XV. The Things for Which Men, and Especially Princes, Are Praised or Blamed
It remains now to see what the methods and conduct of a prince should be toward his subjects and his friends. And because I know that many have written about this, I fear that I may be thought presumptuous in writing about it too, especially since in discussing this matter I depart from the rules others have laid down. But since my intention is to write something useful for whoever understands it, it has seemed to me more fitting to go after the effectual truth (verità effettuale) of the thing than after what people imagine about it. Many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in reality. For there is such a distance between how one lives and how one ought to live that whoever abandons what is done for what ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation; because a man who wants to make a profession of goodness in everything is bound to come to ruin among so many who are not good. Hence a prince who wants to keep his position must learn to be able not to be good, and to use this and not use it according to necessity.
Leaving aside, then, the things imagined about a prince, and discussing those that are true, I say that all men, when they are spoken of, and princes above all, since they are placed higher, are noted for some of these qualities that bring them either blame or praise. That is, one is held generous, another a miser (to use a Tuscan word, because in our language an avaro is also someone who wants to have things by robbery, while we call misero one who refrains too much from using what is his own); one is held a giver, another rapacious; one cruel, another merciful; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another fierce and spirited; one humane, another proud; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easygoing; one serious, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving; and so on. I know that everyone will admit that it would be a most praiseworthy thing for a prince to be found with all of the qualities listed above that are held to be good. But because he cannot have them all, or observe them fully, since the conditions of human life do not allow it, he must be prudent enough to know how to avoid the infamy of those vices that would take his state from him, and to guard against those that would not, if he can; but if he cannot, he may let them go with less hesitation. And again, he should not mind incurring the infamy of those vices without which it would be difficult for him to save his state; because, if everything is considered well, something will be found that looks like virtue, and following it would be his ruin, and something else that looks like vice, and following it brings about his security and well-being.1
Notes
1. This paragraph is missing from the e-text on which this translation is based; it is translated from the Italian edition of 1814.