IX. The Civil Principality
But coming to the other case, when a private citizen becomes prince of his own country not through crime or other intolerable violence but by the favor of his fellow citizens (what may be called a civil principality, and to attain it requires neither pure ability nor pure fortune, but rather a fortunate cunning), I say that one rises to this principality either by the favor of the people or by the favor of the great. For in every city these two different humors are found, and they arise from this: the people do not want to be commanded or oppressed by the great, and the great want to command and oppress the people. From these two different appetites one of three effects arises in cities: principality, liberty, or license.
A principality is brought about either by the people or by the great, according to which of these parties has the opportunity. For when the great see that they cannot resist the people, they begin to build up the reputation of one of their own and make him prince, so that under his shadow they can satisfy their appetite. The people, too, when they see that they cannot resist the great, build up the reputation of one man and make him prince, so as to be defended by his authority. The one who comes to the principality with the help of the great holds on with more difficulty than the one who becomes prince with the help of the people, because he finds himself a prince surrounded by many who seem to be his equals, and for this reason he can neither command them nor manage them as he likes. But the one who arrives at the principality by popular favor finds himself alone there, and has around him either no one or very few who are not ready to obey. Besides this, one cannot honestly satisfy the great without injury to others, but one can satisfy the people; for the people’s aim is more honest than that of the great, since the great want to oppress and the people want not to be oppressed. Besides, a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because there are too many of them; he can secure himself against the great, because they are few. The worst a prince can expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile great men he must fear not only being abandoned but also their coming against him, because, having more foresight and more cunning, they always get out in time to save themselves, and seek favor with whoever they expect will win. The prince is also obliged always to live with the same people, but he can do very well without the same great men, since he can make and unmake them every day, and give and take away their reputation as he pleases.
To make this part clearer, I say that the great are to be considered chiefly in two ways. Either they conduct themselves in such a way that they bind themselves entirely to your fortune, or they do not. Those who bind themselves and are not rapacious should be honored and loved. Those who do not bind themselves are to be examined in two ways. Either they do this out of faintheartedness and a natural lack of spirit, and then you should make use of them, especially those who give good counsel, because in prosperity they bring you honor and in adversity you have nothing to fear from them. But when they do not bind themselves by design and for ambitious reasons, it is a sign that they are thinking more of themselves than of you; and the prince must guard against such men and fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they will always help to ruin him.
One who becomes prince through the favor of the people, therefore, must keep them friendly to him, which will be easy, since they ask only not to be oppressed. But one who becomes prince against the people with the favor of the great must before everything else try to win the people over, which will be easy if he takes them under his protection. And because men who receive good from someone from whom they expected harm are more bound to their benefactor, the people quickly become better disposed toward him than if he had been brought to the principality by their favor. The prince can win them over in many ways, but because these vary with circumstances, no fixed rule can be given, and so they will be left aside. I will conclude only that a prince must have the people friendly; otherwise he has no remedy in adversity.
Nabis, prince of the Spartans,1 withstood a siege by all of Greece and by a very victorious Roman army, and defended his country and his state against them; and when the danger came, it was enough for him to secure himself against a few. If he had had the people hostile, this would not have been enough. And let no one contest this opinion of mine with that trite proverb, that whoever builds on the people builds on mud. That is true when a private citizen lays his foundation on them and persuades himself that the people will free him if he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates. In that case he could often find himself deceived, like the Gracchi in Rome and Giorgio Scali in Florence.2 But if it is a prince who builds on them, who can command and is a man of heart, who does not lose his nerve in adversity, who does not neglect other preparations, and who keeps the whole people in good spirit with his courage and his institutions, he will never find himself deceived by them, and he will see that he has laid his foundations well.
These principalities are usually in danger when they are about to pass from a civil to an absolute order. For these princes command either by themselves or through magistrates. In the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous, because they depend entirely on the will of the citizens who have been placed in the magistracies, and these men, especially in adverse times, can take the state from them with great ease, either by acting against them or by not obeying them. And in times of danger the prince is too late to seize absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, who are used to receiving their orders from the magistrates, are not ready in those emergencies to obey his; and in uncertain times he will always be short of men he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely on what he sees in quiet times, when the citizens need the state; because then everyone comes running, everyone makes promises, and each one is willing to die for him, when death is far away. But in adverse times, when the state needs its citizens, then few are found. And this test is all the more dangerous in that it can be made only once. So a wise prince must think of a way by which his citizens, always and in every kind of time, will need the state and him; and then they will always be faithful to him.
Notes
1. Nabis, tyrant of Sparta (207–192 BC), held out against the Romans and the Achaean League in 195 BC.
2. The brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Roman tribunes of the people, were killed in 133 and 121 BC. Giorgio Scali, a leader of the popular party in Florence after the Ciompi revolt, was beheaded in 1382 when the people failed to rise for him.