupactus, and crossed over to the mainland opposite, to Acarnania, to Alyzia and to Anactorium, which the Athenians held. While he was there Eurymedon met him, sailing back from Sicily, where he had been sent in the winter with the money for the army; and he reported, among other things, that he had learned while already on his voyage that Plemmyrium had been taken by the Syracusans. Conon, who commanded at Naupactus, also came to them, reporting that the twenty-five Corinthian ships lying opposite them were not breaking off the war and were about to fight; he asked them to send ships, since his own eighteen were not enough to fight their twenty-five. So Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent ten ships with Conon, the best sailers they had, to join those at Naupactus, and themselves went on with the gathering of the army. Eurymedon sailed to Corcyra, told the Corcyraeans to man fifteen ships, and enlisted hoplites (for he had turned back and was now sharing the command with Demosthenes, as he had been elected to do); Demosthenes collected slingers and javelin men from the districts around Acarnania.

32 The envoys who had gone from Syracuse to the cities after the capture of Plemmyrium had persuaded them and gathered an army, and were about to bring it. Nicias learned of it in advance and sent to those of the Sicels who held the route and were his allies, the Centoripans, the Halicyaeans, and others, asking them not to let the enemy through but to unite and stop them from passing; for they would not even try another route, since the Agrigentines would not give them passage through their territory. When the Sicilian Greeks were already on the march, the Sicels, as the Athenians had asked, set an ambush in three places, fell on them suddenly while they were off their guard, and killed about

eight hundred of them, and all the envoys except one, the Corinthian. He brought those who escaped, about fifteen hundred, to Syracuse.

33 About the same days the Camarinaeans also arrived to help the Syracusans, with five hundred hoplites, three hundred javelin men, and three hundred archers. The Geloans too sent a naval force of five ships, four hundred javelin men, and two hundred horsemen. For by now almost the whole of Sicily, except the Agrigentines (who were with neither side), all the rest, who had before been watching events, joined together with the Syracusans and came to help against the Athenians. The Syracusans, after the disaster they had suffered among the Sicels, held off from attacking the Athenians at once. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, their forces from Corcyra and from the mainland now being ready, crossed the Ionian Gulf with their whole army to the Iapygian headland. Setting out from there, they put in at the Choerades islands off Iapygia and took on board their ships a hundred and fifty Iapygian javelin men of the Messapian tribe; and after renewing an old friendship with Artas, who as ruler there had supplied them with the javelin men, they came to Metapontum in Italy. They persuaded the Metapontines, under their alliance, to send with them three hundred javelin men and two triremes, and taking these they sailed along the coast to Thurii. There they found that the party opposed to the Athenians had recently been driven out in a civil conflict. They wished to gather their whole army there and review it, to see if anyone had been left behind, and to persuade the Thurians to join the campaign with them as eagerly as possible and, since they were in this position, to count the same men enemies and friends as the Athenians did; so they waited in Thurian territory and worked at this.

34 At about this same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships, who had been lying opposite the ships at Naupactus to

cover the passage of the merchant ships to Sicily, made ready for a sea battle, manned still more ships, so that they were only a little fewer than the Attic ships, and anchored off Erineus in Achaea, in the territory of Rhypes. The place where they lay was crescent-shaped; the infantry of the Corinthians and of the local allies, who had come to help, was drawn up on the headlands projecting on either side, and the ships held the space between, blocking it. The fleet was commanded by Polyanthes, a Corinthian. The Athenians sailed out against them from Naupactus with thirty-three ships, commanded by Diphilus. At first the Corinthians kept still; then, when the signal was raised for them and the moment seemed right, they charged the Athenians and fought. They held each other off for a long time. Three Corinthian ships were destroyed; of the Athenian ships none was sunk outright, but some seven were disabled, struck head-on and with their outriggers stove in by the Corinthian ships, which had catheads made thicker for this very purpose. They fought an even battle, such that each side could claim the victory; but the Athenians took possession of the wrecks, because the wind drove them out to sea and the Corinthians did not put out again, and the two sides parted. There was no pursuit, and no prisoners were taken on either side; for the Corinthians and Peloponnesians, fighting close to land, got away easily, and on the Athenian side no ship was sunk. When the Athenians had sailed back to Naupactus, the Corinthians at once set up a trophy as victors, because they had disabled more of the enemy's ships, and because they considered themselves not beaten for the very reason that the others did not consider themselves victorious. For the Corinthians thought they had won if they were not badly beaten, and the Athenians thought they had lost because they had not won by much. When the Peloponnesians had sailed away and the infantry had dispersed, the Athenians too set

up a trophy as victors in Achaea, about twenty stades from Erineus, where the Corinthians had lain. So the sea battle ended.

35 When the Thurians had been made ready to join the campaign with seven hundred hoplites and three hundred javelin men, Demosthenes and Eurymedon ordered the ships to sail along the coast toward the territory of Croton, and they themselves, after reviewing all their infantry first at the river Sybaris, led them through the territory of Thurii. When they reached the river Hylias, the Crotoniates sent to tell them that they did not wish the army to go through their land; so they went down to the sea and camped near the mouth of the Hylias, and their ships met them at the same place. The next day they went aboard and sailed along the coast, putting in at the cities except Locri, until they reached Petra in the territory of Rhegium.

36 Meanwhile the Syracusans, learning that they were on their way, wished to make another attempt with their ships and with the rest of their infantry force, which they had been gathering for this very purpose, wishing to strike before the newcomers arrived. They fitted out the rest of their fleet in the way they had seen, from the earlier sea battle, would give them some advantage; and they cut the bows of their ships shorter and made them more solid, set heavy catheads on the bows, and ran stays from these to the ships' sides, about six cubits long, inside and out. This was the way the Corinthians too had refitted their ships at the bows to fight the squadron at Naupactus. The Syracusans thought that against the Athenian ships, which were not built in the same way to meet them but were light at the bows, because the Athenians did not ram head-on so much as by sailing around, they would have the advantage; and that the battle in the Great Harbor, where there would be many ships in a small space, would be in their favor. Ramming bow to bow, they would stave in the Athenians' bows, striking with solid, heavy beaks against hollow, weak ones.

And the Athenians, in a confined space, would have neither the sailing around nor the breaking through, the maneuvers in which they most trusted their skill; for they themselves would do all they could to keep them from breaking through, and the narrowness of the space would keep them from sailing around. And the head-on collision, which had before been thought a lack of skill in the helmsmen, they themselves would use most of all, for in it they would have the greatest advantage. The Athenians, if they were pushed back, would have no room to back water except toward the land, and that only a short way and into a small space, right by their own camp; the rest of the harbor the Syracusans would control. And the Athenians, if they were pressed anywhere, would be crowded together into a small space, all into the same place, and would run into each other and fall into confusion (and this was in fact what hurt the Athenians most in all the sea battles, since they could not back water over the whole harbor, as the Syracusans could). As for sailing around into the open water, they would not be able to, since the Syracusans controlled the way in from the open sea and the way back, especially as Plemmyrium would be hostile to them and the mouth of the harbor was not wide.

37 Having worked out such plans to suit their own skill and strength, and at the same time more confident now after the earlier sea battle, the Syracusans attacked with their infantry and their ships at once. Gylippus led out the infantry from the city a little before and brought it up against the part of the Athenian wall that faced the city; and the men from the Olympieum, the hoplites who were there and the horsemen and the light troops of the Syracusans, advanced against the wall from the other side. Immediately afterward the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out. The Athenians, who at first thought they would try them with their infantry alone, were thrown into confusion when they saw the ships too suddenly bearing down on them. Some

formed up on the walls and in front of the walls against the attackers; others went out to meet the horsemen and javelin men, many of them, who were coming quickly from the Olympieum and from outside; others manned the ships and at the same time ran down to the beach to help; and when the ships were manned, they put out seventy-five ships against them. The Syracusan ships numbered about eighty.

38 For much of the day they advanced and backed water and tried each other out, and neither side could gain any advantage worth mentioning, except that the Syracusans sank one or two Athenian ships; then they parted, and at the same time the infantry withdrew from the walls. The next day the Syracusans kept quiet and gave no sign of what they would do next. Nicias, seeing that the sea battle had been evenly fought and expecting them to attack again, made the trierarchs repair their ships wherever any had been damaged, and moored merchant ships in front of the palisade they had driven into the sea before their ships, in place of an enclosed harbor. He set the merchant ships at intervals of about two plethra from one another,[5] so that if any ship were hard pressed it would have a safe refuge and a way out again at leisure. The Athenians spent the whole day until nightfall making these preparations.

39 The next day the Syracusans engaged the Athenians earlier in the day, but with the same kind of attack, by infantry and fleet together. They took up position facing them with their ships in the same way and again spent much of the day trying each other out, until Ariston son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, the best helmsman on the Syracusan side, persuaded their naval commanders to send to the officials in the city and tell them to move the market of things for sale down to the sea as quickly as possible and to compel everyone who had food to bring it there and sell it, so that they could land the sailors and have them take their meal at once

beside the ships, and after a short time attack the Athenians again on the same day, when they did not expect it.

40 They were persuaded and sent a messenger, and the market was got ready. The Syracusans suddenly backed water and sailed back toward the city, landed at once, and took their meal there. The Athenians, thinking they had withdrawn toward the city because they were beaten, landed at leisure and went about their other business and about getting their meal, believing that on this day at least there would be no more fighting at sea. But suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and sailed against them again. The Athenians, in great confusion and most of them unfed, went aboard in no order and with difficulty finally put out against them. For some time the two sides held off from each other, on their guard. Then the Athenians decided not to wait any longer and be worn down by their own exhaustion, but to attack as quickly as possible; and they charged with a cheer and engaged. The Syracusans received them, and, ramming bow to bow as they had planned, with the beaks they had prepared, stove in the Athenian ships along a great part of their outriggers. The men on their decks, throwing javelins, did the Athenians great harm, and still greater harm was done by the Syracusans who rowed around in light boats, slipped in under the oars of the enemy ships, came alongside their flanks, and threw javelins from the boats at the sailors.

41 In the end, fighting hard in this way, the Syracusans won, and the Athenians turned and fled between the merchant ships into their own anchorage. The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the merchant ships; then the yards with the dolphins, hoisted from the merchant ships above the entrances, stopped them. Two Syracusan ships, carried away by their victory, closed in near them and were destroyed, and one of them was taken, men and all. The Syracusans sank seven Athenian ships and disabled many, took

most of the men alive and killed the others, and withdrew; and they set up trophies for both sea battles, and now held a firm hope that they were far superior with their ships, and they thought they would master the infantry too.

42 They were preparing to attack again on both elements, when at this point Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the reinforcements from Athens: about seventy-three ships, including the foreign ones; about five thousand hoplites, their own and the allies'; javelin men, barbarian and Hellenic, not a few; and slingers and archers and the rest of the equipment in good measure. The Syracusans and their allies were at once struck with no little dismay, wondering whether there would ever be any end for them, any release from danger, when they saw that in spite of the fortification of Decelea an army had come no smaller than the first and like it, and that the power of the Athenians appeared great on every side; while the first Athenian army, after its misfortunes, regained some strength. Demosthenes saw how matters stood and thought it impossible to waste time and suffer what Nicias had suffered. (For Nicias, who was formidable when he first arrived, came to be despised when he did not at once attack Syracuse but spent the winter at Catana; and Gylippus forestalled him by arriving with an army from the Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would not even have sent for if Nicias had attacked at once; for thinking themselves strong enough, they would have learned that they were weaker at the same moment as they were walled off, so that even if they had sent for it, it would no longer have helped them in the same way.) Considering this, then, and knowing that he himself too was at this moment, on the first day, most formidable to the enemy, Demosthenes wished to make use as quickly as possible of the dismay the army was causing at present. He saw that the Syracusan counter-wall, by which they had prevented the Athenians from walling them in, was a single wall, and that if one

could master the ascent to Epipolae and then the camp on it, the wall would easily be taken (for no one would even stand against them); so he hurried to make the attempt, and thought it the shortest way of ending the war. Either he would succeed and take Syracuse, or he would lead the army away and not waste the Athenians serving with him and the whole city to no purpose. First, then, the Athenians went out and ravaged the land of the Syracusans around the Anapus, and they were superior with their forces as at first, both on land and at sea (for the Syracusans did not come out against them on either element, except with the horsemen and javelin men from the Olympieum).

43 Then Demosthenes decided first to try the counter-wall with siege engines. But when he brought them up, the engines were burned by the enemy defending from the wall, and the rest of the army was beaten back as it attacked at many points; so he decided to waste no more time, and having persuaded Nicias and his other colleagues, he made the attempt on Epipolae as he had planned. By day it seemed impossible to approach and climb up without being seen; so he ordered five days' provisions, took all the masons and carpenters and other equipment, arrows and whatever else they would need for building if they won, and himself, with Eurymedon and Menander, took the whole army after the first sleep and marched for Epipolae; Nicias was left behind in the walls. When they came up to it at Euryelus, where the first army too had first gone up, they got past the Syracusan guards unseen, went up to the fort the Syracusans had there, took it, and killed some of the guards. But most of them escaped at once to the camps, of which there were three on Epipolae, in outworks, one of the Syracusans, one of the other Sicilian Greeks, and one of the allies, and reported the attack; and they told the six hundred Syracusans, who were the first guards on this part of Epipolae. These came to the rescue at once, and Demosthenes and the

Athenians met them and, though they fought hard, routed them. The Athenians themselves pressed straight on, so as not to lose speed, while their present momentum lasted, in accomplishing what they had come for; others, from the first, took the Syracusan counter-wall, whose guards did not stand, and began tearing down the battlements. The Syracusans and their allies, and Gylippus and his men, came to help from the outworks; and since the daring stroke had been made at night and was unexpected, they were dismayed as they attacked the Athenians, and at first they were forced back by them. But as the Athenians advanced, now more in disorder, as if they had won, and wishing to get through all the enemy who had not yet fought as quickly as possible, so that they should not rally again if the Athenians slackened their attack, the Boeotians were the first to stand against them; they charged them, routed them, and put them to flight.

44 And now the Athenians fell into great confusion and helplessness, and it was not easy to learn, even from the men of either side, how each thing happened. In daylight things are clearer, but even so those who are present scarcely know everything, except what happened near each man himself; but in a night battle, the only one between large armies in this war at least, how could anyone know anything clearly? There was a bright moon, and they saw each other as one naturally sees by moonlight, making out the shape of a body before them but unable to trust their recognition of their own side. Hoplites on both sides, not a few, were moving about in a narrow space. Of the Athenians, some were already beaten, while others, still unbeaten from their first attack, were going forward. Much of the rest of their army had either just come up or was still climbing, so that they did not know which way to move. For now that the front had been routed, everything was in confusion, and it was hard to make anything out because of the shouting. The Syracusans and their allies, as victors, were cheering

each other on with loud cries, since it was impossible at night to signal in any other way, and at the same time they were receiving those who charged them. The Athenians were looking for one another and took everything coming toward them for enemy, even if it was friendly and part of those already fleeing back; and since they could tell each other apart in no other way, by constantly asking for the watchword they made great confusion for themselves, all asking at once, and they made it known to the enemy. But they did not learn the enemy's watchword in the same way, because the enemy, being victorious and not scattered, were less unknown to each other. So if they met a party of the enemy that they outnumbered, the enemy escaped them, since they knew the Athenian watchword; but if they themselves did not answer, they were killed. What did the greatest harm, and not least of all, was the singing of the paean; for it was much the same on both sides and caused bewilderment. Whenever the Argives and the Corcyraeans and all the Dorians who were with the Athenians sang the paean, it frightened the Athenians, and the enemy's did the same. So that in the end, once they had been thrown into confusion, they fell on one another in many parts of the army, friends on friends and citizens on citizens, and not only were they terrified, but they came to blows with one another and could hardly be parted. As they were pursued, many threw themselves down the cliffs and were killed, since the way down again from Epipolae was narrow; and when those who got safely down from above reached the level ground, most of them, and especially those of the earlier army, from their better knowledge of the country, escaped to the camp, but of those who had come later some missed the roads and wandered about the countryside; and when day came, the Syracusan horsemen rode around them and killed them.

45 The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one on Epipolae at the point of the ascent, and one at the place where the

Boeotians had first stood against the enemy; and the Athenians took up their dead under truce. Not a few of them and of their allies had been killed, but even more arms were taken than there were dead; for of the men who had been forced to leap down the cliffs without their shields, some were killed and some survived.

46 After this the Syracusans, restored once more by their unexpected success, as they had been before, sent Sicanus with fifteen ships to Agrigentum, which was torn by civil strife, to bring the city over if he could; and Gylippus went off again by land into the rest of Sicily to bring still more troops, since he now hoped to take even the Athenian walls by storm, after the way things had gone on Epipolae.

47 Meanwhile the Athenian generals met to deliberate on the disaster that had occurred and on the general weakness that now prevailed in the camp. They saw that their attempts were failing and that the soldiers were weary of staying. They were afflicted with sickness on two counts: this was the season of the year in which men are most often ill, and at the same time the place where they were camped was marshy and unhealthy; and everything else seemed hopeless to them. Demosthenes therefore thought they should stay no longer. In accordance with the plan on which he had risked the attack on Epipolae, now that it had failed, he voted to leave and to waste no time, while it was still possible to cross the sea and while, with the ships that had come at least, they still had the upper hand in their forces. He said it was more useful to the city to make war on those who were building forts in their own country than on the Syracusans, who could no longer easily be subdued; nor was it reasonable to sit on there spending a great deal of money to no purpose.

48 That was Demosthenes' opinion. Nicias himself also thought their affairs were in a bad way, but he did not wish to reveal their weakness in words, or to have the enemy informed of it by their

openly voting for withdrawal with many present; for they would be far less able to do it unnoticed when they wished. To some extent, too, the enemy's affairs, of which he had a better view than the others, still gave him some hope that they would become worse than their own, if they persisted in the siege; for they would wear the enemy out through lack of money, especially now that, with the ships they already had, they controlled the sea more widely. There was also a party in Syracuse that wished to hand the city over to the Athenians, and it kept sending messages to him and would not let him raise the siege. Knowing this, he was in fact still holding off, keeping both courses open and watching; but in the open statement he made at that time he said he would not lead the army away. He knew well, he said, that the Athenians would not accept this from them, if they left without a vote of the Athenians themselves. For those who would vote on them would not be men who, like themselves, saw the facts and did not have to learn them from the criticism of others, but men who would be persuaded by whatever any clever speaker might say in slander. And many of the soldiers present, indeed most, who were now crying out that they were in danger, would, once they got home, cry out the opposite, that the generals had been bribed to betray them and leave. For his own part, then, knowing the Athenian character, he did not wish to be put to death by the Athenians on a shameful charge and unjustly, rather than, if he must, suffer this at the hands of the enemy, taking the risk on his own account. And the Syracusans' position, he said, was even so still worse than theirs. They were paying for mercenaries, spending money on garrison posts at the same time, and had now been maintaining a large navy for a year; they were already short in some respects, and in others would soon be at a loss. They had already spent two thousand talents and owed much besides; and if they let go any part whatever of their present force by failing to give it pay, their cause would be ruined,

since it rested on auxiliaries rather than, like their own, on men compelled to serve. So they must wear them down by continuing the siege, he said, and not go away beaten by money, in which they were far stronger.

49 Nicias said this and held to it, because he knew the situation in Syracuse precisely, and their lack of money, and that there was a large party there who wished affairs to go the Athenians' way and who kept sending messages to him not to raise the siege; and at the same time he was more confident than before that with their ships at least they would prevail. Demosthenes would not hear of continuing the siege in any way at all. But if they must not lead the army away without a decree of the Athenians, and had to wear the enemy down where they were, he said they should move to Thapsus or to Catana and do it from there. From there, with their infantry, they could overrun much of the country and live by ravaging the enemy's land, and do them harm; and with their ships they would fight their battles in the open sea and not in a confined space, which favored the enemy rather, but in wide waters, where their experience would be of use and they could make their retreats and their attacks without setting out from and putting in to a small, closed-in space. In a word, he said, he was in no way content to stay in the same place any longer; they should move out now as quickly as possible and without delay. Eurymedon spoke in support of him. But since Nicias opposed it, a certain hesitation and delay set in, and with it a suspicion that Nicias might know something more and was insisting for that reason. So in this way the Athenians delayed and stayed where they were.

