XIX. Avoiding Contempt and Hatred
But since I have spoken of the most important of the qualities mentioned above, I want to discuss the others briefly under this general heading: that the prince should think, as has been partly said above, of avoiding the things that make him hated and contemptible. Whenever he avoids this, he will have done his part, and will find no danger in other infamies. What makes him hated above all, as I said, is being rapacious and seizing the property and the women of his subjects, from which he must abstain. Whenever the generality of men are deprived of neither property nor honor, they live content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, which can be curbed in many ways and with ease. What makes him contemptible is being held changeable, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, and irresolute. A prince must guard against this as against a reef, and contrive that greatness, spirit, gravity, and strength be recognized in his actions; and in the private dealings of his subjects he should insist that his judgment be irrevocable, and maintain such an opinion of himself that no one thinks of deceiving him or getting around him.
The prince who gives this opinion of himself is highly esteemed; and it is difficult to conspire against one who is esteemed, and difficult to attack him, provided he is understood to be excellent and revered by his own people. For a prince must have two fears: one within, on account of his subjects; the other without, on account of foreign powers. From the latter he defends himself with good arms and good friends; and if he has good arms, he will always have good friends. And things inside will always be steady when things outside are steady, unless they have already been disturbed by a conspiracy; and even if things outside should be stirred up, if he has organized himself and lived as I have said, and does not give up, he will always withstand every assault, as I said that Nabis the Spartan did. But as for his subjects, when things outside are not stirring, he has to fear that they may conspire in secret. Against this the prince secures himself well by avoiding being hated or despised and keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is necessary to achieve, as was said at length above. And one of the most powerful remedies a prince has against conspiracies is not to be hated by the people at large. For whoever conspires always believes that he will satisfy the people by killing the prince; but when he believes he will offend them, he does not take heart to adopt such a course, because the difficulties on the side of conspirators are countless. Experience shows that there have been many conspiracies and few have ended well. For whoever conspires cannot be alone, nor can he take as companions anyone but those he believes to be discontented; and as soon as you have revealed your mind to a malcontent, you give him the means to content himself, because he can obviously hope for every advantage from it. So that, seeing a sure gain on one side, and on the other a doubtful one full of danger, he must indeed be a rare friend, or else a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you. And to reduce the matter to brief terms, I say that on the side of the conspirator there is nothing but fear, jealousy, and the dread of punishment that terrifies him; but on the side of the prince there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, and the protection of his friends and of the state to defend him. So that, when the goodwill of the people is added to all these things, it is impossible that anyone should be so rash as to conspire. For ordinarily, where a conspirator has to fear before carrying out his crime, in this case he must also fear afterward, having the people as his enemy once the deed is done, and being unable for this reason to hope for any refuge.
Of this matter one could give countless examples, but I want to be content with only one, which happened within the memory of our fathers. Annibale Bentivoglio, prince in Bologna and grandfather of the present Annibale, was killed by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, and no one of his family was left but Giovanni, who was in swaddling clothes. Immediately after the murder the people rose up and killed all the Canneschi. This came from the popular goodwill that the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those times, which was so great that, since no one of that house remained in Bologna who could govern the state after Annibale’s death, and since there was word that in Florence there was one born of the Bentivoglio who until then had been thought the son of a blacksmith, the Bolognese came to Florence for him and gave him the government of their city. And it was governed by him until Giovanni came of an age fit to govern.1
I conclude, therefore, that a prince should take little account of conspiracies when the people are well disposed toward him; but when they are hostile and hate him, he must fear everything and everyone. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care not to drive the great to desperation and to satisfy the people and keep them content; for this is one of the most important matters a prince has to deal with.
Among the well-ordered and well-governed kingdoms of our times is that of France, and in it are found countless good institutions on which the liberty and security of the king depend. The first of these is the parlement and its authority.2 For the one who organized that kingdom knew the ambition of the powerful and their insolence, and judged that they needed a bit in their mouths to correct them; on the other hand, he knew the hatred of the people at large for the great, founded on fear, and wanted to secure them. He did not want this to be the particular charge of the king, so as to spare him the resentment he might incur with the great by favoring the people, and with the people by favoring the great. So he set up a third judge, to beat down the great and favor the lesser without any burden to the king. No institution could be better or more prudent than this, or a greater cause of the security of the king and the kingdom. From this another notable thing can be drawn: that princes should have others administer the things that bring blame, and keep for themselves the things that bring favor. Again I conclude that a prince should esteem the great but not make himself hated by the people.
