XXIII. How Flatterers Are to Be Avoided
I do not want to leave out an important point, an error from which princes defend themselves with difficulty unless they are very prudent or make good choices. This is flatterers, of whom courts are full. For men take such pleasure in their own affairs, and deceive themselves about them so much, that they defend themselves with difficulty against this plague; and in trying to defend themselves against it they run the risk of becoming contemptible. For there is no other way to guard yourself against flattery than to let men understand that they will not offend you by telling you the truth; but when everyone can tell you the truth, you lose their respect. Therefore a prudent prince must take a third way, choosing wise men in his state, and to them alone he must give freedom to speak the truth to him, and only of the things he asks about, and nothing else. But he must ask them about everything, and listen to their opinions, and then decide by himself, in his own way. With these councils, and with each member of them, he must conduct himself so that each one knows that the more freely he speaks, the better he will be received. Apart from these, he must not want to listen to anyone; he must go straight on with what has been decided, and be firm in his decisions. Whoever does otherwise either is ruined by flatterers or changes often because of the variety of opinions, and from this comes his low reputation.
I want to bring forward a modern example on this subject. Father Luca, a man of Maximilian, the present emperor, said of His Majesty that he took counsel with no one and never did anything in his own way.1 This came from his following the opposite course to the one described above. For the emperor is a secretive man; he does not share his plans with anyone or take their advice. But as his plans begin to be known and revealed when he puts them into effect, they begin to be contradicted by those around him, and he, being easily swayed, is talked out of them. Hence the things he does one day he undoes the next; no one ever understands what he wants or plans to do; and no one can rely on his decisions.
A prince, therefore, should always take counsel, but when he wants to, and not when others want him to; on the contrary, he should discourage everyone from advising him about anything unless he asks. But he should be a great asker, and then, about the things he has asked, a patient listener to the truth; indeed, if he learns that someone, out of some scruple, is not telling him the truth, he should be angry. And since many think that a prince who gives the impression of being prudent is held so not because of his own nature but because of the good advisers he has around him, they are undoubtedly deceived. For this is a general rule that never fails: a prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised, unless by chance he should put himself entirely in the hands of a single man who governs him in everything and happens to be very prudent. In that case he may well be well advised, but it would not last long, because that governor would soon take his state from him. But if he takes counsel with more than one, a prince who is not wise will never have unified counsel and will not know how to unify it himself. Each of the counselors will think of his own interests, and he will not know how to correct them or see through them. And they cannot be found to be otherwise, because men will always turn out bad for you unless they are made good by some necessity. So the conclusion is that good counsel, from whomever it comes, must arise from the prudence of the prince, and not the prudence of the prince from good counsel.
Notes
1. Luca Rinaldi, a priest and envoy of the emperor Maximilian I (reigned 1493–1519). Machiavelli knew the emperor’s court from his mission to Germany in 1507–8.