50 Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus had failed to win Agrigentum (for while he was still at Gela, the party friendly to the Syracusans had been driven out); but Gylippus came with a large additional army from Sicily, and with the hoplites who had been sent from the Peloponnese in the mer-

chant ships in the spring and had come from Libya to Selinus. They had been carried off course to Libya; the Cyrenaeans gave them two triremes and pilots for the voyage, and on their way along the coast they fought on the side of the Euesperitae, who were being besieged by the Libyans, and defeated the Libyans; from there they sailed along the coast to Neapolis, a Carthaginian trading post, from which Sicily is a voyage of two days and a night at the shortest; and crossing from there, they came to Selinus. As soon as they had arrived, the Syracusans prepared to attack the Athenians again on both elements, with ships and with infantry. The Athenian generals, seeing that another army had joined the enemy, and that their own affairs, far from improving, were growing worse day by day in every respect, and above all were being crushed by the sickness of the men, regretted that they had not moved out before; and since Nicias no longer opposed it as strongly, but only asked that they should not vote on it openly, they gave notice to everyone, as secretly as they could, to be ready to sail out of the camp when the signal was given. And when everything was ready and they were about to sail away, the moon was eclipsed; for it happened to be full moon.[6] Most of the Athenians took it to heart and urged the generals to wait; and Nicias (who was somewhat too much given to divination and such things) said that he would not even discuss the question further until they had waited thrice nine days, as the soothsayers prescribed, before making any move. So the Athenians, who had delayed, stayed on for this reason.

51 The Syracusans also learned of this, and they were much more eager not to let up on the Athenians, since the Athenians themselves had now admitted that they were no longer superior to them either with their ships or with their infantry (otherwise they would not have planned to sail away); and at the same time they did not want them to settle somewhere else in Sicily and be harder

to fight, but wished to force them to fight at sea there, as quickly as possible and in conditions that suited themselves. So they manned their ships and trained for as many days as seemed enough. When the moment came, on the first day they attacked the Athenian walls; and when a small part of the hoplites and horsemen came out against them by some gates, they cut off some of the hoplites, routed them, and pursued them; and since the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and a few of the hoplites.

52 On this day the Syracusan army withdrew. The next day they sailed out with their ships, seventy-six of them, and at the same time advanced with their infantry against the walls. The Athenians put out against them with eighty-six ships, closed, and fought. Eurymedon held the Athenian right wing and, wishing to surround the enemy's ships, was extending his line too far toward the land; and the Syracusans and their allies, having first defeated the Athenian center, cut him off too in the hollow and inmost part of the harbor, and killed him, and destroyed the ships that had followed him. Then they pursued all the Athenian ships and drove them ashore.

53 Gylippus, seeing the enemy's ships beaten and driven ashore outside their palisades and their own camp, and wishing to kill the men as they landed and to make it easier for the Syracusans to tow the ships away from a shore held by their friends, came down to help at the breakwater with part of the army. The Tyrrhenians (for they were on guard for the Athenians at this point), seeing them coming on in disorder, ran out to meet them, fell on the foremost, routed them, and drove them into the marsh called Lysimeleia. Later, when a larger part of the army of the Syracusans and their allies had come up, the Athenians too came to help, fearing for their ships, and engaged them in battle, defeated them, and pursued them; they killed a few hoplites and saved most of the

ships and brought them together at the camp; but the Syracusans and their allies took eighteen of them and killed all the men. Wishing to burn the rest, they filled an old merchant ship with brushwood and pine torches (for the wind was blowing fair toward the Athenians), set fire to it, and let it go. The Athenians, fearing for their ships, devised means in turn to put out the fire and stop it; they quenched the flames and kept the merchant ship from coming close, and so escaped the danger.

54 After this the Syracusans set up a trophy for the sea battle and for the cutting off of the hoplites up by the wall, where they had also taken the horses; and the Athenians set up one for the rout of the infantry that the Tyrrhenians had driven into the marsh, and one for the rout they themselves had made with the rest of the army.

55 Now that the Syracusans had won a brilliant victory with their navy too (before, they had feared the ships that had come with Demosthenes), the Athenians were in utter despondency. Their disappointment was great, and their regret for the expedition far greater still. These were the only cities they had come against that were like their own in character: democracies, as they themselves were, and possessing ships and horses and size. They could not bring on them any division through a change of government, by which they might have won them over, nor through a much superior force; they had failed in most things, and they were at a loss even before, and now that they had been beaten even with their ships, which they would never have thought possible, they were much more so still.

56 The Syracusans at once began to sail freely along the harbor, and they planned to close its mouth, so that the Athenians could no longer, even if they wished, sail out unnoticed. For they were no longer concerned only with saving themselves, but also with how to stop the enemy. They believed, rightly, that their position

was now far superior, and that if they could defeat the Athenians and their allies by land and by sea, the contest would appear a glorious one for them in the eyes of the Hellenes. The other Hellenes would at once be freed, some of them, and others released from fear (for the remaining power of the Athenians would no longer be able to bear the war that would afterward be brought against it); and they themselves, being thought the authors of this, would be greatly admired by all other men and by those who came after. And the contest was indeed worthy of this, both for these reasons and because they were prevailing not over the Athenians only but over their many allies as well, and not by themselves alone, but together with those who had come to help them, having taken the lead with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, and having offered their own city to bear the brunt of the danger, and having made great progress with their navy. For more peoples came together against this one city than ever, apart, that is, from the whole muster in this war against the city of Athens and that of the Lacedaemonians.

57 For these were the peoples on each side who fought at Syracuse, coming against Sicily or for Sicily, some to help win the country, others to help save it. They took their stand together not according to justice, or according to kinship, but as each found themselves placed by circumstance, either by advantage or by necessity. The Athenians themselves, Ionians, came of their own will against Dorians, the Syracusans; and with them, still using the same language and customs, came the Lemnians and Imbrians and the Aeginetans, those who then held Aegina, and also the Hestiaeans who live at Hestiaea in Euboea, who were colonists. Of the others, some served as subjects, some as independent allies, and some as mercenaries. Of the subjects paying tribute, there were the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians from Euboea; from the islands, the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians; and

from Ionia, the Milesians, Samians, and Chians. Of these the Chians did not pay tribute but provided ships and came along as independent. Nearly all of these were Ionians and of Athenian descent, except the Carystians (these are Dryopes), and though they were subjects and came under compulsion, still they were Ionians following against Dorians. Besides these there were Aeolians: the Methymnaeans, subjects with ships, not tribute, and the Tenedians and Aenians, tributaries. These Aeolians were forced to fight against Aeolians, their founders, the Boeotians, who were with the Syracusans; but the Plataeans, Boeotians directly opposed to Boeotians, alone fought them, naturally enough, out of hatred. Of the Rhodians and Cytherians, both Dorians, the Cytherians, colonists of the Lacedaemonians, bore arms with the Athenians against the Lacedaemonians who were with Gylippus; and the Rhodians, Argives by descent, were forced to make war on the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and on the Geloans, who were even their own colonists and were serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders around the Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians were independent, but because of their island position they were rather constrained, since the Athenians controlled the sea, and so came along. The Corcyraeans, not only Dorians but plainly Corinthians, came against Corinthians and Syracusans, though they were colonists of the one and kinsmen of the other: with compulsion as the respectable reason, but no less by choice, out of hatred of the Corinthians. The people now called Messenians, from Naupactus and from Pylos, which the Athenians then held, were taken along to the war. And a few Megarian exiles, by misfortune, fought against the Selinuntines, who were Megarians. With the rest the service was by now more voluntary. The Argives, not for the sake of the alliance so much as out of hatred for the Lacedaemonians and each man's own immediate advantage, followed the Athenians, Ionians, as Dorians against

Dorians. The Mantineans and other Arcadians, mercenaries accustomed to go against whatever enemy was pointed out to them at the time, now for gain thought the Arcadians who had come with the Corinthians no less their enemies. The Cretans and Aetolians had also been persuaded by pay; and it so happened that the Cretans, who had helped the Rhodians found Gela, came of their own will for pay not with their colonists but against them. Some of the Acarnanians came to help partly for gain, but more because they were allies out of friendship for Demosthenes and goodwill toward the Athenians. These were the peoples bounded by the Ionian Gulf. Of the Italian Greeks, the Thurians and Metapontines, caught then in such necessities by times of faction, joined the campaign; of the Sicilian Greeks, the Naxians and Catanaeans; of the barbarians, the Egestaeans, who had called the Athenians in, and most of the Sicels; and of those outside Sicily, some Tyrrhenians, because of their quarrel with the Syracusans, and Iapygian mercenaries. These were the peoples who served with the Athenians.

58 On the side of the Syracusans, there came to help the Camarinaeans, their neighbors, and the Geloans, who live beyond them; then, with the Agrigentines neutral, the Selinuntines, who are settled beyond them. These inhabit the part of Sicily that faces Libya. The Himeraeans came from the part that faces the Tyrrhenian Sea, where they are the only Hellenes living; they were also the only ones from there who came to help. These were the Hellenic peoples in Sicily who fought on their side, Dorians and all independent; and of the barbarians only the Sicels, those who had not gone over to the Athenians. Of the Hellenes outside Sicily, the Lacedaemonians provided a Spartiate as commander, and the rest Neodamodes and Helots (Neodamode means a man who is now free); the Corinthians alone came with both ships and infantry, and the Leucadians and Ambraciots because of kinship; from Arcadia,

mercenaries sent by the Corinthians, and Sicyonians serving under compulsion; and from outside the Peloponnese, the Boeotians. Against these incomers the Sicilian Greeks themselves furnished greater numbers in every arm, since they lived in great cities; for many hoplites and ships and horses, and an abundant crowd of other troops, were gathered. And against all the others, so to speak, the Syracusans themselves furnished more again, because of the size of their city and because they were in the greatest danger.

59 Such were the auxiliaries gathered on each side, and by now they were all present on both sides, and nothing more came to either. The Syracusans and their allies naturally thought it would be a glorious contest for them, after the sea victory they had won, to take the whole Athenian camp, great as it was, and not let them escape either way, by sea or by land. So they at once began to close the Great Harbor, whose mouth is about eight stades wide, with triremes set broadside, and boats and small craft moored at anchor; and they made their other preparations in case the Athenians should still dare to fight at sea; and nothing they planned was small.

60 The Athenians, seeing the harbor being closed and perceiving the rest of the enemy's intentions, thought they must deliberate. The generals and the taxiarchs met to consider their present difficulties of every kind, and above all that they no longer had provisions for the moment (for in expectation of sailing away they had sent ahead to Catana telling them not to bring any), nor would they have any in future unless they won control of the sea. They decided to abandon the upper walls, and at the ships themselves to cut off, by a cross wall, as small a space as possible that would be enough for the baggage and the sick, and to garrison this; and with the rest of the infantry to man all the ships, every one that was serviceable and even those less seaworthy, putting every man

aboard; and to fight it out at sea, and if they won, to go to Catana, but if not, to burn the ships, form up, and retreat by land by whatever route would most quickly bring them to some friendly place, barbarian or Hellenic. And as they decided, so they did. They came down from the upper walls and manned all the ships, compelling everyone to go aboard who seemed to be of serviceable age in any way. In all about a hundred and ten ships were manned. They put aboard many archers and javelin men, Acarnanians and other foreigners, and provided everything else as far as possible under necessity and with such a plan. When most things were ready, Nicias, seeing that the soldiers were despondent at having been badly beaten at sea, contrary to their habit, and that because of the shortage of provisions they wished to risk a decision as quickly as possible, called them all together and first encouraged them, and spoke as follows.

61 "Soldiers of the Athenians and of our other allies, the coming contest will be common to all alike, a contest for the safety and the country of each of us, no less than it is for the enemy; for if we now win with our ships, each of us can see his own city again, wherever it is. You must not lose heart, nor feel what the most inexperienced of men feel, who, having failed in their first contests, ever afterward have hopes as fearful as their misfortunes. All of you Athenians here, who already have experience of many wars, and all of you allies, who always serve with us, remember the surprises that come in war; and hoping that fortune too may stand on our side, prepare to fight again in a manner worthy of this multitude of yourselves that you see before you.

62 "Whatever help we have seen against the crowding of ships that there will be in the narrow harbor, and against the troops on their decks, by which we were harmed before, all of this we too have now prepared, after considering it with the helmsmen, as far as present means allow. Many archers and javelin men will go

aboard, and a crowd of men, whom we would not use if we were fighting in the open sea, because they would hamper our skill by the weight of the ships; but in the land battle that we are forced to fight here from the ships, they will be useful. We have found out how we must refit our ships in turn, and against the thickness of their catheads, which did us the most harm, we have grappling irons, which will stop the ship that has struck from backing off again, if the marines do their part after this. For we have been forced to this: to fight a land battle from the ships, and it seems to our advantage neither to back water ourselves nor to let them do so, especially since the land, except as much as our infantry holds, is hostile.

63 "Remember this, and fight it out as hard as you can, and do not let yourselves be driven onto the shore; when ship meets ship, do not think of breaking loose until you have swept the hoplites off the enemy's deck. I urge this on the hoplites no less than on the sailors, since this work belongs more to the men on deck; and we still have the advantage, even now, in most respects with our infantry. To the sailors I give this advice, and I beg them as well, not to be too much dismayed by our misfortunes, since we now have better equipment on our decks and more ships; and to consider that this pleasure deserves to be preserved: you who until now, though not Athenians, have been taken for Athenians, and for your knowledge of our language and your imitation of our ways have been admired throughout Hellas, and who have had no less share than we in the benefits of our empire, and a far greater share in being feared by the subjects and in being safe from wrong. So, as the only free partners in our empire, it would be just for you not to betray it now. Despise the Corinthians, whom you have often beaten, and the Sicilian Greeks, not one of whom even thought of standing against us while our navy was in its prime; fight them off, and show that even with weakness and misfortunes

your skill is stronger than another's strength that has luck on its side.

64 "And to you who are Athenians I say this too, to remind you again: you have left behind no other ships in the sheds like these, and no hoplites of fighting age; and if anything happens other than your victory, the enemy here will at once sail against Athens, and those of us left there will be unable to hold off both the enemy at home and those who come against them. Those of you here would at once be under the Syracusans, and you know yourselves with what intent you came against them; and those at home would be under the Lacedaemonians. So, since you stand in this one contest for both, hold firm now if ever, and keep in mind, each of you and all together, that those of you who will now be on the ships are, for the Athenians, their infantry and their ships and what remains of their city and the great name of Athens. For their sake, if any man excels another in skill or in courage, he could find no better moment to show it, to his own benefit and for the safety of all."

65 Nicias, having given this encouragement, at once ordered the ships to be manned. Gylippus and the Syracusans could tell that the Athenians were going to fight at sea, since they could see the preparations themselves; and they had been told in advance of the grappling irons too. So they equipped themselves against everything else, each thing as it came, and against this too: they covered the bows and much of the upper part of each ship with hides, so that the iron hand when thrown would slip off and find no hold. When everything was ready, the generals and Gylippus encouraged their men and spoke as follows.

66 "Syracusans and allies, that what has already been done is glorious and that the coming contest will be for glorious things, most of you seem to us to know (otherwise you would not have taken them up so eagerly); and if anyone has not grasped it as fully as he should, we will show him. The Athenians came to this coun-

try first to enslave Sicily, and then, if they succeeded, the Peloponnese too and the rest of Hellas. They possessed the greatest empire of any Hellenes past or present; and you, the first of men to stand up to their navy, by which they had mastered everything, have already beaten them in the sea battles, and in all likelihood will beat them in this one now. For when men are cut short in the thing in which they claim to excel, what remains of their self-regard is weaker than it would have been if they had never thought so well of themselves to begin with; and being tripped up, against their expectation, in what they boasted of, they give way more than their real strength warrants. That is likely what has now happened to the Athenians.

67 "With us, the strength we had before, with which we dared even while still unskilled, is now surer; and since the belief has been added to it that we are the strongest, if we have beaten the strongest, each man's hope is doubled. And in most undertakings the greatest hope gives the greatest eagerness too. As for their imitation of our equipment, it is familiar to our way of fighting, and we will not be unprepared for any of it. But when they have many hoplites on their decks, contrary to their custom, and many javelin men too, landsmen, so to speak, Acarnanians and others, put aboard ships, who will not even find out how to throw a missile sitting down, how can they help unsettling their ships and all falling into confusion among themselves, moving in a way not their own? Nor will the number of their ships help them, if any of you fear this too, that he will not be fighting on equal terms; for many ships in a small space will be slower to do what they wish and the easiest to damage with the means we have prepared. And know the plain truth from what we believe we have learned for certain: overwhelmed by their misfortunes and forced by their present helplessness, they have been driven to desperation, trusting not in their preparation so much as in fortune, to risk everything in

whatever way they can, so that they may either force their way out by sea or afterward make their retreat by land, since they could fare no worse than they are faring now.

68 "Against such disorder, then, and against the fortune of our bitterest enemies, which has given itself up to us, let us close with anger. Let us consider that it is most lawful against enemies to claim, as just requital for the aggressor, to sate the fury of the heart; and at the same time that vengeance on enemies, which we shall have, is, as the saying goes, the sweetest thing. That they are enemies, and the worst of enemies, you all know, since they came against our country to enslave it; and if they had succeeded, they would have inflicted the most grievous sufferings on our men, the most shameful on our children and women, and on the whole city the most disgraceful name. In return for this, no one should go soft or think it a gain if they merely go away without danger. They will do that just the same even if they win. But if we accomplish what we wish, as is likely, and these men are punished, and we hand on to the whole of Sicily the freedom it enjoyed before, but made more secure, it is a glorious contest. And of risks, the rarest are those in which failure does the least harm and success brings the most good."

69 The generals of the Syracusans and Gylippus, having given their own soldiers such encouragement, at once began to man their ships in turn when they saw the Athenians doing so. Nicias, overwhelmed by the situation, and seeing what the danger was and how near it was now, since they were all but on the point of putting out, and thinking, as men do in great contests, that in deed everything still fell short and in words not enough had yet been said to them, called upon each of the trierarchs again, one by one, naming each by his father's name and his own and his tribe. He asked each man who had any distinction of his own not to betray it, and those whose ancestors were illustrious not to obscure the

virtues of their fathers; he reminded them of their country, the freest of all, and of the freedom in it, without orders from anyone, for every man to live as he pleased; and he said all the other things that men will say when they have come to such a moment, without guarding against seeming to anyone to talk in stale commonplaces: the appeals, much alike on every occasion, to wives and children and the gods of their fathers, which men cry out because in the dismay of the moment they think them useful. When he thought he had given exhortation, not enough, but as much as necessity allowed, he withdrew and led the infantry down to the sea, and drew it up along as long a line as he could, so that it would be of the greatest help to the men on the ships in keeping up their courage. Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus (for these had gone aboard the Athenian ships as generals) put out from their own camp and sailed straight for the barrier across the harbor and the passage that had been left open, wishing to force their way out.

70 The Syracusans and their allies had put out before them with about the same number of ships as before, and they guarded the way out with part of them and the rest of the harbor all around, so as to fall on the Athenians from all sides at once; and at the same time their infantry came to help wherever the ships put in to shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and Agatharchus, each holding a wing of the whole, and by Pythen and the Corinthians in the center. When the rest of the Athenians came up to the barrier, in their first rush they overpowered the ships stationed at it and tried to break the fastenings; but after this, when the Syracusans and their allies bore down on them from all sides, the sea battle was no longer at the barrier only but all over the harbor, and it was hard fought, as none of the earlier ones had been. On both sides the sailors showed great eagerness to charge whenever the order was given, and there was great

counter-maneuvering by the helmsmen and rivalry against one another; the marines took care, whenever ship struck ship, that the work on deck should not fall short of the skill of the rest; and every man, at whatever post he had been assigned, strove to be seen first. With many ships colliding in a small space (for these were the most ships that ever fought in the smallest space; together they came little short of two hundred), the rammings were few, because there was no room for backing water or breaking through; but the collisions, as ship happened to fall on ship, either in fleeing or in attacking another, were more frequent. As long as a ship was bearing down, the men on the decks used javelins and arrows and stones against it unsparingly; and once they had closed, the marines came to grips and tried to board each other's ships. In many places it happened, because of the narrow space, that some had rammed others and were themselves rammed, and that two ships or sometimes more were locked by necessity around one; and the helmsmen had to guard against some and plan against others, not one at a time but many from every side; and the great din from many ships colliding both struck terror and made it impossible to hear what the boatswains called. For there was much exhortation and shouting on each side from the boatswains, both as their craft required and from the eagerness of the moment: to the Athenians they cried out to force the passage, and now, if ever again, to fight hard for their safe return to their country; to the Syracusans and their allies, that it was a glorious thing to stop the enemy escaping and, by winning, to increase the glory of each one's own country. The generals on each side, besides, if they saw any ship anywhere backing water without being forced to, called out the trierarch by name and asked him: the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they now thought the most hostile land more their own than the sea, which they had won with no small toil; the Syracusans,

whether they were fleeing from fleeing men, men they knew well were eager to escape in any way they could.