It may perhaps seem to many, considering the life and death of some Roman emperors, that they are examples contrary to this opinion of mine, since some who always lived nobly and showed great strength of spirit nevertheless lost the empire, or were killed by their own men, who conspired against them. Wanting to answer these objections, then, I will discuss the qualities of some emperors, showing that the causes of their ruin are not different from those I have put forward; and in part I will bring forward the things worth noting for anyone who reads of the actions of those times. And I want it to be enough to take all the emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus the philosopher to Maximinus: they were Marcus, his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus, his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.3 And it should first be noted that where in other principalities one has only to contend with the ambition of the great and the insolence of the people, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty: they had to put up with the cruelty and greed of the soldiers. This was so difficult that it was the cause of the ruin of many, since it was difficult to satisfy both the soldiers and the people. For the people loved quiet, and for this reason loved modest princes, while the soldiers loved a prince of military spirit who was insolent, cruel, and rapacious; and they wanted him to practice these things on the people, so that they could have double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty. As a result, those emperors who by nature or by art did not have a great enough reputation to hold both in check always came to ruin. And most of them, especially those who came to the principality as new men, recognizing the difficulty of these two different humors, turned to satisfying the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. This course was necessary; for since princes cannot avoid being hated by someone, they must first try not to be hated by the whole community; and when they cannot achieve this, they must contrive with every effort to avoid the hatred of the most powerful group. And so those emperors who, being new, needed extraordinary support, attached themselves to the soldiers rather than to the people; and this nevertheless turned out to be useful to them or not, according to whether the prince knew how to keep his reputation with them. From the causes mentioned above it came about that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, all of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, humane and kindly, all came to a bad end except Marcus. Marcus alone lived and died in the greatest honor, because he succeeded to the empire by hereditary right and did not owe it to either the soldiers or the people; and then, since he was endowed with many virtues that made him venerated, he always kept both orders within their bounds while he lived, and was never hated or despised. But Pertinax was made emperor against the will of the soldiers, who, being used to living licentiously under Commodus, could not bear the honest life to which Pertinax wanted to bring them back. So, having made himself hated, and with contempt added to this hatred because he was old, he was ruined at the very beginning of his reign.
And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired through good works as well as through wicked ones; and so, as I said above, a prince who wants to keep his state is often forced not to be good. For when that body, whether the people or the soldiers or the great, whose support you judge you need to keep your position, is corrupt, you must follow its humor to satisfy it, and then good works are your enemies. But let us come to Alexander, who was so good that among the other praises given him is this: that in the fourteen years he held the empire, no one was ever put to death by him without trial. Nevertheless, since he was held effeminate, and a man who let himself be governed by his mother, and had come into contempt for this, the army conspired against him and killed him.
Now, discussing by contrast the qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them extremely cruel and rapacious. To satisfy the soldiers they did not spare any kind of injury that could be inflicted on the people; and all of them except Severus came to a bad end. For in Severus there was so much ability that, keeping the soldiers friendly, though the people were oppressed by him, he was always able to reign successfully; because his abilities made him so admirable in the sight of the soldiers and the people that the people remained in a way astonished and stupefied, and the soldiers reverent and satisfied. And because this man’s actions were great for a new prince, I want to show briefly how well he knew how to use the persons of the fox and the lion, the natures I say above a prince must imitate. Knowing the sloth of the emperor Julian, Severus persuaded the army he commanded in Slavonia that it would be good to go to Rome to avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the Praetorian soldiers. Under this pretext, without showing that he aspired to the empire, he moved his army against Rome, and was in Italy before his departure was known. When he arrived in Rome, the Senate, out of fear, elected him emperor, and Julian was killed. After this beginning, two difficulties remained for Severus if he wanted to make himself master of the whole state: one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asian armies, had had himself proclaimed emperor; and the other in the west, where Albinus also aspired to the empire. And because he judged it dangerous to reveal himself as the enemy of both, he decided to attack Niger and deceive Albinus. He wrote to Albinus that, having been elected emperor by the Senate, he wanted to share that dignity with him; he sent him the title of Caesar and, by decree of the Senate, made him his colleague; and Albinus accepted these things as genuine. But after Severus had defeated and killed Niger and pacified the East, he returned to Rome and complained in the Senate that Albinus, ungrateful for the benefits he had received from him, had treacherously sought to kill him, and that for this reason he was obliged to go and punish his ingratitude. Then he went to find him in France and took from him his state and his life.