71 The infantry of both sides on the land, while the sea battle hung in the balance, went through a great agony and conflict of mind: the men of the place striving now for still greater glory, the invaders afraid that they would fare even worse than they were faring. For since everything the Athenians had was staked on their ships, their fear for what was to come was like no other; and because the battle was uneven, they were forced to see it unevenly from the land too. The spectacle was close at hand, and they were not all looking at the same point at once. If some saw their own men winning somewhere, they took heart and turned to calling on the gods not to rob them of their safety; others, who looked toward a part that was losing, broke into lamentation and cries, and from the sight of what was being done were more enslaved in their minds than the men in the action; still others, looking at some part of the battle that was evenly fought, because of the unbroken, undecided struggle, swayed their very bodies in fear along with their opinion, and passed the most painful time of all; for they were always within a little of escaping or of being destroyed. And in the same Athenian army, as long as they fought at sea on even terms, you could hear everything at once: lamentation, shouting, "We are winning," "We are beaten," and all the other cries that a great army in great danger would be forced to utter. The men on the ships went through much the same, until at last the Syracusans and their allies, after the battle had held for a long time, routed the Athenians, and pressing on them brilliantly, with great shouting and cheering each other on, pursued them to the land. Then the naval force, scattered here and there, those who had not been captured afloat, ran ashore and rushed out into the camp. The infantry, no longer divided in feeling but with one impulse, all groaning and wailing, unable to bear what was hap-

pening, some ran down to help at the ships, others to guard what remained of the wall, and others, the majority, were now thinking of themselves and of how they would be saved. At that moment the dismay was greater than at any time before. What they suffered was much like what they had done to others at Pylos; for when the Lacedaemonians' ships were destroyed, they lost besides the men who had crossed to the island, and so now for the Athenians there was no hope of being saved by land, unless something happened beyond all reckoning.

72 The sea battle had been hard fought, and many ships and men had been lost on both sides. The Syracusans and their allies, having won, took up the wrecks and their dead, sailed back to the city, and set up a trophy. The Athenians, because of the magnitude of their present misfortunes, did not even think of asking for the recovery of their dead or the wrecks, but planned to retreat at once that night. Demosthenes went to Nicias and proposed that they man the remaining ships once more and try to force the passage at dawn, if they could, saying that they still had more ships fit for service than the enemy: the Athenians had about sixty left, and the enemy fewer than fifty. Nicias agreed with this proposal, and they wished to man the ships; but the sailors refused to go aboard, because they were stunned by their defeat and no longer believed they could win.

73 So now they were all of one mind to retreat by land. But Hermocrates the Syracusan suspected their intention. He thought it would be dangerous if so large an army withdrew by land and settled somewhere in Sicily and chose to make war on them again; so he went to the authorities and put it to them that they ought not to let the Athenians get away by night, saying what he himself thought, but that all the Syracusans and their allies should go out at once, block the roads with walls, and occupy and guard the narrow passes in advance. They too agreed with this no less than he

did, and thought it ought to be done; but they thought the men, who had just gladly taken their rest after a great sea battle, and on a festival day as well (for it happened that they had a sacrifice to Heracles on this day), would not readily be willing to obey. In their delight at the victory most of them had turned to drinking at the festival, and the authorities thought they could expect them to obey in anything rather than in taking up arms and going out at that moment. When the magistrates, reckoning this, found it impracticable, and Hermocrates could no longer persuade them, he himself contrived the following, fearing that the Athenians might quietly get ahead of them by passing the most difficult places during the night. He sent some of his own companions with horsemen to the Athenian camp when it was growing dark. They rode up close enough to be heard and called out to some of the men as though they were friends of the Athenians (for there were some who brought news to Nicias from inside the city), and told them to tell Nicias not to lead the army away by night, since the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to make his preparations at leisure and withdraw by day. Having said this, they went away, and those who heard it reported it to the Athenian generals.

74 On this message they held back for the night, believing it was not a trick. And since even so they had not set out at once, they decided to wait the following day as well, so that the soldiers could pack up the most useful things they could, and then to leave everything else behind and start out taking only what was needed for bodily subsistence. The Syracusans and Gylippus went out ahead with their infantry, blocked the roads through the country by which the Athenians were likely to go, guarded the crossings of the streams and rivers, and posted themselves to receive the army and stop it wherever they thought best. With their ships they sailed up and towed the Athenian ships away from the beach (the Athenians themselves had burned a few of them, as they had

intended); the rest they took in tow at their leisure, with no one to stop them, wherever each had run ashore, and brought them to the city.

75 After this, when Nicias and Demosthenes thought the preparations sufficient, the army at last moved out, on the third day after the sea battle. It was a terrible thing, and not in one respect only: that they were leaving after losing all their ships, and that instead of their great hope they and their city were in danger; but also, in abandoning the camp, it fell to every man to see things painful to the eye and to the mind. The dead lay unburied, and whenever a man saw one of his friends lying there, he was filled with grief and fear; and the living who were being left behind, the wounded and the sick, were far more painful to the living than the dead, and more wretched than those who had perished. For they turned to entreaty and lamentation and drove the others to distraction, begging to be taken along and calling on each one by name, if they saw any of their comrades or kinsmen anywhere, hanging on to their tentmates as they were already leaving and following as far as they could, and, when strength and body failed, being left behind with not a few appeals to the gods and with wailing. So the whole army was filled with tears and with such distress that it was not easy for them to set out, even from a hostile land, and though they had already suffered things too great for tears and feared for what they might yet suffer in the unknown. There was also a deep dejection among them and much self-reproach. They were like nothing so much as a city starved out by siege and making its escape, and no small city; for the whole multitude on the march was not less than forty thousand. All the others carried whatever each could that was useful, and the hoplites and horsemen, contrary to custom, carried their own provisions under their arms, some for lack of attendants, others because they did not trust them; for the attendants had been deserting for a long time,

and most of them did so at once. Even so they did not carry enough; for there was no longer any grain in the camp. And the rest of their misery, and the equal share of misfortunes, though there is a certain relief in suffering with many, did not even so seem easy to bear at that moment, especially when they thought from what splendor and boasting at first they had come to what an end and what humiliation. This was indeed the greatest reversal that ever befell a Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and they were leaving in fear of suffering this themselves; instead of the prayers and paeans with which they had sailed out, they were setting out again with the opposite omens; they were going by land instead of by sea, and relying on hoplites rather than on a navy. And yet, because of the greatness of the danger still hanging over them, all this seemed bearable to them.

76 Nicias, seeing the army despondent and greatly changed, went along the ranks and encouraged and comforted them as far as he could in the circumstances, raising his voice still more as he came to each group in turn, out of eagerness, and wishing to do some good by being heard by as many as possible.

77 "Even in our present situation, Athenians and allies, we must have hope (men have been saved before from worse straits than these), and you must not blame yourselves too much, either for your misfortunes or for your present sufferings, which you do not deserve. I myself am no stronger than any of you (you see the state my sickness has brought me to), and I think I was once second to no one in good fortune, in my private life and otherwise; yet now I am hanging in the same danger as the meanest. And yet I have spent my life performing many duties toward the gods as custom requires, and many just and blameless acts toward men. For this reason my hope for the future is still bold, though our misfortunes frighten me, being undeserved. But perhaps they may abate; for the enemy have had good fortune enough, and if we made this

expedition offensive to any of the gods, we have by now been punished sufficiently. Others before now have gone against their neighbors, and after doing what men do, have suffered what men can bear. And we too may now reasonably hope to find the gods kinder (for we are by now more deserving of their pity than of their resentment); and seeing yourselves, what fine hoplites you are and how many of you are marching in your ranks, do not be too dismayed, but reckon that you are yourselves a city, wherever you settle, and that there is no other city in Sicily that could easily withstand your attack, or drive you out once you were settled anywhere. See to it yourselves that the march is safe and orderly, each man thinking only this: that whatever place he is forced to fight in, if he wins it, he will have it as his country and his fortress. We shall press on with the march night and day alike; for our provisions are short, and if we reach some friendly place of the Sicels (these are still loyal to us because of their fear of the Syracusans), consider yourselves already secure. Word has been sent ahead to them, and they have been told to meet us and to bring more food. In a word, soldiers, know that you must be brave men, since there is no place near where you could find safety if you played the coward; and that if you escape the enemy now, the rest of you will see again what you long for, and the Athenians will raise up again the great power of their city, fallen though it is. For men are the city, and not walls or ships empty of men."

78 Nicias, as he gave this encouragement, at the same time went along the army, and wherever he saw it straggling and not marching in order, he brought it together and set it in place; and Demosthenes did no less with the men under him, saying such things and the like. The army marched in a hollow square, Nicias' division leading and Demosthenes' following; the hoplites had the baggage carriers and most of the crowd inside. When they reached the crossing of the river Anapus, they found a force of the

Syracusans and their allies drawn up at it; they routed them, took the ford, and went on. But the Syracusans pressed them, their horsemen riding alongside and their light-armed troops throwing javelins into them. On this day the Athenians advanced about forty stades and camped for the night at a hill. The next day they set out early and advanced about twenty stades, and went down into a level place and camped there, wishing to get some food from the houses (for the place was inhabited) and to carry water with them from there; for in front of them, for many stades along the way they were to go, there was little of it. Meanwhile the Syracusans went ahead and walled off the pass in front of them. This was a strong hill with a steep ravine on either side, and it was called the Acraean Cliff. The next day the Athenians advanced, and the horsemen and javelin men of the Syracusans and their allies, many of them, hindered them on both sides, throwing javelins and riding alongside. The Athenians fought for a long time, and then withdrew again to the same camp. And they no longer had provisions as before; for it was no longer possible to leave the camp because of the horsemen.

79 Early in the morning they started out and marched again, and forced their way to the hill that had been walled off; and they found in front of them, above the wall, the enemy infantry drawn up in depth, many shields deep, for the place was narrow. The Athenians charged and attacked the wall, but they were shot at by many men from the hill, which was steep (for the men above reached them more easily), and, unable to force their way, they withdrew again and rested. At the same time there happened to be some thunder and rain, such as is usual when the year is turning toward autumn; and at this the Athenians lost heart still more and thought that all this too was happening for their destruction. While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent part of their army to wall them off again in the rear, on the way they had

come; but the Athenians sent some of their own men against them and prevented it. After this the Athenians withdrew with the whole army more toward the plain and camped there for the night. The next day they advanced, and the Syracusans attacked them on all sides around them and wounded many; if the Athenians charged, they gave way, and if they retreated, they pressed on them, falling especially on the rearmost, in case they could rout them little by little and throw the whole army into panic. For a long time the Athenians held out in this way; then, after advancing five or six stades, they rested in the plain. And the Syracusans withdrew from them to their own camp.

80 During the night Nicias and Demosthenes decided, since the army was in a bad state, from want of all provisions by now, and many had been wounded in the many attacks the enemy had made, to light as many fires as possible and lead the army away, no longer by the route they had intended, but in the opposite direction from the one the Syracusans were watching, toward the sea. This route as a whole led the army not toward Catana but toward the other part of Sicily, toward Camarina and Gela and the cities, Hellenic and barbarian, in that region. So they lit many fires and set out in the night. And, as fears and terrors tend to arise in all armies, and most of all in the largest, especially when they are marching by night, through hostile country, and with the enemy not far off, confusion fell on them. Nicias' division, which was leading, kept together and got far ahead; but Demosthenes' division, about half the army or more, became separated and marched in greater disorder. Nevertheless at dawn they reached the sea, and taking the road called the Helorine Road, they marched on, intending, when they reached the river Cacyparis, to go up along the river into the interior; for they hoped that the Sicels they had sent for would meet them along this way. When they reached the river, they found there too a Syracusan guard walling off and fenc-

ing off the ford with stakes. They forced their way through it, crossed the river, and went on again toward another river, the Erineus; for this was the way their guides told them to go.

81 Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and their allies learned that the Athenians had gone, most of them blamed Gylippus for having let the Athenians get away on purpose. They pursued quickly along the route, which they had no difficulty in discovering the Athenians had taken, and caught up with them about the time of the midday meal. When they came up with Demosthenes' men, who were behind and marching more slowly and in more disorder, since they had been thrown into confusion that night, they fell on them at once and fought; and the Syracusan horsemen surrounded them the more easily because they were separated from the others, and drove them together into one place. Nicias' division was as much as fifty stades ahead; for Nicias was leading faster, thinking that in such a situation safety lay not in staying and fighting by choice, but in retreating as quickly as possible and fighting only as much as they were forced to. Demosthenes, for his part, had been for most of the time in more continuous hardship, because, as he was retreating in the rear, the enemy attacked him first; and now, when he learned that the Syracusans were pursuing, instead of pushing on he formed his men for battle, until, lingering there, he was surrounded by them, and he and the Athenians with him were in great confusion. For they were crowded into a place that had a wall around it, with a road on either side and not a few olive trees, and they were shot at from every side. The Syracusans naturally used such attacks rather than fighting at close quarters; for to risk everything against men in despair was no longer to their advantage rather than the Athenians'; and at the same time, with success now certain, they were sparing of themselves, so that no one should be used up

before the end; and they thought that even so, by this method, they would subdue them and take them.

82 So when they had been shooting at the Athenians and their allies from all sides all day, and saw that they were now worn out by their wounds and their other sufferings, Gylippus and the Syracusans and their allies made a proclamation, first, that any of the islanders who wished could come over to them and be free; and some cities, not many, went over. Then later an agreement was made with all the rest of Demosthenes' men, that they should hand over their arms and that no one should be put to death, either by violence or by imprisonment or by want of the barest necessities of life. Six thousand in all surrendered, and they laid down all the money they had, throwing it into upturned shields, and they filled four shields. These men were at once taken off to the city. Nicias and his men reached the river Erineus on this day; he crossed it and posted his army on some high ground.

83 The next day the Syracusans overtook him and told him that Demosthenes' men had surrendered, and called on him to do the same. He did not believe it, and made a truce to send a horseman to see. When the horseman had gone and brought back word that they had surrendered, Nicias sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans to say that he was ready to make an agreement on behalf of the Athenians to repay whatever money the Syracusans had spent on the war, on condition that they let his army go; and until the money was paid he would give Athenians as hostages, one man for each talent. The Syracusans and Gylippus did not accept these proposals, but attacked, surrounded them, and shot at these men too from every side until late in the day. These men too were in a wretched state for want of food and provisions. Nevertheless they waited for the quiet of the night and meant to march on. They were taking up their arms when the Syracusans noticed it and raised the paean. When the Athenians saw that they had not

escaped notice, they laid them down again, except for about three hundred men; these forced their way through the guards and went on through the night wherever they could.

84 When day came Nicias led the army on; and the Syracusans and their allies pressed them in the same way, shooting at them from every side and striking them down with javelins. The Athenians hurried on toward the river Assinarus,[7] partly because they were hard pressed by the attack from every side of the many horsemen and the rest of the crowd, and thought things would be somewhat easier for them if they crossed the river, and partly because of their exhaustion and their craving to drink. When they reached it, they rushed in, no longer in any order; every man wanted to be the first across himself, and the enemy pressing on them made the crossing difficult by now. For being forced to move in a mass, they fell on one another and trampled each other down, and some were killed at once on the spears and the baggage, while others got entangled and were carried away by the stream. The Syracusans, standing along the other bank of the river (it was steep), shot down from above at the Athenians, most of whom were drinking greedily and were tangled together in confusion in the hollow riverbed. The Peloponnesians came down and slaughtered them, especially those in the river. And the water was at once fouled, but it was drunk all the same, muddy and bloody as it was, and most of them fought to have it.

85 At last, when the dead were already lying in heaps on one another in the river, and the army had been destroyed, part of it at the river, and part, if any got away, by the horsemen, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, trusting him more than the Syracusans; and he told him and the Lacedaemonians to do with himself whatever they wished, but to stop killing the rest of the soldiers. After this Gylippus gave orders to take prisoners. They brought in alive all the rest whom the soldiers had not hidden

away (and these were many), and they sent men in pursuit of the three hundred who had broken through the guard in the night and captured them. The part of the army that was collected as public property was not large, but the part stolen away was large, and the whole of Sicily was filled with them, since they had not been taken by agreement, as had Demosthenes' men. Not a small part was also killed; for this was the greatest slaughter, and second to none, in this war. And in the other attacks that had been frequent during the march not a few had died. Many nevertheless escaped, some at the time, and others after being enslaved and running away later; for these, Catana was the place of refuge.

86 The Syracusans and their allies gathered together, took up as many of the prisoners as they could and the spoils, and went back to the city. All the other Athenians and allies they had taken they put down into the stone quarries, thinking this the safest way to keep them;[8] but Nicias and Demosthenes they put to death, against the will of Gylippus. For Gylippus thought it would be a glorious achievement for him, on top of everything else, to bring the enemy generals as well to the Lacedaemonians. It happened that one of them, Demosthenes, was their bitterest enemy, because of what had happened on the island and at Pylos, and the other, for the same reasons, their best friend; for Nicias had worked hard to get the Lacedaemonians from the island released, by persuading the Athenians to make the treaty.'[9] For this reason the Lacedaemonians were well disposed toward him, and it was not least because of this that he trusted Gylippus and surrendered himself to him. But some of the Syracusans, it was said, afraid because they had been in communication with him, that under torture he might cause them trouble in the midst of their success; and others, especially the Corinthians, afraid that since he was rich he might bribe someone, escape, and cause them new trouble again, persuaded the allies and killed him. For this reason, or for

something very close to it, he was put to death, the man who of all the Hellenes in my time least deserved to come to such misfortune, because of his whole way of life, devoted to virtue as custom understands it.

87 Those in the quarries the Syracusans treated harshly in the first period. There were many of them in a hollow and narrow place, and at first the sun, and the stifling heat besides, tormented them, since there was no roof; and then the nights that followed, autumnal and cold, by the change brought on sickness. Because of the lack of space they did everything in the same place; and besides, the dead were heaped together on one another, men who had died of their wounds and of the change and of such things, and the stench was unbearable; and they were tormented at the same time by hunger and thirst (for to each of them, for eight months, they gave a cotyle of water a day and two cotyles of grain);[10] and of all the other sufferings that men thrown into such a place were likely to endure, there was none that did not befall them. For about seventy days they lived like this, all together. Then, except for the Athenians and any Sicilian or Italian Greeks who had served with them, they sold the rest. How many were taken in all, it is hard to say exactly, but they were not fewer than seven thousand. This was the greatest action of this war, and, it seems to me, of all Hellenic actions that we know of from report; it was the most glorious for the victors and the most disastrous for the vanquished. For they were beaten at every point and altogether; they suffered no small misery in anything; they were destroyed, as the saying goes, with total destruction, army and ships and everything, and nothing was not lost; and few out of many returned home. These were the events in Sicily.

1. Locri on the toe of Italy, called Epizephyrian (“under the west wind”) to distinguish it from the Locrians of mainland Greece.

2. The number “a hundred” is supplied by editors; the manuscripts give twenty talents.

3. Neodamodes: Helots freed by the Spartans, usually for military service.

4. The Greek of “at the arms posts” is corrupt in the manuscripts; the sense is uncertain.

5. A plethron is a hundred Greek feet, about thirty meters.

6. The lunar eclipse of 27 August 413 BC.

7. A river south of Syracuse, near Helorus; its modern identification is uncertain.

8. The latomiae, stone quarries cut into the rock at Syracuse.

9. The Spartiates captured on Sphacteria in 425 BC (Book 4) were returned under the Peace of Nicias, 421 BC (Book 5).

10. A cotyle was about a quarter of a liter, roughly half a pint.

Book 8

1 When the news reached Athens, for a long time they would not believe it, even from the very soldiers who had escaped from the action itself and reported it plainly; they would not believe that the destruction had been so utterly complete. When they did realize it, they turned on those of the public speakers who had joined in urging the expedition, as though they had not voted for it themselves, and they were angry too with the oracle-mongers and seers and all who had at that time, by some claim of divine inspiration, raised their hopes that they would take Sicily. Everything on every side distressed them, and after what had happened fear and the greatest consternation beset them. For they were weighed down, each man in his own household and the city as a whole, at the loss of many hoplites and horsemen and of a body of young men such as they saw no other to replace; and at the same time, seeing that they had not enough ships in the docks, nor money in the treasury, nor crews for the ships, they had no hope for the moment of coming through. They thought that the enemy in Sicily would sail straight against the Piraeus with their fleet, especially after so great a victory, and that their enemies at home, now doubly prepared in every respect, would press them with all their strength by land and sea at once, and that their own allies would revolt and join them. Nevertheless they decided that, as far as their means allowed, they must not give in, but must equip a fleet, procuring timber wherever they could, and money, and make sure of their allies, above all Euboea; they must also bring some restraint and economy into the affairs of the city, and choose a

board of older men who would deliberate in advance on the business at hand as occasion required.[1] In the fear of the moment, as a democracy is apt to do, they were ready to submit to discipline in everything. And as they decided, so they acted; and the summer ended.

2 The following winter, in view of the great Athenian disaster in Sicily, all the Hellenes were at once roused against Athens. Those who were allies of neither side thought that, even if no one called on them, they must no longer stay out of the war but should go against the Athenians of their own accord; each of them supposed that the Athenians would have come against them too if they had succeeded in Sicily, and that the rest of the war would be short and it would be honorable to have a share in it. The allies of the Lacedaemonians, for their part, were more eager than before to be quickly rid of their long hardship. Most of all the subjects of the Athenians were ready to revolt, even beyond their strength, because they judged the situation in anger and would not admit even the argument that the Athenians would be able to hold out through the coming summer. The city of the Lacedaemonians was encouraged by all of this, and most of all because their allies from Sicily, with a great force, their navy having now been added to them by necessity, would in all likelihood be with them at the beginning of spring. Hopeful on every side, they resolved to throw themselves into the war without reservation, reckoning that if it ended well they would be free for the future from such danger as the Athenians would have posed to them if they had acquired Sicily, and that once they had overthrown them they would themselves lead all Hellas securely from then on.

3 At once, then, in this winter, their king Agis set out from Decelea with an army and levied money from the allies for the fleet. Turning toward the Malian Gulf, he carried off most of the plunder of the Oetaeans, in keeping with the old enmity, and

exacted money from them; and from the Achaeans of Phthiotis and the other subjects of the Thessalians in those parts, over the complaints and against the will of the Thessalians, he forced hostages and money, deposited the hostages at Corinth, and tried to bring these peoples into the alliance. The Lacedaemonians assigned to the cities the building of a hundred ships: to themselves and to the Boeotians they assigned twenty-five each, to the Phocians and Locrians fifteen, to the Corinthians fifteen, to the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians ten, and to the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians ten; and they made all their other preparations with the intention of taking up the war at once at the beginning of spring.

4 The Athenians too made their preparations in this same winter, as they had resolved. They pushed on the shipbuilding, after procuring timber, and fortified Sunium, so that their grain ships might have safe passage around it; they abandoned the fort in Laconia that they had built on their voyage past it to Sicily; and in other matters, wherever any expense seemed useless, they cut back for economy. Above all they kept a close watch on their allies, so that they would not revolt from them.

5 While both sides were doing these things, and were in fact preparing for war just as though they were beginning it, the Euboeans were the first to send envoys to Agis in this winter about revolting from the Athenians. He accepted their proposals and sent for Alcamenes son of Sthenelaidas and Melanthus from Lacedaemon to command in Euboea. They came with about three hundred of the Neodamodes,[2] and he began preparing their crossing for them. Meanwhile the Lesbians also came, wishing to revolt as well; and since the Boeotians supported them, Agis was persuaded to hold off on Euboea and began to prepare the revolt of the Lesbians, giving them Alcamenes, who was to have sailed to Euboea, as their harmost; the Boeotians promised ten ships and

Agis ten. All this was done without the city of the Lacedaemonians. For Agis, as long as he was at Decelea with the force under him, had authority to send an army wherever he wished, to raise troops, and to levy money. And at this time, one might say, the allies obeyed him much more than they obeyed the Lacedaemonians at home; for since he had a force of his own, he could appear formidable at once anywhere. So he was acting for the Lesbians; but the Chians and the Erythraeans, who were also ready to revolt, did not turn to Agis but to Lacedaemon. With them came an envoy from Tissaphernes, who was general of the coastal provinces for King Darius son of Artaxerxes.[3] For Tissaphernes too was inviting the Peloponnesians in and promising to provide maintenance. He had recently been pressed by the King for the tribute from his province, which he owed in arrears because he had been unable to collect it from the Hellenic cities on account of the Athenians. He thought, then, that by doing harm to the Athenians he would be better able to collect the tribute, and at the same time would make the Lacedaemonians allies of the King, and would either bring in alive or kill Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was in revolt in Caria, as the King had ordered him.

6 The Chians, then, and Tissaphernes were acting jointly to the same end. At about the same time Calligeitus son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both exiles from their own cities living with Pharnabazus son of Pharnaces, arrived at Lacedaemon, sent by Pharnabazus to bring ships to the Hellespont. He himself wished, if he could, to do what Tissaphernes was eager to do: to make the cities in his own province revolt from the Athenians, for the sake of the tribute, and to win the alliance of the Lacedaemonians for the King through his own efforts. Since the two parties, the agents of Pharnabazus and those of Tissaphernes, were negotiating separately, there was a

great rivalry at Lacedaemon, the one side trying to persuade them to send ships and an army first to Ionia and Chios, the other first to the Hellespont. The Lacedaemonians, however, received the proposals of the Chians and Tissaphernes by far the more favorably; for they had the help of Alcibiades as well, who was a hereditary guest-friend, and a very close one, of Endius, then ephor. It was from this guest-friendship, in fact, that their family had acquired its Laconian name, for Endius was called "son of Alcibiades." Still, the Lacedaemonians first sent Phrynis, one of the Perioeci, to Chios as an observer, to see whether they had as many ships as they said and whether the city in other respects was equal to its reputation. When he reported that what they had heard was true, they at once made the Chians and Erythraeans allies and voted to send them forty ships, since there were not fewer than sixty already there, according to what the Chians said. At first they themselves intended to send ten of these, with Melanchridas, who was their admiral; but then an earthquake occurred, and instead of Melanchridas they sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten ships they began preparing five in Laconia. So the winter ended, and with it the nineteenth year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

7 At the very beginning of spring in the following summer, since the Chians were pressing for the ships to be sent and were afraid that the Athenians would learn of what was going on (for all their embassies were sent in secret from them), the Lacedaemonians sent three Spartiates to Corinth, to have the ships hauled across the Isthmus as quickly as possible from the other sea to the sea facing Athens, and to order them all to sail to Chios, both those which Agis was preparing for Lesbos and the rest. The ships of the allies there numbered thirty-nine in all.

8 Calligeitus and Timagoras, acting for Pharnabazus, took no part in the expedition to Chios and did not give the money they had brought for the dispatch, twenty-five talents, but planned to

sail later on their own with another expedition. Agis, when he saw that the Lacedaemonians were set on Chios first, did not himself think otherwise either. The allies met at Corinth and deliberated, and decided to sail first to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who was preparing the five ships in Laconia; then to Lesbos, under the command of Alcamenes, the man Agis also had in mind; and last to go to the Hellespont (Clearchus son of Ramphias had been appointed commander there). They decided to carry half the ships across the Isthmus first and have them sail off at once, so that the Athenians would pay attention to those setting out rather than to those carried across afterward. For they were making this voyage openly, despising the weakness of the Athenians, since no fleet of theirs worth mentioning was yet to be seen. As they decided, so they did, and at once carried twenty-one ships across.

9 But while the others were pressing for the voyage, the Corinthians were not willing to sail with them until they had celebrated the Isthmian festival, which was then being held. Agis was ready to let them keep the Isthmian truce intact and to make the expedition his own. The Corinthians would not agree, and time was lost; meanwhile the Athenians became more aware of what was afoot at Chios. They sent Aristocrates, one of their generals, and charged the Chians with it; and when the Chians denied it, they ordered them to send ships with them to the allied fleet as a pledge of good faith. They sent seven. The reason the ships were sent was that the many among the Chians did not know what was being negotiated, while the few who were in the secret did not yet wish to have the people hostile to them before they had acquired some strength, and they no longer expected the Peloponnesians to come, since they were delaying.

10 Meanwhile the Isthmian Games were held, and the Athenians, who had been notified of them, sent delegates to them,

and the affairs of the Chians became still more evident to them. When they returned, they at once made preparations so that the ships setting out from Cenchreae should not slip past them. After the festival the Peloponnesians put out for Chios with twenty-one ships, under the command of Alcamenes. The Athenians at first sailed against them with an equal number of ships and drew back toward the open sea. When the Peloponnesians did not follow them far but turned back, the Athenians withdrew too, for they had the seven Chian ships among their number and did not consider them reliable. But later they manned others and, with thirty-seven ships in all, chased the enemy as they sailed along the coast into Spiraeum in the territory of Corinth. This is a deserted harbor, the last one toward the border of Epidaurus. The Peloponnesians lost one ship at sea, but collected the rest and brought them to anchor. The Athenians attacked both by sea with their ships and by landing on shore; there was great confusion and disorder, and the Athenians disabled most of the ships on the beach and killed the commander Alcamenes. Some of their own men were killed too.

11 After the two sides separated, the Athenians posted enough ships to blockade the enemy's ships, and with the rest anchored at the islet not far off, where they encamped, and sent to Athens for reinforcements. For the Corinthians came to the aid of the Peloponnesians at the ships on the next day, and not long afterward the other people of the neighborhood as well. The Peloponnesians, seeing that guarding the ships in a deserted place was laborious, were at a loss, and at first thought of burning the ships; but then they decided to haul them up on shore and keep guard, sitting by them with the infantry, until some suitable means of escape should present itself. Agis too, when he learned of this, sent them Thermon, a Spartiate. The Lacedaemonians had first received word that the ships had put out from the Isthmus (for the

ephors had told Alcamenes to send a horseman when this happened), and they at once wanted to send their own five ships under the command of Chalcideus, with Alcibiades accompanying him. Then, when they were already on the point of starting, came the news of the ships' flight into Spiraeum; and disheartened because they had stumbled at the very first step of the Ionian war, they no longer intended to send the ships from their own country, but even to recall some that had already put out.

12 When Alcibiades learned of this, he again persuaded Endius and the other ephors not to shrink from the voyage. He told them that they would arrive before the Chians learned of the disaster to the ships, and that he himself, once he reached Ionia, would easily persuade the cities to revolt by describing the weakness of the Athenians and the zeal of the Lacedaemonians, for he would be believed more readily than others. To Endius in private he said that it would be a fine thing for Endius if through his agency Ionia were brought to revolt and the King made an ally of the Lacedaemonians, and this achievement did not become Agis's; for he himself happened to be at odds with Agis. Having persuaded the other ephors and Endius, he put out with the five ships, together with Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian, and they made the voyage at speed.

13 At about this same time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships that had fought through the war in Sicily with Gylippus were also returning home. They were intercepted off Leucas and roughly handled by twenty-seven Attic ships under the command of Hippocles son of Menippus, who was on watch for the ships from Sicily; but all except one escaped the Athenians and sailed into Corinth.

14 Chalcideus and Alcibiades, as they sailed, seized everyone they fell in with, so that no report of them would go ahead. They put in first at Corycus on the mainland and released them there.

Then, after a preliminary meeting with some of the Chians who were in the plot, who urged them to sail into the city without announcing themselves in advance, they arrived unexpectedly at Chios. The many were amazed and dismayed; but the few had arranged things so that the council happened to be in session. Chalcideus and Alcibiades spoke, saying that many other ships were sailing to join them, and making no mention of the blockade of the ships at Spiraeum; and the Chians revolted from the Athenians, and the Erythraeans after them. After this they sailed with three ships and brought Clazomenae to revolt as well. The Clazomenians at once crossed to the mainland and began fortifying Polichne, as a refuge for themselves if needed from the islet on which they live. All those who had revolted were busy building fortifications and preparing for war.

15 News of Chios quickly reached Athens. The Athenians thought that the danger surrounding them was now great and plain, and that the rest of the allies would not be willing to keep quiet when the greatest city had gone over. In the alarm of the moment they at once repealed the penalties laid on anyone who should propose or put to the vote the use of the thousand talents, which they had been so anxious not to touch throughout the whole war,[4] and they voted to draw on them and to man a large number of ships. Of the ships blockading at Spiraeum they voted to send at once the eight which had left the blockade to chase the ships with Chalcideus and had returned without catching them (Strombichides son of Diotimus commanded them), and twelve others under Thrasycles to follow to the rescue not long after, these also leaving the blockade. They brought back the seven Chian ships which had been helping them blockade the ships at Spiraeum, freed the slaves aboard them, and put the free men in irons. In place of all the ships that had left they quickly manned ten others and sent them to blockade the Peloponnesians, and

they intended to man thirty more. Their zeal was great, and nothing they did for the relief of Chios was done on a small scale.

16 Meanwhile Strombichides arrived at Samos with his eight ships. He added one Samian ship, sailed to Teos, and asked the Teians to remain quiet. But Chalcideus was also sailing from Chios to Teos with twenty-three ships, and at the same time the land force of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans was marching along the coast. Strombichides learned of it in advance and put out; and when, out in the open sea, he saw how many ships there were from Chios, he fled toward Samos, and they pursued him. The Teians at first would not admit the land force, but when the Athenians fled they let it in. The infantry held back, waiting for Chalcideus to return from the pursuit; and when he was slow in coming, they began on their own to pull down the wall that the Athenians had built on the landward side of the city of Teos, and a few of the barbarians who came up helped them, under the command of Stages, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

17 Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after chasing Strombichides into Samos, armed the sailors from the ships from the Peloponnese and left them at Chios. They manned these ships afresh from Chios, added twenty others, and sailed to Miletus to bring it to revolt. For Alcibiades, who was on intimate terms with the leading men of the Milesians, wanted to win them over before the ships from the Peloponnese arrived, and so to secure the achievement for the Chians, for himself, for Chalcideus, and for Endius, who had sent him out, as he had promised: that he would bring as many of the cities as possible to revolt with the Chian forces and Chalcideus. So, having escaped notice for most of the voyage and arriving not long before Strombichides and Thrasycles, who had just come from Athens with twelve ships and joined in the pursuit, they brought Miletus to revolt. The Athenians, sailing up close on their heels with nineteen ships, were not admitted by the Milesians and

took up a blockading station at Lade, the island lying off the city. Directly after the revolt of the Milesians the first alliance of the Lacedaemonians with the King was concluded, through Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, as follows:

18 "On these terms the Lacedaemonians and their allies have made an alliance with the King and Tissaphernes. Whatever territory and cities the King holds, and the forefathers of the King held, shall be the King's. And whatever money or anything else came in to the Athenians from these cities, the King and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall jointly prevent, so that the Athenians receive neither money nor anything else. And the King and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall jointly wage the war against the Athenians. And it shall not be permitted to make an end of the war against the Athenians unless it is resolved by both parties, the King and the Lacedaemonians and their allies. And if any revolt from the King, they shall be enemies to the Lacedaemonians and their allies; and if any revolt from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, they shall be enemies to the King in the same way."

19 Such was this alliance. After this the Chians at once manned ten more ships and sailed to Anaea, wishing to get news of affairs at Miletus and at the same time to bring the cities to revolt. When word came to them from Chalcideus to sail back again, and that Amorges would be there by land with an army, they sailed to the sanctuary of Zeus, and there sighted sixteen ships which Diomedon was bringing up from Athens, sailing still later than Thrasycles. When they saw them, they fled, one ship to Ephesus and the rest toward Teos. The Athenians took four of them empty, the men having reached the shore first; the others took refuge in the city of Teos. The Athenians sailed off toward Samos, while the Chians put out with their remaining ships, and with the land force

accompanying them brought Lebedus to revolt, and then Erae. After this they all went home, both the land force and the ships.

20 At about the same time the twenty Peloponnesian ships at Spiraeum, which had been chased there earlier and were being blockaded by an equal number of Athenian ships, made a sudden sortie, won a sea battle, and took four Athenian ships. They sailed back to Cenchreae and again began preparing for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Astyochus came to them from Lacedaemon as admiral, and to him the whole command at sea now passed. When the land force had withdrawn from Teos, Tissaphernes too came there in person with an army, demolished whatever was left of the wall at Teos, and withdrew. Not long after he had gone, Diomedon arrived with ten Athenian ships and made an agreement with the Teians that they should admit the Athenians as well. He then sailed along the coast to Erae and attacked it, and when he failed to take the city he sailed away.

21 At this time too the rising of the people at Samos against the powerful took place, with the help of the Athenians, who happened to be there with three ships. The Samian people put to death some two hundred in all of the most powerful men, punished four hundred with exile, and divided their land and houses among themselves. After this the Athenians voted them autonomy, since they were now considered reliable, and they ran the affairs of the city thereafter. They gave the landowners no share in anything else, and no one of the people was any longer permitted to give a daughter in marriage to them or take a wife from them.

22 After this, in the same summer, the Chians, keeping up the zeal with which they had begun, and being present in force to bring the cities to revolt even without the Peloponnesians, and wishing at the same time to have as many as possible share the danger with them, made an expedition themselves with thirteen ships against Lesbos, as the Lacedaemonians had directed that

they go there second and from there to the Hellespont. At the same time the land force, made up of the Peloponnesians who were present and the allies from there, marched along the coast toward Clazomenae and Cyme; Evalas, a Spartiate, commanded it, and Deiniadas, one of the Perioeci, the ships. The ships sailed in and first brought Methymna to revolt, and four ships were left there; then the rest brought Mytilene to revolt.

23 Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, sailed from Cenchreae with four ships, as he had set out to do, and arrived at Chios. On the third day after his arrival twenty-five Attic ships sailed to Lesbos under the command of Leon and Diomedon; for Leon had later come out from Athens with ten ships as reinforcement. Astyochus too put out late on the same day and, taking one Chian ship with him, sailed to Lesbos to give what help he could. He reached Pyrrha, and from there on the next day Eresus, where he learned that Mytilene had been taken by the Athenians at the first assault. For the Athenians, sailing in unexpectedly just as they were, had put into the harbor, overcome the Chian ships, landed, defeated those who resisted them in battle, and taken the city. Astyochus learned this from the Eresians and from the Chian ships with Eubulus from Methymna, which had been left there earlier and had fled when Mytilene was taken; three of them fell in with him, for one had been captured by the Athenians. He no longer made for Mytilene, but brought Eresus to revolt and armed its people. He sent the hoplites from his own ships along by land to Antissa and Methymna, appointing Eteonicus to command them, and he himself sailed along the coast with his own ships and the three Chian ones, hoping that the Methymnaeans would take courage at the sight of them and hold to their revolt. But when everything in Lesbos went against him, he took his own land force on board and sailed back to Chios. The land force of the allies, which was to have gone to the Hellespont, was also taken back to

the various cities. After this six of the allied Peloponnesian ships at Cenchreae came to them at Chios. The Athenians restored order again in Lesbos, and sailing from there took Polichne, the place the Clazomenians were fortifying on the mainland, and moved the people back to their city on the island, except those responsible for the revolt; these went off to Daphnus. And Clazomenae came over to the Athenians again.

24 In the same summer the Athenians at Miletus, who were blockading from Lade with their twenty ships, made a landing at Panormus in Milesian territory and killed Chalcideus, the Lacedaemonian commander, who had come out against them with a few men. On the third day afterward they sailed across and set up a trophy, which the Milesians pulled down, on the ground that it had been set up without command of the land. Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian ships from Lesbos, operating from the Oenussae islands off Chios, from Sidussa and Pteleum, forts they held in Erythraean territory, and from Lesbos, carried on the war against the Chians from their ships. They had hoplites from the muster roll on board as marines, men pressed into service. They landed at Cardamyle and at Bolissus, defeated in battle the Chians who came out against them, killed many, and laid waste the places in that region; they won another battle at Phanae, and a third at Leuconium. After this the Chians no longer came out against them, and the Athenians ravaged a country that was finely cultivated and had suffered no harm from the Persian Wars until then. For the Chians, alone of any people I know of after the Lacedaemonians, were prosperous and prudent at the same time, and the more their city grew, the more securely they ordered it. Nor did they venture on this revolt itself, if it is thought that in this they acted against their own safety, until they were going to share the danger with many good allies, and until they saw that the Athenians themselves no longer denied, after the disaster in Sicily,

that their situation was very bad. And if they were tripped up by one of the surprises of human life, they made their mistake together with many who thought as they did, that the power of the Athenians would quickly be destroyed. Now that they were shut off from the sea and their land was being ravaged, some of them attempted to bring the city over to the Athenians. The magistrates learned of it and took no action themselves, but brought Astyochus the admiral from Erythrae with the four ships he had with him, and considered how they might put an end to the plot as moderately as possible, by taking hostages or in some other way. That was what they were doing.

25 At the end of the same summer a thousand Athenian hoplites, fifteen hundred Argives (the Athenians had armed five hundred of the Argives, who were light-armed troops), and a thousand of the allies sailed from Athens to Samos on forty-eight ships, some of which were troop transports, under the generals Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides. They crossed to Miletus and encamped. The Milesians came out, eight hundred hoplites of their own, together with the Peloponnesians who had come with Chalcideus and a body of mercenaries of Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes himself being present with his cavalry, and engaged the Athenians and their allies. The Argives on their own wing dashed out ahead and, despising the enemy as Ionians who would not stand up to them, advanced in some disorder; they were defeated by the Milesians, and a little fewer than three hundred of them were killed. The Athenians first defeated the Peloponnesians and pushed back the barbarians and the rest of the crowd; they did not engage the Milesians, who after routing the Argives had withdrawn into the city when they saw the rest of their side beaten, and as victors they grounded their arms right up against the city of the Milesians. In this battle it happened that on both sides the Ionians defeated the Dorians: the Athenians beat the

Peloponnesians opposed to them, and the Milesians the Argives. The Athenians set up a trophy and began preparing to wall the city off, since the site is like an isthmus, thinking that if they won over Miletus the other places too would readily come over to them.