Whoever examines this man’s actions closely, then, will find him a very fierce lion and a very cunning fox, and will see that he was feared and revered by everyone and not hated by the armies; and he will not be surprised that he, a new man, could hold so great an empire, because his very great reputation always protected him from the hatred the people might have conceived for his plundering. But Antoninus his son was also a man with most excellent qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and welcome to the soldiers; for he was a military man, able to endure every hardship, contemptuous of all delicate food and every other softness, which made all the armies love him. Nevertheless his ferocity and cruelty were so great and so unheard of (after countless individual killings he put to death a large part of the people of Rome and all the people of Alexandria) that he became extremely hateful to the whole world, and began to be feared even by those around him; so that he was killed by a centurion in the midst of his army. Here it should be noted that deaths like this, which follow from the deliberate resolve of an obstinate mind, cannot be avoided by princes, because anyone who does not care about dying can harm a prince; but the prince should fear them less, because they are very rare. He must only take care not to do grave injury to any of those he employs and has around him in the service of his principality, as Antoninus had done. He had shamefully put to death a brother of that centurion and threatened the centurion himself every day, yet kept him in his bodyguard; this was a rash course and one bound to ruin him, as it did.
But let us come to Commodus, for whom it was very easy to hold the empire, since he had it by hereditary right, being the son of Marcus. It would have been enough for him to follow in his father’s footsteps, and he would have satisfied both the soldiers and the people. But being of a cruel and bestial spirit, he set about indulging the armies and making them licentious, so as to be able to practice his rapacity on the people. On the other hand, not keeping up his dignity, often going down into the arenas to fight with gladiators, and doing other very base things little worthy of the imperial majesty, he became contemptible in the sight of the soldiers. And being hated on one side and despised on the other, he was conspired against and killed.
It remains for us to describe the qualities of Maximinus. He was a very warlike man; and since the armies were annoyed by the softness of Alexander, of whom I spoke above, when Alexander was dead they elected Maximinus to the empire. He did not hold it for long, because two things made him hated and contemptible. One was his very base origin, since he had once herded sheep in Thrace, which was known everywhere and brought him great disdain in everyone’s eyes. The other was that at the beginning of his reign he had put off going to Rome to take possession of the imperial seat, and had given the opinion of himself that he was very cruel, having had his prefects commit many cruelties in Rome and everywhere in the empire. So the whole world was stirred, with indignation at the baseness of his blood and with hatred out of fear of his ferocity; first Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him. To this was added his own army, which, besieging Aquileia and finding it difficult to take, and annoyed by his cruelty, and fearing him less when it saw how many enemies he had, killed him.
I do not want to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will come to the conclusion of this discussion. I say that the princes of our times have less of this difficulty of satisfying their soldiers by extraordinary means in their governments. For although one must give them some consideration, the matter is quickly resolved, since none of these princes has armies that have grown old together with the government and administration of provinces, as the armies of the Roman Empire had. So if at that time it was necessary to satisfy the soldiers more than the people, it was because the soldiers could do more than the people; now it is more necessary for all princes, except the Turk and the Sultan, to satisfy the people than the soldiers, because the people can do more than the soldiers. I except the Turk because he always keeps around him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, on whom the security and strength of his kingdom depend; and that lord must keep them friendly, putting every other consideration aside. Similarly, since the kingdom of the Sultan is entirely in the hands of the soldiers, he too must keep them friendly without regard for the people.4 And you must note that this state of the Sultan is unlike all other principalities, because it is similar to the Christian pontificate, which can be called neither a hereditary principality nor a new principality. For it is not the sons of the old prince who are the heirs and remain lords, but the one who is elected to that rank by those who have the authority. And since this order is ancient, it cannot be called a new principality, because none of the difficulties of new principalities are found in it; for although the prince is new, the institutions of that state are old and organized to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord.
But let us return to our subject. I say that whoever considers the discussion above will see that either hatred or contempt was the cause of the ruin of the emperors named, and will also see how it came about that, though some of them proceeded in one way and some in the opposite, in either group one had a happy end and the others an unhappy one. For to Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, it was useless and harmful to want to imitate Marcus, who held the principality by hereditary right; and similarly to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus it was ruinous to imitate Severus, since they did not have enough ability to follow in his footsteps. Therefore a new prince in a new principality cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor again is it necessary to follow those of Severus; but he should take from Severus those parts that are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those that are fitting and glorious for preserving a state that is already established and firm.
Notes
1. Annibale Bentivoglio was murdered in 1445. The young man brought from Florence was Santi Bentivoglio, who governed Bologna from 1446 until his death in 1463; Giovanni II Bentivoglio then ruled until Julius II drove him out in 1506.
2. The parlement of Paris, the supreme court of the kingdom, not a representative assembly.
3. The emperors from Marcus Aurelius to Maximinus Thrax, AD 161–238. Machiavelli follows the Greek historian Herodian. Julian is Didius Julianus (193); Alexander is Severus Alexander (222–35).
4. The Mamluk sultan of Egypt, chosen from and by the slave-soldier caste. The Mamluk state fell to the Ottomans in 1517.