26 Meanwhile, late in the afternoon, news reached them that the fifty-five ships from the Peloponnese and Sicily were all but there. For of the Sicilian Greeks, with Hermocrates the Syracusan pressing most of all for them to join in completing the destruction of what was left of the Athenians, twenty Syracusan ships had come and two Selinuntian, and the ships from the Peloponnese which they had been preparing were now ready. Both squadrons were entrusted to Therimenes the Lacedaemonian to take to Astyochus the admiral, and they put in first at Leros, the island off Miletus. From there, learning that the Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed first into the Iasian Gulf, wishing to find out how things stood at Miletus. Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichiussa in Milesian territory, the place on the gulf where they had sailed and bivouacked, and from him they learned about the battle (for Alcibiades had been present and had fought on the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes). He urged them, unless they wished to ruin affairs in Ionia and the whole cause, to go to the aid of Miletus as quickly as possible and not let it be walled off.

27 They intended to go to its aid at dawn. But Phrynichus, the Athenian general, when he had clear information from Leros about the ships, and his colleagues wished to stay and fight it out at sea, said that he himself would not do it and would not allow them or anyone else to do it, as far as it lay in his power. Where it would be possible to fight later, when they knew clearly how many enemy ships they faced and how many of their own they could set against them, after preparing adequately and at leisure, he would never yield to the reproach of disgrace and take a reckless risk. It was no disgrace for Athenians to withdraw with a fleet when the moment

required it; it would be a worse disgrace, whatever the circumstances, if they were defeated. And the city would be exposed not only to disgrace but to the greatest danger; after the disasters that had befallen it, it could scarcely afford to take the offensive anywhere of its own will even with a secure force, except under absolute necessity, much less go into dangers of its own choosing when nothing compelled it. He ordered them as quickly as possible to take up the wounded and the land force and the equipment they had brought with them, to leave behind what they had taken from the enemy's country so that the ships might be light, and to sail back to Samos; and from there, once all the ships were assembled, to make their attacks when an opportunity arose. As he persuaded them, so he acted. And not then so much as afterward, not in this matter only but in all the others in which Phrynichus was involved, he was judged to be a man of no small intelligence. So the Athenians at once, that very evening, departed from Miletus in this way with their victory unfinished; and the Argives, in haste and in anger at their defeat, sailed home from Samos.

28 At dawn the Peloponnesians set out from Teichiussa and put in at Miletus. They waited one day, and on the next, taking with them the Chian ships that had first been chased in with Chalcideus, they wanted to sail back for the gear they had unloaded at Teichiussa. When they arrived there, Tissaphernes came up with his land force and persuaded them to sail against Iasus, which Amorges, an enemy, was holding. They attacked Iasus suddenly, when the people there expected nothing but that the ships were Attic, and took it; the Syracusans won most praise in the action. They took Amorges alive, the bastard son of Pissuthnes and a rebel from the King, and the Peloponnesians handed him over to Tissaphernes to take to the King if he wished, as the King had ordered him. They sacked Iasus, and the army took a very great deal of money, for the place had long been wealthy. The mer-

cenaries who had been with Amorges they took over to their own side and, without harming them, enrolled them in their ranks, since most of them were from the Peloponnese. They handed over the town to Tissaphernes, and all the captives, slave and free, for each of whom they agreed to receive from him one Daric stater; then they withdrew to Miletus. The Lacedaemonians had sent Pedaritus son of Leon to Chios as governor, and they dispatched him by land as far as Erythrae with the mercenary force from Amorges, and appointed Philip there at Miletus. And the summer ended.

29 The following winter, after Tissaphernes had put Iasus in a state of defense, he went to Miletus and distributed a month's pay to all the ships at the rate of an Attic drachma a day for each man, as he had promised at Lacedaemon. For the rest of the time he wished to give three obols, until he could consult the King; and if the King ordered it, he said, he would give the full drachma. But Hermocrates, the Syracusan general, objected (for Therimenes, who was not admiral but was sailing with them only to hand over the ships to Astyochus, was slack about the pay), and so they came to an agreement under which, by the margin of five ships, each man got more than three obols. For he gave thirty talents a month for fifty-five ships; and to the rest, for as many ships as there were beyond that number, pay was given at the same rate.

30 In the same winter the Athenians at Samos, since thirty-five more ships had come out to them from home, with the generals Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, gathered in the ships from Chios and all the rest, and wished to divide their duties by lot, blockading Miletus with the fleet and sending a fleet and a land force against Chios. They did so. Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, to whom the lot fell, sailed against Chios with thirty ships, taking a part of the thousand hoplites who had come to Miletus on troop transports; the others stayed at Samos with

seventy-four ships, commanded the sea, and made descents on Miletus.

31 Astyochus, who happened to be at Chios at that time collecting hostages because of the plot of betrayal, stopped doing so when he learned that the ships with Therimenes had arrived and that the affairs of the alliance were in a better state. He took ten Peloponnesian ships and ten Chian and put out to sea. He attacked Pteleum without taking it, then sailed along the coast to Clazomenae and ordered those there who were of the Athenian party to move up to Daphnus and come over to his side; Tamos, the lieutenant governor of Ionia, joined him in this demand. When they would not listen, he attacked the city, which was unwalled, and, unable to take it, sailed off in a strong wind, himself to Phocaea and Cyme, while the rest of the ships put in at the islands lying off Clazomenae: Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. Whatever property the Clazomenians had stored there for safety they partly plundered and consumed during the eight days they were kept there by the winds, and partly took on board, and then sailed to Phocaea and Cyme to join Astyochus.

32 While he was there, envoys came from the Lesbians wishing to revolt again. They persuaded him; but since the Corinthians and the other allies were unenthusiastic because of the earlier failure, he weighed anchor and sailed for Chios. His ships were caught in a storm and arrived at Chios later, from different directions. After this Pedaritus, who was then marching along the coast from Miletus, reached Erythrae and crossed over with his army to Chios. He also had there some five hundred soldiers with their arms, from the five ships, left behind by Chalcideus. When some Lesbians announced that they were ready to revolt, Astyochus proposed to Pedaritus and the Chians that they should go with their ships and bring Lesbos to revolt: they would either gain more allies, or, if they failed, would do harm to the Athenians. But they

would not listen, and Pedaritus said that he would not hand over the Chian ships to him.

33 So Astyochus took the five Corinthian ships, a sixth from Megara, one from Hermione, and the Laconian ships he had brought with him, and sailed for Miletus to take up his command as admiral, with many threats to the Chians that he would certainly not come to their aid if they needed anything. He put in at Corycus in Erythraean territory and bivouacked there. The Athenians from Samos, sailing with their army against Chios, had put in on the other side of the hill that separated them and had anchored there, and neither side knew of the other. During the night a letter came from Pedaritus saying that some Erythraean prisoners released from Samos had come to Erythrae to betray it, and Astyochus at once put out back to Erythrae; by so narrow a margin did he escape running into the Athenians. Pedaritus also sailed across to him, and they investigated the case of those who were thought to be traitors; and when they found that the whole thing had been a pretext devised by the men to secure their release from Samos, they acquitted them of the charge and sailed off, Pedaritus to Chios and Astyochus to Miletus, as he had intended.

34 Meanwhile the Athenian force, sailing around from Corycus with its ships, fell in off Arginus with three Chian warships and, on seeing them, gave chase. A great storm came on; the Chian ships barely escaped into the harbor, but of the Athenian ships the three that had pressed hardest were wrecked and cast ashore near the city of Chios, and of their crews some were captured and some killed. The rest took refuge in the harbor called Phoenicus, under Mimas. From there they later put in at Lesbos and began preparing for the work of fortification.

35 In the same winter Hippocrates the Lacedaemonian sailed out from the Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships, under the com-

mand of Dorieus son of Diagoras with two colleagues, one Laconian ship, and one Syracusan, and put in at Cnidus, which had already revolted at the instigation of Tissaphernes. When the men at Miletus learned of it, they ordered them to guard Cnidus with half their ships, and with those stationed at Triopium to seize the merchant ships putting in from Egypt. Triopium is a projecting cape of Cnidian territory, with a sanctuary of Apollo. The Athenians learned of this, sailed from Samos, and captured the six ships keeping guard at Triopium, though the men escaped from them. After this they sailed into Cnidus, attacked the city, which was unwalled, and very nearly took it. On the next day they attacked again; but since the inhabitants had fenced themselves in better during the night, and the men who had escaped from the ships at Triopium had come in to join them, they no longer did as much damage, and they went off, ravaged the land of the Cnidians, and sailed back to Samos.

36 At about the same time Astyochus came to Miletus to take over the fleet. The Peloponnesians were still well provided with everything in their camp: the pay was being given in sufficient amount, the soldiers still had the large sums they had plundered from Iasus, and the Milesians bore the burdens of the war with zeal. Still, the Peloponnesians thought that the first agreement with Tissaphernes, the one made by Chalcideus, was defective and not to their advantage, and they made another while Therimenes was still there. It is as follows:

37 "Agreement of the Lacedaemonians and their allies with King Darius, the sons of the King, and Tissaphernes: that there shall be a treaty and friendship on the following terms. Whatever territory and cities belong to King Darius, or belonged to his father or his ancestors, against these neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of the Lacedaemonians shall go for war or for any harm, nor shall either the Lacedaemonians or the allies of the Lacedaemonians

exact tribute from these cities. Nor shall King Darius, nor any of those whom the King rules, go against the Lacedaemonians or their allies for war or for any harm. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies have need of anything from the King, or the King from the Lacedaemonians or their allies, whatever they agree upon with each other, that they shall do and it shall stand. The war against the Athenians and their allies both parties shall wage jointly; and if they make an end of it, both shall make it jointly. Whatever army is in the King's territory at the King's summons, the King shall bear its expense. If any of the cities that have made this agreement with the King goes against the King's territory, the rest shall prevent it and defend the King to the best of their power; and if any of those in the King's territory, or in the territory the King rules, goes against the territory of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall prevent it and defend them to the best of his power."

38 After this agreement Therimenes handed over the ships to Astyochus, sailed away in a small boat, and disappeared. The Athenians from Lesbos, who had by now crossed over to Chios with their army and controlled both land and sea, began fortifying Delphinium, a place strong in other respects on the landward side, provided with harbors, and not far from the city of the Chians. The Chians, having been beaten in many earlier battles, and being in other respects not at all on good terms among themselves, kept quiet: Tydeus son of Ion and his associates had already been put to death by Pedaritus for Atticism, and the rest of the city had been brought by force into the hands of a few, so that they were suspicious of one another. For these reasons neither they themselves nor the mercenaries with Pedaritus seemed a match for the enemy. They did, however, send to Miletus urging Astyochus to come to their aid; and when he would not listen, Pedaritus wrote to Lacedaemon about him, accusing him of wrongdoing. That was how things stood for the Athenians at Chios. Their ships from

Samos kept sailing out against the ships at Miletus, and when the enemy did not put out against them, they withdrew to Samos again and kept quiet.

39 In the same winter the twenty-seven ships that the Lacedaemonians had fitted out for Pharnabazus, through the efforts of Calligeitus the Megarian and Timagoras the Cyzicene, set sail from the Peloponnese for Ionia about the time of the solstice, with Antisthenes, a Spartiate, sailing as their commander. With them the Lacedaemonians also sent eleven Spartiates as advisers to Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas son of Arcesilaus. They had been instructed, on arriving at Miletus, to help direct affairs in general as would best serve, and to send these ships, either the same number or more or fewer, to Pharnabazus at the Hellespont if they thought fit, appointing as commander Clearchus son of Ramphias, who was sailing with them; and, if the eleven thought fit, to remove Astyochus from his command as admiral and appoint Antisthenes in his place, for in consequence of Pedaritus's letters they were suspicious of him. The ships, then, sailing from Malea across the open sea, put in at Melos, and falling in with ten Athenian ships they took three of them empty and burned them. After this, fearing that the Athenian ships that had escaped from Melos would report their approach to the men at Samos, as in fact happened, they sailed toward Crete and, lengthening their voyage as a precaution, put in at Caunus in Asia. From there, thinking themselves safe, they sent a message to the ships at Miletus to come and escort them along the coast.

40 At the same time the Chians and Pedaritus, no less than before, kept sending messengers to Astyochus, though he kept delaying, and demanded that he come to their aid with all his ships now that they were under siege, and not stand by while the greatest of the allied cities in Ionia was shut off from the sea and ravaged by raiding on land. For the Chians had many slaves, more

than any one city except the Lacedaemonians, and because of their numbers they were punished the more harshly for their offenses; so as soon as the Athenian army seemed to be firmly established behind a fortification, most of them at once deserted to it, and since they knew the country they did it the greatest damage. The Chians therefore said that he must come to their aid while there was still hope and it was possible to stop it, while Delphinium was being fortified and was unfinished and a larger defensive wall was being thrown around the camp and the ships. Astyochus, although he had not intended to, because of the threat he had made earlier, set out to go to their aid when he saw that the allies too were eager for it.

41 Meanwhile word arrived from Caunus that the twenty-seven ships and the Lacedaemonian advisers had come. He thought that everything else came second to escorting so many ships, so that they might command the sea more securely, and to bringing safely across the Lacedaemonians who had come to keep watch on him; so he at once gave up going to Chios and sailed for Caunus. On the way along the coast he landed at Cos Meropis, and sacked the city, which was unwalled and had been laid in ruins by an earthquake, the greatest in fact of any we remember; the people had fled to the mountains. He overran the countryside and took it as plunder, except for the free persons, whom he released. From Cos he arrived at Cnidus by night and was compelled by the urging of the Cnidians not to disembark his sailors, but to sail straight on, just as he was, against the twenty Athenian ships with which Charminus, one of the generals from Samos, was on watch for these twenty-seven ships approaching from the Peloponnese, the very ships Astyochus was sailing to meet. The men at Samos had learned from Melos of their approach, and Charminus's watch was being kept around Syme, Chalce, and Rhodes, and off Lycia; for he had by now learned that they were at Caunus.

42 So Astyochus sailed on to Syme just as he was, before word of him could get out, in the hope of catching the ships somewhere out at sea. But rain and a heavily clouded sky caused his ships to stray in the darkness and fall into confusion. At dawn, with his fleet scattered and the left wing already in view of the Athenians while the rest was still straying about the island, Charminus and the Athenians put out in haste with fewer than their twenty ships, thinking these were the ships from Caunus that they were watching for. They fell on them at once, sank three, disabled others, and had the better of the action until, contrary to their expectation, the greater part of the enemy ships came into view and they were being cut off on every side. Then they took to flight and lost six ships; with the rest they escaped to the island of Teutlussa, and from there to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put in at Cnidus, were joined by the twenty-seven ships from Caunus, sailed with the whole fleet to set up a trophy on Syme, and then anchored again at Cnidus.

43 When the Athenians learned of the sea battle, they sailed to Syme with all the ships from Samos. They did not move against the fleet at Cnidus, nor did the enemy move against them; but they took up the ships' gear that was at Syme, attacked Loryma on the mainland, and sailed back to Samos. All the Peloponnesian ships, now together at Cnidus, were being refitted where needed, and the eleven Lacedaemonians held discussions with Tissaphernes, who had come there, about what had already been done, in case anything did not satisfy them, and about the conduct of the war to come, how it might be waged best and most to the advantage of both. Lichas above all scrutinized what was being done. He said that neither of the treaties, neither Chalcideus's nor Therimenes's, had been properly drawn up, and that it was outrageous if the King was to claim even now to rule all the territory that he and his ancestors had ruled before; for that would mean that all the

islands would be enslaved again, and Thessaly and Locris and everything as far as Boeotia, and that instead of freedom the Lacedaemonians would be putting the Hellenes under the rule of the Medes. He therefore demanded that they make another and better treaty, or at least that they not abide by these; nor did they want any maintenance on such terms. Tissaphernes, indignant, went away from them in anger and with nothing settled.

44 They decided to sail to Rhodes, since the most powerful men there had been sending them proposals. They hoped to win over an island that was not without strength, both in the number of its seamen and in its land forces, and at the same time they thought that from their existing alliance they would be able to maintain their ships themselves without asking Tissaphernes for money. They sailed at once, in the same winter, from Cnidus, and attacking Camirus first, in Rhodian territory, with ninety-four ships, they frightened the many, who did not know what was being negotiated; and these fled, all the more since the city was unwalled. Then the Lacedaemonians called together these and the people of the two other cities, Lindus and Ialysus, and persuaded the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians; and Rhodes went over to the Peloponnesians. At this moment the Athenians learned of it and sailed with the ships from Samos, hoping to forestall them, and appeared out at sea; but arriving a little too late, they sailed off for the time being to Chalce, and from there to Samos. Later they carried on the war against Rhodes by making attacks from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. The Peloponnesians collected about thirty-two talents from the Rhodians, and for the rest stayed quiet for eighty days, having hauled up their ships.

45 Meanwhile, and even earlier, before they moved to Rhodes, the following intrigues were going on. After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades was suspected by the Peloponnesians, and a letter came from them at Lacedaemon

to Astyochus ordering him to be put to death; for he was an enemy of Agis and in other respects seemed untrustworthy. First, in fear, he withdrew to Tissaphernes, and then he did as much harm as he could to the Peloponnesian cause with him. Becoming his instructor in everything, he cut down their pay, so that instead of an Attic drachma three obols were given, and these not regularly. He told Tissaphernes to say to them that the Athenians, who had longer experience of naval matters, gave their own men three obols, not so much from poverty as to keep their sailors from growing insolent through having too much: some would ruin their bodies by spending on the kinds of things that cause weakness, and others would desert their ships, leaving behind no arrears of pay as security. He also instructed him to win over the trierarchs and the generals of the cities by giving them money, so that they would agree to this; and they did, except the Syracusans. Of these Hermocrates alone opposed it, on behalf of the whole alliance. Alcibiades himself sent away the cities that asked for money, answering them on behalf of Tissaphernes: the Chians, he said, were shameless, being the richest of the Hellenes and yet, though saved by outside help, expecting others to risk their bodies and their money for the Chians' freedom; as for the other cities, he said they were in the wrong if, having spent money on the Athenians before they revolted, they were not willing now to contribute as much and even more on their own behalf. And he represented Tissaphernes as being sparing, for the present, with good reason, since he was waging the war with his own money; but if maintenance ever came down from the King, he would pay them their wages in full and give the cities fitting help.

46 He also advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a hurry to end the war, and not to wish to give the same people command of both land and sea, either by bringing in the Phoenician ships he was preparing or by providing pay for more Hellenes; but to let

each side keep its own half of the empire, so that the King could always bring the one against whichever of them was troublesome to him. If command by land and sea were united in one power, he would be at a loss whom to join in pulling down the victors, unless he were willing to rise himself, at great expense and risk, and fight it out at some time. This way was cheaper: at a small fraction of the expense, and with safety for himself, to let the Hellenes wear one another down. He said, too, that the Athenians would be more suitable partners in empire for him; for they were less eager for dominion on land, and the principle and the practice by which they waged war were most convenient for him. They would join in subjugating the maritime part for themselves and, for him, all the Hellenes who lived in the King's territory; whereas the others, on the contrary, had come to set them free. It was not to be expected that the Lacedaemonians, who were now freeing the Hellenes from Hellenes, would fail to free them from barbarians as well, unless at some point the barbarians got rid of them first. He urged him, therefore, first to wear both sides down, and then, after paring away as much as possible from the Athenians, to rid the country of the Peloponnesians. And Tissaphernes was in general inclined this way, as far at least as one could guess from what he did. For on this account, regarding Alcibiades as a good adviser on these matters, he gave him his confidence; he provided the Peloponnesians with their maintenance poorly and would not let them fight at sea. By claiming that the Phoenician ships would come and that they would then fight with a superior force, he ruined their affairs and robbed their fleet of its prime, which had been very strong; and in other respects he took part in the war without zeal, too plainly to escape notice.

47 Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, with whom he now was, because he thought it best for them, but at the same time he was working for his own return to his country,

knowing that if he did not destroy it there would come a time when he could persuade them to recall him. And he thought he could persuade them best in this way, if it was seen that Tissaphernes was his friend; which is what happened. For when the Athenian soldiers at Samos learned that he had influence with Tissaphernes, partly because Alcibiades himself had sent word to their most powerful men to mention him to the best people among them, saying that he wished to return under an oligarchy, and not under the villainy of the democracy that had banished him, and to provide Tissaphernes as their friend and share in the government with them, but still more on their own initiative, the trierarchs and the most powerful of the Athenians at Samos set to work to overthrow the democracy.

48 This movement began first in the camp, and from there it later came to the city. Some men crossed over from Samos to Alcibiades and had discussions with him. He held out the prospect of making Tissaphernes their friend first, and then the King as well, if they were not governed as a democracy (for in that way the King would trust them more); and the most powerful of the citizens, who also bore the heaviest burdens, had high hopes of getting the government into their own hands and of overcoming the enemy. When they came back to Samos, they banded together those who were suitable into a conspiracy, and openly told the many that the King would be their friend and would provide money if Alcibiades were restored and they were not governed as a democracy. The crowd, even if they were for the moment annoyed at what was being done, kept quiet because of the easy hope of pay from the King. Those who were forming the oligarchy, after they had communicated the plan to the multitude, again considered Alcibiades's proposals among themselves and with most of the members of their political club.[5] To the others the proposals seemed practicable and trustworthy; but Phrynichus,

who was still general, was not at all pleased with them. Alcibiades, he thought, and so it was, had no more desire for an oligarchy than for a democracy, nor was he considering anything except how to change the city from its existing order and return at the invitation of his associates; and their own chief concern must be to avoid civil strife. Nor was it in the King's interest, now that the Peloponnesians were as much at home on the sea as they were and held cities in his own dominion, and not the least of them, to join the Athenians, whom he did not trust, and take on trouble, when he could make friends of the Peloponnesians, from whom he had as yet suffered no harm. As for the allied cities, to whom they were supposedly promising oligarchy because they themselves would no longer be a democracy, he said he knew well that this would not make the cities that had revolted come back to them any sooner, nor those still in hand become more loyal. For they would not wish to be slaves under an oligarchy or a democracy rather than to be free under whichever of the two they happened to have. The cities thought that those called the gentlemen, the "fine and good," would give them no less trouble than the people did, since these were the ones who devised and proposed the evil measures for the people, from which they themselves drew most of the benefit. Under them, so far as it lay with them, the allies would be put to death without trial and more violently; whereas the people were their refuge and a check on those men. He said he knew for certain that the cities thought so, having learned it from experience itself. For his own part, therefore, nothing in Alcibiades's proposals or in the present negotiations pleased him.

49 Those who had joined the conspiracy met together and, as they had first resolved, accepted the proposals before them, and prepared to send Peisander and others as envoys to Athens to negotiate for the return of Alcibiades and the overthrow of the

democracy there, and to make Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians.

50 Phrynichus, knowing that there would be a proposal for the return of Alcibiades and that the Athenians would accept it, was afraid that, because of the opposition he had expressed, Alcibiades, if he returned, would do him harm as the man who had tried to prevent it; and he resorted to the following device. He sent secretly to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was then still in the neighborhood of Miletus, and wrote to him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians, setting down all the rest clearly as well; he himself, he said, should be pardoned for plotting harm against a personal enemy, even to the disadvantage of his city. Astyochus had no intention of punishing Alcibiades, especially since Alcibiades no longer came within his reach as before; instead he went up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, told them what had been written to him from Samos, and became an informer himself. He had attached himself to Tissaphernes, it was said, for private gain, in this and in other matters, and this was also why he was so mild in his complaints about the pay when it was not given in full. Alcibiades at once sent a letter against Phrynichus to the men in authority at Samos, telling what he had done and demanding that he be put to death. Phrynichus was thrown into confusion and was in the greatest danger because of this disclosure, and he sent again to Astyochus. He reproached him for not having kept the earlier message secret, and now offered to put the whole Athenian army at Samos into their hands to destroy, writing down in detail how he would bring it about, since Samos was unwalled; and he said that, since his life was in danger because of them, he could no longer be blamed for doing this or anything else rather than be destroyed by his worst enemies. Astyochus revealed this too to Alcibiades.

51 Phrynichus learned beforehand that Astyochus was betraying him and that a letter from Alcibiades about these matters was all but there. He got in first and himself announced to the army that the enemy intended to attack the camp, since Samos was unwalled and not all the ships were anchored inside the harbor, that he had sure information of this, and that they must fortify Samos as quickly as possible and keep everything else under guard. He was general and had authority to do this himself. They set about the fortification, and in consequence Samos, which would have been fortified in any case, was fortified the faster. Not long afterward the letters from Alcibiades arrived, saying that the army was being betrayed by Phrynichus and that the enemy were about to attack. But Alcibiades was not thought trustworthy; it seemed that he had learned in advance the enemy's plans and was attributing them out of enmity to Phrynichus as an accomplice. So he did him no harm, but rather bore witness on his side by reporting the same thing.

52 After this Alcibiades worked on Tissaphernes and tried to persuade him to become a friend of the Athenians. Tissaphernes was afraid of the Peloponnesians, because they had more ships there than the Athenians, but nevertheless wished to be persuaded if he somehow could, especially after he learned of the dispute at Cnidus about the treaty of Therimenes. (It had already taken place by this time, for the Peloponnesians were at Rhodes then.) In that dispute Lichas had confirmed the argument Alcibiades had made earlier, that the Lacedaemonians were freeing all the cities, when he declared it intolerable that the King should by treaty rule over cities that he or his fathers had once ruled before. And Alcibiades, since great things were at stake for him, kept at it, zealously courting Tissaphernes.

53 The envoys of the Athenians who had been sent from Samos with Peisander arrived at Athens and made speeches before the

people, summarizing much, but chiefly saying that if they restored Alcibiades and were not governed as a democracy in the same way, they could have the King as their ally and overcome the Peloponnesians. Many others spoke against them on behalf of the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades cried out that it would be outrageous if he were to return by violating the laws; and the Eumolpidae and the Ceryces bore witness about the Mysteries, for which he had gone into exile, and called on the gods against his recall.[6] Peisander came forward in the face of this strong opposition and these protests and, calling forward his opponents one by one, asked each of them whether he had any hope of safety for the city, now that the Peloponnesians had at sea no fewer ships than they did facing them, and more allied cities, and the King and Tissaphernes were providing them with money, while they themselves had no more money, unless someone could persuade the King to come over to their side. When those he questioned said they had none, he then told them plainly: "This, then, cannot happen for us unless we govern ourselves more prudently and put the offices in the hands of fewer men, so that the King may trust us, and unless at present we take counsel less about the constitution than about our safety (for later we can change it back again, if anything does not please us), and unless we restore Alcibiades, who alone of men living is able to bring this about."

54 When the people first heard about oligarchy, they took it badly; but when Peisander showed them plainly that there was no other way to safety, they were afraid, and at the same time hoped that they could change it back again, and they gave way. They voted that Peisander and ten men with him should sail and negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades as seemed best to them. At the same time, since Peisander also accused Phrynichus, the people removed him from his command, together with his colleague Scironides, and sent out Diomedon and Leon in their place as gen-

erals with the fleet. Peisander accused Phrynichus of having betrayed Iasus and Amorges, because he did not think him suitable for the negotiations with Alcibiades. Peisander also went around to all the sworn clubs that already existed in the city for help in lawsuits and elections, and urged them to unite and, taking counsel together, to overthrow the democracy. When he had made his other arrangements to suit the present situation, so that there would be no more delay, he himself, with the ten men, made the voyage to Tissaphernes.

55 In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by now arrived to take command of the Athenian ships, made an attack on Rhodes. They found the Peloponnesian ships hauled up on shore, made a landing, defeated in battle the Rhodians who came out against them, and withdrew to Chalce, and they carried on the war from there rather than from Cos, for it was easier for them to keep watch from there in case the Peloponnesian fleet put out anywhere. Xenophantidas, a Laconian, also came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, saying that the Athenian wall was now complete, and that unless they came to the rescue with all their ships, the cause at Chios would be lost. They intended to go. Meanwhile Pedaritus, with the mercenaries he had with him and the Chians in full force, attacked the Athenian fortification around the ships, took part of it, and seized some of the ships that were hauled up. But the Athenians came out to the rescue and routed the Chians first, and then the rest of the force around Pedaritus was defeated as well; Pedaritus himself was killed, with many of the Chians, and many arms were captured.

56 After this the Chians were besieged by land and sea even more closely than before, and the famine there was great. Meanwhile the Athenian envoys with Peisander came to Tissaphernes and held discussions about an agreement. But Alcibiades was not altogether sure of Tissaphernes, who feared the

Peloponnesians more and still wished, as Alcibiades himself had taught him, to wear both sides down. So he resorted to the following scheme: that Tissaphernes should make the greatest possible demands on the Athenians and so not come to terms. It seems to me that Tissaphernes too wished the same thing, he himself out of fear; while Alcibiades, when he saw that Tissaphernes would not come to terms in any case, wished the Athenians to think, not that he was unable to persuade him, but that Tissaphernes had been persuaded and wished to come over to them, and that the Athenians were not offering enough. For Alcibiades, speaking himself on behalf of Tissaphernes, who was present, demanded such excessive terms that the responsibility fell on the Athenian side, even though they had conceded most of what he asked. He demanded that all Ionia be given up, and then the islands lying off it, and other things; and when the Athenians did not oppose these, finally, at the third meeting, fearing that he would be exposed as quite powerless, he demanded that they allow the King to build ships and sail along his own coast wherever and with as many ships as he wished. At that point the Athenians no longer ...[7] but, considering the terms impossible and that they had been deceived by Alcibiades, they went away in anger and returned to Samos.

57 Immediately after this, in the same winter, Tissaphernes went to Caunus. He wished to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and after making yet another agreement, whatever he could, to provide them with maintenance and not to be driven into outright war with them. He was afraid that if they lacked maintenance for so many ships, they would either be forced to fight the Athenians at sea and be defeated, or their ships would be emptied of men and the Athenians would get what they wanted without him. Still more he feared that in search of maintenance they would ravage the mainland. With all this in his calculation and foresight, in keeping with his wish to keep the Hellenes balanced against one

another, he sent for the Peloponnesians, gave them maintenance, and concluded with them this third treaty:

58 "In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas being ephor at Lacedaemon, an agreement was made in the plain of the Maeander by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies. The King's territory, as much of it as is in Asia, shall be the King's; and concerning his own territory the King shall decide as he wishes. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not go against the King's territory for any harm, nor shall the King go against the territory of the Lacedaemonians or of their allies for any harm. If any of the Lacedaemonians or their allies goes against the King's territory for harm, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall prevent it; and if anyone from the King's territory goes against the Lacedaemonians or their allies for harm, the King shall prevent it. Tissaphernes shall provide maintenance for the ships now present, according to the terms agreed, until the King's ships arrive. The Lacedaemonians and their allies, when the King's ships have arrived, may maintain their own ships at their own expense if they wish. If they wish to receive their maintenance from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall provide it, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, at the end of the war, shall repay to Tissaphernes whatever money they have received. When the King's ships have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and of their allies and those of the King shall wage the war jointly, in whatever way seems good to Tissaphernes and to the Lacedaemonians and their allies. And if they wish to make an end of the war with the Athenians, they shall make an end of it jointly, on the same footing."

59 Such was this treaty. After this Tissaphernes began preparing to bring the Phoenician ships, as had been agreed, and every-

thing else he had promised, and wished at any rate to be seen preparing.

60 At the very end of the winter the Boeotians took Oropus by betrayal, though it was held by an Athenian garrison. Some men of Eretria and of Oropus itself had a hand in it, plotting the revolt of Euboea; for since the place lies opposite Eretria, it was impossible, while the Athenians held it, for it not to do great harm to Eretria and the rest of Euboea. Now that they held Oropus, the Eretrians came to Rhodes, calling the Peloponnesians to Euboea. But the Peloponnesians were bent rather on relieving Chios, which was in distress, and they put out from Rhodes with all their ships and sailed. When they were off Triopium, they sighted the Athenian ships out at sea sailing from Chalce; and since neither side sailed against the other, the one fleet reached Samos and the other Miletus, and the Peloponnesians saw that it was no longer possible to relieve Chios without a sea battle. So this winter ended, and with it the twentieth year of this war, which Thucydides recorded.

61 In the following summer, at the very beginning of spring, Dercylidas, a Spartiate, was sent with a small army by land to the Hellespont to bring Abydos to revolt (the Abydenes are colonists of the Milesians); and the Chians, while Astyochus was at a loss how to help them, were forced by the pressure of the siege to fight at sea. While Astyochus was still at Rhodes, they had happened to receive from Miletus a commander to replace Pedaritus, Leon, a Spartiate, who had come out with Antisthenes as a marine, and with him twelve ships that had been guarding Miletus: five Thurian, four Syracusan, one from Anaea, one Milesian, and one of Leon's own. The Chians came out in full force and seized a strong position, and at the same time their ships, thirty-six of them, put out against the thirty-two Athenian ships, and they fought. The battle was hard fought; the Chians and their allies had not the

worse of the action, but since it was now late, they withdrew into the city.

62 Immediately after this, when Dercylidas had gone along the coast by land from Miletus, Abydos on the Hellespont revolted to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus, and Lampsacus two days later. Strombichides heard of it at Chios and hurried to the rescue with twenty-four Athenian ships, some of them transports carrying hoplites. The Lampsacenes came out against him; he defeated them in battle, took Lampsacus, which was unwalled, at the first assault, and after plundering the goods and the slaves he resettled the free inhabitants there and went on to Abydos. When the Abydenes would not come over and he could not take the place by assault, he sailed across to the opposite shore from Abydos, to Sestus, a city of the Chersonese once held by the Medes, and set it up as a fort and a guard post for the whole Hellespont.

63 Meanwhile the Chians gained a greater command of the sea; and the men at Miletus and Astyochus, learning of the sea battle and that Strombichides and his ships had gone, took courage. Astyochus sailed along the coast to Chios with two ships, brought away the ships from there, and with the whole fleet now made an advance against Samos. When the Athenians did not put out against him, because they were suspicious of one another, he sailed back again to Miletus. For about this time, and even earlier, the democracy at Athens had been overthrown. When Peisander and the envoys came back from Tissaphernes to Samos, they secured their position in the army itself still more firmly, and urged the most powerful of the Samians themselves to try to establish an oligarchy together with them, although these had risen up against one another precisely so as not to be ruled by an oligarchy. At the same time the Athenians at Samos conferred among themselves and decided to let Alcibiades be, since he was unwilling (and in any case he was not a suitable man to come into

an oligarchy). They themselves, on their own, since they were already in danger, would see to it that the movement was not dropped, and at the same time would keep up the war and contribute money and whatever else was needed from their own households with zeal, since it was no longer for others but for themselves that they were toiling.

64 Having encouraged one another in this way, they at once sent Peisander and half of the envoys home to carry out the business there, with instructions to establish oligarchy in the subject cities at which they touched. The other half they sent off, some to one place and some to another, to the rest of the subject territories. Diitrephes, who was in the neighborhood of Chios and had been elected to command in the Thraceward region, they sent off to his command. When he reached Thasos, he overthrew the democracy. But in the second month or so after he had left, the Thasians began fortifying their city, since they no longer had any need of an aristocracy with the Athenians and were expecting freedom from the Lacedaemonians any day. For there was in fact a party of their exiles, banished by the Athenians, living among the Peloponnesians, and these, with their friends in the city, were working with all their strength to bring ships and make Thasos revolt. So it turned out exactly as they wished: the city was set right without risk, and the people who would have opposed them had been put down. At Thasos, then, the result was the opposite of what the Athenians who were establishing the oligarchy intended, and so it was, I think, in many other places among the subjects. For once the cities had acquired a moderate government and freedom to act without fear, they went on to outright freedom, setting no value on the specious good order offered by the Athenians.

65 Peisander and his colleagues, as had been decided, put down the democracies in the cities as they sailed along the coast, and at the same time took hoplites from some places as auxiliaries for

themselves, and came to Athens. They found most of the work already done by their associates. For some of the younger men had banded together and secretly murdered one Androcles, the leading champion of the people, who had also been chiefly responsible for driving out Alcibiades. They killed him for both reasons, because of his popular leadership and because they thought they would gratify Alcibiades, who was going to return and make Tissaphernes their friend; and in the same way they secretly did away with certain others who were inconvenient to them. A program had also been put about by them openly, that no one should draw pay except those serving in the field, and that no more than five thousand should share in the government, and these the ones best able to serve the state with their money and their persons.

66 This was a plausible pretext for the majority, since in fact those who were changing the constitution were going to hold the city. The people, however, and the council chosen by the bean[8] still met. But they discussed nothing that the conspirators did not approve; the speakers were from among them, and what was to be said had been examined by them in advance. None of the others spoke against them any longer, out of fear and because they saw how large the conspiracy was. If anyone did speak against them, he was at once put to death in some convenient way, and there was no search for those who had done it, nor, if they were suspected, any prosecution. The people kept quiet and were in such a state of dismay that anyone who suffered no violence, even if he kept silent, counted himself lucky. Thinking the conspiracy much larger than it really was, they were defeated in spirit, and they were unable to find out the truth because of the size of the city and because they did not know one another. For the same reason it was impossible for anyone who was indignant to lament his wrongs to another, so as to defend himself by plotting in return; for he would have found either a stranger to speak to, or an

acquaintance whom he could not trust. All the members of the popular party approached one another with suspicion, each thinking the other had a hand in what was going on. For there were among the conspirators men whom no one would ever have thought would turn to oligarchy; and it was these who caused the greatest distrust among the many and did most to secure the safety of the few, by making sure that the people could not trust one another.

67 At this juncture, then, Peisander and his colleagues arrived and at once took up the remaining work. First they called the people together and proposed a motion to elect ten men as commissioners with full powers to draft proposals, and that these, after drafting them, should bring before the people on a fixed day a motion on how the city might best be governed. Then, when the day came, they shut the assembly up in Colonus (a sanctuary of Poseidon outside the city, about ten stades away), and the commissioners brought forward nothing but this one thing: that any Athenian should be permitted with impunity to propose whatever motion he wished; and they laid heavy penalties on anyone who should indict the proposer for an illegal proposal or harm him in any other way. Then at last it was said openly that no one should hold any office any longer under the existing order or draw pay, and that they should elect five men as presidents; these should elect a hundred men, and each of the hundred should co-opt three more; and these, being four hundred, should enter the council chamber and govern with full powers as they judged best, and should convene the Five Thousand whenever they saw fit.

68 The man who proposed this motion was Peisander, who in other respects too was openly the most zealous in helping to overthrow the democracy. But the man who had contrived the whole affair, how it should be brought to this point, and who had given it the longest attention, was Antiphon, an Athenian second to none

of his time in excellence, and the ablest both at thinking out a plan and at expressing what he had thought. He did not come forward before the people, or into any other public contest if he could help it, but was regarded with suspicion by the multitude because of his reputation for cleverness; yet for those who were contending in the courts or before the people, he was the one man best able to help anyone who consulted him. And he himself, when the government of the Four Hundred was later overturned and was being harshly dealt with by the people,[9] was accused on these very charges, of having helped to set it up, and of all men down to my time he is known to have made the best defense in a capital case. Phrynichus too showed himself the most zealous of all for the oligarchy, beyond everyone else, because he feared Alcibiades and knew that Alcibiades was aware of all his dealings with Astyochus at Samos, and he thought that in all likelihood Alcibiades would never return under an oligarchy; and once he had committed himself, he proved by far the most dependable in the face of danger. Theramenes son of Hagnon was also a leader among those who overthrew the democracy, a man not without ability in speaking or in judgment. So it was not surprising that the undertaking, carried out by many able men, succeeded, great as it was. For it was a hard thing to deprive the Athenian people of their freedom about a hundred years after the tyrants had been put down, a people not only unused to being subject but accustomed for more than half of that time to rule over others.

69 When the assembly had ratified these measures, without anyone speaking against them, and had been dissolved, they then brought the Four Hundred into the council chamber in the following way. All the Athenians were constantly under arms, some on the walls and others in the ranks, because of the enemy at Decelea. On that day, then, they let those who were not in the secret go off as usual, while those in the conspiracy had been told

to wait quietly, not at the arms themselves but some distance away, and if anyone opposed what was being done, to take up their arms and not allow it. There were also Andrians and Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the settlers at Aegina whom the Athenians had sent to live there, who had come for this very purpose with their own arms and had received the same instructions. When these dispositions had been made, the Four Hundred came, each with a dagger concealed on him, and with them the hundred and twenty young men whom they used whenever there was any violent work to be done. They confronted the councilors chosen by the bean in the council chamber and told them to take their pay and get out. They had brought them the pay for the whole of their remaining term themselves, and handed it to them as they went out.

70 When the council had withdrawn in this way without a word of protest, and the rest of the citizens made no move but kept quiet, the Four Hundred entered the council chamber. For the time being they chose presiding officers, the prytaneis, from among themselves by lot and performed all the customary prayers and sacrifices to the gods on entering office. Later they made great changes in the democratic administration (except that they did not recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades), and in general they governed the city by force. They put to death a few men, not many, whom they thought it convenient to have out of the way, and imprisoned others, and banished some. They also sent heralds to Agis, the king of the Lacedaemonians, who was at Decelea, saying that they wished to make peace and that it was reasonable for him to come to terms with them, rather than with the untrustworthy people.

71 But he thought that the city was not quiet and that the people would not so quickly surrender their ancient freedom; that if they saw a large army of the Lacedaemonians they would not stay

quiet; and he did not at all trust that, even now, there would be no more disturbances among them. So he gave the envoys from the Four Hundred no conciliatory answer, but sent for a large army from the Peloponnese in addition, and not long afterward himself went down, with the garrison from Decelea and the troops who had come, to the very walls of Athens. He hoped that in their confusion they would either submit more readily on whatever terms the Lacedaemonians wished, or even be taken at the first assault in the tumult that would probably arise both inside and outside the city; for he thought he could not fail to take the Long Walls, since they were undermanned. But when he came close, the Athenians made not the slightest movement inside the city; they sent out their cavalry and a part of their hoplites, light-armed troops, and archers, struck down some of his men who had come too near, and got possession of some arms and bodies. Then, realizing how things were, he led his army back again. He himself and his own men stayed where they were at Decelea, while the troops who had come out he sent home after they had stayed a few days in the country. After this the Four Hundred continued to send envoys to Agis no less than before; and now that he was more receptive and encouraged them, they sent envoys to Lacedaemon as well to negotiate an agreement, wishing to make peace.

72 They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army and to explain that the oligarchy had not been established to harm the city or the citizens, but for the safety of the whole state; that there were five thousand, and not only four hundred, who were in charge; and yet, they said, never before had the Athenians, because of their campaigns and their occupations abroad, come together to deliberate on any matter so important that five thousand of them assembled. They gave them other suitable instructions as to what to say, and sent them off immediately after they themselves had taken power, fearing what in fact happened: that

the naval crowd would not themselves be willing to remain under the oligarchic order, and that, the trouble beginning there, they would remove the Four Hundred.

73 For at Samos there was already a revolution under way concerning the oligarchy, and the following events took place at the very time when the Four Hundred were being set up. Those of the Samians who had earlier risen against the powerful and who were the popular party changed sides once again; persuaded by Peisander when he came, and by the Athenians at Samos who were in the conspiracy, they formed a sworn band of about three hundred and were about to attack the rest as being the democracy. They put to death one Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a worthless man who had been ostracized, not from fear of his power and prestige, but for his villainy and because he was a disgrace to the city;[10] this they did together with Charminus, one of the generals, and some of the Athenians who were with them, giving them a pledge of their good faith. They also took part with them in other acts of the same kind, and were set on attacking the majority. But the majority learned of it and informed two of the generals, Leon and Diomedon (who did not willingly accept the oligarchy, because they were honored by the people), of what was coming, as well as Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the one a trierarch and the other serving as a hoplite, and others who were thought to have always been most strongly opposed to the conspirators. They asked them not to stand by and see themselves destroyed and Samos alienated from the Athenians, the one place through which alone their empire had held together until now. When these men heard this, they went to the soldiers one by one and urged them not to permit it, and above all the crew of the Paralus, Athenians all and free men who sailed on that ship, and who had always been hostile to oligarchy even when there was none. Leon and Diomedon, whenever they sailed anywhere, left some ships behind to guard them. So

when the three hundred attacked them, all these came to the rescue, the crew of the Paralus most of all, and the Samian majority prevailed. They put to death some thirty of the three hundred and punished three of the most guilty with exile; the rest they did not hold to account for past wrongs, and they lived together thereafter as fellow citizens under a democracy.

74 The Samians and the soldiers at once sent the Paralus to Athens, with Chaereas son of Archestratus on board, an Athenian who had been zealous for the change, to report what had happened; for they did not yet know that the Four Hundred were in power. When they sailed in, the Four Hundred at once imprisoned two or three of the Paralians, took the ship away from the rest, transferred them to another ship, a troopship, and ordered them to stand guard around Euboea. Chaereas, when he saw how matters stood, somehow escaped notice at once and went back to Samos. He reported to the soldiers everything at Athens, exaggerating it all for the worse: that they were punishing everyone with beatings, that it was impossible to say a word against those who held the government, that the soldiers' wives and children were being outraged, and that the Four Hundred intended to seize and imprison the relatives of all those serving at Samos who were not of their way of thinking, so that the relatives would be put to death if the men at Samos did not obey. And he told many other lies besides.

75 When they heard this, their first impulse was to stone the men chiefly responsible for the oligarchy and those of the rest who had taken part in it. But they were stopped by those who held a middle position, and were warned not to ruin everything while the enemy lay at anchor close by, prows facing them; and they desisted. After this Thrasybulus son of Lycus and Thrasyllus, who were the chief leaders of the change, now wishing openly to bring affairs at Samos over to democracy, bound all the soldiers by the

most solemn oaths, and the members of the oligarchic party most of all, that they would truly be governed as a democracy and live in concord, carry on the war against the Peloponnesians with zeal, be enemies to the Four Hundred, and hold no negotiations with them by herald. All the Samians of military age swore the same oath with them, and the soldiers made the Samians partners in everything, and in whatever the outcome of their dangers might be, thinking that neither for the Samians nor for themselves was there any other path to safety, but that if either the Four Hundred or the enemy at Miletus prevailed, they would be destroyed.

76 So at this time they had come into a contest of wills, the one side trying to force the city to be a democracy, the other trying to force the army to be an oligarchy. The soldiers at once held an assembly, in which they deposed their former generals and any of the trierarchs whom they suspected, and elected others in their place as trierarchs and generals, among them Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. They stood up among themselves and gave each other encouragement on many points, and in particular that they should not lose heart because the city had revolted from them. For it was the minority that had broken away from them, the majority, who were also better provided in every respect. Since they held the whole fleet, they would compel the other cities over which they ruled to pay their money just the same as if they were operating from Athens (for they had a city, Samos, which was not weak but had come within a very little of taking command of the sea away from the Athenians when it was at war with them, and they would defend themselves against the enemy from the same base as before); and since they had the ships, they were better able to procure their supplies than those in the city. It was because of them, stationed in advance at Samos, that the men in the city had controlled the entrance to the Piraeus even before; and now, if those men were not willing to give them back their constitution, they

would be in a position where they were better able to shut them out of the sea than to be shut out by them. What the city had contributed to help them overcome the enemy was a small thing and worth nothing, and they had lost nothing in losing it, since the men at home had neither money left to send (the soldiers were providing for themselves) nor good counsel, which is the reason a city commands its armies. On the contrary, in this too the men at home had gone wrong, by overthrowing the ancestral laws, while they themselves were preserving them and would try to force the others to do the same; so that those among them who might give good counsel would be no worse than the men at home. And Alcibiades, if they secured for him immunity and recall, would gladly provide them with the King's alliance. Most important of all, if they failed in everything, they had so great a fleet that there were many places to withdraw to where they would find both cities and land.

77 After holding this assembly among themselves and encouraging one another, they went on with their preparations for the war no less than before. The ten envoys sent to Samos by the Four Hundred learned of these things when they had already reached Delos, and stayed there quietly.

78 About this same time the soldiers in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus were crying out among themselves that their cause was being ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes. Astyochus, they said, had not been willing to fight at sea before, while they themselves were still stronger and the Athenian fleet was small, nor was he willing now, when the Athenians were said to be in civil strife and their ships were not yet together; instead, waiting for the Phoenician ships from Tissaphernes, a mere name and no reality, they ran the risk of being worn away. And Tissaphernes, for his part, was not bringing these ships, and was ruining the fleet by

giving maintenance neither regularly nor in full. They therefore said that they must delay no longer, but fight it out at sea.

79 The Syracusans above all urged this. The allies and Astyochus, aware of the murmuring, decided in council to fight a decisive battle, especially since news had come to them of the disturbance at Samos. They set out with all their ships, a hundred and twelve, and ordering the Milesians to go along the coast by land toward Mycale, they sailed for Mycale. The Athenians, with eighty-two ships from Samos that happened to be anchored at Glauce in Mycale (at that point Samos is only a short distance from the mainland at Mycale), when they saw the Peloponnesian ships sailing toward them, withdrew to Samos, not thinking themselves strong enough in numbers to risk everything on a battle. At the same time, since they had learned in advance that the enemy at Miletus were eager for a sea battle, they were expecting Strombichides to come to their aid from the Hellespont with the ships that had gone from Chios to Abydos; for a messenger had been sent ahead to him. So the Athenians withdrew to Samos in this way, while the Peloponnesians put in at Mycale and encamped there, together with the land force of the Milesians and their neighbors. On the next day, when they were about to sail against Samos, news came that Strombichides had arrived with the ships from the Hellespont, and they at once sailed back again to Miletus. The Athenians, now reinforced by these ships, themselves made an advance on Miletus with a hundred and eight ships, wishing to fight a decisive battle; and when no one put out against them, they sailed back to Samos.

80 Immediately after this, in the same summer, the Peloponnesians, who had not put out against the enemy because they thought themselves no match for them with their whole fleet together, were at a loss where to get money for so many ships, especially since Tissaphernes paid badly. They therefore sent

Clearchus son of Ramphias with forty ships to Pharnabazus, as had originally been ordered from the Peloponnese. For Pharnabazus was inviting them and was ready to provide maintenance, and at the same time Byzantium was sending them messages about revolting. These Peloponnesian ships put out into the open sea, so as to escape the notice of the Athenians on their voyage, and were caught in a storm. Most of them, with Clearchus, made Delos and later returned to Miletus (Clearchus went by land to the Hellespont again and took up his command there); but ten of them, under Helixus the Megarian general, got through safely to the Hellespont and brought Byzantium to revolt. After this the Athenians at Samos, learning of it, sent ships to the Hellespont as reinforcement and guard, and a short sea battle took place off Byzantium, eight ships against eight.

81 The leaders at Samos, and above all Thrasybulus, who held always to the same policy once he had brought about the change, that they should recall Alcibiades, at last persuaded the mass of the soldiers in an assembly. They voted Alcibiades recall and immunity, and Thrasybulus sailed to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades back to Samos, thinking that their only safety lay in his bringing Tissaphernes over to their side from the Peloponnesians. An assembly was held, and Alcibiades complained of and lamented the private misfortune of his exile. He spoke at length about public affairs and raised in them no small hopes for the future, and he exaggerated beyond measure his own influence with Tissaphernes. His purpose was that those who held the oligarchy at home should fear him and the sworn clubs be the more readily broken up, that those at Samos should hold him in greater honor and themselves take more courage, and that the enemy should be discredited with Tissaphernes as much as possible and fall from the hopes they now had. So Alcibiades made these promises, boasting to the utmost: that Tissaphernes had assured him that, if he could only

trust the Athenians, they would never lack maintenance as long as he had anything left, not even if in the end he had to turn his own bedding into silver; and that he would bring the Phoenician ships, which were already at Aspendus, to the Athenians and not to the Peloponnesians; but that he could trust the Athenians only if Alcibiades were safely restored and gave his guarantee for them.

82 When they heard this and much else besides, they at once elected him general together with the former generals and entrusted everything to him. Not one of them would have given up for anything his present hope of safety and of revenge on the Four Hundred; and on the strength of what had been said they were now ready to despise the enemy before them and to sail against the Piraeus. But Alcibiades firmly prevented them from sailing against the Piraeus and leaving behind the enemy who were nearer, though many were pressing for it. He said that, since he had been elected general, he would first sail to Tissaphernes and arrange the conduct of the war with him. And he went off directly from this assembly, so that he might seem to share everything with Tissaphernes, and at the same time wishing to stand higher in his esteem and to show him that he had now been elected general and was able to do him good or harm. So it fell out that Alcibiades frightened Tissaphernes with the Athenians, and the Athenians with Tissaphernes.

83 When the Peloponnesians at Miletus learned of Alcibiades's recall, their distrust of Tissaphernes, which existed already, turned into far stronger hostility. For it had happened that, at the time of the Athenian advance on Miletus, when they would not put out and fight, Tissaphernes had become much slacker in his payments, and their hatred of him, which existed even before this because of Alcibiades, had grown greater still. The soldiers gathered in groups, as they had before, and went over their grievances, and not only the soldiers but some of the other men of standing as

well: that they had never yet received their pay in full, that what was given was small and not even that regular, and that unless someone either fought a decisive battle or moved them to a place where they could get maintenance, the men would desert the ships. And Astyochus, they said, was to blame for everything, humoring Tissaphernes for his own private gain.

84 While they were in this frame of mind, a disturbance broke out around Astyochus of the following kind. The sailors of the Syracusans and Thurians, who were the boldest because most of them were free men, came at him and demanded their pay. He answered them somewhat arrogantly and threatened them, and he even raised his staff against Dorieus, who was speaking up for his own sailors. When the mass of the soldiers saw it, they broke out, sailors that they were, and rushed at Astyochus to stone him. But he saw them coming and took refuge at an altar. He was not hit, however, and they separated. The Milesians also fell on the fort that Tissaphernes had built in Miletus, took it by surprise, and drove out the garrison inside it; and the other allies approved of this, the Syracusans not least. Lichas, however, was displeased with it and said that the Milesians and the others in the King's territory ought to submit to Tissaphernes within reasonable limits and court his favor until they had settled the war well. The Milesians were angry with him for this and for other things of the same kind, and when he later died of illness they would not allow the Lacedaemonians who were there to bury him where they wished.

85 While their affairs with Astyochus and Tissaphernes were at this point of discord, Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon as successor to Astyochus in the command of the fleet and took over; and Astyochus sailed for home. Tissaphernes sent with him one of his own people as an envoy, a bilingual Carian named Gaulites, to complain of the Milesians about the fort and at the same time to

defend himself. He knew that the Milesians were going chiefly to cry out against him, and that Hermocrates was going with them, who meant to show that Tissaphernes was ruining the cause of the Peloponnesians together with Alcibiades and was playing a double game. There had always been enmity between them over the payment of wages; and at last, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse and other generals of the Syracusans, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, had come to Miletus to take over the ships, Tissaphernes pressed still harder against Hermocrates, now an exile, and among other things accused him of having once asked him for money and, when he did not get it, of having declared his enmity toward him. So Astyochus and the Milesians and Hermocrates sailed off to Lacedaemon. Alcibiades had by now crossed back from Tissaphernes to Samos.

86 The envoys from the Four Hundred who had been sent earlier to soothe and instruct the men at Samos now arrived from Delos while Alcibiades was present, and when an assembly was held they tried to speak. At first the soldiers would not listen, but shouted that those who were overthrowing the democracy should be put to death; then, however, with difficulty, they quieted down and heard them. The envoys reported that the change had been made not to destroy the city but to save it, and not so that it might be handed over to the enemy (for they could have done that when the enemy invaded while they were already in power); that all the Five Thousand would share in the government in turn; and that the soldiers' families were neither being outraged, as Chaereas had slanderously reported, nor suffering any harm, but each of them was staying where he was in possession of his own property. They said much else besides, but the soldiers listened no better; they grew angry and proposed various courses, above all to sail against the Piraeus. And it seems that Alcibiades then for the first time did the city a service, and as great a service as anyone ever did. For

when the Athenians at Samos were set on sailing against their own countrymen, in which case the enemy would most certainly have gained Ionia and the Hellespont at once, he was the one who prevented it. At that moment no one else would have been able to restrain the crowd; but he stopped them from sailing, and turned aside, by rebuking them, those who were angry with the envoys on their own account. He himself gave the envoys their answer and sent them away: he did not object to the Five Thousand governing, but he told them to get rid of the Four Hundred and to restore the council as it had been before, the Five Hundred; and if any cuts had been made for economy, so that the men in the field might be better provided with maintenance, he heartily approved. In other respects he told them to hold out and not give in to the enemy at all; for if the city was preserved, there was much hope that they would also come to terms with one another, but if once either side failed, either the army at Samos or the men at home, there would no longer be anyone left to be reconciled with. Envoys from Argos were also there, offering help to the Athenian democracy at Samos; Alcibiades praised them, told them to come when they were called, and so sent them away. The Argives had come with the Paralians, who had been assigned by the Four Hundred to cruise around Euboea in the troopship. These had been carrying Athenian envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Lacedaemon, Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias; and when on their voyage they came off Argos, they seized the envoys and handed them over to the Argives, as men among the foremost in overthrowing the democracy. They themselves did not go on to Athens, but took the Argive envoys from Argos and came to Samos in the trireme they had.

87 In the same summer, at the time when the Peloponnesians were most indignant with Tissaphernes, for other reasons and especially because of Alcibiades's recall, regarding him as now

openly favoring the Athenians, Tissaphernes, wishing, so it seemed, to clear himself of their accusations, prepared to go to Aspendus to fetch the Phoenician ships, and asked Lichas to go with him. He said he would appoint Tamos, his lieutenant, to the army, to provide maintenance while he himself was away. Accounts differ, and it is not easy to know with what intention he went to Aspendus and, having gone there, did not bring the ships. That the Phoenician ships, a hundred and forty-seven of them, came as far as Aspendus is clear; why they did not come on is the subject of many guesses. Some say it was so that by going away he might wear down the Peloponnesian cause, as he had in fact intended (Tamos, at any rate, who had been charged with it, provided maintenance no better, but even worse); others, that he brought the Phoenicians to Aspendus in order to extort money from them for their discharge (for in any case he was not going to use them); others again, that it was because of the outcry at Lacedaemon, so that it might be said that he was doing no wrong, but had plainly gone after ships that were really manned. To me, however, it seems quite clear that his purpose in not bringing the fleet was to wear down and hold in check the forces of the Hellenes: wearing them down while he went there and delayed, and keeping them even, so as not to make either side stronger by joining it. For if he had wished, he could surely have brought the war to an end by appearing on the scene, beyond any doubt; by bringing the ships he would in all likelihood have given the Lacedaemonians the victory, since even as it was they lay at anchor facing the enemy as an equal rather than an inferior fleet. And what convicts him most of all is the excuse he gave for not bringing the ships. He said that fewer had been assembled than the King had ordered; yet surely he would have won still greater favor in this way, by not spending much of the King's money and accomplishing the same things with fewer ships. In any case, with

whatever intention, Tissaphernes reached Aspendus and met the Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians, at his request, sent Philip, a Lacedaemonian, with two triremes, to fetch the ships.

88 When Alcibiades learned that Tissaphernes was going to Aspendus, he too sailed there, taking thirteen ships, and promised the men at Samos a safe and great service: that he would either himself bring the Phoenician ships to the Athenians or at least prevent them from coming to the Peloponnesians. He probably knew from long acquaintance Tissaphernes's intention not to bring them, and he wished to discredit him as much as possible with the Peloponnesians for his friendship with Alcibiades and the Athenians, so that he might be the more compelled to come over to their side. So he set out and sailed directly toward Phaselis and Caunus, eastward along the coast.

89 The envoys sent by the Four Hundred, on reaching Athens from Samos, reported Alcibiades's message: that he urged them to hold out and not give in to the enemy at all, and that he had great hopes of reconciling the army with them and of overcoming the Peloponnesians. Many of those who shared in the oligarchy had already been dissatisfied, and would gladly have got out of the business in any way that was safe; and this message gave them much more confidence. They now began to form a party and to find fault with the conduct of affairs, having as their leaders some of the very foremost men in the oligarchy and in office, such as Theramenes son of Hagnon, Aristocrates son of Scellias, and others. These had been among the first to take part in affairs; but they were afraid, so they said, of the army at Samos and of Alcibiades in earnest, and also of the envoys being sent to Lacedaemon, lest they do the city some harm without the authority of the majority. They did not openly propose to give up the narrow oligarchy itself,[11] but said that the Five Thousand must be appointed in fact and not in name only, and the constitution made more equal. This

was the political form their argument took; but most of them pursued it out of private ambition, the very thing by which an oligarchy that arises out of a democracy is most surely destroyed. For all of them claim from the very first day not merely to be equal but each to be by far the first himself; whereas under a democracy, when an election takes place, a man bears the outcome more easily, as he is not being worsted by his equals. What most plainly encouraged them was the strength of Alcibiades's position at Samos, and the fact that they did not think the oligarchy would last. Each of them, then, was striving to become himself the first champion of the people.

90 The members of the Four Hundred who were most opposed to this kind of movement, and who were their leaders, were Phrynichus, who had been general at Samos and had then quarreled with Alcibiades; Aristarchus, a man who was among the most bitter and longest-standing opponents of the people; Peisander; Antiphon; and others of the most powerful. Earlier, as soon as they had established themselves, and again when the army at Samos broke away from them to democracy, they had been sending envoys of their own to Lacedaemon, were eager for an agreement, and were building the wall in the place called Eetionea; and they did so much more still after their envoys came back from Samos, as they saw that the many, and even those of their own number who had seemed reliable before, were changing sides. They sent Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten others in haste, being afraid both of the situation at home and of that at Samos, with instructions to come to terms with the Lacedaemonians in any way whatever that was at all tolerable; and they went on building the wall at Eetionea more eagerly than ever. The purpose of the wall, according to Theramenes and his party, was not to keep out of the Piraeus the men at Samos if they sailed against it by force, but rather to let in the enemy, whenever they wished, with ships and

infantry. For Eetionea is a mole of the Piraeus, and the entrance to the harbor runs right beside it. It was being fortified, together with the wall that already existed on the landward side, in such a way that a few men stationed in it could control the entrance. For both the old wall on the landward side and the new inner wall being built on the seaward side ended at one of the two towers at the mouth of the harbor, which is narrow. They also walled off a colonnade, the largest in the Piraeus and immediately adjoining this wall, and kept it in their own control; and they compelled everyone to store in it both the grain that was on hand and the grain that came in by sea, and to take it out from there for sale.

91 Theramenes had long been spreading talk of all this, and when the envoys came back from Lacedaemon without having arranged any agreement for the whole people, he declared that this wall was likely to destroy the city. For at this same time, as it happened, forty-two ships from the Peloponnese, among them some Italian ships from Tarentum and Locri and some Sicilian ones, were already at anchor at Las in Laconia and preparing for the voyage to Euboea, at the invitation of the Euboeans; Agesandridas son of Agesander, a Spartiate, commanded them. Theramenes said that they were sailing not so much to Euboea as to those who were fortifying Eetionea, and that unless they took precautions now, they would be destroyed before they knew it. And there was in fact something of the kind on the part of those he accused; it was not merely slander. For their first wish was to keep the oligarchy and rule over the allies as well; failing that, to hold the ships and the walls and be independent; and if they were shut out from that too, at least not to be destroyed themselves first of all by the people once it was restored, but to bring in the enemy and come to terms, without walls or ships, and keep the city's affairs on any terms whatever, so long as their own persons were safe.

92 For this reason they were eagerly building this wall, with small gates and entrances and ways to let the enemy in, and they wished to finish it in time. Before this, the talk against them had been among a few and rather secret. But Phrynichus, returning from the embassy to Lacedaemon, was struck down by design, by one of the frontier guards,[12] in the crowded marketplace, not far from the council chamber after he had left it, and died on the spot. The man who struck him escaped, but his accomplice, an Argive, was caught and put to torture by the Four Hundred, and he gave the name of no one who had ordered it, nor anything else except that he knew of many men who met at the house of the commander of the frontier guards and in other houses. When no reprisals followed from this, then at last Theramenes, Aristocrates, and all the others, members of the Four Hundred or outside it, who were of the same mind, set about the business more boldly. For at the same time the ships from Las had by now sailed around and anchored at Epidaurus, and had overrun Aegina; and Theramenes said it was not to be expected that ships sailing for Euboea would turn into the gulf as far as Aegina and then go back to anchor at Epidaurus, unless they had come on the invitation he had always been charging; it was therefore no longer possible to stay quiet. At last, after much factious talk and suspicion, they set about it in deed. The hoplites in the Piraeus who were building the wall at Eetionea, among whom was Aristocrates, a taxiarch at the head of his own tribe, seized Alexicles, a general of the oligarchy and one most devoted to the clubs, and took him into a house and locked him up. Others joined them in this, among them one Hermon, commander of the frontier guards stationed at Munychia; and, most important, the main body of the hoplites wanted it. When this was reported to the Four Hundred (who happened to be sitting together in the council chamber), they were at once ready, all except those who were secretly glad of it, to go to arms, and they

threatened Theramenes and his party. He defended himself and said he was ready to go at once and help rescue Alexicles. He took with him one of the generals who was of his mind and went down to the Piraeus; Aristarchus also went to the rescue, with some of the young horsemen. There was a great and alarming uproar. For those in the city thought that the Piraeus had already been seized and the man arrested had been killed, and those in the Piraeus that the men from the city were all but upon them. With difficulty the older men stopped those in the city who were running about and rushing for their arms; and Thucydides of Pharsalus, the city's proxenus (the citizen who represented Athens in his own city), who was there, zealously put himself in the way of each group and cried out to them not to destroy their country while the enemy lay in wait close by. So they quieted down and kept their hands off one another. Theramenes, on reaching the Piraeus (he was himself a general), made a show of being angry with the hoplites, as far as shouting went; but Aristarchus and those opposed to the hoplites were truly angry. Most of the hoplites went at the work with a will and had no regrets, and they asked Theramenes whether he thought the wall was being built for any good purpose and whether it would not be better pulled down. He said that if they thought it should be pulled down, he thought so too. At that the hoplites and many of the people of the Piraeus at once climbed up and began demolishing the fortification. The appeal to the crowd was that whoever wished the Five Thousand to govern instead of the Four Hundred should join in the work. For they still screened themselves behind the name of the Five Thousand, not saying outright "whoever wishes the people to govern," for fear that the Five Thousand really existed and a man speaking to someone might stumble through ignorance. For this reason the Four Hundred were unwilling either to let the Five Thousand exist or to make it plain that they did not exist: to establish so many partners in

power they thought would be outright democracy, while the uncertainty would make men afraid of one another.

93 On the next day the Four Hundred, though in disarray, nevertheless met in the council chamber. The hoplites in the Piraeus released Alexicles, whom they had seized, and after demolishing the fortification went to the theater of Dionysus near Munychia, grounded their arms, and held an assembly. They decided at once to march to the city, and grounded their arms again at the Anaceum. Some men chosen by the Four Hundred came to them and talked with them man to man, trying to persuade those they saw to be reasonable to keep quiet themselves and to restrain the others. They said that they would make known the Five Thousand, and that the Four Hundred would be chosen from these in turn, as the Five Thousand should decide, and meanwhile urged them in no way to ruin the city or drive it into the arms of the enemy. The whole body of the hoplites, after much talk from many speakers to many listeners, became calmer than before, and their chief fear was for the state as a whole. They agreed that on a fixed day an assembly should be held in the theater of Dionysus to restore concord.

94 When the day of the assembly in the theater of Dionysus came and they had all but gathered, news arrived that the forty-two ships under Agesandridas were sailing from Megara along the coast of Salamis. Every one of the hoplites thought this was exactly what Theramenes and his party had long been saying, that the ships were sailing for the fortification, and it seemed a good thing that it had been pulled down. Agesandridas may perhaps have been cruising in the neighborhood of Epidaurus and those waters by some prior arrangement; but it is likely too that he was lingering there because of the present civil strife among the Athenians, in the hope that he might arrive at the right moment. The Athenians, for their part, as soon as the news reached them, at

once ran down to the Piraeus in full force, thinking that a war greater than their own private war was upon them from the enemy, not far off but at the harbor itself. Some went on board the ships that were ready, others launched more, and others hurried to man the walls and the mouth of the harbor.

95 But the Peloponnesian ships sailed past, rounded Sunium, and anchored between Thoricus and Prasiae, and later arrived at Oropus. The Athenians, in haste, were forced to use untrained crews, as was to be expected in a city torn by faction that wished to send help quickly where the greatest interest was at stake (for, with Attica shut off from them, Euboea was everything to them). They sent Thymochares as general, with ships, to Eretria; and when these arrived, together with the ships already in Euboea, there were thirty-six of them. They were at once forced to fight at sea. For Agesandridas, after his men had had their midday meal, put out from Oropus; Oropus is about sixty stades from the city of the Eretrians by sea. As he sailed up, the Athenians at once began manning their ships, thinking that their soldiers were near the ships. But it happened that the soldiers were getting provisions for their meal not from the marketplace (for, by the design of the Eretrians, nothing was being sold there), but from houses on the outskirts of the town, so that, while the ships were being manned slowly, the enemy might fall on them first and force the Athenians to put out just as they were. A signal was also raised for the enemy from Eretria to Oropus to tell them when to put out. Putting out with such preparation as this, the Athenians fought off the harbor of Eretria and nevertheless held out for a short time; then they turned to flight and were chased to the shore. Those who took refuge in the city of the Eretrians, as a friendly place, fared worst of all, being slaughtered by the Eretrians; those who reached the fort in Eretrian territory which the Athenians themselves held survived, as did the ships that reached Chalcis. The Peloponnesians

captured twenty-two Athenian ships, killed some of the men and took others prisoner, and set up a trophy. Not long afterward they brought all Euboea to revolt, except Oreus (which the Athenians themselves held), and settled affairs there in general.

96 When the news of what had happened in Euboea reached the Athenians, the greatest consternation of any yet came over them. Neither the disaster in Sicily, great as it had seemed at the time, nor anything else had ever yet frightened them so much. The army at Samos had revolted; there were no other ships, nor men to man them; they were in civil strife among themselves, and no one could tell when they would come to blows; and on top of all this so great a disaster had befallen them, in which they had lost their ships and, most important, Euboea, from which they drew more than from Attica. How could they not lose heart? What alarmed them most, and most immediately, was the thought that the enemy, after their victory, would dare to sail straight against the Piraeus, now empty of ships; and they thought they were all but there already. If they had been more daring, they could easily have done it, and either, by lying off the city, would have divided it further, or, if they had stayed and besieged it, would have forced the fleet from Ionia, though hostile to the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their own kinsmen and of the whole city; and in that case the Hellespont would have been theirs, and Ionia, and the islands, and everything as far as Euboea, and, one might say, the whole Athenian empire. Not on this occasion only but on many others too, the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient of all enemies for the Athenians to fight. For the two peoples were utterly different in temperament, the one quick, the other slow, the one enterprising, the other lacking in daring; and this was of the greatest service to the Athenians, especially in a naval empire. The Syracusans showed it: being most like the Athenians in temperament, they fought them best.

97 Upon this news, then, the Athenians nevertheless manned twenty ships and called an assembly, the first one at once in the place called the Pnyx, where they had been accustomed to meet in the past. In it they deposed the Four Hundred and voted to hand over affairs to the Five Thousand (and that all those who furnished arms should belong to them), and that no one should receive pay for any office, under pain of a curse. Many other assemblies were also held later, in which they voted to appoint lawgivers and passed the other measures for the constitution. And in the first period of this government, in my time at least, the Athenians appear to have been governed better than ever; for there was a moderate blending of the few and the many, and this was what first raised the city up out of the bad state its affairs had fallen into. They also voted to recall Alcibiades and others with him, and sending to him and to the army at Samos, they urged them to take up the conduct of affairs.

98 At the moment of this change Peisander, Alexicles, and the others who were most deeply involved in the oligarchy at once slipped away to Decelea. Aristarchus alone of them (for he happened also to be a general) quickly took some archers of the most barbarian kind and marched to Oenoe. This was an Athenian fort on the Boeotian border, and the Corinthians were besieging it of their own accord, having called in the Boeotians to help, because of a disaster that had befallen them from Oenoe, when some of their men returning from Decelea had been destroyed. Aristarchus came to an understanding with them and deceived the men in Oenoe, telling them that the people in the city had made a general settlement with the Lacedaemonians and that they too must hand over the place to the Boeotians, for these were the terms of the agreement. They believed him, as he was a general, and, knowing nothing because they were under siege, came out under a truce. In

this way the Boeotians took possession of Oenoe after its surrender, and the oligarchy and the civil strife at Athens came to an end.

99 About the same time in this summer the Peloponnesians at Miletus were receiving maintenance from none of those to whom Tissaphernes had assigned the task when he went to Aspendus, and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had yet come. Philip, who had been sent with him, had written to Mindarus the admiral, and so had another man, Hippocrates, a Spartiate, who was at Phaselis, that the ships would not come and that they were being wronged by Tissaphernes in every way. Pharnabazus was inviting them and was eager, if he got the fleet, to bring the remaining cities of his province to revolt from the Athenians, as Tissaphernes had also done, hoping to gain something by it. So at last Mindarus, in good order and on a sudden word of command, so as to escape the notice of the men at Samos, set out from Miletus with seventy-three ships and sailed for the Hellespont (earlier in this same summer sixteen ships had sailed into it and overrun a part of the Chersonese). But he was caught by a storm and forced to put in at Icarus, and after staying there five or six days because of bad weather for sailing, he reached Chios.

100 Thrasyllus, when he learned at Samos that Mindarus had set out from Miletus, at once sailed too, with fifty-five ships, hurrying so that Mindarus should not get into the Hellespont before him. When he learned that he was at Chios, and thought that he would stay there, he posted lookouts both on Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, so that the ships might not move anywhere without his knowing; he himself sailed along the coast to Methymna and ordered barley meal and other provisions to be got ready, intending, if more time passed, to make his attacks on Chios from Lesbos. At the same time, since Eresus on Lesbos had revolted, he wished to sail against it and take it if he could. For some of the Methymnaean exiles, and not the least influential of

them, had brought over from Cyme about fifty hoplites who were bound to them by friendship, and had hired others from the mainland, some three hundred in all, with Anaxander, a Theban, in command by reason of kinship. They first attacked Methymna; and when they were beaten back in the attempt because of the Athenian garrison troops who came out from Mytilene, and were again driven off in a battle outside the walls, they made their way across the mountain and brought Eresus to revolt. Thrasyllus therefore sailed against it with all his ships and intended to make an assault. Thrasybulus too had arrived there before him with five ships from Samos, when they learned of this crossing of the exiles; but coming too late, he lay at anchor off Eresus on his arrival. They were also joined by two ships that were returning home from the Hellespont, and by five Methymnaean ships; and in all there were sixty-seven ships present, and with their crews they began preparing to take Eresus by storm, with siege engines and by every other means, if they could.

101 Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian ships at Chios spent two days taking on provisions, and each man received from the Chians three Chian fortieths;[13] then on the third day they set out from Chios in haste, not by the open sea, so as not to fall in with the ships at Eresus, but keeping Lesbos on their left they sailed toward the mainland. They put in at the harbor of Carteria in the territory of Phocaea and took their midday meal, sailed along the coast of Cyme, and had their evening meal at Arginusae on the mainland, opposite Mytilene. From there they sailed along the coast while it was still deep night and reached Harmatus on the mainland, opposite Methymna; and after a hasty midday meal they sailed quickly past Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the places in that region, and arrived at Rhoeteum, now within the Hellespont, before midnight. Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum and other places in that region.

102 The Athenians at Sestus, with eighteen ships, learned that the Peloponnesians were sailing in when their beacon watchers signaled to them and they saw many fires suddenly appear in the enemy's territory. That same night, with all the speed they could, they stole along close to the Chersonese and sailed toward Elaeus, wishing to get out into the open sea and away from the enemy's ships. They slipped past the sixteen ships at Abydos, though the friendly fleet that was approaching had sent word to these in advance to keep a careful watch in case the Athenians sailed out; but at dawn they were sighted by the ships with Mindarus, who at once gave chase, and they did not all get away. Most of them escaped toward Imbros and Lemnos, but four of the ships sailing last were overtaken off Elaeus. One, which ran aground by the sanctuary of Protesilaus, the enemy took with its crew, and two others without their crews; the fourth they burned, empty, off Imbros.

103 After this, with the ships from Abydos that had joined them and all the rest, eighty-six in all, they besieged Elaeus that day, and when it did not come over to them they sailed back to Abydos. The Athenians had been misled by their scouts and had not supposed that the enemy fleet could sail past without their knowledge, but were attacking the wall at their leisure. When they learned of it, they at once abandoned Eresus and hurried to the defense of the Hellespont. They took two of the Peloponnesian ships, which had ventured out too boldly into the open sea during the pursuit and fell in with them; and a day later they arrived and anchored at Elaeus, brought in from Imbros the ships that had fled there, and spent five days preparing for the battle.

104 After this they fought at sea in the following way. The Athenians sailed in column along the shore toward Sestus; the Peloponnesians, seeing this from Abydos, put out against them in turn. When they knew there was going to be a battle, the

Athenians extended their line along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani, seventy-six ships; the Peloponnesians, opposite them, from Abydos to Dardanus, eighty-six ships. On the Peloponnesian side the Syracusans held the right wing, and Mindarus himself the other, with the fastest ships; on the Athenian side Thrasyllus held the left and Thrasybulus the right, while the other generals were posted each in his place. The Peloponnesians were eager to engage first, and with their left to outflank the Athenian right and so, if they could, shut them out from sailing out of the strait, and to force their center back against the shore, which was not far off. The Athenians saw this, and where the enemy wished to cut them off they extended their own line to meet them and outsailed them; their left had by now passed beyond the headland called Cynossema. As a result their center was left with ships that were weak and strung out, especially since they had fewer in number and the coast around Cynossema runs out to a sharp angle, so that what was happening on the other side of it could not be seen.

105 The Peloponnesians, then, fell on the center, drove the Athenian ships onto dry land, and landed after them, having much the better of the action. Neither could Thrasybulus and his men help the center from the right, because of the number of ships pressing them, nor Thrasyllus and his from the left (for Cynossema hid the center from view, and at the same time the Syracusans and the others drawn up against them, no fewer in number, held them in check), until the Peloponnesians, in the confidence of victory, began chasing one ship here and another there, and a part of their force fell into some disorder. Then Thrasybulus and his men, seeing this, stopped extending their wing, turned about, at once engaged the ships opposite them and routed them; and falling on the ships of the victorious part of the Peloponnesian fleet, which were scattered, they cut them up and threw most of them into panic without a fight. The Syracusans too, as it happened, had by

now given way before Thrasyllus and his men, and were all the more inclined to flight when they saw the others fleeing.

106 When the rout had taken place and the Peloponnesians had fled, first toward the river Meidius and afterward to Abydos, the Athenians took only a few ships (for the Hellespont, being narrow, gave the enemy short distances to safety); yet this victory at sea came at the most opportune moment possible. For until then they had feared the Peloponnesian fleet, because of their losses one after another and because of the disaster in Sicily; but now they were freed from blaming themselves and from thinking the enemy still of any account at sea. They took from the enemy eight Chian ships, five Corinthian, two Ambraciot and two Boeotian, and one each of the Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and Pellenians; they themselves lost fifteen ships. They set up a trophy on the headland where Cynossema is, collected the wrecks, gave back the enemy's dead under a truce, and sent a trireme to Athens to announce the victory. When the ship arrived and the Athenians heard of this unexpected good fortune, after the recent disasters in Euboea and during the civil strife, they took great heart, and thought that their cause could still prevail if they set themselves to it with zeal.

107 On the fourth day after the battle the Athenians at Sestus, having hastily refitted their ships, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted. Off Harpagium and Priapus they sighted the eight ships from Byzantium lying at anchor; they sailed against them, defeated the men on shore in battle, and took the ships. Arriving at Cyzicus, which was unwalled, they brought it back to their side and exacted money from it. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians also sailed from Abydos to Elaeus and recovered those of their own captured ships that were still sound (the people of Elaeus had burned the rest), and sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to bring the ships from there.

108 About this same time Alcibiades also sailed back to Samos with his thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselis, announcing that he had turned the Phoenician ships away from the Peloponnesians so that they would not come, and that he had made Tissaphernes more friendly to the Athenians than before. He manned nine ships in addition to those he had, exacted large sums of money from the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After doing this and appointing a governor at Cos, he sailed back to Samos, autumn now approaching. Tissaphernes, when he learned at Aspendus that the Peloponnesian ships had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, broke camp and marched back toward Ionia. While the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, who are Aeolians, brought over hoplites from Abydos by land across Mount Ida and let them into their city. They were being wronged by Arsaces the Persian, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This was the man who, when the Delians who had settled at Atramyttium after being removed by the Athenians for the purification of Delos, pretended a quarrel whose cause he did not disclose and called on the best men among them to serve in an expedition; he led them out as friends and allies, watched for them while they were at their midday meal, surrounded them with his own men, and shot them down with javelins. Because of this deed the Antandrians were afraid that he might at some time do something lawless to them as well; and since he was also laying other burdens on them that they could not bear, they drove his garrison out of their acropolis.

109 Tissaphernes learned of this deed too of the Peloponnesians, in addition to what they had done at Miletus and Cnidus (for there too his garrisons had been driven out). He thought that he had been badly discredited with them and feared that they might do him still further harm; and at the same time he was vexed at the thought that Pharnabazus, having received them in less time and at less expense, would achieve more against the

Athenians. So he resolved to go to them at the Hellespont, to complain of what had been done at Antandrus and to answer the accusations about the Phoenician ships and the rest as plausibly as he could. And arriving first at Ephesus, he offered a sacrifice to Artemis. [When the winter that follows this summer ends, the twenty-first year will be complete.][14]

Notes

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1. The *probouloi*, a board of ten elderly "preliminary councilors" created after the Sicilian disaster (413 BC).

2. Helots who had been freed by the Spartans, often in return for military service.

3. Darius II, King of Persia 424–404 BC. Tissaphernes was satrap of Sardis and the western coastal provinces; Pharnabazus (8.6) held the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia.

4. A reserve of a thousand talents set aside on the Acropolis in 431 BC, to be used only if an enemy fleet attacked Athens (2.24).

5. The *hetaireiai*, private political clubs of upper-class Athenians, bound by oath, which organized support in lawsuits and elections (compare 8.54).

6. The Eumolpidae and Ceryces were the two priestly families of the Eleusinian Mysteries; Alcibiades had been condemned in 415 BC for profaning the Mysteries (6.28, 6.61).

7. The manuscripts have a gap here; some words are lost.

8. The regular democratic Council of Five Hundred, whose members were chosen by lot (literally "by the bean").

9. The Greek of this sentence is corrupt in the manuscripts; the sense given is the one generally accepted.

10. Hyperbolus was ostracized about 417/416 BC; he was the last Athenian to be ostracized.

11. The Greek of this clause is corrupt; the sense given is the one generally accepted.

12. The *peripoloi*, young Athenians who patrolled the borders of Attica.

13. The “fortieth” was a Chian coin; its exact value is uncertain.

14. This bracketed sentence is regarded by editors as a later addition. Thucydides’ *History* breaks off here, unfinished, in the summer of 411 BC; the narrative of the war’s last years was continued by Xenophon in the *Hellenica*.

Colophon

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